



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
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
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
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
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1861.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF SECESSION.*

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THE doctrine of secession was defended prior to the Civil War as both a legal and sovereign right.† In support of the legal right of secession were cited the provisions of the Tenth Amendment declaring that the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively or to the people. From this the conclusion was drawn that, since no power had been conferred upon the National Government to forbid secession and no prohibition had been imposed upon the right of the States to secede, the right of withdrawal remained as a reserved power. But the answer made to this argument was that the whole history of the adoption of the Tenth Amendment clearly showed that its authors had in mind a reservation to the States of the right of local government, and not the right of secession.

The theory on which secession was defended as a sovereign right was that the Union was a confederation of independent and sovereign States united by articles of agreement resembling an international compact or convention. Each member of the confederation, being a sovereignty in itself, was not legally bound by the articles of union and was at liberty to withdraw at will. In becoming a party to the compact each State had voluntarily delegated certain powers to the Federal Government and had retained the right to resume the powers thus granted whenever it saw fit, several of them (notably Virginia, New York and Rhode Island) having made express reservations of this kind in their acts of ratification.

To ascertain whether the right of secession was constitutionally justified, it is necessary to inquire into the nature of the Federal Union and, particularly, into the relations subsisting between it and the several States composing it. The exponents of the right of secession maintained, in the

* Prepared for this History by James Wilford Garner, Professor of Political Science, University of Illinois.

† Burgess, *The Civil War and the Constitution*, vol. i., p. 75.

first place, that the Union (as has been said) was the creation of the several States acting as independent sovereignties and that the Constitution was an international compact rather than the organic law of a National State. If the correctness of this view of the nature of the Constitution and the Union be conceded, the right of secession followed as a logical necessity. Secondly, it was argued that, even if it be granted that the States were independent sovereignties at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, they surrendered their sovereignty when they entered the Union, and with it the right of withdrawal therefrom. In other words, while the States may have been sovereign at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, they did not remain so thereafter. In the third place, the view was propounded that the constituent members of the Union were never separately sovereign—at least not in 1789, when they created the Union.

This view has the support of such distinguished constitutional writers as Story, Pomeroy, Von Holst, and Burgess. They all maintain, to start with, that the dependence upon England was thrown off by the united action of the colonies and that the Declaration of Independence was a result of their joint action, not of the States acting separately and independently. The Declaration itself avows that it was made by the "Representatives of the United States," that is, of the States in their joint and

united capacity.* The colonies did not, says Judge Story, act severally for themselves and proclaim their own independence; the declaration was the united act of all for the benefit of the whole—a National act by the sovereign and paramount authority of the people at large. The people therefore were a nation before the Confederation of 1781 was formed; and, unless the establishment of the Confederation destroyed their National character, the States were never sovereign. Pomeroy expressed the view enunciated by Judge Story. From the first moment of independence, he says, the colonies acted as a unit. The Declaration of Independence was not the result of the colonies acting separately, but of all acting together through their representatives in Congress.† There was never, says he, a moment's interval when the several States were each independent and sovereign. As colonies they unitedly resisted Great Britain, revolted, and declared their independence, after which they ceased to be thirteen communities, but were a political unit—a Nation, possessing the highest attributes of sovereignty.‡ From the moment of the meeting of the first Continental Congress, says Burgess, there was something more on this side of the Atlantic than thirteen local governments. There was a sovereignty—a State—not an idea simply

* Story, *Commentaries*, vol. i., sec. 210.

† Pomeroy, *Constitutional Law*, sec. 52.

‡ *Ibid.*, sec. 54.

or a thing on paper, but an organization in fact.* This was also the view of Lincoln, who went even further and declared that the Union was older than any of the States and that it in fact created them. Originally, he said, some colonies made the Union, and it, in turn, threw off their old dependence upon the Mother Country for them and made them States such as they are.

Down to the time of the Declaration of Independence, says Von Holst, the individual colonies considered themselves as legally dependent upon England and did not take a single step which could have placed them before the Mother Country or the world in the light of sovereign States. They remained colonies until the "representatives of the United States," in the name of the good people of the colonies, solemnly declared these "United Colonies" to be free and independent States—not independent of each other, but independent, in their united capacity, of Great Britain. The separation from England was the joint act of one people, and the Declaration was the act of one people. The doctrine of Calhoun and others that the separation from England rendered the colonies completely independent of one another because they were not dependent upon the Mother Country as colonies was a logical abstraction, says Von Holst.† As a

matter of fact, after the proclamation of independence, the States did not take the initiative in setting up governments of their own until Congress had so recommended, thus indicating that the Union already existed. Patrick Henry even went so far as to say that the separation from England had destroyed the landmarks and boundaries of the several colonies, and with it the distinction between Pennsylvanians, New Yorkers, and New Englanders. "I am no longer a Virginian," he said, "but an American—all distinctions are thrown down, all America is thrown into one mass."*

But granting the correctness of the view that the States constituted a single political unity after the separation from England, did they remain such after the establishment of the Confederation in 1781 and were they such at the time of the adoption of the Constitution? Article II. of the Confederation expressly declared that "each state retains its sovereignty, freedom and independence and every power, jurisdiction and right which is not by this confederation expressly delegated to the United States in Congress assembled." Article III. left no doubt of the nature of the Union in 1781 by declaring it to be a "firm league of friendship among the states" for purposes of common defence, the security of their liberties and the general welfare. Though the States may not have been non-sover-

* Burgess, *Political Science and Constitutional Law*, vol. i., p. 100.

† *Constitutional History of the United States*, vol. i., p. 6.

* Wirt, *Life of Patrick Henry*, pp. 124-125.

eign prior to this act, it is beyond dispute that they were sovereign after it.

Those who maintain that the States became united in 1775-1776 and thereby lost their separate and individual sovereignty, have found difficulty in explaining the status of the States during the period of the Confederation (1781-1789). The explanation commonly given is that the individual sovereignty which they undoubtedly enjoyed during this period was not legitimate, but usurped, and that the establishment of the Confederation, nationally speaking, was a step backward—a view far from satisfactory, because it is virtually begging the question.* Regarding the general proposition that the effect of the separation from Great Britain was to merge the thirteen colonies into a single sovereignty, we may observe that, however it may accord with sound public policy, such a view is wholly at variance with the natural interpretation of the facts as well as with contemporary opinion. Mere concert of action among a number of revolted colonies in the prosecution of a foreign war is not sufficient in itself to constitute a State out of the colonies so acting together.† In the

absence of formal constitutional arrangements providing for their consolidation, they remain, constitutionally speaking, disunited, and this, we believe, was the true status of the American States after 1776. This was the view almost universally entertained in America at the time. It was the view also of the Supreme Court and was conceded by Madison, Hamilton, Webster, and other opponents of secession.* But, even though the States were individually sovereign at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, does it necessarily follow that the Union was merely a confederation, the Constitution a mere compact, and secession a logical constitutional right? Does it follow that because the political machinery and organs of the States were employed in ratifying the Constitution, it was any the less the act of the people of the United States? It was doubtless out of considerations of convenience that the Constitution was referred to the legislatures of the States and by them submitted to ratifying conventions, instead of being submitted directly to the voters themselves. Although the majority of thinking men of the time probably re-

* John Quincy Adams asked, "Where did each state get the sovereignty which the Articles of the Confederation declared that they retained? Not from the people of the whole union or the people of the states." He concluded therefore that there was no authority for such a declaration.

† Cf. Willoughby, *The American Constitutional System*, p. 17.

* The Supreme Court expressed the opinion in *McIlvaine vs. Cox* (2 Pet. 86) that in October of 1776 New Jersey was a completely sovereign State. See also *Ware and Hylton* (3 Dall. 199) and *Gibbons vs. Ogden* (9 Wheat.) where Chief Justice Marshall said that prior to the establishment of the Union the States were completely sovereign and independent and were connected with each other by a league. Compare, too, *Curtis, History of the Constitution*, vol. i., p. 142.

garded the Constitution as a compact between the States, they nevertheless believed at the same time that they were creating something quite different from the league under which they were then living and from the intolerable evils from which they were seeking to escape.* They believed that they were creating a National State under which no right of nullification or secession was reserved to the constituent political units of which it was comprised.† They neither believed that the new state which they were creating was completely sovereign or that the component members were fully sovereign. With the imperfect notions then prevalent in regard to the nature of sovereignty, they believed that sovereignty was capable of division and that, in fact, it was divided between the States on the one hand and the Union on the other. In short, both were partly sovereign and partly non-sovereign, so that while a legally indissoluble Union was being created, the entire sovereignty of the States was not being sacrificed. We know now that sovereignty is a unit and cannot be divided, and that the founders of the Republic had deceived themselves in believing that they had

constructed a system in which there was such a division. When this fact became clear, the advocates of secession were compelled to reject the theory of a divided sovereignty and take the position that sovereignty in the Federal system remained in the States, and with it consequently the right to withdraw from the Union. This view was enunciated by Tucker in his edition of Blackstone published in 1803, where he declared that each component member of the Union was still a perfect State, still sovereign, still independent, and still capable of resuming, when necessary, the exercise of its functions, as such, in the most unlimited extent. Twenty years later the same view was advanced by Judge Rawle of Pennsylvania in his work on the Constitution, where he declared that "The states may wholly withdraw from the Union, but while they continue they must retain the character of representative republics." This doctrine was further elaborated by Calhoun in his Fort Hill address of 1831, in which he said:

"The great and leading principle is that the general government emanated from the people of the several states, forming distinct political communities, and acting in their several and sovereign capacity, and not from all of the people forming one aggregate political community; that the constitution of the United States is in fact a compact, to which each state is a party, in the character already described; and that the several states, or parties, have a right to judge of its infractions, and in case of a deliberate, palpable and dangerous exercise of power not delegated, they have the right in the last resort, to use the language of the Virginia Resolutions, 'to interpose for arresting the progress of the evil, and

* A. H. Stephens, however, expresses a contrary opinion. There was nothing in the proceedings of the convention or upon the face of the Constitution, he says, (*War Between the States*, vol. i., p. 14.) which shows either expressly or by implication that any change in the character of the existing union was intended or, in fact, effected.

† Willoughby, *The American Constitutional System*, p. 23.

for maintaining within their respective limits, the authorities, rights and liberties appertaining to them.'"

In the Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 and 1799 it was asserted that, whenever the general Government assumes undelegated powers, its acts are unauthoritative, void and of no force; that the Government created by the Constitution was a compact; and that it was not the exclusive or final judge of the extent of the powers delegated to it, but that the power belonged to the parties (the States) to judge for themselves as well of the infractions as of the mode and measure of redress. This was not, however, an assertion of the right of secession, but of nullification—that is, the right of a State to remain in the Union and refuse to be bound by an act of the National Government whenever in the judgment of the aggrieved State such an act was not warranted by the Constitution. The Virginia Resolutions of 1799 went further and asserted it to be the right and duty of the States in case of deliberate, palpable and dangerous exercise of powers not granted to the Federal Government to interpose for arresting the progress of the evil.

The "right of interposition" thus asserted, said Calhoun in his *South Carolina Exposition*, "call it what you will—state right, veto, nullification or any other name, was the fundamental principle of our system resting upon facts historically as certain as our revolution itself and deductions

as simple and as demonstrative as that of any political or moral truth whatever." As a practical remedy, however, Calhoun did not approve of nullification. He planted himself squarely on the doctrine of the sovereignty of the States and advocated withdrawal from the Union, whenever their grievances could not be otherwise redressed.*

The constitutional right of secession was first publicly and emphatically asserted in Congress by Josiah Quincy, of Massachusetts, in 1811, in the course of a debate on the proposed admission of Louisiana to the Union. "It is my deliberate opinion," he said, "that if this bill passes, the bonds of the Union are virtually dissolved; that the states which compose it are free from their moral obligations; and that as it will be the right of all so it will be the duty of some, to prepare definitely for a separation, amicably if they can, violently if they must." At the time of the admission of Texas to the Union threats of secession were made in New England, and the argument was again repeated that the Constitution was made for the original States and that the admission of new States against the will of the old would justify their withdrawal. Thereafter the right of secession was rarely asserted outside the South. The act of 1850 for admitting California with a constitution forbidding slavery brought up the question again.

* Cf. Von Holst, *Constitutional History of the United States*, vol. i., p. 475.

The Nashville Convention in June of 1850 adopted a resolution declaring that the slaveholding States could not and would not submit to the enactment by Congress of any law imposing onerous conditions or restraints upon the right of slaveholders to take their slaves into the Territories, and at a second meeting held in November of the same year, after the admission of California, it adopted a resolution declaring the Union to be a union of equal and independent sovereignties, and that the powers delegated to the Federal Government might be resumed by the several States whenever it might seem to them proper and necessary. This right was asserted by conventions in several of the Southern States in 1850 and 1851, but the attempt to carry it out was not made until after the election of Lincoln in 1860.

The threatened secession of South Carolina and other slave States in 1860 squarely raised the question of whether a State might legally secede without resisting the laws of the United States and whether there was any power in the National Government to prevent its doing so. President Buchanan sought the advice of his Attorney-General, Mr. Black, who replied that the President might take such measures as he deemed necessary to protect the public property of the United States in any State which might secede, and that he might lawfully employ the army, the navy and the militia to aid the civil officers of

the United States in such States in the enforcement of the laws, provided there were any longer such officers remaining there. If, however, there were no Federal courts or marshals in such States and no officers could be found to take the places of those who had resigned (which was then the case in South Carolina), his power was at an end. To send the military forces into such a State to enforce the laws would be tantamount to making war upon the State, a thing which neither the President nor Congress had any constitutional power to do. With this advice to guide him, the President sent his annual message to Congress declaring that, while in his opinion no State had a constitutional right to withdraw from the Union, the Government of the United States had no lawful right to prevent it from doing so. No such prerogative had been conferred upon either the President or Congress, whose powers were specifically enumerated in the Constitution; and the power to prevent the withdrawal of a State was manifestly not one of those so delegated. The exercise of such authority would involve the use of force and would be interpreted by the State against which it was directed as a declaration of war and a dissolution of all previous compacts by which it was bound. The coercion of a State by military force for any purpose, he said, was at variance with the whole spirit and intent of the Constitution. A proposition made in the Constitutional Convention of 1787 to

authorize the use of force against a delinquent State was, he pointed out, strongly opposed by Madison and was abandoned after full consideration. It is evident from a reading of President Buchanan's message that he entirely confused the power of the United States to coerce a recalcitrant State—a power which it surely possesses—with its right to enforce the laws of the United States wherever they are applicable, and to use the armed force whenever it may be necessary to accomplish this end—a power which it undoubtedly possesses. Even the most strenuous opponent of secession would probably not have defended the right to apply coercion against the State as a corporate political entity. But the power to proceed against its citizens for violating the laws and to protect the public property was a very different thing, for the President is bound by oath to see that the laws are faithfully executed.

President Lincoln in his inaugural address practically agreed with President Buchanan that the Federal government had no power to wage war against a State, as such, or to proceed against it by way of Federal execution, but he denied that, because it could not coerce a State, it could not defend the public property against attack or compel obedience to its laws by those subject to its jurisdiction. The Union, he said, was sovereign and

it was intended to be perpetual, from which it followed that no State upon its mere motion could lawfully get out of the Union; that resolves and ordinances to that effect were legally void; and that acts of violence within any State or States against the authority of the United States were insurrectionary or revolutionary according to circumstances. At the same time he announced his determination to hold, occupy and possess the property and places belonging to the Government of the United States and to collect the duties and imposts everywhere. Further than that he did not purpose to go. No attempt was to be made to coerce any State as such, but only to compel obedience to the laws; and in his call for the militia it was stated that their services were to be employed in overcoming the resistance to the laws by combinations of persons too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings.

The result of the war established this idea of the nature of the Union and of the relations between it and the States. The view was also sanctioned by the Supreme Court,* which held that the United States was an indestructible Union of indestructible States; that the ordinances of secession and all acts of the State legislatures to give effect to them were void and of no effect; that the obligations

* *Texas vs. White* (7 Wall. 726). See also *Keith vs. Clark* (97 U. S. 454).

of the States and of every citizen remained perfect and unimpaired throughout the war and that the

States, as such, never ceased to exist, notwithstanding their ordinances of secession.*

CHAPTER XIV.

1861.

THE ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF SLAVERY.†

The economic basis of slavery — England's sanction of slavery in colonial times — Abrogation of restriction on the colonial slave trade by the English crown — The far-reaching influence of British efforts to make colonies a slave mart — Attitude of the Revolutionary leaders on slavery — The economic weakness of slavery — Its temporary decline at the close of the Eighteenth century — Its promotion by cotton and the cotton-gin — Advantages and disadvantages of slave labor — Prevailing rates of slaves in Richmond in 1853 — Inherent defects of the slavery system.

Although slavery is primarily a legal or civil condition, it is at bottom also an economic institution. Its introduction into America was determined wholly by economic conditions, and it was the desire for monetary gain that caused its spread throughout the South and created a demand for its perpetuation as a permanent part of the economic system wherever it gained a foothold. In the Seventeenth and Eighteenth centuries the importation of slaves into America was encouraged and promoted by both the crown and Parliament of England, mainly for economic considerations. In 1662 the "Company of Royal Adventurers Trading to Africa" was chartered by Charles II., and successive English sovereigns were stockholders in this company as well as in its successor, the Royal Assiento. The king issued a proclamation inviting his subjects to engage in the slave trade; and, to encourage migration to

America, he offered a grant of 100 acres of land for each four slaves that should be employed in the cultivation of the same.‡ The economic importance attached to the slave trade found expression in a provision of the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) by the terms of which England was given the monopoly of supplying the Spanish

* Besides the works previously mentioned, see in this respect: James G. Blaine, *Twenty Years of Congress*, vol. i., chap. x.; J. L. M. Curry, *The Southern States of the American Union*, chap. x.; G. T. Curtis, *Constitutional History*, vol. ii., chap. x.; Jefferson Davis, *Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government*, vol. i., pp. 70-77, 168-192; H. Von Holst, *Constitutional and Political History of the United States*, vol. i.; J. C. Hurd, *Theory of Our National Existence*; E. P. Powell, *Nullification and Secession*; A. H. Stephens, *War between the States*, vol. i., pp. 477-522; J. R. Tucker, *The Constitution*, vol. i., pp. 338-348; vol. ii., pp. 588-597; *The South in the Building of the Nation*, vol. iv., pp. 442-486.

† Prepared for this History by James Wilford Garner, Professor of Political Science, University of Illinois.

‡ See Judah P. Benjamin's speech in the Senate, in Clusky, *Political Text Book*, p. 558.

American colonies with negro slaves, and so great were the profits expected from this monopoly that Queen Anne reserved for herself one-quarter of the stock of the company formed to carry on the traffic.

Parliament on one occasion went so far as to declare that the slave trade was "highly beneficial and advantageous to this kingdom and to the plantations and colonies thereto belonging," and then enacted a law permitting private ships to enter the trade on the payment of 10 per cent. duty on English goods exported to Africa.* Again, in 1708, the Commons resolved that "the trade was important, and ought to be free and open to all the Queen's subjects trading from Great Britain." This action was taken in response to the complaints of the London merchants that their trade to the African coasts was hampered by the restrictions of the royal monopoly which confined the trade to the king's favorites. Finally, in the twenty-third year of the reign of George II., Parliament threw the slave trade open to all British subjects and again declared that it was highly advantageous both to Great Britain and the American colonies, and should be encouraged by every possible means. Henceforth it was the avowed policy of the British government to promote the transportation of slaves to America and to discourage all colonial restrictions upon the importation of negroes thereinto.

* Spears, *The American Slave Trade*, p. 16.

An act passed by the colonial Assembly of South Carolina in 1760 prohibiting the further importation of slaves into the colony was abrogated by the crown, the governor being reprimanded for signing it and circular letters being sent to all the colonial governors warning them to discountenance all such legislation in the future. A similar act of the Virginia Assembly imposing a high duty on imported slaves was vetoed, while the governor was instructed not to assent to any law in the future discontinuing or restricting the importation of slaves—an act against which Virginia made a respectful but strong remonstrance. As late as 1775 (after the Revolution had begun) the Earl of Dartmouth informed an agent of the colonies that "we cannot allow the colonies to check or discourage in any degree a traffic so beneficial to the nation."

Thus the institution of slavery was forced upon the colonies against their will, and their repeated efforts to check the slave traffic were nullified by the English government on the ground that it was an economic benefit to both the Mother Country and the colonies. It is estimated that, down to the outbreak of the Revolution, no fewer than 300,000 slaves had been brought into the colonies and that the number constituted one-fifth of the total population—a proportion larger than obtained ever after.* Besides, nearly

* Rhodes, *History of the United States*, vol. i., p. 11.

3,000,000 negroes had been carried to the West Indies and other English colonies. The determined policy of the British government to make America a slave mart was boldly declared by Burke to have been one of the causes of the breach with England, and it is well known that in the original draft of the Declaration of Independence one of the indictments against the king was that "he has waged cruel war against human nature itself, violating its most sacred rights of life and liberty in the persons of a distant people who never offended him, capturing and carrying them into slavery in another hemisphere, or to incur miserable death in the transportation thither. Determined to keep open a market where men should be bought and sold, he has prostituted his negative for suppressing every legislative attempt to prohibit or restrain this execrable commerce."

Although this resolution probably represented the prevailing sentiment in America as a whole, it was struck out in deference to the views of South Carolina and Georgia, which States no longer desired to see the importation of negroes restricted.* At the time of the Revolution many of the foremost leaders of America, including Washington, Jefferson, Randolph, Henry, Franklin, Mason, and others, not only favored the abolition of the slave trade, but desired to see the adoption of measures toward the

gradual extinction of slavery itself. The economic weakness of slavery was early perceived by many of the slaveholders themselves, agreeing with Mason when he declared in the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 that "slavery discourages arts and manufactures," as well as "brings the judgment of heaven" upon the country which permits it. Before the close of the Eighteenth century the principal staple crops of the country in the production of which slave labor was extensively utilized were tobacco, rice, and indigo. In the North, where cereal crops were the principal staple, for the cultivation of which slave labor was less adapted, slavery declined, and before the end of the century it had been abolished in all of the Northern States. The motive which led to the abolition of slavery in the North was quite as much economic as humanitarian, and there is no reason to believe that, had economic conditions in the Northern States been as favorable to the employment of slave labor as they were in the South, the abolition movement in that part of the country could not have spread as it did. It is well known that moral scruples did not prevent the New England merchants from engaging actively in the slave trade; throughout the Eighteenth century they were, in fact, the principal carriers of negroes to the Southern colonies and to the West Indies. New England ships which traded to Europe were accustomed to touch on the return voyage at the Guinea coast, take

* Schouler, *Life of Jefferson*, p. 81.

on a cargo of negroes, and dispose of them in the West Indies or the Southern colonies of America—a traffic in which Rhode Island led the rest of the New England States.*

While slave labor was well adapted to the production of tobacco, rice, and indigo, the first-mentioned staple could be cultivated almost as well by free help; and the commercial demand for rice and indigo and the comparatively limited area in which they could be successfully grown, rendered an extensive system of slave labor in the production of these staples unnecessary. These facts, together with the decline in the price of rice and indigo after the Revolution, helped to render those industries more insignificant; and this was chiefly responsible for the decline of slavery in many parts of the South at the close of the Eighteenth century. Before 1796 not fewer than five of the Southern States had forbidden the further importation of slaves, and a strong sentiment was growing up in favor of gradual abolition. A representative of Georgia in the Fifth Congress declared: "There is not a man in Georgia but wishes there were no slaves; they are a curse to the country." The unprofitableness of slave labor during this period

had also resulted in a fall in the price of slaves, the best of them in 1790 bringing only \$200 each.

At this juncture the movement toward the abolition of slavery in the South received a set-back through the invention of the cotton-gin, an invention which enormously increased the economic value of slave labor and greatly stimulated the demand for slaves. Before the Revolution, comparatively little attention had been bestowed on the production of cotton owing to trade restrictions which closed foreign markets to the American supply, to British legislation forbidding the manufacture of cotton goods in the colonies, and to the lack of mechanical processes for separating the seed from the lint. With the outbreak of the Revolution, however, the home demand for cotton goods occasioned by the curtailment of the foreign supply, gave a stimulus to the production of cotton in America, and the provincial congress of the several colonies, as well as the Continental Congress, urged the people to turn their attention to the raising of this then much-needed staple. But the difficulty of separating the seed from the lint, as already noted, rendered the production of cotton for commercial purposes unprofitable. So unimportant was the industry then that Jay, in 1794, agreed to a stipulation in his treaty with Great Britain that cotton should be one of the articles which should not be exported from the United States in American ships—a provision which,

* Samuel Hopkins says in his reminiscences that in 1770 Rhode Island had 150 vessels engaged in the slave trade and was more deeply interested in the importation of slaves (especially Africans) than any other colony in New England (Spears, *The American Slave Trade*, p. 19). For a more detailed account of the New England slave trade, see Weeden, *Economic and Social History of New England*.

fortunately, the Senate struck out. The invention of the cotton-gin in 1793, however, entirely changed the situation and immensely stimulated the cotton industry. Formerly, by hand, one person could separate only a few pounds of lint from the seed in a day. With the gin, he could clean a thousand pounds a day. The effect on the production and export of cotton was magical. In 1790 the amount produced in the United States was 1,500,000 pounds; in 1795 it was 8,000,000 pounds; in 1800, 35,000,000 pounds; and in 1807, 80,000,000 pounds. At the same time the exports increased from 6,276,300 pounds in 1795 to nearly 64,000,000 pounds in 1808.*

The most far-reaching influence of the invention of the cotton-gin and the consequent stimulation of cotton production was the promotion of the institution of slavery. It was rescued from its moribund or decaying condition, henceforth to play the dominant rôle in the history and economic life of the South. The demand for slave labor soon exceeded the supply. South Carolina repealed her prohibitory laws and threw open her ports to the foreign slave trade, and the activity of New England traders was immediately revived. From 1804 to 1807 202 cargoes of negro slaves were brought into the harbor of Charleston alone.† Even the act of Congress of

1807 prohibiting the foreign slave trade did not entirely stop the traffic, because the penalty attached to the violation of the law was inadequate. In 1819, however, Congress went the limit, and declared the slave trade to be piracy—a declaration which practically put a stop to the traffic thereafter.

As the demand for slave labor increased, the loss of the foreign supply was met by slave-breeding, which presently became an important industry in such border States as Virginia, Maryland, and Kentucky, where, owing to the character of the principal crops, slave labor was much less profitable than in the cotton-producing States. The rapid rise in the price of slaves still further increased the lucrativeness of this peculiar industry and stimulated its growth.* Thus the border States shared in the prosperity of their Southern sisters and their interest in the extension and perpetuation of slavery was secured.

So closely connected was slavery with the cotton industry that it may truthfully be said that, just as slavery was the prime cause of the Civil War, cotton was the *raison d'être* of slavery. The demand for slave labor in the production of tobacco, rice, and indigo had never been great. The production of indigo soon became an industry of minor importance, the

* Bogart, *Economic History of the United States*, p. 117.

† *Ibid.*, p. 121.

* Olmsted (in the *Cotton Kingdom*) estimates that the number of slaves imported into the cotton-growing States, mainly from the "slave breeding states," averages about 25,000 annually between 1850 and 1860.

growth of rice was restricted to a comparatively small area, while tobacco, as already stated, could be cultivated with more success by free laborers. Without the demand for slave labor to cultivate the cotton plantations and the consequent impetus this gave to the slave-breeding industry in Maryland, Virginia and Kentucky, slavery would probably have soon disappeared in those States, Missouri would not have been admitted as a slave State, and the South's demand for "equal rights" in the Western Territories would probably never have been insisted upon.*

Meanwhile the rapid rise of the price of cotton stimulated its production, and increased correspondingly the demand for slaves. From 14½ cents in 1790, the price rose to 44 cents in 1799, though a decline to a more normal figure came later. From 1790 to 1830 the number of slaves in the States increased from 677,897 to over 2,000,000, and by 1860 it rose to nearly 4,000,000, over two-thirds of whom were in the cotton-growing States.

As time passed, slavery came to be defended in the South as an economic necessity. Negroes, it was argued, were better fitted than white men to clear and drain malarial swamps and cultivate cotton. They were capable of enduring the burning sun and of resisting malaria to which the white man succumbed. It was asserted,

moreover, that the free white labor necessary to the cultivation of cotton on the extensive scale required to meet the world's demand was not to be had. Without slave labor, therefore, it was argued, one of the greatest of the world's industries would be destroyed. With it, cotton was king and slavery its sceptre. Rapidly the cotton belt was extended from Georgia and South Carolina to Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and finally to the fertile plains of Texas, so that the system of slavery became so strongly entrenched that its eradication came to be regarded an impossibility. In the beginning slavery might have been abolished without disturbing the economic order or seriously injuring the South, but at that stage of its development this was no longer possible. Naturally, her people resented attacks upon the system as a strike at the heart of their very existence.

The system of slave labor in the South had its economic advantages and disadvantages. Of all crops grown in America, the cultivation of cotton was especially adapted to slave labor. For the most part, it was planted by hand and cultivated by the simplest of farm implements, so that little intelligence was required in the work. The hoeing of the plant and the picking of the lint were tasks in which the women and children could be employed to advantage, so that the planter was able to utilize the services of the entire family. Moreover, the cultivation and gathering of cotton extended

* See Rhodes, *History of the United States*, vol. i., p. 27.

over the greater part of the year, so that the idleness of the slaves engaged in it was reduced to a minimum. Slave labor, especially in the cotton industry, was also well adapted to organization on a large scale. While one man could cultivate 20 or 25 acres of grain, he could take care of an average of but five or six acres of cotton, thus making it possible for one overseer to direct the labor of a large number of slaves within a limited area. The cost of maintaining a slave was also slight, rarely exceeding \$15 to \$30 a year. His labor was, of course, unpaid, and hence the owner received the entire output of his services. He was housed in a small one-room shanty, and the warm climate necessitated but the simplest clothing, while the cost of food was inconsiderable. The slave's labor being compulsory, it was more easily managed and directed than free labor, as the employer had absolute control over it; and, being permanent, one of the chief sources of loss which the Southern planter now suffers from the frequent abandonment of his crop by negro tenants, was then unknown. Thus there was then greater certainty in the labor system, for the planter was always reasonably sure of retaining his laborers to gather what was planted and grown. Moreover, as slave labor was under the complete control of the owner, the maximum hours of work could be exacted. Finally, cotton being less exhaustive to the soil than cereal or other crops,

the destructive effects of unintelligent cultivation were smaller in the South than they would have been in other parts of the country where different crops were grown and where intelligent handling of the soil through rotation, diversification, and scientific treatment was essential to the maintenance of its productive power.

However, the economic disadvantages of slavery as a system of labor were very great and came in time to be generally recognized by the slaveholders themselves. In the Virginia House of Delegates in 1832, Mr. Marshall thus described some of its evils:

"Slavery is ruinous to the whites—retards improvement—roots out industrious population—banishes the yeomanry of the country—deprives the spinner, the weaver, the shoemaker, the carpenter, the smith, of employment and support. This evil admits of no remedy—it is increasing and will continue to increase, until the whole country will be inundated with one black wave covering its whole extent, with a few white faces here and there floating on the surface. The master has no capital but what is vested in human flesh; the father, instead of being richer for his sons, is at a loss how to provide for them; there is no diversity of occupations, no incentive to enterprise. Labor of every species is disreputable, because performed mostly by slaves. Our towns are stationary, our villages almost everywhere declining, and the general aspect of the country marks the course of a wasteful, idle, reckless population, who have no interest in the soil, and care not how much it is impoverished. Public improvements are neglected and the entire continent does not present a single region for which nature had done so much and art so little. If cultivated by free labor, the soil of Virginia is capable of supporting a vast population, among whom labor would be honorable, and where the 'busy hum of men' would tell that all were happy and all were free."

In the first place, slave labor really cost more than free labor, since it in-

volved the ownership of the laborer and not merely his hire. This cost increased, of course, with the rise of the price of slaves, finally reaching a point where the ownership of slaves by the small farmer was well-nigh impossible. At the time of the invention of the cotton-gin an able-bodied slave could be bought for about \$200. The demand for slave labor created by the demand for cotton, however, led to a rapid rise in the price until the average value of a slave in the cotton region by 1840 had reached \$500, and by 1860 good field-hands brought from \$1,400 to \$1,500; occasionally some, especially drivers and carpenters, would bring as much as \$2,000 each.*

The Atlanta (Ga.) *Daily Intelligencer* of January 13, 1860, declared that the average price of negroes in Crawford County of that State was \$1,113. The best field-hand, a negro of 21 years, sold there for \$1,900. One woman and a one-year-old child brought \$2,150, another woman and a child sold for \$2,500, while a third woman and her three children sold for \$4,525. The following is a table of prices current in Richmond in December of 1853:†

Best men, 18 to 25 years old...	\$1,200 to \$1,300
Fair men, 18 to 25 years old....	950 to 1,050
Boys 5 feet.....	850 to 950
Boys 4 feet 8 inches.....	700 to 800
Boys 4 feet 5 inches.....	500 to 600
Boys 4 feet.....	375 to 450

* Olmsted, *The Cotton Kingdom*, vol. ii., p. 151; Hammond, *The Cotton Industry*, p. 52.

† Phillips, *Plantation and Frontier*, in *Documentary History of the United States*, vol. ii., p. 71.

Young women	\$800 to \$1,000
Girls 5 feet.....	750 to 850
Girls 4 feet 9 inches.....	700 to 750
Girls 4 feet.....	350 to 450

In addition to the purchase-price of the slave, had to be reckoned the risk of loss through his possible death or loss of labor through illness, accidental injury, or escape into free territory. Then there was the cost of medical care in illness, the cost of sustenance—an expense to which the master was always subject whether the slave worked or not—and finally the cost of maintenance during old age and infirmity, since the poorhouses were closed to slaves. Speaking of the comparative cost of free and slave labor, Governor Hammond, of South Carolina, said in 1850:

“I agree that as a general rule it must be admitted that free labor is cheaper than slave labor. And I have no hesitation in saying that if I could cultivate my land on these terms, I would without a word resign my slaves, provided they could be properly disposed of. But the question is whether free or slave labor is cheapest to us in this country, at this time, situated as we are. And it is to be decided at once by the fact that we cannot avail ourselves of any other than slave labor.”*

Aside from the costliness of slave labor, there were certain inherent defects in the character of such labor that rendered it inferior in quality. Being forced labor, it was given reluctantly, and such service necessarily is not the best. To be effective, it had to be carefully watched and directed, thus adding to its cost. Moreover, since it was unpaid labor, the slave had no interest in the output, and

* Bogart, *Economic History*, p. 254.

hence there was no incentive to careful and faithful performance of duty. It was, of course, unintelligent labor, and was therefore cheap in quality. The difficulty of teaching the slave anything concerning modern methods of agriculture was very great, and the attempt was rarely made. Under such circumstances, scientific cultivation of the soil with improved implements and according to modern methods was out of the question. The result was that slave labor had to be confined almost exclusively to the raising of cotton, in the production of which skill was not essential, and rotation or diversification was seldom attempted.

Whenever the cotton lands became exhausted for lack of rotation or scientific treatment of the soil, the planter sold his land and moved on to the newer and richer regions of the West—a course found to be more profitable than the resuscitation of worn-out soils by means of unintelligent (slave) labor. The net income from each year's crop was invested in more negroes, for it was the ambition of every planter to own more slaves than his neighbor. Little or nothing was returned to the soil by way of improvement, and comparatively nothing was spent for improved farm machinery, new buildings, or plantation equipment. Under such a system, the wealth of the South consisted mainly in its slaves.

An important economic and social effect of slavery was that it tended to degrade free labor. As time passed,

especially in the cotton regions where the number of slaves was large, the social odium attached to labor by men in the cotton fields increased until free white labor no longer existed. To work in the cotton fields beside the negro was something no self-respecting white man would do. The result was the development of a class of shiftless and lazy whites that added nothing to the economic wealth of the country. William Gregg, in an address before the South Carolina Institute in 1851, said:

"From the best estimates that I have been able to make, I put down the white people who ought to work, and who do not, or who are so employed as to be wholly unproductive to the State, at one hundred and twenty-five thousand. Any man who is an observer of things could hardly pass through our country, without being struck with the fact that all the capital, enterprise and intelligence, is employed in directing slave labor; and the consequence is, that a large portion of our poor white people are wholly neglected, and are suffered to while away an existence in a state but one step in advance of the Indian in the forest. It is an evil of vast magnitude and nothing but a change in public sentiment will effect its cure." *

Another effect of slavery was to retard the development of small farms, since it was the practice of the large slaveholder to buy up the small farms wherever possible and to crush out the small cotton-grower. As time passed, the average size of farms increased. In 1850 the average was 273 acres and by 1860 the average had greatly increased, many plantations exceeding 10,000 acres.† Speaking of

* Callender, *Economic History of the United States*, p. 792.

† Hammond, *Cotton Industry*, p. 102.

this tendency, Hon. C. C. Clay, in an address in 1855, said:

"Our small planters, after taking the cream off their lands, unable to restore them by rest, manures, or otherwise, are going further west and south in search of other virgin lands, which they may despoil and impoverish in like manner. Our wealthier planters with greater means and no more skill are buying out their poorer neighbors, extending their plantations and adding to their slave force. The wealthy few, who are able to live on smaller profits, and to give their blasted fields some rest, are thus pushing off the many who are merely independent."

All over the South there was a constant struggle between the small farmer and the large plantation-owner, with his numerous slaves, for the possession of the best lands, the overwhelming advantage, of course, being with the wealthy slave-owner. The new cotton lands of the West were usually cleared and put in a state of cultivation by the small farmers, but in the course of time the planter, after exhausting his lands, came along, bought up the small farms and established the plantation system. Thus the development of a body of small farmers (such as existed in the free States) was greatly hindered. Slavery, as Von Holst remarks, has an inevitable tendency in favor of plantation industry, which suppresses or swallows up small farms.*

As time passed, the number of non-slaveholders increased as the number of slaveholders decreased. It was estimated that at the outbreak of the Civil War the larger part of the slave population was owned by about

5 per cent. of the cotton growers. According to DeBow, there were less than 8,000 slaveholders in 1850 who owned more than 50 slaves each. The non-slaveholders were, as a rule, either poor or possessed of only small means, while the lands they occupied were so sterile that only a meagre subsistence could be gained therefrom.*

Under such circumstances, there was little migration of free laborers to the South from the Northern States or from Europe. The odium attached to white labor in the cotton fields and the unwillingness of white laborers from the Old World to compete with slave labor, deprived the South almost wholly of the tide of thrifty immigrants from Europe, who preferred to settle in the Northern States; the only exception of note being the German settlers in portions of Texas. Of the persons of foreign birth in the United States in 1850, 1,866,397 were in the free States and only 378,205 were in the slave States.† Thus the growth of the population of the South lagged far behind that of the North. Starting with almost equal populations in 1790, the North by 1860 had more than 20,000,000 inhabitants, while the South had 12,000,000.

One of the most deplorable results of slavery was its injurious effect upon the development of manufactur-

* *Constitutional History of the United States*, vol. i., p. 342.

* See Olmsted, *The Cotton Kingdom*, vol. i., p. 18; DeBow, *Industrial Resources*, vol. ii., p. 106.

† Hammond, *The Cotton Industry*, p. 63.

ing and other industries. Agriculture, and especially the raising of cotton, continued until after the Civil War to be almost the sole industry of the South. Excepting rice, Indian corn (in the upper South), and tobacco, no staples were raised in considerable quantities. Indeed, in the cotton-growing regions, hardly any attempt was made to produce anything beyond the necessary food supplies used on the plantation, so great was the demand for cotton. Though particularly favored with mineral deposits, water-power, and other natural resources for manufacturing, this industry was neglected and the industrial development of the South soon fell far behind that of the North. According to the census of 1850, the industries of commerce, trades and mining employed about 180,334 persons in the slave States, as against 456,863 in the free States. In 1855 the estimated value of cotton manufactures in the slave States was \$885,608, as against \$9,367,331 in the free States. The total value of all manufactures in the South in 1850 was estimated at \$93,362,202, as against \$347,748,612 in the North. The number of persons engaged in manufacturing was 151,944 in the slave States and 807,125 in the free States.*

Practically all the cotton produced was sent to the North or to England to be made into cloth, in spite of the well recognized economic law that,

other things being equal, the manufacture of a raw material will always be carried on in the neighborhood where the material is produced. Only the manufacture of coarse cloths, tools and implements used on the farm, and of some fire-arms, was attempted. The greater part of the available capital of the South was utilized in the purchase of slaves and new lands. The amount thus left for the development of manufacturing was wholly inadequate, while capital from the North was not readily obtainable.

The foreign and internal trade of the South was carried on by Northern capital, and of course most of the manufactured articles used in the South (save the ruder farm implements and coarser clothing for the slaves) came from the North or from abroad. A prominent Southern writer said:

"All the world sees or ought to see that in a commercial, mechanical, manufactural, financial and literary point of view, we (the South) are as helpless as babes. It is a fact well known to every intelligent Southerner that we are compelled to go to the North for almost every article of utility and adornment, from matches, shoe pegs and paintings up to cotton mills, steamships and statuary; that we have no foreign trade, no princely merchants, nor respectable artists; that, in comparison with the free states, we contribute nothing to the literature, polite arts and inventions of the age. Nearly all the profits arising from the exchange of commodities, from insurance and shipping offices, and from the one thousand and one industrial pursuits of the country, accrue to the North, and are there invested in those magnificent cities and stupendous works of art which dazzle the eyes of the South, and attest the superiority of free institutions! All our commercial, manufactural, and literary supplies come from there. We want Bibles, brooms, buckets and books and we go to the North; we want shoes, hats, handkerchiefs,

* Von Holst, *Constitutional History of the United States*, vol. i., p. 344.

umbrellas and pocket-knives, and we go to the North; we want toys, primers, school books, fashionable apparel, machinery, medicines, tomb stones, and a thousand other things, and we go to the North for them all." *

Many other frank and thoughtful Southerners were ready to admit the truth of this indictment, and would gladly have welcomed the abolition of slavery if it could be effected without ruining the South. The wealth of thousands of its citizens consisted almost entirely of slaves and lands. To have suddenly abolished slavery would not only have destroyed what was then the chief element of economic power, but would have so upset the labor system as to render the lands almost valueless. The belief in the necessity of slave labor in the pro-

duction of cotton, gradually took strong hold upon the people of the South, who came to believe that there was a natural connection between the two which could not be severed without destroying the cotton industry. It is not at all strange, therefore, that they should have clung to slavery and defended it as a necessary part of their economic system, though they readily admitted its shortcomings. Even when abolition was finally forced upon them, many believed that free negro labor would prove a failure. Of course their worst fears were never realized.*

* Helper, *The Impending Crisis*, pp. 21-23.

* Besides the works already cited, see G. F. Callender, *Economic History of the United States*, chap. xv.; U. B. Phillips, *The Economic Cause of Slave Holding*, in *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. xx., and *Documentary History of American Industrial Society*, vols. i.-ii.

PART FIVE.

The Appeal to Arms and The Triumph of Nationalism, 1861-1865.

THE UNITED STATES

CHAPTER I.

1861.

THE OPENING OF THE WAR.

Lincoln's call for volunteers and the response of the States — The attack on the 6th Massachusetts at Baltimore — Lincoln's proclamation blockading Southern ports — Seizure of Harper's Ferry and the Gosport navy yard — Lee's resignation — Union meetings in New York — The attitude of Maryland — The case of John Merryman — The struggle for Kentucky and Missouri — The secession of Texas — Acts of the Confederate Congress — Comparison of the North and South — The occupation of Alexandria, and Ellsworth's death — Engagements at Romney, New Creek and Big Bethel — The formation of a separate government in West Virginia — The fight at Philippi — The Battle of Rich Mountain — Tennessee's course — Acts and resolutions passed at the special session of Congress — The demand for a forward movement of the army — McDowell's defeat at the first battle of Bull Run.

LANGUAGE can hardly portray the state of feeling when news of the bombardment of Fort Sumter reached the North. The attack convinced nearly everyone that the time for argument had passed and that compromise and entreaty had given way to action. With stern determination the Northern people accepted the responsibilities which this grave event thrust upon them and warmly approved the policy foreshadowed by President Lincoln when, on April 15, he issued a proclamation* calling for 75,000 militia to suppress combinations obstructing the execution of the laws in the States of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Missis-

sippi, Louisiana and Texas.* Accompanying the President's proclamation were requisitions upon the governors of 24 States, the seceded States being omitted, while California, Oregon and Kansas were passed over as too distant. The States were called upon to furnish their respective quotas of

* The *New York Times* was of the opinion that the rebellion would be short-lived. "Let us make quick work. The 'Rebellion' as some people designate it, is an embryo tadpole. Let us not fall into the delusion, noted by Hallam, of mistaking a 'local commotion' for a revolution. A strong, active pull together will do our work effectually in thirty days. We have only to send a column of twenty-five thousand men across the Potomac to Richmond, and burn out the rats there; another column of twenty-five thousand to Cairo, seizing the cotton ports of the Mississippi, and retaining the remaining twenty-five thousand included in Mr. Lincoln's call for seventy-five thousand men at Washington, not because there is need for them there, but because

* For which see Richardson, *Messages and Papers*, vol. vi., pp. 13-14.

militia for three months' service, the largest apportionment being to New York, 13,280, to Pennsylvania, 12,500, and to Ohio, 10,153. The replies of the governors indicated the general sentiment of the people. From Illinois came word that the day after the governor's call was published 40 companies had tendered their services.* From Vermont came information that the citizens would respond with great enthusiasm "to any call for sustaining the government against the designs of the conspirators."† Iowa stated that the two parties existing in the State ten days previously had merged into one which was "for the Constitution and Union unconditionally."‡ Indiana reported that 6,000 men were in camp on April 23 and six additional regiments had tendered their services.|| Dennison, of Ohio, reported that so great was the response to the proclamation that "without seriously repressing the ardor of the people I can hardly stop short of 20 regiments."§ According to the report of the Secretary of War

there were in the field on July 1 at the command of the Government 310,000 men, but according to the report of the provost-marshal-general there were in the service on July 1 an aggregate of 16,422 regulars and 170,329 volunteers or a total of 186,751 men.* Party lines seemed to be obliterated. Men apparently forgot that they had ever been Democrats or Republicans, the partisan being lost in the patriot. On Sunday evening, April 14, Douglas at his own request had a long confidential interview with Lincoln, and on the following morning, side by side with Lincoln's proclamation, the country read the telegraphic announcement that while Douglas was yet "unalterably opposed to the Administration on all its political issues, he was prepared to sustain the President in the exercise of all his constitutional functions to preserve the Union, maintain the government, and defend the Federal capital."†

In the South the revolutionary excitement rose to a similar height. The President's proclamation "was received at Montgomery with derisive

we do not require their services elsewhere."—See Harris, *The Political Conflict in America*, p. 241; Greeley (*American Conflict*, vol. i., p. 551) characterizes as a "deplorable error" the belief that the South "was to be put down in sixty or ninety days by some process equivalent to the reading of the Riot Act to an excited mob, and sending a squad of police to disperse it."

* *Official Records*, series iii., vol. i., p. 109.

† *Ibid.*, p. 113.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 111.

|| *Ibid.*, pp. 127-128.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 125. In this connection see also George H. Porter, *Ohio Politics During the Civil War Period*, in *Columbia University Studies in History, Economics and Public Law* (1911).

* Frederick Phisterer, *Statistical Record of the Armies of the United States*, p. 62.

† Johnson, *Life of Douglas*, p. 477; Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. iv., pp. 80-84. See also Henry P. Willis, *Stephen A. Douglas* (1911). Before his death on June 3 Douglas made an address and issued a message urging the people to sustain the National Government. See Johnson, p. 486 *et seq.*; Moore, *Rebellion Record*, vol. i., Rumors and Incidents, p. 110. For tributes as to the value of his influence at this time see Stephens, *The War between the States*, vol. ii., p. 421; Greeley, *Recollections of a Busy Life*, p. 359.

laughter; the newspapers were refreshed with the Lincolniana of styling sovereign States 'unlawful combinations' and warning a people standing on their own soil to return within twenty days to their 'homes'; and, in Virginia, the secessionists were highly delighted at the strength Mr. Lincoln had unwittingly or per-versely contributed to their cause."* On April 8 21,000 volunteers were conditionally asked for by the Confederate government and on April 16 the Confederate Secretary of War, Walker, notified the governors of the seceded States that 32,000 more must be immediately prepared to take the field.† Walker requested also that the forts and military posts within the limits of these States be formally turned over to the control of the Confederate government.‡ On the 17th permission was asked of the executives of Arkansas and Tennessee to plant batteries to blockade the Mississippi.¶ The governors of Maryland and Delaware endeavored to hold a middle ground and were not prepared for decisive action,§ but in the other border States there was no attempt to disguise the determination not to aid the Federal government. Governor Magoffin, of Kentucky, wrote: "Emphatically Kentucky will furnish no troops for

the wicked purpose of subduing her sister Southern States."* Governor Ellis, of North Carolina, expressed himself as follows:

"I can be no party to this wicked violation of the laws of the country and to this war upon the liberties of a free people. You can get no troops from North Carolina."†

Governor Rector, of Arkansas, wrote:

"In answer to your requisition for troops from Arkansas to subjugate the Southern States I have to say that none will be furnished. The demand is only adding insult to injury. The people of this commonwealth are freemen, not slaves, and will defend to the last extremity their honor, lives and property against Northern mendacity and usurpation."‡

Governor Harris, of Tennessee, wrote:

"In such an unholy crusade no gallant son of Tennessee will ever draw his sword. Tennessee will not furnish a single man for coercion but 50,000 if necessary for the defence of our rights or those of our Southern brethren."¶

Governor Jackson, of Missouri, spoke even more strongly:

"No doubt these men are intended to make war upon the seceded States. Your requisition in my judgment is illegal, unconstitutional and revolutionary in its objects, inhuman and diabolical, and cannot be complied with. Not one man will the State of Missouri furnish to carry on such unholy crusade."§

Governor Letcher, of Virginia, wrote:

"The militia of Virginia will not be furnished to the powers at Washington for any such use

* Magoffin to Cameron, *Official Records*, series iii., vol. i., p. 98. See also Shaler, *History of Kentucky*, p. 242; Thomas Speed, *The Union Cause in Kentucky, 1860-1865* (1907).

† *Official Records*, vol. i., p. 99.

‡ *Ibid*, p. 124.

¶ *Ibid*, p. 118.

§ *Ibid*, p. 106. See also Carr, *Missouri*, pp. 299-300.

* Pollard, *First Year of the War*, p. 59.

† *Official Records*, vol. i., pp. 64-65.

‡ *Ibid*, pp. 69-70.

¶ *Ibid*, pp. 70, 78.

§ *Ibid*, series iii., vol. i., pp. 135, 104-105; Moore, *Rebellion Record*, vol. i., Docs., p. 155.

or purpose as they have in view. Your object is to subjugate the Southern States, and a requisition made upon me for such an object—an object in my judgment not within the purview of the Constitution or the act of 1795—will not be complied with. You have chosen to inaugurate civil war; and having done so, we will meet it in a spirit as determined as the administration has exhibited toward the South.”*

The only Northern State fully prepared for the emergency was Massachusetts, her governor, John A. Andrew, having caused the State militia to begin active and regular drilling in the armories.† Thus when the call came, about 5,000 men (of whom 3,000 were armed with Springfield rifles) were in some measure prepared for war. On the 16th the militia began to muster at Boston and on the 17th the 6th Massachusetts armed with rifles started for Washington.‡ On April 19 the cars reached the depot on the northern side of Baltimore (the Philadelphia or President Street station) whence the troops were to be taken to the Washington or Camden station to embark on cars for Washington. A crowd was found awaiting the troops, who were greeted with hootings, jeerings, and abusive epithets, but to these the troops, according to orders, paid no attention.|| Finally stones and other missiles were used and one man was shot in the thigh. Orders were

then given to fire at will.* Part of the troops reached their destination in good order, but obstructions were placed on the tracks in front of the cars transporting the balance of the troops from one depot to the other and, finally, passage in this manner was no longer practicable. In this emergency the Massachusetts men determined to proceed on foot. They formed in close order and started, whereupon the mob resumed the assault with brickbats and stones. The mayor placed himself at the head of the troops with the officer in command and did what he could to prevent further disorder, but the mob grew bolder and the attacks became more violent.† Meanwhile the chief of police had gathered a body of 50 policemen who, allowing the troops to pass through their ranks, immediately closed behind them, forming a firm line across the street. This opposed an effectual barrier to the further advance of the mob and the troops succeeded in joining their companions at the Washington depot. There the troops boarded the train for Washington, but as it moved away several muskets were discharged from the window of the rear car and a prominent citizen was mortally wounded. Bystanders declared the act to be unprovoked, but soldiers and officers maintained that it was in response to a volley of shots or stones. The cas-

* *Official Records*, vol. i., p. 103. See also *Confederate Military History*, vol. iii., p. 38.

† Regarding this see Schouler, *Massachusetts in the Civil War*.

‡ For details of the trip see Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. iv., p. 110 *et seq.* See also J. W. Hanson, *The Sixth Massachusetts Regiment*.

|| The orders will be found in Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. iv., p. 111.

* Harrison, *The Sixth Massachusetts Regiment*, p. 25.

† *Official Records*, vol. ii., p. 16.

ualties were never accurately ascertained. The soldiers lost 4 killed and 36 wounded whereas the loss of citizens was probably two or three times that number.*

In a dispatch to Cameron the next day Governor Hicks stated that the mob had taken possession of the armories and were plentifully supplied with arms and ammunition; therefore he thought it prudent to decline for the present to respond affirmatively to the requisition made by President Lincoln for four regiments of infantry.† Other troops were expected to arrive, wherefore, apprehending more bloodshed, Governor Hicks, the mayor and the chief of police, after consultation, decided to burn some of the bridges on the Phila-

delphia, Wilmington and Baltimore Railroad, and on the Northern Central Railroad toward Harrisburg. At the same time a committee of citizens went by special train to Washington with a letter from the mayor, approved by the governor, begging that no more troops be sent through Baltimore.* Early the next morning, April 20, the committee consulted Lincoln and Scott, when it was decided that the troops would be marched around Baltimore and not through it.† Such an arrangement was accepted by the governor who expressed his satisfaction at the action of the Government.‡

Meanwhile the people were awaiting with considerable apprehension the action of Virginia. When the convention called to consider the status of the State assembled, a majority of its members were decidedly opposed to secession, but when they received word of Lincoln's intention to resist force with force it was said that Virginia had but one course to pursue. Accordingly, on April 17, by a vote of 88 to 55, the ordinance of secession was passed. Although the law required a vote of the people before secession could be ratified the secessionists did not wait for such permission. Members of the Confederate Congress were appointed and when, on May 23, the people voted on secession, it was

* Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. iv., pp. 113-118. See also George W. Brown, *Baltimore and the Nineteenth of April, 1861*, in *Johns Hopkins University Studies*, extra vol. iii. (1887); *Confederate Military History*, vol. ii., pp. 16-22.

† *Official Records*, vol. ii., p. 581. "Baltimore was a secession volcano in full eruption; while the counties south of that city were overwhelmingly in sympathy with the slaveholders' rebellion, and their few determined Unionists completely overawed and silenced. The counties near Baltimore, between that city and the Susquehanna, were actively co-operating with the rebellion, or terrified into dumb submission to its behests. The great populous counties of Frederick, Washington, and Alleghany, composing Western Maryland—having few slaves—were preponderantly loyal; but they were overawed and paralyzed by the attitude of the rest of the state, and still more by the large force of rebel Virginians—said to be 5,000 strong—who had been suddenly pushed forward to Harper's Ferry, and threatened Western Maryland from that commanding position."—Greeley, *American Conflict*, vol. i., p. 468. See also G. L. Radcliffe, *Governor Hicks of Maryland and the Civil War*, in *Johns Hopkins University Studies*, series xix., nos. xi.-xii. (1901).

* Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. iv., p. 123.

† *Ibid.*, vol. iv., p. 126.

‡ *Official Records*, vol. ii., p. 581. See also Moore, *Rebellion Record*, vol. i., Docs., p. 123.

overwhelmingly adopted by a vote of 128,884 in favor, to 32,134 against.*

The secession of Virginia carried three States into the Confederacy — Tennessee which seceded on May 6,† Arkansas which seceded on May 18, and North Carolina which seceded on May 21, thus making 11 States in hostility to the Union.

On the same day that Virginia seceded, April 17, and as an answer to Lincoln's call for volunteers, Jefferson Davis, at Montgomery, professing himself convinced that the United States were about to invade "this Confederacy with an armed force for the purpose of capturing its fortresses and thereby subverting its independence and subjecting the people thereof to the dominion of a foreign power," issued a proclamation "inviting all those who may desire, by service in private armed vessels on the high seas, to aid this government in resisting so wanton and wicked an oppression, to make applications for commissions or letters of marque and reprisal, to be issued under the seal of these Confederate States."‡ As a rejoinder President Lincoln, on April 19, issued a counter proclamation declaring a blockade of the ports of the seceded States and subjecting the privateers in the Confederate service to the laws

for the prevention and punishment of piracy.* Davis, in an address to the Confederate Congress a few days afterward, affected to doubt the authenticity of this proclamation, stigmatising President Lincoln's course in no measured terms, and stating his disbelief that Lincoln was prepared to "inaugurate a war of extermination on both sides, by treating as pirates open enemies acting under commissions issued by an organized government." In this address Davis expressed the desire of the Confederate government to be let alone to work out its own salvation.

Meanwhile there had been no delay in entering upon active measures of hostility. Within 24 hours after Virginia adopted her secession ordinance the custom house and post office at Richmond were seized upon and the United States arsenal at Harper's Ferry was attacked. The arsenal was in charge of about 40 riflemen under command of Lieutenant Roger Jones, who had been instructed, in case of attack, not to surrender, but to destroy the gun shops and their contents. Learning of the approach of the State militia, Lieutenant Jones caused all the arms, some 15,000 in number, to be heaped up ready for burning, and on the night of April 18, when the invaders approached, the trains were fired and in a short time the buildings and their contents were destroyed.

* For details of this convention see Rhodes, *United States*, vol. iii., pp. 378-387 and the authorities cited. See also Munford, *Virginia's Attitude Toward Slavery and Secession* (1909).

† J. W. Fertig, *The Secession and Reconstruction of Tennessee*.

‡ Moore, *Rebellion Record*, vol. i., Docs., p. 71.

* Richardson, *Messages and Papers*, vol. vi., pp. 14-15; Moore, *Rebellion Record*, vol. i., Docs., p. 78.

Jones and his men escaped by way of the bridge leading into Maryland and reached Carlisle Barracks in Pennsylvania the next afternoon.*

Simultaneously the Confederates took measures to secure possession of the Gosport Navy Yard at Norfolk. There were 12 vessels in the yard, the most important being the *Merrimac*, a first-class frigate of 40 guns. To secure the vessels at the navy yard Governor Letcher attempted to obstruct the channel from Norfolk to Fortress Monroe by means of sunken vessels, but the effort failed. Knowing this, the Federal authorities prepared the best ships (the *Merrimac*, *Germantown*, *Plymouth*, and *Dolphin*) for quick removal to Fortress Monroe, the fires being lighted under their boilers and the moment of departure announced. The junior officers, however (evidently sympathizing with the Confederacy), persuaded Commandant Charles S. McCauley to retain the *Merrimac* for the security of the yard. On learning of this the authorities at Washington ordered Commodore Hiram Paulding to take the *Pawnee* down the Potomac with discretionary orders to defend or destroy. On April 20, having taken 300 or 500 of the 3d Massachusetts aboard at Fortress Monroe, Paulding proceeded to Norfolk but was too late, for before his arrival Commandant McCauley had yielded to the suggestion of his juniors and had scuttled the removable ships, ostensibly to prevent

their seizure by the Confederates. Hence no effort to remove them could succeed, and no resource was left but to destroy everything as far as possible. Accordingly several parties were detailed to fire the ships and the buildings and to lay a mine to blow up the dry dock. Taking the *Cumberland* in tow, Paulding then sailed down the river.* More than half the buildings were consumed; but 1,500 or 2,000 cannon in the yard could neither be removed nor rendered unserviceable, while in stores, furniture, etc., the Confederates gained property to the amount of about \$10,000,000. Of the seven ships burned to the water's edge, the hull of the *Merrimac* was soon afterward raised and, in the course of events, became the ironclad *Merrimac* or, as the Confederates called her, the *Virginia*.†

One of the greatest losses to the Union cause was the resignation of Robert E. Lee from the Union army. Lee was a favorite of Scott, and when Lincoln called for troops the general-in-chief at once selected Lee as the most capable and promising officer in the service to take command of the troops in the field. On April 18 Francis P. Blair called upon Lee and un-

* Pollard (*First Year of the War*, pp. 65-66) in speaking of this "act of ruthless vandalism" says that the *Pawnee* stole like a guilty thing through the harbor fleeing from the destruction she had been sent to accomplish.

† *Official Records*, vol. ii., p. 21 *et seq.*; Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. iv., pp. 145-147; Rebecca P. Meade, *Life of Admiral Hiram Paulding* (1910); *Confederate Military History*, vol. iii., pp. 123-126.

* *Official Records*, vol. ii., p. 3 *et seq.*

officially offered him the command of the Union army. Lee says:

"After listening to his remarks I declined the offer he made me to take command of the army that was to be brought into the field, stating, as candidly and courteously as I could, that though opposed to secession and deprecating war, I could take no part in an invasion of the Southern States." *

In a letter to his sister Lee further states the motive of his unwillingness to serve, since he could not take part against his native State nor raise his hand against his relatives, children and home.† In a letter to his son he stated that secession was nothing but revolution:

"The framers of our Constitution never exhausted so much labor, wisdom and forbearance in its formation and surrounded it with so many guards and securities if it was intended to be broken by every member of the Confederacy at will. It was intended for 'perpetual union' so expressed in the preamble, and for the establishment of a government, not a compact, which can only be dissolved by revolution or the consent of all the people in convention assembled. It is idle to talk of secession.‡

Lee stated that if he owned all the slaves in the South he would sacrifice them to the Union, but he did not see how he could draw his sword against his native State. Accordingly he concluded that he ought no longer to retain his commission in the United States Army, and two days later forwarded his resignation to General Scott.|| Immediately afterward (April

22) he was appointed by the governor and convention of Virginia to the chief command of the Virginia State forces, and, on the 23d, publicly assumed that office.

All railroad communication between Washington and the North had been cut by the burning of the bridges, and on Sunday night, April 21, the telegraph ceased to work.* Thus the only means of communication between the Government and the loyal territory was by private courier. Since correct information was hard to procure, all sorts of rumors began to fill the air, some of which were to the effect that Beauregard would soon proceed to capture Washington. Panic seized the city and preparations were made to stand a siege. On April 22 Scott wrote that the city was "partially besieged, threatened and in danger of being attacked on all sides in a day or two or three."† The President was greatly alarmed for the safety of the capital city, and when the days began to pass without bringing troops he paced the floor of the executive office in restless anxiety, at length breaking out into repeated exclamations, "Why don't they come! Why don't they come!"‡ However, his anxiety was soon relieved by news of the great uprising at the North, that the 7th New York regiment had departed, and that Governor Sprague's Rhode Islanders had sailed.

* J. W. Jones, *Life of Lee*, p. 141.

† *Ibid.*, p. 139.


‡ Letter of January 23, 1861, quoted in *ibid.*, p. 137.

|| Long, *Life of Lee*, p. 93; Jones, *Life of Lee*, pp. 138-139. See also Rhodes, *United States*, vol. iii., pp. 365-366; Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. iv., pp. 97-101.

* *Official Records*, vol. ii., p. 586.

† *Ibid.*, vol. ii., p. 587.

‡ Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. iv., pp. 140-152.



Nowhere was there greater National sentiment than in New York.* Everything indicated that the weight of the financial and trade centre of the country would be on the side of the National Government. All party ties were ignored, which was especially disappointing to the South, since she had reckoned on the friendship of the metropolis and had hoped thereby to divide the North. This seemed to be possible, since on January 6, 1861, Mayor Fernando Wood had addressed a message to the common council in which he spoke of the "dissolution of the Union as inevitable," of our "aggrieved Southern brethren of the slave States," of the fanatical spirit of New England, etc. Toward the close of the message he said:

"When disunion has become a fixed and certain fact, why may not New York disrupt the bonds which bind her to a menial and corrupt master—to a people and a party that have plundered her revenues, attempted to ruin her commerce, taken away the power of self-government, and destroyed the Confederacy of which she was the proud Empire city? Amid the gloom which the present and prospective condition of things must cast over the country, New York as a *free city* may shed the only light and hope of a future reconstruction of our once blessed confederacy."†

It was rumored that a conspiracy had been formulated to carry this project into effect.‡ However this may have been, the voice of the people soon gave

no uncertain sound. The papers began to change their tone and when on the 19th, the 7th regiment left for Washington, the enthusiasm of the people was raised to its highest pitch. The next day an imposing assemblage met at Union Square. General Dix, Prof. O. M. Mitchel, and many others spoke in eloquent words, appealing to the people to uphold the Constitution and the laws. Not only was the loyalty of the Nation manifested by words of encouragement, but money was liberally furnished. The subscriptions of individuals, corporations, towns, cities, and State legislatures in a fortnight after the attack on Sumter reached a sum estimated at more than \$30,000,000.*

In Baltimore and in Maryland the frenzy of opposition to the National Government subsided within a week after the attack on the Massachusetts regiment. Being loyal to the Union and distrusting the legislature, Governor Hicks was loath to convene it, but on April 22 summoned it to meet on the 26th. At the previous session of the legislature the delegates from Baltimore had been unseated and, on April 24, a special election was held at Baltimore when all the State rights candidates were elected.† It appeared certain that with this accession of secession sentiment the legislature would pass some-

* See Sidney D. Brummer, *Political History of New York State During the Period of the Civil War*, in *Columbia University Studies in History, Economics and Public Law* (1911).

† Wilson, *Rise and Fall of Slave Power*, vol. iii., p. 66.

‡ For details of which see Rhodes, *United States*, vol. iii., pp. 369-371.

* See F. B. Goodrich, *The Tribute Book: A Record of the Munificence, Self Sacrifice, and Patriotism of the American People During the War for the Union*.

† Scharf, *History of Maryland*, vol. iii., p. 424.

thing equivalent to an ordinance of secession. In order to prevent this it was suggested that the legislature be arrested or dispersed by force. Several plans were discussed by the Cabinet, Bates and Chase recommending drastic measures.* Lincoln, however, in a letter to General Scott, said that to arrest or disperse the legislature would neither be justifiable nor efficient for the desired object, since they had a legal right to assemble; no one could know in advance whether their action would favor peace or war, and the Federal authorities could not permanently prevent their action since, if arrested, they could not long be held as prisoners and, when liberated, would immediately reassemble and take action. Accordingly, he recommended that the commanding general watch and await their action, and in case they should turn against the Union he was to adopt the most prompt and efficient means to counteract such action, even if he bombarded the city and suspended the writ of *habeas corpus*.† These orders were promptly transmitted by Scott to General Butler at Annapolis.‡ On the 27th the legislature met at Frederick City instead of Annapolis, the capital, which was occupied by Federal troops.¶ On the 27th, in his

special message reciting the recent occurrences, Governor Hicks expressed the conviction "that the only safety of Maryland lies in preserving a neutral position between our brethren of the North and of the South." He recommended, however, that the State array herself on the side of Union and peace.* At first, both branches of the legislature declared that it possessed no authority to commit the State to secession. Nevertheless that body called no convention to decide this question,† but adjourned on May 14 to meet again on June 4. Thus Maryland remained officially attached to the Federal Government.

On April 27 President Lincoln issued an order to Scott authorizing the suspension of the writ of *habeas corpus* if, at any point on or in the vicinity of any military line between Philadelphia and Washington, Scott should encounter resistance to the Federal authority.‡ Hardly had Butler departed from the city when a noteworthy judicial incident arose. On May 25 a wealthy Marylander named John Merryman was arrested by military authority on a charge of being engaged in treasonable practices and imprisoned in Fort McHenry. Merryman applied to Chief Justice Taney, then in Baltimore, for

* For Chase's opinion see Schuckers, *Life of S. P. Chase*, p. 424.

† Letter of April 25 to Scott quoted in Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. iv., pp. 167-168.

‡ *Official Records*, vol. ii., p. 602.

¶ Moore, *Rebellion Record*, vol. i., Docs., p. 175.

* *Ibid.*, pp. 159-161. See also Appleton's *Annual Cyclopædia* 1861, p. 446.

† For some instructive details regarding the movements of the Baltimore police authorities and the action of the Maryland legislatures see McPherson, *History of the Rebellion*, pp. 392-398.

‡ McPherson, *History of the Rebellion*, p. 177.

a writ of *habeas corpus*, which was issued.* Cadwalader stated that the President had authorized him to suspend the writ in such cases, and requested Taney to postpone further action until the matter could be referred to Lincoln. Taney, however, immediately ordered an attachment against Cadwalader for contempt, but the marshal was unable to serve it, being denied entrance to Fort McHenry. Thereupon Taney declared that the President could not suspend the privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus* nor authorize a military officer to do it. On June 1 the chief justice filed his written opinion and transmitted a copy to the President.† No attention was paid to the transmitted papers as the President at the time of their receipt was engaged in preparing his message to the special session of Congress and in that document presented the justification of his act.‡

The month of May found the country actively engaged in preparations for the conflict of arms. Forces were mustering into service, officers were busy at recruiting stations, companies were forming, men were enlisting in favorite regiments, and private con-

tributions as well as legislative loans or grants were freely supplied. More volunteers offering than were necessary to fill the call for 75,000 and more than were desired for three months' service, Lincoln determined to utilize this outburst of patriotism by enlisting men for three years. Accordingly he sent word to the various governors that no further troops beyond the quota of the several States could be received unless they agreed to volunteer for three years unless sooner discharged.* On May 3 he issued a proclamation calling for 42,034 volunteers to serve for three years; directing that the regular army be increased by eight regiments of infantry, one regiment of cavalry and one regiment of artillery (a total of 22,714 officers and enlisted men); and ordering the enlistment of 18,000 seamen for not less than one or more than three years.† Under the provisions of this call the army was increased to 156,861 men and the navy to 25,600 men.‡ Though this action was beyond the President's

* *Official Records*, series iii., vol. i., p. 143.

† For the proclamation see Richardson, *Messages and Papers*, vol. vi., pp. 15-16; Moore, *Rebellion Record*, vol. i., Docs., p. 185.

‡ This total is made up as follows:

Regular Army, April 5.....	17,113	
Proclamation May 3.....	22,714	
		39,827
Volunteers, Proclamation April		
15 (3 months).....	75,000	
Proclamation May 3.....	42,034	
		117,034
		156,861
Regular Navy, March 4.....	7,600	
Proclamation May 3.....	18,000	
		25,600

* Tyler, *Memoir of Roger B. Taney*, pp. 640-642.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 646-649.

‡ For the message see Richardson, *Messages and Papers*, vol. vi., pp. 20-31. See also Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. iv., pp. 174-178. For criticisms of the opinion see Horace Binney, *The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus*, part i., p. 36; Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. viii., pp. 28-31; McPherson, *History of the Rebellion*, pp. 155-162.

constitutional authority, yet it received the approval of the North.

Meanwhile several important events had happened in the border States. Governor Magoffin, of Kentucky, had advised the State to assume neutral ground and had refused to furnish troops to the National Government "for the wicked purpose of subduing her sister Southern States." When the legislature met late in April, Governor Magoffin, asserting that the Union was dissolved, called upon the members to summon a convention of the people to determine which side the State would espouse. He also placed the State guard under General Simon B. Buckner, an avowed neutral, though probably a predetermined secessionist, since in the following September he entered the service of the Confederate government.

The situation in Kentucky was not reassuring to the people north of the Ohio, Governor Morton, of Indiana, writing that no doubt was entertained of Kentucky's secession and that the people feared the plundering and burning of their towns by marauding parties from the other side of the river.* In a similar strain General McClellan wrote that Magoffin was a traitor, that Buckner was under his influence, making it necessary to watch them both, and that the secessionists were concentrating at points threatening the Northern cities.† The lower branch of the legislature de-

clared for strict neutrality, and on May 16, 1861, approved Magoffin's refusal to furnish troops to the President.* A "home guard" was authorized, also, as an offset to Buckner's "State guard," and the privates and officers of both organizations were required to swear allegiance to both State and Union. No arms or ammunition could be used against the United States nor the Confederate States unless to protect Kentucky against invasion.†

President Lincoln was seriously concerned over the attitude of Kentucky. Though officially the State had refused him troops, Lincoln had received from private sources assurances that many Kentuckians were ready to fight for the Union. Accordingly, on May 7, he commissioned Major Robert Anderson, who was a Kentuckian, "to receive into the army of the United States as many regiments of volunteer troops from the State of Kentucky and from the Western part of the State of Virginia as shall be willing to engage in the service of the United States."‡ Lincoln sent also two intimate friends, Joshua S. Speed and William Nelson, a lieutenant in the United States navy, to Kentucky to work up Union sentiment. Thus encouraged, the Union-

* *Official Records*, series iii., vol. i., pp. 152.

† *Ibid*, pp. 211-212.

* Shaler, *History of Kentucky*, pp. 242-246.

† Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. iv., p. 234; Shaler, *History of Kentucky*, pp. 246-247; Thomas Speed, *The Union Cause in Kentucky* (1907).

‡ *Official Records*, series iii., vol. i., p. 191.

ists began the formation of Union clubs and home guards.

When the Kentucky legislature adjourned on May 24 the issue was transferred to the people, and the contest took a double form: First, an appeal to the ballot box and, second, a show of military force. In the election held on June 20 the Unionists gained a decisive victory, nine out of ten anti-secession Congressmen being elected, while the Union majority in the State was 54,670.* At the general election of August 5 the Union men secured a majority of three-fourths in each branch of the legislature.† Knowing their strength throughout the State, the Union men were aroused to greater efforts, with the result that Nelson recruited four regiments from central Kentucky, and after the August election assembled them at Camp Dick Robinson between Danville and Lexington. This was denounced by Governor Magoffin as a violation of the neutrality of the State and, on August 19, he wrote to Lincoln urging the removal of the troops from the limits of Kentucky. Five days later Lincoln replied, refusing to accede to the governor's demands.‡ Magoffin addressed Jefferson Davis also, requesting that he remove the Confederate troops from the State, but Davis replied that it was necessary for him to seize upon im-

portant strategical points to prevent their occupation by Union forces.

The legislature was not disposed to favor Magoffin's views and, on September 18, resolved that the Confederate troops which had entered the State should be expelled by the State troops, that aid should be asked from the United States, and that Major Anderson should be requested to enter upon his command immediately.* The Confederates had already seized upon and fortified Hickman and Chalk Bluffs and when Grant, on September 6, marched a force from Cairo to Paducah, he found that place also prepared to receive a Confederate force. Accordingly he issued a proclamation stating that it was his business to deal with armed rebellion and that he would interfere with nothing else. Some days before, the Confederate general, Felix K. Zollicoffer, had seized upon Cumberland Gap in the eastern part of the State, on a plea of military necessity and on September 7 General (Bishop) Leonidas Polk occupied Columbus. On September 20 Anderson assumed command of the district allotted him, and called for Union volunteers to drive out the invaders. Zollicoffer advanced to Barboursville and captured a Union camp. A month later, October 21, he attacked Camp Wild Cat, but was repulsed with severe loss by General Albin Schoepf. In eastern Kentucky a Confederate force had been gathered under Colonel John S. Williams. On Novem-

* Shaler, *History of Kentucky*, p. 247.

† *Ibid.*

‡ See Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. iv., pp. 241-242.

* Shaler, *Kentucky*, pp. 251-253.

ber 8 General Nelson who had advanced against him with two Ohio and detachments of several Kentucky regiments encountered at Ivy Creek a strong detachment thrown forward by Williams. After a well contested engagement Williams was forced from his position and retired through Pound Gap into Virginia. Nelson, with his Ohio regiments, was then ordered to join the column in front of Louisville, where he was assigned to command the 4th division.* Meanwhile, finding his health much impaired by his exertions, General Anderson had resigned, and in October General W. T. Sherman was placed in command. Thenceforth Kentucky showed herself to be heart and soul in the Union.

In March the Missouri convention had declared against secession by a heavy majority,† but after the fall of Sumter and the President's call for troops many Missourians favored an espousal of the Confederate cause. Southern sympathy found a head in Governor Jackson. He endeavored to gain possession of the St. Louis arsenal, but as suspicion had been aroused the commandant was changed and the garrison largely increased, so that on the day the convention decided against secession there were over 400 men behind the arsenal walls.! Francis P. Blair, Jr., brother of Post-

master-General Montgomery Blair, obtained command of the arsenal for Captain Nathaniel Lyon. Upon assuming command of the department in the absence of General William S. Harney, who had been called to Washington, Lyon was directed to muster in and arm four Missouri regiments of volunteers and to send all extra arms to Springfield, Illinois. These orders were issued on April 20 and St. Louis was soon in a state of high excitement. The antagonism grew into armed organizations, the Union volunteers being mustered, armed and drilled at the arsenal, while Governor Jackson recruited volunteers at a camp at Lindell's Grove, christened Camp Jackson in his honor, and commanded by Brigadier-General D. M. Frost.*

On the night of May 8 some cannon, a large supply of ammunition and several hundred muskets brought from the arsenal at Baton Rouge, Louisiana, arrived at Camp Jackson, but Captain Lyon had received information of this and determined to move immediately against the camp, for he feared that a longer delay might enable the camp to assume proportions so formidable as to endanger the safety of the State.† At 2 o'clock on the afternoon of May 10 with a strong battalion of regulars, four regiments of Missouri volunteers, and two regiments of home guards with six pieces

* Century Company, *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, vol. i., pp. 383-384.

† Carr, *Missouri*, pp. 286-290.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 294.

* Carr, *Missouri*, pp. 300-301.

† *Ibid.*, p. 303. See also James Peckham, *General Nathaniel Lyon and Missouri in 1861*; Woodward, *Life of Nathaniel Lyon*.

of artillery Lyon marched against Camp Jackson, gaining commanding positions surrounding the camp and planting his batteries ready for action. On perceiving this movement Frost sent a note to Lyon denying that he or his command or any other of the State forces contemplated action hostile to the United States,* but Lyon refused to receive Frost's letter and sent a written demand for the immediate surrender of Camp Jackson, "with no other conditions than that all persons surrendering under this demand shall be humanely and kindly treated." Frost had no alternative and surrendered with the usual protest. A large amount of ammunition, together with 20 cannon and 1,200 new rifles, were captured. The troops then prepared to march the prisoners to the arsenal for parole but on the return were mobbed and grossly insulted by the people of the city until someone fired a shot and a general mêlée ensued. The troops fired a return volley killing several citizens and wounding many more, whereupon the crowd fled.† Great excitement prevailed and threats of vengeance were made, but it was evident that Lyon was in earnest and not

to be trifled with.* On May 12 General Harney returned from Washington to reassume command. On his arrival the secessionists complained to him of the action of Lyon, and thinking Lyon's course unwarranted Harney began to talk of disbanding the home guards. This brought him into conflict with the Union safety committee and President Lincoln's orders. Delegations of influential citizens advocating both sides went to Washington, but after hearing all the evidence Lincoln decided to sustain Lyon. Accordingly he ordered that Harney be relieved and that Lyon be made a brigadier-general of volunteers.

Meanwhile the legislature had convened in special session at Jefferson City and, when the news of the capture of Camp Jackson arrived, the governor, still claiming and wielding the executive power of the State, sent a train to destroy the telegraph and to burn the railroad bridge over the Osage River. At night the legislature met for business. It appropriated \$3,000,000, authorized an issue of bonds, diverted the school fund, anticipated two years' taxes, made the governor a military dictator, and appointed Sterling Price major-general commanding the Missouri State guard.† These enactments appeared

* Carr, *Missouri*, p. 304.

† *Ibid.*, p. 306. Carr (p. 307) points out that as a matter of fact, Lyon and his coadjutors were "in open, flagrant revolt against the State," and that so far as the National Government sanctioned their action, the capture of Camp Jackson was an act of war against a State which was as much a part of the Union as Illinois or Iowa.

* Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. iv., pp. 212-215. See also Peckham, *General Nathaniel Lyon in Missouri in 1861*; Woodward, *Life of Lyon; Battles and Leaders*, vol. i., p. 265.

† Carr, *Missouri*, pp. 308-309. In this connection see also Samuel B. Harding, *Missouri Party*

particularly hostile to General Harney who on May 14 issued a proclamation defending and justifying the capture of Camp Jackson.* A week later he entered into a sort of truce with General Price concluding with the words:

"We do therefore mutually enjoin upon the people of the State to attend to their civil business of whatever sort it may be; and it is to be hoped that the unquiet elements which have threatened so seriously to disturb the public peace may soon subside and be remembered only to be deplored."†

In spite of this truce, however, Union men in Missouri continued to be driven from their homes and maltreated, and Harney was informed that an invasion was threatened from the Arkansas border. Price denied these persecutions and stated that, if troops entered Missouri from Arkansas or any other State, he would "cause them to return instanter."‡ The Government, however, still distrusted the professions of loyalty by the State authorities and directed Harney to be watchful of their movements. Should a movement be made, hostile to the authority of the United States, whether under color of State authority or not, Harney was to put it down immediately.¶ Harney wrote to the War Department that he still had confidence in the loyalty, honor

and integrity of General Price,* whereupon the order previously sent relieving him of command, but which, on Lincoln's order to Blair, had been withheld,† was delivered, and on June 1 General Lyon was placed in command of the department.‡

On June 11, at St. Louis, Governor Jackson, General Price, and Thomas L. Snead had an interview with Lyon, Blair, and Major Horace A. Conant, at which the governor proposed that the State remain neutral and that he would make no attempt to organize the militia under the military bill if the home guards were withdrawn and a guarantee given that no more Federal troops would be stationed in Missouri. Lyon immediately rejected this proposal, asserting that, rather than allow Missouri to dictate to the National Government, he would see every man, woman, and child in the State dead and buried.¶ Whereupon, after his return to the capital, the governor issued a proclamation calling for 50,000 State militia to repel Federal invasion and to protect life, liberty and property in Missouri. In issuing this proclamation Jackson acknowledged that Missouri was still one of the United States and to a certain extent bound to obey the Govern-

Struggles in the Civil War Period, in *Annual Report of the American Historical Association for 1900*, vol. i., pp. 85-103; Snead, *The Fight for Missouri*.

* *Official Records*, vol. iii., pp. 371-372.

† *Ibid.*, vol. iii., p. 375.

‡ For the correspondence see *ibid.*, pp. 379-380.

¶ *Ibid.*, p. 376.

* *Ibid.*, p. 383.

† Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. iv., p. 217.

‡ Peckham, *General Nathaniel Lyon*, p. 223; Carr, *Missouri*, pp. 310-312.

¶ Carr, *Missouri*, p. 312; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. i., p. 267.

ment, but asserted that allegiance was due first to the State.*

This announcement of active hostility did not take Lyon by surprise. On June 13 he embarked one of his regular batteries and several battalions of Missouri volunteers, steamed up to Jefferson City where he arrived June 15, and took possession of the town without resistance,† Jackson and his adherents, having retreated some 40 miles above to Booneville, cutting off the telegraph and destroying the railroad bridges along the route. Leaving a small guard at the capital, Lyon followed Jackson, reached Booneville on the 17th, landed without difficulty and, after a spirited skirmish, dispersed the hostile forces.‡ The loyal State government was soon regularly restored. The State convention met at Jefferson City on July 22 and took up the task of reconstructing the disorganized machinery of civil administration. The State offices were declared vacant, new elections were provided for, and on July 31 a provisional government was inaugurated with St. Louis as the official headquarters and Hamilton R. Gamble, a conservative Union man, as governor. Though this did not end the fight in Missouri, yet she remained throughout the entire war, both in form and in substance, on the side of the North.||

* Peckham, *General Nathaniel Lyon*, p. 252.

† Carr, *Missouri*, p. 314; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. i., p. 267.

‡ Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. iv., pp. 223-224.

|| For further details see Snead, *The Fight for Missouri*.

Meanwhile, on February 1, at a special session of the legislature, Texas passed an ordinance of secession which was adopted on February 23 by nearly 25,000 majority. Brigadier-General David E. Twiggs had assumed command of the department of Texas, but, sympathizing with the secession movement, asked to be relieved, and on January 28 Colonel C. A. Waite was placed in command of the department.* Five companies of artillery stationed along the Rio Grande were withdrawn by sea and sent to Fort Jefferson at Tortugas, to Fort Taylor, at Key West, and to Washington.† On February 15 Scott ordered Waite, in the event of Texas seceding, to march his entire command to Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; preliminary thereto, however, Waite was to concentrate troops in sufficient bodies to protect their march out of the State.‡ Before this order arrived, a force of secessionists under Benjamin McCulloch marched on San Antonio and took possession of the arsenal and public store houses. Commissioners had been appointed by the State convention to treat with General Twiggs regarding the public property in the State, but after the occupation of San Antonio a peremptory demand was sent to Twiggs to surrender all military posts and public property. As he had insuffi-

* *Official Records*, vol. i., p. 584.

† *Ibid.*, p. 585.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 589.

cient troops to offer successful resistance, the transfer was formally made.* On March 4, after the result of the election regarding secession had become known, Texas was declared to be free and independent, and on March 5 the Confederate States constitution was ratified. Governor Samuel Houston refused to adhere to these enactments, and in a letter to the Confederate Secretary of War resented, on behalf of the people of Texas, "the course pursued in annexing them to a new government without their knowledge or consent."† Nevertheless the convention refused to be set aside, passed an ordinance requiring an oath of allegiance to the Confederate States and, when Houston refused to take the prescribed oath, placed Lieutenant-Governor Edward Clark in power.‡ About two weeks later (April 1) orders from General Scott were received by Colonel Waite directing him to form a strongly intrenched camp at some suitable point convenient to Indianola where he was to remain until the question of secession had been settled by the people and, in case of conflict, to give aid and support to Houston.¶ But if there should be no substantial Union party in the State ready to defend the Federal authority by force of arms, Waite might evacu-

ate the State. Accordingly, as Houston declined the assistance of the Government and protested against the concentration of troops or fortifications in Texas,* Waite began the evacuation. The greater part of the troops got away safely, but before the detachment at Indianola could put to sea, Earl Van Dorn appeared in overwhelming force and compelled their surrender, later allowing them to proceed North on parole.† At about the same time Colonel Waite and his staff at San Antonio were made prisoners,‡ and another detachment was captured at San Lucas Springs.¶ Thus, by the middle of May, Texas was in the hands of the Confederate government.§

Meanwhile, on April 29, the Confederate Congress met at Montgomery. In his address Davis made an elaborate apology for secession. On the 6th of May an act was passed recognizing the existence of war between the United States and the Confederate States and authorizing Davis to issue letters of marque and reprisal. A loan of \$50,000,000 was authorized which might be raised by the sale of 8 per cent. 20-year bonds, or \$20,000,000 of it might be obtained by the issue of Treasury notes without interest, which notes should be receivable for all debts and taxes due the Confederate States with the exception of

* *Ibid*, p. 513 *et seq.* See also *Battles and Leaders*, vol. i., pp. 33-39.

† *Official Records*, vol. i., p. 613.

‡ Elliott, *Sam Houston*, pp. 137-140; Bruce, *Life of Houston*, pp. 203-207; Garrison, *Texas*, pp. 286-287.

¶ *Official Records*, vol. i., pp. 598-599.

* *Ibid*, p. 551.

† *Ibid*, pp. 562-564.

‡ *Ibid*, pp. 552-553.

¶ *Ibid*, p. 568.

§ For other details see Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. iv., pp. 179-191.

the export duty on cotton. All persons were forbidden to pay their debts to individuals or corporations in the United States except in Delaware, Maryland, the District of Columbia, Kentucky, and Missouri, but they were authorized to pay the amount of their indebtedness into the Confederate States Treasury for which a Treasurer's receipt was to be given, redeemable at the restoration of peace. The exportation of cotton was prohibited save through the seaports. After Lincoln had proclaimed an increase of the Union forces, Davis was authorized also to accept without limit volunteers to serve during the war. At this session of the Confederate Congress also Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee and Arkansas were admitted into the Confederacy, and Richmond was designated as the capital of the new government.* The Congress then adjourned to meet on July 20 at Richmond.

Thus 23 States of the Union and 11 States of the Confederacy were arrayed against each other. The Union States, according to the census of 1860, contained about 22,000,000 people against 9,000,000 in the Confederate States, while of the latter 3,500,000 were slaves. The Union had much greater wealth, possessed the money market, and could borrow with greater ease than the South. The Confederacy was chiefly devoted to agriculture and dependent upon Eu-

rope and the North for everything but bread and meat. The North possessed most of the manufactories, and in its armies were mechanics of all kinds and men accustomed to business system, while the Southern army, though containing splendid fighters of rare courage, was composed chiefly of gentlemen and poor whites having little knowledge of the mechanical arts as compared with the men of the North. Furthermore, the North possessed the regular army and navy and all the machinery of government. The ministers from foreign countries were accredited to the United States, and the archives of what had been the common government were also in the possession of the United States.* Many at the South believed or pretended to believe that, at the last moment, the North would not fight, but that the Democrats and Conservatives would oppose the invasion of the seceding States and so hamper the dominant party that it would be unable to consummate its designs. All held the opinion that the stand of the North was unconstitutional and unjust, and hence were united in resisting encroachments upon their rights. Though they knew the immense preponderance of the North in wealth and men, they were by no means dismayed. Tyler wrote, "The numbers opposed to us are immense, but 12,000

* Rhodes, *United States*, vol. iii., p. 396; Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. iv., p. 263.

* Rhodes, *United States*, vol. iii., pp. 397-398. See also Greeley, *American Conflict*, vol. i., pp. 498-516, and the article by A. B. Hart in *New England Magazine* (November, 1891).

Grecians conquered the whole power of Xerxes at Marathon, and our fathers, a mere handful, overcame the enormous power of Great Britain.”* On the other hand, a tremendous task confronted the North. From the nature of the case, the North had to conduct an offensive warfare and hence the fighting must be on Southern soil. For such a task the odds in favor of the North were none too great and, as the result showed, had they been less, the North might have failed.

In warlike materials the South was at a disadvantage. She had about 145,000 muskets and 19,000 rifles, whereas the Union forces had more than 400,000 muskets and over 30,000 rifles. The North possessed numerous private establishments for the manufacture of warlike implements, whereas the South was compelled to erect these after the war started. In powder and facilities for making it, the same disadvantage appeared. To offset these disadvantages, however, the Confederates had secured the adherence of Robert E. Lee, probably one of the greatest generals the world has ever seen, not only in his military capacity but in his private character.

As Lincoln in his proclamation of April 15 had allowed the insurgents 20 days in which to disperse, no forward movement could take place until the end of that time. Geographical position necessitated the advance into Virginia, but at the expiration of the

time allowed by the proclamation the people of Virginia had not voted on secession. Accordingly, it was decided best not to push matters in that section. On May 23, however, when the people voted in favor of secession and Virginia became one of the Confederate States, an advance into Virginia was entirely proper. On May 17, in planning a decisive fall and winter campaign, General Scott wrote to Cameron that, after the safety of the capital had been insured, seven or eight regiments should occupy and fortify Arlington Heights, after which an expedition could be sent to Harper's Ferry.* This movement was intrusted to Colonel J. K. F. Mansfield. On the night of May 23-24 the Union forces under Mansfield crossed the Potomac and took possession of Arlington Heights, the capture of Alexandria and its garrison forming part of the projected work. The 1st Michigan regiment was to attack the city in the rear, while the 11th New York regiment under E. E. Ellsworth was to be landed on the Alexandria wharves. The Confederate commander had his infantry under arms and, just as the Union forces entered the city, hurried his detachment to a waiting train of cars, thus making his escape. A small troop of cavalry, however, ordered to await further movements, was easily captured. Ellsworth led his regiment into the place and, after posting it in a position to prevent surprise, noticed the Confederate flag fly-

* *Letters and Times of the Tylers*, vol. ii., p. 641.

* *Official Records*, series iii., vol. i., p. 233.

ing over the principal hotel, the Marshall House. Though accompanied by only three or four soldiers, Ellsworth, with more enthusiasm than discretion, rushed into the house, mounted to the roof, cut the halyards and started down the stairs with a soldier preceding and another following him. As he was about to pass the doorway the proprietor of the house sprang from concealment and discharged the contents of a double barrel shotgun full in the colonel's heart. As Ellsworth fell dead, one of his companions killed the assassin. This created a profound sensation in the North, while on the other hand the Southern press lauded the deed.*

After the occupation of Arlington Heights and Alexandria, Scott turned his attention to Harper's Ferry. The command of the Pennsylvania volunteers assigned to the campaign against this post was given to General Robert Patterson. At this time there were about 7,000 Confederates of all arms at Harper's Ferry,† whereas Patterson had more than 17 regiments. Patterson reached Williamsport about June 15, only to find that the Confederates had destroyed the railroad bridge over the Potomac, abandoned their heavy guns, and retreated above Winchester, tearing up the tracks of

the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad as they went.* The retreat of the Confederates seems to have satisfied Patterson who designed no pursuit, simply proposing to hold and fortify Harper's Ferry and open the railroad to the West.† Several other skirmishes took place at different points in Virginia. The Confederate earthworks near Fortress Monroe were shelled; a battery on the Potomac near Aquia Creek was bombarded with no very decided effect; and on June 1 Lieutenant Charles H. Tompkins with a company of cavalry made a bold dash into Fairfax Court House and defeated a detachment of Confederates found there. At Romney a severe engagement occurred. This place was important as an outpost of the Union troops guarding the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and also as a base for operations up the valley of the south branch of the Potomac. It was held, early in June of 1861, by Colonel Angus McDonald, with about 500 Virginia troops and two guns. On the night of June 12 Colonel Lewis Wallace, with 800 men of the 11th Indiana regiment, went by rail from Cumberland to New Creek Station, and, marching across the mountains, attacked and routed McDonald on the 13th, on the same day starting to return. Information of Wallace's movement reached General J. E. Johnston, commanding the Confederate forces at Harper's Ferry,

* Duyckinck, *The Late Civil War*, vol. i., pp. 195-202; Pollard, *First Year of the War*, vol. i., pp. 72-76; Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. iv., pp. 313-314; Nicolay, *The Outbreak of Rebellion*, chap. ix.

† J. E. Johnston, *Narrative of Military Operations*, p. 22.

* *Battles and Leaders*, vol. i., pp. 111-125.

† Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. iv., p. 317.

on the morning of the 14th, and supposing it to be the advance of General McClellan's column from West Virginia to coöperate with General Patterson, who was threatening to cross the Potomac at Williamsport, Johnston ordered Colonel A. P. Hill, with three regiments, to march on Romney, 45 miles west, drive out Wallace, and destroy the bridges of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad west of Cumberland. Hill reached Romney, but Wallace had fallen back to Cumberland. The night of the 18th Hill sent Colonel Vaughn, with four companies of infantry, to destroy the bridge of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad over New Creek, guarded by about 200 local militia and two guns. Vaughn crossed the north branch of the Potomac, beyond which the Union troops had taken position, and put them to flight, captured the two guns and a set of colors, burned the bridge over the mouth of New Creek, and then pushed on to Piedmont, five miles westward, destroyed parts of the railroad, cut the telegraph wires, and then returned to Winchester. Later, the position at New Creek was fortified and garrisoned to protect the railroad bridge.*

Meanwhile the Confederates had strongly intrenched themselves at Big Bethel where they had established a battery. Accordingly a secret expedition under General Butler was sent to drive them out. Late on the night of June 9 the Federal advance guard

under General E. W. Peirce reached Little Bethel, a few miles from Big Bethel, and made prisoners of the pickets. Everything promised success, but unhappily the main body of Federal troops consisting of two regiments, which had taken a different route, came upon their own advance guard and, mistaking them for enemies, fired into them with both cannon and musketry, killing 2 and wounding 19. This gave warning to the Confederates who lost no time in preparing a defence. Hence the expedition proved a failure and, after an hour of purposeless manœuvering, the order was given to retreat. The Union forces sustained a loss of 18 killed and 53 wounded.*

When Virginia, on May 23, voted on the ordinance of secession, a heavy majority was registered in western and northwestern Virginia against it, thus evidencing the wish of the people in those sections to adhere to the Union.† On April 22, before the election was held, a meeting had taken place at Clarksburg, Harrison County, at which the initial step was taken to separate the eastern and western parts of the State. Delegates were chosen from the various counties west of the Alleghanies, and on May 13, at a convention at Wheeling, resolutions

* Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. iv., pp. 319-320; the biography of General Peirce in *National Cyclopædia of American Biography*, vol. xiii., p. 106; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. ii., pp. 148-151; *Confederate Military History*, vol. iii., pp. 134-141, and vol. iv., pp. 17-20.

† Rhodes, *United States*, vol. iii., p. 387.

* *Confederate Military History*, vol. iii., p. 76.

were passed condemning the ordinance of secession as unconstitutional, null and void, and declaring the annexation to the Southern Confederacy "a plain and palpable violation of the Constitution of the State and utterly subversive of the rights and liberties of the good people thereof." At the same time provision was made for a convention of the people to be held at Wheeling on June 11 in case the ordinance of secession should be ratified as was proposed on May 23. On June 11 representatives of 40 counties assembled at Wheeling and took oath to support the Constitution and laws of the United States. On the 19th an ordinance was adopted creating a provisional State government, and Francis H. Pierpont was appointed governor. On July 22 the newly chosen legislature met, the new government was recognized by the President, two Senators were chosen to take the place of those who had resigned, and various other acts were passed.*

Meanwhile Governor Letcher had called out the militia of West Virginia and ordered officers to protect the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and guard the frontier of the State against invasion by way of Ohio and Pennsylvania. The principal officer assigned to this duty was Colonel George A. Porterfield, who, on May 4, was ordered by General R. E. Lee to Grafton to call out the militia and


enroll volunteers to protect the railroad and encourage secession sentiment. When informed of this, General George B. McClellan, in command of the Union department of the Ohio, including West Virginia, ordered his troops to move to the Ohio, and four regiments were crossed on the 27th, reaching Grafton on the 30th. Porterfield abandoned Grafton on the 28th, retreating 15 miles south to Philippi, in Tygart's River Valley. General T. A. Morris, with a brigade of Indiana troops, arrived at Grafton on June 1, and was given command of the Union troops in West Virginia. Upon his arrival he found that Colonel B. F. Kelley, 1st Virginia (Union) regiment, under instructions from McClellan, had planned an expedition to surprise and capture Porterfield. Morris enlarged it by sending another column, under Colonel Dumont, of the 7th Indiana, to coöperate with Kelley. Kelley had about 1,500 men of the 1st Virginia, 9th Indiana, and 16th Ohio, and Dumont, the 7th Indiana, part of the 6th, 14th Ohio and two guns of Barnett's Ohio artillery. Both columns made a night march, Kelley starting from Thornton and Dumont from Webster, and converging on Philippi, which was to be attacked about 4 A. M. on June 3. Dumont reached the hills overlooking Philippi soon after the appointed time, and, without waiting for Kelley, opened fire with his artillery upon Porterfield's camp, taking it by surprise, in the midst of which Kelley came in from

* *The South in the Building of the Nation*, vol. i., pp. 365-384.

the other direction, but not soon enough to intercept the Confederate retreat. Though surprised, Porterfield, by his coolness, courage, and energy, got his men off with but few casualties, and the loss of some public stores and private baggage, and retreated in good order to Beverly, some 30 miles southeast, and the Union troops occupied Philippi. Colonel Kelley was the only person wounded on the Union side, and only three Confederates were wounded.*

After this reverse General Lee ordered General Henry A. Wise to the Kanawha Valley and General Robert S. Garnett to the Cheat Mountain region, the latter to relieve Porterfield, recover lost ground, and secure control of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. Ascertaining that Garnett had taken post at Laurel Hill near Beverly, McClellan determined to drive him out. The long turnpike lay through the Alleghanies from Staunton to the Ohio branches at Beverly in the Cheat River valley, one line going to Buckhannon through a pass over Rich Mountain and the other to Philippi through a pass in the same range 17 miles toward the North, which is named Laurel Hill. Arriving toward the end of June, Garnett established Lieutenant-Colonel John Pegram in the pass at Rich Mountain with a regiment and 4 guns, while he took post at Laurel Hill with three or

four regiments, leaving a small detachment at Beverly. Early in July McClellan sent Brigadier-General T. A. Morris with about 4,000 men to Philippi to confront Garnett at Laurel Hill and threaten a main attack, while he himself moved with seven regiments from Clarksburg by way of Buckhannon so as to attack the



enemy's left at Rich Mountain. The column under McClellan consisted of 10,000 men with 12 guns, and was organized into three brigades under General W. S. Rosecrans, N. Schleich, and Colonel R. L. McCook. On July 6 Morris was ordered to march his brigade from Philippi to within a mile and a half of Garnett's position at

* *Battles and Leaders*, vol. i., pp. 126-128; *Confederate Military History*, vol. ii., pt. ii., pp. 14-16; vol. iii., pp. 43-45.

Laurel Hill and, on the 9th, McClellan had three brigades of his own column at Roaring Creek, two miles from the position occupied by Colonel Pegram. It was arranged that early on the morning of the 11th Rosecrans with 1,900 men should gain the road in Pegram's rear, march down it and attack, and that at the sound of the engagement in the rear McClellan would attack in front.* After a very hard march through a rain storm Rosecrans came upon the enemy's skirmishers. Pegram had been warned of danger to his rear and during the morning had sent two detachments to Hart's Farm at the summit of the mountain with Major J. A. DeLagnel in command of 310 men and one gun. Rosecrans was repulsed at first, but after a sharp engagement of nearly two hours drove the Confederates from their position just as Pegram was approaching with reinforcements and another gun. A part of the reinforcements became involved in the defeat and Rosecrans captured 21 prisoners, two brass 6-pounders and 50 stand of arms, with a loss to himself of 12 killed and 49 wounded.† The noise of the engagement had been heard by McClellan who prepared for an attack in the front, but the long continuance of the artillery fire on the mountain and the cheering in Pegram's camp convinced him that Rosecrans had been defeated. Hence he

did not make the attack, but at night withdrew his troops beyond Roaring Creek. At the same time, finding himself caught between hostile forces, Pegram abandoned his camp and marched northwest along the mountain to join Garnett at Laurel Hill. At daybreak of the 12th Rosecrans entered Pegram's abandoned camp, took two more guns, and then sent word to McClellan of his success.

The forces engaged with Rosecrans on the mountain top succeeded in passing around his right during the night to Beverly where they were joined by the 44th Virginia, and the retreat was continued through Huttonsville and across Cheat Mountain to Greenbrier River and then to Monterey. Pegram had abandoned his works intending to follow his detachment to Beverly, but in the darkness his column was broken up and only a part reached that place. Pegram led the remainder to join Garnett, marching all day of the 12th and halting at night in the valley six miles north of Beverly. There Pegram learned that Garnett had retreated northward and that McClellan was at Beverly. Seeing no chance of escape Pegram sent to McClellan an offer of surrender, which was accepted, and the next morning Pegram, 30 officers and nearly 500 men became prisoners.* Meanwhile Garnett at Laurel Hill, learning of the disaster to Pegram, on the 11th aban-

* Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. iv., pp. 334-335.

† *Official Records*, vol. ii., p. 217.

* *Battles and Leaders*, vol. i., pp. 128-137; *Confederate Military History*, vol. ii., pt. ii., pp. 18-22; vol. iii., pp. 45-56; vol. vi., pp. 65-67.

doned his works and retreated toward Beverly. At daybreak of the 12th, when within five miles of that place, he received erroneous information that it had already been occupied by McClellan, whereupon he retraced his steps and retreated northward toward St. George and West Union, hoping to escape by the northwestern turnpike. At noon of the 13th, however, he was overtaken by Morris at the forks of the Cheat River and was killed in a desultory skirmish fire between sharpshooters at Carrick's Ford. His army continued the retreat through Red House, Greenland and Petersburg to Monterey. On the 12th McClellan occupied Beverly and Huttonsville, on the 14th pushing his advance to the summit of the Cheat Mountain. Leaving the force there and at Huttonsville, he returned to Beverly on the 16th. On the 19th he issued an address to his soldiers full of encouraging words, and a few days later (after the Bull Run disaster) was summoned by the President to command the army of the Potomac while the army of occupation in western Virginia was assigned to General Rosecrans. Thereafter the secession movement never had a foothold in western Virginia. The political transformation of the State begun by the Wheeling convention went on unchecked until, in June of 1863, West Virginia was formally admitted into the Union.

Meanwhile, in eastern Tennessee, a convention of the people had met at

Knoxville on May 30, attended by more than 1,000 representatives of the people. Thomas Nelson was chosen president. Secession was denounced and the people throughout the State were besought to resist it and vote it down on the day appointed, June 8. To this appeal the people of the eastern counties heartily responded. In 29 counties the vote reached 32,923 against secession to 14,780 in its favor. As proclaimed by Governor Harris, the vote of the entire State stood 104,019 for separation and 47,238 against.

In compliance with the President's proclamation of April 15, a special session of the Thirty-Seventh Congress met at Washington on July 4, 1861. Senators from 25 States and 159 Representatives were present soon after the opening. Galusha A. Grow, of Pennsylvania, was elected Speaker on the second ballot. The next day President Lincoln sent in his special session message.* Outside of a discussion of events up to this date, the most important part of the message was the request for at least 400,000 men and \$400,000,000, to make the contest "a short and decisive one." Congress exceeded the President's request, a new army bill providing for the enlistment of 500,000 volunteers and a loan of \$250,000,000 being authorized. The tariff duties were in-

* For which see Richardson, *Messages and Papers*, vol. vi., pp. 20-31. Excerpts are given in Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. iv., pp. 371-375.

creased also. A direct tax of \$20,000,000 and an income tax were imposed, whereby it was hoped \$75,000,000 would be realized during the fiscal year.* Moreover the regular army was increased by 11 new regiments. The President was authorized to close insurrectionary ports of entry by proclamation, was granted permission to hire, purchase, or contract for vessels, and to enlist seamen for three years or during the war, and a considerable number of important amendments to existing laws were passed. Authority was granted the President to collect duty on shipboard. The Force Bill of 1795 was amended so that, in addition to calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrection, and repel invasions, authority was granted to suppress "rebellion against the authority of the Government of the United States." Conspiracy against the Government was made punishable, unlawful recruiting was prohibited, and the law punishing piracy was amended.

In his message the President spoke of his extraordinary acts since Sumter fell. He believed that the call for 75,000 militia and the blockade proclamation were legal, but he wished Congress to ratify them, as well as the call for the three years' troops and the increase of the regular army and navy. Reso-

lutions ratifying these acts were introduced and met with little direct opposition save from the extreme Democrats. All seemed to agree that the call for 75,000 militia and the blockade proclamation were strictly legal. Some argued that, if they were legal, there was no reason for Congress to approve them, whereas, if they were illegal, no power of Congress could validate them. There was much disagreement in both branches of Congress about the suspension of the writ of *habeas corpus*. However, there was an unwillingness toward opening a serious discussion which might interfere with the prompt disposal of such legislation as was immediately necessary. During the last days of the session a bill to increase the pay of privates was introduced. To this bill was attached a section ratifying the acts and proclamation of the President respecting the regular army and navy, and the volunteers from the loyal States. In this shape the act was passed with only five negative votes, all of which came from the border slave States. In the House only 19 opposed it. On July 19 Clark, of New Hampshire, moved the expulsion from the Senate, on the ground of their being engaged in a conspiracy against the Government, of Mason and Hunter, of Virginia, Clingman and Bragg, of North Carolina, Chestnut, of South Carolina, Nicholson, of Tennessee, Sebastian and Mitchell, of Arkansas, and Hemphill and Wigfall, of Texas. This was accordingly done.

* The income tax was 3 per cent. on incomes over \$800. Coffee and tea were taken from the free list and a duty of 4 cents and 15 cents per lb., respectively, imposed. The duty on sugar was considerably augmented.

On the day after the battle of Bull Run, while the Crittenden resolution was being considered in the House, the Judiciary Committee of the Senate reported an amendment to a pending bill to confiscate property of persons engaged in the rebellion used for insurrectionary purposes. Senator Trumbull stated that the amendment provided:

"That if any person held to labor or service in any State, under the laws thereof (by which, of course, is meant a slave in any of those States) is employed in aid of this rebellion, in digging ditches or entrenchments, or in other way, or if used for carrying guns, or if used to destroy this government by the consent of his master, his master shall forfeit all right to him and he shall be forever discharged." *

This amendment was opposed by Crittenden as being unconstitutional and dangerous, but in spite of his influence the bill was passed by a large majority.†

Meanwhile the country demanded a forward movement of the army. On June 26, 1861, the *New York Tribune* contained this injunction, "Forward to Richmond! Forward to Richmond! The rebel Congress must not be allowed to meet there on the 20th of July. By that date the place must be held by the National army."‡ On June 29 President Lincoln called a council of war of his Cabinet members and of prominent military men to consider the best plan of campaign. By request General Irvin McDowell sub-

mitted a plan of attack on Beauregard who had at Manassas Junction and within easy distance an effective force of 21,900 men. McDowell said that, if Joseph E. Johnston's force of 9,000 men then in the Shenandoah Valley could be prevented by Major-General Patterson from joining Beauregard, and if Major-General Butler engaged the force then in his vicinity, he would make the movement against Beauregard.* General Scott did not approve the plan of fighting a battle in Virginia, but assured McDowell that if "Johnston joins Beauregard he shall have Patterson right on his heels." With this understanding it was decided and ordered that McDowell should enter on his preparations and that the movement should begin on July 9. The advance was not made as soon as intended, however, and July 16 had come before McDowell's "grand army" marched to the front. This army consisted of five divisions, commanded respectively by Brigadier-General Daniel Tyler (four brigades), Colonel David Hunter (two brigades), Colonel S. P. Heintzelman (four brigades), Brigadier-General Theodore Runyon (two brigades), and Colonel Dixon S. Miles (three brigades). General Runyon with the fourth division was left behind as a reserve in the region of the fortifications to guard communications. The advance division (Tyler's) reached Centreville on the morning of the 18th, and a brigade was sent ahead

* *Congressional Globe*, pp. 218-219.

† For further details of the session, see Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. iv., chap. xxi.

‡ Rhodes, *United States*, vol. iii., p. 437; Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. iv., p. 321.

* *Official Records*, vol. ii., pp. 720-721.

to reconnoitre. After a sharp skirmish in which both sides lost about 60 men, the Union troops withdrew toward Centreville, to which point, hearing of the operations at Blackburn's Ford, McDowell directed the concentration of four divisions.*

The Confederate "Army of the Potomac" had been concentrated at Manassas under General P. G. T. Beauregard. In expectation of a Union advance Beauregard occupied the south bank of Bull Run for eight miles; from Union Mills Ford at the crossing of the railroad to Alexandria to the stone bridge at the Warrenton turnpike, three brigades were thrown forward of that position, one of them to Fairfax Court House. These brigades fell back before the Union advance, skirmishing slightly. Richard S. Ewell's brigade, the right of the line, was at Union Mills, with Theophilus H. Holmes in support; David R. Jones' brigade at McLean's Ford; James B. Longstreet's at Blackburn's Ford; Milledge L. Bonham's between Mitchell's and Ball's Fords; Philip S. Cocke's at Lewis' Ford; and Nathan G. Evans' at the Stone bridge, forming the Confederate left. Johnston's army of the Shenandoah had arrived, and of this Jackson's brigade was in support of Bonham, and Bernard E. Bee and F. S. Bartow in support of Cocke.

Johnston had received a telegram

from the Confederate government on the morning of July 18 to join Beauregard if practicable.* To do this it was necessary to defeat Patterson or to elude him. Patterson had received so many false reports that Johnston's army had been magnified in his mind from a force of 9,000 to 35,000.† On the 15th Patterson advanced to Bunker Hill, prepared to attack if opportunity offered.‡ He was then within 9 miles of Johnston's camp at Winchester, and now had the opportunity to crush Johnston, since he could throw against Johnston's force of 12,000 an army of from 18,000 to 22,000. Instead of remaining where he was, attacking Johnston, or placing himself between the Confederates and the Shenandoah River, Patterson marched directly away from them, on the 17th going to Charlestown, 22 miles from Winchester, thus allowing Johnston an excellent opportunity to escape, which he did and on July 20 joined Beauregard's army. On this day Patterson first learned that Johnston had left Winchester with his whole force and so telegraphed to Washington.||

From each of the fords before mentioned fair roads ran to Centreville. Beauregard had planned an attack upon Centreville, with an advance of

* *Official Records*, vol. ii., p. 478.

† *Ibid.*, p. 172.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 166.

|| *Ibid.*, p. 172. See also Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. iv., pp. 344-346; Rhodes, *United States*, vol. iii., pp. 445-446; *Confederate Military History*, vol. iii., pp. 85-88.

* Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. iv., pp. 341-342; Rhodes, *United States*, vol. iii., p. 444.

his whole force upon that point. The orders for such an advance and attack were duly written out and approved by General Johnston early on Sunday morning, July 21, but at sunrise this plan was rendered impossible by McDowell's initiative, and a modification was proposed by Beauregard—to stand on the defensive with the left flank at the station bridge and attack the Union right from the region of Blackburn's ford. This suggestion was approved by Johnston and ordered to be carried out.*

The Union army lay encamped about Centreville, from which place the Warrenton turnpike ran westward over a stone bridge crossing Bull Run to Gainesville, several miles beyond. Unaware that Johnston had joined Beauregard, McDowell determined to seize Gainesville to prevent such a junction. As the stone bridge was thought to be defended in force besides being mined, no crossing was considered, and late on Saturday it was reported that Sudley Ford, two or three miles above, could be carried easily by an attacking column. Accordingly, McDowell called a council of war and announced his plan of battle for the following day. Tyler's division was to advance on the Warrenton turnpike and threaten the

stone bridge. Hunter and Heintzelman were to make a detour across Sudley Ford, and, advancing on the enemy's side of Bull Run, carry the batteries at the stone bridge by a rear attack, thus allowing Tyler to cross and join in the main battle.*


Tyler's division was slow in getting out on the road and hindered the divisions which were to make the detour. Tyler marched to the stone bridge, and at 6.30 fired signal guns to show that he was in position. Hunter and Heintzelman did not come to their designated positions until the middle of the morning. The Confederate general, Evans, had discovered the movement and withdrew 11 companies of his division and formed them on a ridge half a mile north of the road just as the head of Hunter's column entered the open fields which extended a mile north of the Warrenton road. The Union troops engaged far outnumbered the Confederates, but Evans made a stubborn resistance and was soon supported by Bee's brigade and Imboden's battery. While the position was hotly contested, the Confederates were pressed back down the hill, across the valley of Young's branch, a tributary of Bull Run, to the plateau south of it on which were the Robinson and Hunter houses. But the Union column was constantly swelling with the arrival of batteries and regulars. Two of Tyler's brig-

* *Official Records*, vol. ii., pp. 484-488; Johnston, *Narrative of Military Operations during the Late War*, pp. 41, 42, 47. Cf. also the chapter by General Johnston, *Responsibilities of the First Bull Run Battle in Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, vol. i., p. 244 et seq.

* *Official Records*, vol. ii., p. 326.

ades found a ford across Bull Run, a short distance above the stone bridge, and joined Hunter and Heint-

sisting, began to disintegrate. At 12 o'clock Johnston's troops wavered and broke and were swept back across



zelman in their advance. The fighting was desperate until noon, when the Confederate line, while stubbornly re-

and out of the valley of the Warrenton turnpike, and down the road running southward from Sudley Ford to

Manassas Junction.* At that hour a Union victory seemed assured. Beauregard's plan to make a counter attack from his right flank against Centreville had failed through the miscarriage of orders and, leaving Johnston at headquarters to watch the entire field of action, Beauregard hastened in person toward the field of battle in order to check the tide of defeat. As the troops retreated before the Union forces up the slope of the plateau about the Hunter house, they came upon T. J. Jackson's brigade standing in line calmly waiting the onset. It is stated by some that at this time Jackson won his sobriquet of "Stonewall."†

Johnston, however, did not stay at headquarters, but rode furiously to the scene of action and impressively and gallantly charged to the front with the colors of the 4th Alabama regiment at his side. It was high noon when the two Confederate generals appeared on the field, and from this time until 3 o'clock the battle

surged. The troops on the line of Bull Run that had been held there by the demonstrations of two Union brigades designed to mask McDowell's turning movement, were ordered in haste to the new line which was at right angles to the first. The hottest part of the contest was for the possession of the Henry plateau. The Union troops had seized it, brought forward James B. Ricketts' and Charles Griffin's batteries of regulars, and placed them in an effective position. The Confederates tried to capture these batteries in two charges, but were repulsed. At 2 o'clock Beauregard gave the order to advance to recover the plateau. Jackson's brigade pierced the centre and the forward lines were broken and swept back from the open ground of the plateau. The Union troops rallied, however, recovered their ground, and drove the Confederates entirely from the plateau and beyond it out of sight. In this position the troops were, at 3 o'clock. At this time E. Kirby Smith's brigade of Johnston's army,

* Beauregard, who, as he says, was "opportunistically informed" of McDowell's purpose to advance upon Manassas, claims it as a stroke of policy that his men retreated and thereby deceived McDowell as to his ulterior designs at Bull Run. Major Barnard, chief-engineer of the Army of the Potomac, has criticised this costly reconnaissance by General Tyler in severe terms, and pronounces that the affair had a bad effect upon the morale of the Union troops. Swinton (*Army of the Potomac*, p. 47) terms it "silly ambition" on the part of Tyler to do as he did.

† It is so stated by Daniels, Dabney, Cooke and Mrs. Jackson, and by Henderson (*Stonewall Jackson*, vol. i., p. 178), but General D. H. Hill in the *Century Magazine* (February, 1894) says the tale is a sheer fabrication. In a letter to the

editors, the Rev. James Power Smith, president of the Jackson Monument Association, says:

"I was a private at my gun in the Rockbridge Artillery—at the First Battle of Manassas—with Jackson's command. I did not of course hear General Bee utter the famous words that gave Jackson his imperishable name. But I heard of it soon after.

"When the troops were broken and falling back, Gen. Bee cried, 'See, there stands Jackson like a stone wall—rally behind the Virginians!' I have always supposed that the appearance of Jackson's Virginia regiment, a long gray line—standing firm over the grassy slope—suggested the word 'Stonewall'—they looked like a stone wall."



From the original Brady negative.

SECTION OF THE BATTLEFIELD OF THE FIRST BULL RUN OR MANASSAS, SHOWING THE ENTANGLEMENTS IN WHICH THE TROOPS FOUGHT.

2,300 strong, arrived on the field and was hurled at McDowell's right. Jubal A. Early's brigade of Beauregard's force, from the extreme right of his line, hastened beyond Smith's brigade now under the command of Colonel Arnold Elzey and, supported by J. E. B. Stuart's cavalry, appeared directly on the Union right flank. At the same time two regiments from Bonham and two from Cocke arrived upon the Union right, these being a part of Beauregard's army also. This turned the check which that portion of the Union line had received first into a retreat and then into a disorganized withdrawal. In vain did McDowell's officers attempt to rally the Union soldiers. The battalion of regular infantry alone obeyed commands, covering the volunteers' retreat until the columns were well off the field, the right retracing its long detour by Sudley Spring. The Confederates proceeded as far as Cub Run, half way to Centreville, where one of their batteries broke up the wagons and batteries on the bridge, compelling the abandonment of 13 guns. From this point the movement to the rear was still farther disorganized, to which condition the vehicles of many visitors, Congressmen, correspondents, and officials largely contributed. An attempt to rally the troops at Centreville failed, as did the attempt at Fairfax Court House. From the latter place McDowell telegraphed, "The larger part of the men are a confused mob, entirely demoral-

ized. * * *. They are pouring through this place in a state of utter disorganization.'"* The flight of the troops continued until they reached the fortifications south of the Potomac, and many soldiers retreated as far as Washington.†

After the severe stress in which the Confederate leaders found themselves from 11 o'clock till about 3, the sudden change from a dashing assault to a general retreat and widespread panic was as much a surprise to the Confederate as to the Union commanders. Not until the second day after the battle did the Confederates ascertain the full extent of the Union stampede. Upon this point President Davis wrote Beauregard: "You will not fail to remember, so far from knowing that the enemy was routed, a

* *Official Records*, vol. ii., p. 316.

† McDowell's strength at Centreville appears to have been about 28,000 men and 49 guns, but his report says he crossed Bull Run with about 18,000 men. A very careful estimate made from official records in 1884 by General James B. Fry, McDowell's adjutant-general at the battle, gives the number actually engaged as 17,676. General Beauregard reported his strength at the opening of the battle as 27,833 men and 49 guns, and after the arrival of Jackson's troops and Holmes' brigade in the afternoon as 31,972 men and 57 guns. An estimate by his adjutant-general, James Jordan, fixed the number actually engaged at 18,053, so that the two sides were about equal on the firing line. As reported, the Union loss was: killed, 460; wounded, 1,124; missing, 1,312; total, 2,896; while 29 guns were abandoned or captured. The Confederate loss was: killed, 387; wounded, 1,582; missing, 13; total, 1,982. Cf. these figures with those in Rhodes, *United States*, vol. iii., p. 450; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. i., p. 193; *Official Records*, vol. ii., pp. 327, 328, 570, 571; Pollard, *First Year of the War*, p. 101; Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. iv., p. 357.

large part of our forces was moved by you in the night of the 21st to repel a supposed attack upon our right, and the next day's operations did not fully reveal what has since been reported of the enemy's panic." William T. Sherman writes: "It is now generally admitted that Bull Run was one of the best planned battles of the war but one of the worst fought."*

It may well be supposed that Lincoln was under a terrible strain during that eventful Sunday. The early reports of the battle were encouraging, and having reason to believe that the victory would rest with the Union army he went out for an afternoon drive. Upon his return he received a telegram stating that McDowell's

army was in full retreat through Centreville, that the day was lost, that the routed troops would not reform, and that Washington should be saved.* He heard the crushing news with fortitude and without the slightest change of expression. The President's Cabinet then met at Scott's office to await further news. When a telegram from McDowell confirmed the disaster,† the discussion turned on preparations for the future. All available troops were rushed forward to McDowell's support. Baltimore was put on the alert. Telegrams were sent to the recruiting stations in the North to forward their organized regiments to Washington, and McClellan was ordered, "to come down to the Shenandoah Valley with such troops as can be spared from Western Virginia."‡ At night things seemed to grow worse. McDowell's first dispatch had indicated that he could hold Centreville, but his later dispatches showed that the army was completely demoralized and that there was no alternative but to fall back to the Potomac.

When the Northern people learned the truth of the overwhelming disaster, dismay was in every heart. But the discouragement was of short duration. Only a few were disposed to give up the conquest, though it was perceived that instead of a short campaign the war would be long and

* *Memoirs*, p. 181. For other accounts, *Battles and Leaders*, vol. i., pp. 167-261; Roman, *The Military Operations of General Beauregard in the War between the States*; Early's account in *Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government*, vol. i., p. 392 *et seq.*; Rhodes, *United States*, vol. iii., p. 444-452; Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. iv., chap. xx.; Nicolay, *The Outbreak of Rebellion*, pp. 169-212; Duykinck, *Late Civil War*, vol. i., pp. 402-416; T. C. C. (an English combatant), *Battlefields of the South from Bull Run to Fredericksburg*; George Baylor, *Bull Run to Bull Run, or Four Years in the Army of Northern Virginia*, etc. (1900); W. H. Russell, *On the Battle of Bull Run* (1861); Beauregard, *A Commentary on the Campaign and Battle of Manassas of July, 1861* (1891); Longstreet, *From Manassas to Appomattox*; N. M. Curtis, *From Bull Run to Chancellorsville* (1906); Johnston, *Narrative of Military Operations*; biographies of Johnston by B. T. Johnston, and R. M. Hughes; biographies of Jackson by M. Addey (1863), R. L. Dabney (1866), J. E. Cooke (1866), Sarah N. Randolph (1876), G. F. R. Henderson (1898), C. Hovey (1900), J. Anderson (1904), D. D. White (1908), James H. Wood (1910); *Confederate Military History*, vol. i., pp. 416-420; vol. ii., pp. 54-57; vol. iii., pp. 91-122; vol. iv., pp. 21-24; vol. v., pp. 21-28; vol. vi., pp. 67-69.

* *Official Records*, vol. ii., p. 747.

† *Ibid.*, p. 316.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 749.

severe. Accordingly, recruiting went on with vigor, volunteers agreeing to serve for three years or during the war. In a week the North had recovered from its dejection, and had girded itself anew for the conflict. In the South the people received the news with expressions of profound gratitude to the "God of Battles." The Confederate Congress recognized "the hand of the King of Kings and the Lord of Lords" in the "mighty

deliverance" of their people. There were keen regrets that the Confederate army did not push on to Washington. The Confederates fully realized that the North would not give up the conflict and felt that their own exertions must be unrelenting and energetic. Stephens wrote: "I have no idea that the North will give it up. Their defeat will increase their energy."*

CHAPTER II.

1861.

THE TRENT AFFAIR, CONTRABAND AND MILITARY EMANCIPATION.

Acts of the Confederate Congress — Privateering — The Trent affair — The question of the disposition of fugitive slaves — The battle of Carthage, Missouri — The appointment of Frémont to command the Western Department — The battle of Wilson's Creek — Frémont's emancipation proclamation — Lincoln's instructions to modify it — The siege of Lexington — Frémont's quarrel with Blair and subsequent removal.

Meanwhile on July 20, 1861, the day before the battle of Bull Run, the Confederate Congress met for the first time at Richmond. Among other things in his message to Congress Davis said:

"The rapid progress of events, for the last few weeks, has fully sufficed to lift the veil behind which the true policy and purpose of the government of the United States had been previously concealed. Their odious features now stand fully revealed. The message of their president, and the action of their Congress during the present month, confess their intention of the *subjugation* of these states by a war, by which it is impossible to attain the proposed result, while its dire calamities, not to be avoided by us, will fall with double severity on themselves. * * * These enormous preparations in men and money, for the conduct of the war, on a scale more grand than any which the new world ever witnessed, is a distinct avowal, in the eyes of civilized man,

that the United States are engaged in a conflict with a great and powerful nation. They are at last compelled to abandon the pretence of being engaged in dispersing rioters and suppressing insurrections, and are driven to the acknowledgment that the ancient Union has been dissolved. They recognize the separate existence of these Confederate states, by an interdictive embargo and blockade of all commerce between them and the United States, not only by sea, but by land; not only in ships, but in cars; not only with those who bear arms, but with the entire population of the Confederate states. Finally, they have repudiated the foolish conceit that the inhabitants of this confederacy are still citizens of the United States; for they are waging an indiscriminate war upon them all, with savage ferocity, unknown in modern civilization."

* Johnston and Browne, *Life of Stephens*, p. 407. Johnston (in his *Narrative*, p. 60) said, however, that many of the Southern volunteers believing the objects of the war had been accomplished by the one victory left the army never to return.

He then announced his purpose of retaliating on account of the privateersmen captured by the United States and on trial for piracy. Various measures were adopted by Congress, principally looking to financial difficulties which now began to press heavily upon the Confederate government. Besides the "Produce Loan," treasury notes were authorized to the extent of \$100,000,000, and a war tax was imposed. The army was reported as numbering 210,000 men in the field, and Davis was authorized to increase this number by 400,000 men and also to enlarge the navy. In retaliation for the confiscation act of the Union Congress, a law providing for the sequestration of the estates and property of alien enemies was passed; and another act defined as alien enemies all citizens of the United States, except those residing in the Confederacy who should declare their intentions to become citizens of the Confederate states, and who should acknowledge the authority of the Confederate government. After a short session the Congress adjourned on August 31 to meet again in November. During the fall of 1861 the Confederate district courts, at Richmond, Charleston, Savannah, and New Orleans were largely occupied with proceedings under the sequestration act, and the proceedings appear to have been conducted in as orderly a manner and with as great regard to the rights of the defendant

as would have obtained in similar cases at the North.*

Privateering was a matter of much importance to the Confederates, since it afforded them an opportunity to inflict great damage on the commerce of the North. Toward the middle of June the *Savannah*, a schooner of 54 tons, carrying an 18-pound pivot gun, and a crew of 22 men, slipped out of Charleston harbor and, after capturing a prize, fell in with the United States frigate *Perry*, Lieutenant E. G. Parrott commanding. The *Savannah* was captured and sent with a prize crew to New York, while her officers and crew were taken to Hampton Roads and later to New York, where they were placed in close confinement. The grand jury promptly found an indictment for robbery on the high seas, and on July 23 the prisoners, 13 in number, were arraigned for trial, which was set down for the October term. Under date of July 6, 1861, Davis sent a letter to Lincoln stating that if the privateersmen were hanged he should hang in retaliation a number of officers and men then prisoners in the hands of the Confederates. When the trial came up it was found to involve grave questions of law as well as of expediency. The trial lasted a week and the jury disagreed, but finally, under all the embarrassments of the case, and the certainty that the Confederates would retaliate on prisoners in their hands, the Government aban-

* Rhodes, *United States*, vol. iii., pp. 464-465.

doned the prosecution and thenceforth treated the privateersmen as prisoners of war.*

Among the vessels seized by the Confederates in the Southern ports was the revenue cutter *Aiken* (of which possession was taken in Charleston Harbor), surnamed the *Petrel*. She ran the blockade and on July 28 fell in with the United States frigate *St. Lawrence*, which was disguised as a lumbering merchantman, her port-holes being closed and her men kept carefully out of sight. Misled by the deception, the commander of the *Petrel* bore down upon the *St. Lawrence* and threw a couple of shots across her bow, following this with the discharge of cannister. Allowing the *Petrel* to approach quite near, the *St. Lawrence* threw open her ports and opened fire. So effective was this that in a few moments the *Petrel* was in a sinking condition. A part of the crew threw themselves overboard, or sought refuge in the life boats. The boats of the *St. Lawrence* were lowered and the survivors were rescued and taken to Philadelphia. Early in June the *Jeff Davis* started on a cruise during which she made prizes estimated in value at about \$225,000. One of the prizes captured on July 26 was recaptured by the United

States steamship *Albatross* some weeks later. On August 18 the *Jeff Davis* was wrecked while attempting to cross the bar at the entrance of St. Augustine, Florida. The capture of one ship threatened for a time to involve the United States and Great Britain in war. As we have noticed, the Confederate Government had appointed commissioners to foreign countries, two of whom were former United States Senators, James M. Mason, of Virginia, and John Slidell, of Mississippi. On the blockade runner *Theodora*, Mason and Slidell with their secretaries and families succeeded in eluding the Union cruisers around Charleston on the night of October 11, and in reaching Havana. From that place they took passage for Southampton in the regular British mail steamship *Trent*. Learning of this, Captain Charles Wilkes of the Union cruiser *San Jacinto*, of 13 guns, stationed himself in the path of the *Trent* so as to intercept that vessel upon the high seas. On November 8, when the *Trent* made her appearance, two shells were fired across her bow, and she was speedily brought to by the *San Jacinto*. Lieutenant D. M. Fairfax, with two officers and a guard of marines, boarded the *Trent* to demand the persons of Mason and Slidell and their secretaries. The *Trent's* captain refused either to surrender the Confederates or to allow Fairfax to search the vessel, whereupon the latter sent one of his officers back to the *San Jacinto*, and in half

* In this connection, see letter of C. P. Daly to Ira Harris, December 21, 1861, entitled, *Are the Southern Privateersmen Pirates*, which was printed as a pamphlet of thirteen pages. See also A. F. Warburton, *Trial of the Officers and Crew of the Privateer Savannah*; Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. v., pp. 9-11.

an hour 24 additional men were aboard the *Trent*. Fairfax then proceeded to execute his orders without violence, and Mason and Slidell were soon aboard the *San Jacinto*.* The prisoners were taken to Fort Warren in Boston Harbor.

Captain Wilkes prepared a statement setting forth the grounds on which he justified the seizure of "the embodiment of despatches" as he shrewdly termed Mason and Slidell. He stated also that he would have made a prize of the vessel had it not been that he did not wish to inconvenience the passengers of the *Trent*. The press teemed with the discussion of the legal points involved, and with citations from various authorities on international law tending to show that Wilkes had acted properly.† The Cabinet members seemed to share the jubilation of the North over the arrest of Mason and Slidell, but Lincoln's cool judgment at once recognized the serious complications which might arise from such a course, for he knew that the act of Wilkes was not in line with the principles for which we had contended.‡ Sumner and Blair were in favor of surrendering the Confederate commissioners,|| and Seward,

after reflection, changed his mind, for his dispatch of November 30 seems to indicate that he believed the surrender of the commissioners would solve the difficulty. He informed Adams that Captain Wilkes had acted without instructions and expressed the hope that the British government would consider the subject in a friendly spirit. Adams was given permission to read this confidential note to Earl Russell and Lord Palmerston.

As was to be expected, when the news of the arrest of Mason and Slidell reached England on November 27, it produced a great sensation. The opinion was general that the British flag had been outraged, and the British press was filled with abusive denunciations of Captain Wilkes, Secretary Seward, and the Yankees in general.* At a meeting of the British Cabinet it was decided that the act of Captain Wilkes was a clear violation of international law, and that a peremptory demand should be made for the release of Mason and Slidell.† Earl Russell sent a special message to Lord Lyons, the British minister at Washington, with a dispatch dated November 30 designating the arrest as an affront to the British flag, and demanding the liberation of Mason and Slidell and their secretaries and a "suitable apology for the aggression which had been committed." If this

* Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. v., pp. 21-24; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. ii., pp. 135-142; Moore, *Rebellion Record*, vol. iii., Docs., p. 321 et seq.

† Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. v., pp. 24-25; Rhodes, *United States*, vol. iii., pp. 521-522.

‡ Lossing, *Civil War in the United States*, vol. ii., pp. 156-157; Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. v., p. 26.

|| Pierce, *Life of Sumner*, vol. iv., pp. 52. 61.

* See Duynckinck, *Late Civil War*, vol. ii., pp. 124-150; Russell's *Diary*, p. 573.

† Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. v., pp. 27-29.

demand were not complied with in seven days, Lord Lyons was instructed to leave Washington.*

The British demand reached Washington on December 19 and its tenor was immediately communicated by Lyons to Seward, with the statement that Her Majesty's government would be satisfied with nothing less than the liberation of the captured officials. On December 25 a Cabinet meeting was held to discuss Earl Russell's dispatch, at which time Seward submitted a draft of his answer, proposing to surrender Mason and Slidell to the British authorities. Sumner, chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, was invited to the conference and read letters from John Bright and Richard Cobden, who urged that the United States should not let the matter grow into a war with England.† During the meeting a dispatch from the British minister of foreign affairs to the French representative at Washington was sent into the council-room. This asserted that England had made a just demand, and urged that the Federal Government comply with it. According to the diary of Secretary Bates,‡ all the Cabinet members believed that a war with England would prevent the suppression of the rebellion, that our trade would be utterly ruined, and our

Treasury bankrupt. There was some reluctance, even on the part of Lincoln, to acknowledge these truths, but all yielded to and unanimously concurred in Seward's letter to Lyons. According to Bates the main fear was the displeasure of the people of the United States — lest the Cabinet members should be accused of contemptibly truckling to the power of England. Chase thought it was better to sacrifice the feeling involved in the surrender of Mason and Slidell than to avoid it by delays which explanations must occasion. He would rather surrender the Confederate commissioners than to commit a technical wrong against neutrality. Accordingly he concurred in Seward's letter.* Finally all the Cabinet members came to Seward's position and approved the answer. After designating at large the principles and views which governed the United States with respect to the issues involved, Seward stated that the Government could not deny the justice of the British claims and had therefore decided to liberate the persons in question. Accordingly the incident was terminated when Mason and Slidell with their secretaries were delivered to the British authorities. Lord Russell on his part, while announcing that the British Government differed from Seward in some of his conclusions, nevertheless acknowledged that the action constituted the reparation which Her Majesty and

* Rhodes, *United States*, vol. iii., p. 525; Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. v., pp. 29-30.

† See excerpts from these letters in Rhodes, *United States*, vol. iii., pp. 533-537.

‡ Quoted by Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. v., p. 36.

* Warden, *Life of Chase*, pp. 393-394.

the British nation had a right to expect.*

The first movement of the armed forces proved that the question of slavery was destined to be as omnipresent in war as it had been in politics. Immediately after Butler took command at Fortress Monroe, negroes began to escape from the Confederate lines and to apply for protection to Butler. Soon a Confederate flag of truce appeared with the request that three negro field hands, belonging to a Colonel Mallory, be returned. Butler replied that since Virginia claimed to be a foreign power the fugitive

slave law could not possibly be in operation there, and declined on that ground. If Mallory would come to the fort and take the oath of allegiance to the Constitution of the United States, Butler would deliver the men up to him and endeavor to hire their services of him.* Thus Butler claimed that, as the negroes belonged to a State offering resistance to the Federal Government and had been compelled to labor in the construction of a battery, they were contraband of war. Though not strictly in accordance with legal doctrine, the application of this phrase was at once taken up by the people as an effective solution of a vexing question. A few months more of active campaigning merely shortened the formula, and every negro in and about the army was designated a "contraband." This question of colored fugitives quickly grew in importance. On May 27 General Butler reported to General Scott that he had slave "property" in his hands to the value of \$60,000.† As he was greatly in need of laborers, he received all who came, employed the able-bodied, and kept an account of the value of their services and the cost of their maintenance.‡ The Government approved this course|| and the

* Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. v., pp. 38-40; Rhodes, *United States*, vol. iii., pp. 536-538. Pollard says: "This outrage, when it was learned in the South, was welcome news, as it was thought certain that the British government would resent the insult, and as the boastful and exultant tone in the North, over the capture of the commissioners, appeared to make it equally certain that the government at Washington would not surrender its booty. War between England and the North was thought to be imminent. Providence was declared to be in our favor; the incident of the Trent was looked upon almost as a special dispensation, and it was said, in fond imagination, that on its deck, and in the trough of the weltering Atlantic, the key of the blockade had at last been lost. These prospects were disappointed by the weakness of the government at Washington, in surrendering the commissioners and returning them to the British flag. The surrender was an exhibition of meanness and cowardice unparalleled in the political history of the civilized world, but strongly characteristic of the policy and mind of the North."—*First Year of the War*, p. 208. Russell says: "The bubble has burst. The rage of the friends of compromise and of the South, who saw in a war with Great Britain the complete success of the Confederacy, is deep and burning, if not loud; but they all say they never expected anything better from the cowardly and braggart statesmen who now rule in Washington."—*My Diary North and South*, p. 593.

* *Official Records*, vol. ii., pp. 649-650.

† *Official Records*, vol. ii., p. 53; Greeley, *American Conflict*, vol. ii., p. 238.

‡ Williams, *The Negro Race in America*, vol. ii., pp. 250-251.

|| See Cameron's letter of May 30, in Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. iv., pp. 389-390; Williams, *The Negro Race in America*, vol. ii., p. 251.

negroes were set to work on the intrenchments. On July 30 the negroes under Butler's control numbered 900, whereupon he wrote to Cameron asking for instructions.* On August 8 Cameron replied that in cases of fugitives from the loyal slave States the enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Law under ordinary judicial proceedings must be respected by the military and civil authorities. In the States wholly or partly insurrectionary, where the ordinary laws temporarily failed, rights to service, like other rights, were to be subject to military necessity, if not wholly forfeited by treason. The military authorities must obey the confiscation act, refusing to recognize any claim to service forfeited by treason. In insurrectionary States where the laws were suspended, claims to service could not be decided safely by the military authorities.† Lincoln had signed the confiscation act with reluctance, for one reason because it did not make provision for fugitives escaping from loyal masters in disloyal States. Cameron instructed that care should be taken to protect such owners. This was of little practical moment to them, but it shows Lincoln's careful regard for vested rights when the case was placed before him for decision. Public opinion in the North supported the President in striking at the root of

the trouble should the war be prolonged, and in spite of the murmurs of the abolitionists and radical Republicans, a large majority in the North acquiesced in his policy as a wise temporary expedient.

Hardly had the North expressed its acquiescence in Lincoln's policy when the question was reopened by Frémont's proclamation in Missouri. Before we narrate the circumstances of this proclamation it is necessary to glance at conditions in this section. As previously stated, Governor Jackson had been put to flight by General Lyon at Booneville, whence he retreated to the southwestern portion of the State, collecting adherents as he went. General Price went westward from Booneville to Lexington where he found a camp of volunteers. Jackson and Price then united their forces and proceeded toward Carthage. Meanwhile General Lyon was in close pursuit, and before leaving St. Louis sent an expedition of 2,500 men under General Thomas W. Sweeny to Rolla and thence to Springfield. On June 28, with the 3d Missouri, General Franz Sigel arrived at Sarcoxie, southwest of Springfield and 15 miles southeast of Carthage. Here Sigel learned that Price with about 800 Missourians was near Neosho, 22 miles south, and that Jackson with other State troops was about 15 miles beyond Lamar, marching southwest to join Price. Accordingly, Sigel determined to disperse Price's force and then to turn north on Jackson, hoping thereby to prevent

* Moore, *Rebellion Record*, vol. ii., Docs., p. 437.

† Moore, *Rebellion Record*, vol. ii., Docs., p. 493; *Official Records*, series iii., vol. i., pp. 402-403.

the junction of the two forces and to open communication with Lyon, then marching south from Booneville. After starting on the morning of the 29th he learned that Price had retreated and therefore went after Jackson, continuing his march to Neosho where he was joined a few days later by Colonel Charles E. Salomon with the 5th (Union) Missouri. A company of the 3d Missouri was left to hold Neosho, and on July 4 Sigel with two regiments and two batteries of 4 guns each marched to Spring River, a short distance southeast of Carthage, where he learned that Jackson with more than 4,000 men was but nine miles to the front in the direction of Lamar. On the morning of the 5th with 1,000 men and 8 guns Sigel advanced slowly, driving back the Confederate skirmishers, and about nine miles beyond Carthage came upon Jackson's troops which had been formed in four divisions under command of Generals James S. Rains, John B. Clark, M. M. Parsons, and W. Y. Slack. Of Jackson's force about 1,800 were mounted men armed with shotguns and judiciously posted on the flanks of the infantry. After some skirmishing Sigel at 10 o'clock opened fire with 7 guns, which brought an ineffective reply from the Confederates, since, from want of ammunition, the latter had charged their cannon with pieces of chain, iron spikes, broken iron and stones. After a desultory fire of three hours the Confederate cavalry, making a wide circuit

to avoid Sigel's artillery, began to close in on him and threaten his train about three miles in the rear. Disposing of 4 guns in rear and 2 on either flank Sigel fell back until he reached Carthage where he attempted to make another stand. But, as the enemy was still working on both flanks and threatening the road to Springfield, he again fell back three miles beyond Carthage, where pursuit ended. Sigel then marched to Sarcoxie, and later by way of Mount Vernon to Springfield, where he was joined by Lyon on the 13th. In the battle of Carthage the Union loss was 13 killed and 31 wounded besides the loss of a company of 94 men left at Neosho which was surprised and captured on the 5th by Churchill's Arkansas regiment. The Confederate loss was about 30 killed and 125 wounded.*

The Confederate authorities had ambitious plans for the West. Already possessing Arkansas, they now hoped to secure Missouri. Major-General Leonidas Polk was stationed at Memphis early in July to command the Mississippi, and as the neutrality policy in Kentucky for the moment left the Tennessee contingent idle, Jackson appealed to Polk to make immediate preparations for a campaign in Missouri. On July 23 Polk signified to the Confederate government his purpose to send two strong columns into Missouri—one of 25,000 men under General Ben McCulloch

* *Official Records*, vol. iii.; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. i., pp. 268-269.

against Lyon at Springfield and the other under Generals Gideon J. Pillow and William J. Hardee into southwestern Missouri, where it was estimated they could collect a force of 18,000 men. These two columns were to seize St. Louis, cut off Lyon's return from the West, then enter Illinois and make a rear attack on Cairo.* But this projected expedition was considerably curtailed because Governor Jackson had exaggerated the available forces fully one-half. Hence positive action in Kentucky was deferred until the first week of September. While the Confederates had blockaded the Mississippi River, the Union forces had garrisoned and fortified Cairo and were building gunboats, organizing regiments and planning for a desperate resistance.

To aid the rapid completion of these plans General Frémont was ordered to take charge of the Western department. In many respects no more popular appointment could have been made for the West where Frémont's name carried considerable weight and would be certain to enlist much enthusiasm and earnest support. Frémont arrived from Europe about July 1 and though sorely needed in the West remained in New York three weeks absorbed largely in personal affairs; in fact, two weeks had passed before he sent his letter of acceptance and oath of office. On July 25 he arrived at St. Louis and found chaotic

conditions.* The recruiting offices were full, but the State governor and commanders of departments were quarreling over the dribblets of arms and equipments remaining in arsenals. There were not a sufficient number of educated and experienced officers of the late regular army familiar with organization and routine to furnish the necessary officers for the newly organized companies. Hence error, extravagance, delay and waste ensued; regiments were sent to the front without arms, rations or reinforcements, and sometimes without being mustered into service. Furthermore, a destructive guerilla warfare had broken out, degenerating into neighborhood and family feuds, and bloody personal reprisal and revenge known as bushwhacking. The suppression of these disorders was left to the local administration, but there was so much unfortunate jealousy and rivalry between the factions of radicals and conservatives that the authorities were greatly embarrassed and often thwarted. As time passed the animosity between these factions increased and their antagonistic attitude continued throughout the entire war. This situation produced no end of complications requiring the direct interference of President Lincoln and taxed to the utmost his great forbearance. Before Frémont had left New

* *Official Records*, vol. iii., p. 613.

* General Frémont's account of the conditions existing in Missouri and his side of the subsequent controversy are in *Battles and Leaders*, vol. i., pp. 278-288.

York Brigadier-General John Pope was ordered to the northern part of Missouri to settle the neighborhood troubles there and, when Frémont reached St. Louis, Pope had eight Illinois regiments employed in this duty.* Within a few days after his arrival Frémont gathered all the available forces (about eight regiments) and personally conducted them to Cairo, the strategic key of the whole Mississippi valley. While this was a proper precaution, Frémont should first have seen to the safety of Lyon at Springfield in southwestern Missouri.

When the latter left St. Louis he knew that his force was inadequate for the purpose in view, but he believed that the troops being organized in the contiguous free States would be rushed to his aid. When he combined his troops with those under Sigel who had retreated from Carthage, Lyon had a force of about 6,200 men. Unfortunately, however, his numbers were daily growing less by the expiration of the term of enlistment of the three months' volunteers. Many immediately enlisted under the three years' call, but there was a considerable shrinkage of numbers and Lyon found himself in a discouraging position. To make matters worse, he was 120 miles from a railroad, provisions and supplies had not arrived as expected, and a formidable force of Confederates was just beyond the Arkansas line. He sent several

dispatches to Frémont requesting aid,* but the latter responded feebly. Instead of rushing all available troops and plenty of supplies to Lyon, Frémont sent these troops to Cairo and merely set two regiments in motion toward Lyon. Lyon's danger lay in the junction of the various Confederate leaders just beyond the Arkansas line. General McCulloch had been given three regiments to conquer Indian Territory, but instead decided to organize a campaign of his own. On July 30 he reported that he was on his way toward Springfield with his own brigade of 3,200 troops under the command of General N. B. Pearce and the forces under General Price, which brought the total up to about 11,000 men. On August 1 Lyon heard of their advance and marched out on the Cassville Road to meet them with about 6,000 men and 18 guns, hoping to attack the largest and most advanced force, drive it back on the others and strike them in detail. Accordingly he set out from Springfield, advancing about 20 miles southwardly, and on the afternoon of August 2 his advance met and had a lively encounter with Price's advance under General Rains at Dug Spring. The engagement, though not long, was sharp and decisive and resulted in the retreat of the Confederates. After advancing several miles Lyon thought best to retire to Springfield, whence he reported the condition of affairs to Frémont, asserting that he would

* Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. iv., pp. 402-405.

* *Official Records*, vol. iii., pp. 395, 397.


probably be compelled to abandon Springfield and fall back to St. Louis or into Kansas. McCulloch had refused to support Price in the affair at Dug Spring and now refused to advance unless he were given supreme command. Price consented to this arrangement and at midnight of the 5th the Confederate army advanced, hoping to surprise Lyon.* Finding that he had retired, however, McCulloch followed and on the 6th went into camp on Wilson's Creek about 10 miles from Springfield. As the Confederates showed no disposition to advance, Lyon proposed to make a night march on the 9th and attack the Confederate left at daybreak of the 10th. After this plan had been agreed upon, Colonel Sigel persuaded Lyon to permit him with his two regiments, a 6-gun battery, and two companies of cavalry, to make a flank march around the Confederate right and attack from the south while Lyon attacked from the north. Accordingly Sigel made his detour to the left by way of the Cassville Road and at daybreak was within a mile of the Confederate rear. At 4 a. m. Lyon struck the advance picket of Rains' Missouri command which gave the alarm and at 5:30 one of the most stubborn battles of the war began. The position on Wilson's Creek was held by General Price with about 3,200 men including Henry Guibor's and Hiram M. Bledsoe's batteries, reinforced later by T. J. Churchill's regiment and W. E. Wood-

ruff's battery, both from Arkansas. At Price's right, north of the creek, was McCulloch's brigade; Pearce's Arkansas brigade was on McCulloch's left and rear and on the same side of the creek; while in Pearce's rear, on the south side of the creek, were Churchill's regiment and Green's and J. P. Major's cavalry.

With about 4,000 infantry and cavalry and the two batteries of James Totten and John V. Dubois General Lyon advanced more than a mile, attacked the Confederate right and drove it from the crest to the foot of the ridge. At the same time Captain Joseph B. Plummer with 300 regulars and 200 home guards, while moving on the left and beyond the creek, was attacked by the 3d Louisiana and other parts of McCulloch's brigade and was checked, his command later being withdrawn. At about 8 o'clock Price attempted to turn Lyon's right, but was repulsed. Meanwhile Sigel, having gained the Confederate rear, drove Churchill, Major and Green from their camps, crossed the creek, and, marching to the Springfield and Fayetteville Road, was there attacked by a battalion of mounted Missourians and some Texans and a part of the 3d Louisiana. Bledsoe's battery opened on his front, J. G. Reid's battery joined in the enfilading fire, the Louisianians charged and captured five of his guns, and his troops were driven from the field, he himself narrowly escaping capture. Colonel Salomon with 450 men made a wide detour and

* Carr, *Missouri*, pp. 327-328.

reached Springfield in fair shape, but Sigel's command took no further part in the battle. The Confederates now turned their entire attention to Lyon, McCulloch's brigade, and Pearce's Arkansas brigade, reinforcing Price. The latter then made a determined



advance in two lines which nearly covered Lyon's entire front. An hour of desperate fighting ensued but finally the Confederates were repulsed. Learning that the Confederates expected reinforcements, Lyon led a charge against the Confederate right, driving the Confederates before him, but unfortunately at this juncture Lyon was killed and the command devolved upon Major Samuel D. Sturgis. The contest continued for a half hour

when the Confederates gave way a short distance, to re-form and make another effort. This, however, resulted in a disastrous repulse, but Sturgis, deeming too hazardous any attempt to hold the field, retreated to Springfield. Upon his arrival there Sturgis yielded the command to Sigel, who, the next morning, marched toward Rolla, over 100 miles distant. McCulloch refused to pursue Sturgis, and Price, resuming command of the Missourians, on the next day took possession of Springfield. As officially reported the Union loss was 223 killed, 721 wounded, and 291 missing; the Confederate loss was 265 killed, 800 wounded, and 30 missing. Revised statements make the Union loss 258 killed, 873 wounded and 186 missing, while Price's adjutant-general placed the Confederate loss at 279 killed and 951 wounded.*

This disaster turned public attention and criticism sharply upon Frémont's department and administration. Less than a month had sufficed to show Frémont's intellectual weakness and his utter incapacity for a responsible command. Instead of bringing order into the chaotic conditions, he set methods and routine at defiance, issued commissions and awarded contracts in so irregular a

* *Official Records*, vol. iii.; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. i., pp. 269-273, 289-306; Snead, *The Fight for Missouri*; Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. iv., pp. 406-411; Carr, *Missouri*, pp. 324-333; the biography of General Lyon in *National Cyclopaedia of American Biography*, vol. iv., p. 203; Ashbel Woodward, *Life of General Nathaniel Lyon* (1862).

way as to bring a protest from the regular accounting officers, and though especially requested by the President to coöperate with the provisional governor, continued to ignore him. Soon a storm of complaint arose and reports came to Lincoln from various sources that the man to whom he had looked with such confidence for administrative aid and military success had proved a rank incompetent. Accordingly Lincoln sent Postmaster-General Blair and Montgomery C. Meigs to St. Louis to make a brief inspection and to give friendly advice and admonition to Frémont, but hardly had they gone when the President read Frémont's amazing proclamation of August 30 written "without consultation or advice with anyone"* establishing martial law throughout Missouri, confiscating the real and personal property of all persons in the State who should take up arms against the United States or should be proved to have taken an active part with the enemy, and declaring their slaves freemen.† At the same time Frémont set up a "bureau of Abolition"‡ and began to issue deeds of manumission to slaves.|| This was going quite too fast and too far, for

the Government had as yet no fixed policy in this respect. Nevertheless, though the act was one of insubordination, Lincoln decided not to act harshly against Frémont. In a letter dated September 2 he informed Frémont of the danger that might come from the proclamation and requested that he modify it so as to conform to the confiscation act of August 6, 1861.* In reply Frémont said that the proclamation had been issued only after full deliberation and that he would not modify it unless openly directed to do so by Lincoln.† Accordingly, on September 11, Lincoln issued the order.‡

Whatever temporary popularity Frémont gained with anti-slavery people by reason of his proclamation was quickly neutralized by a military disaster at Lexington. After the battle of Wilson's Creek on August 10 General Price, deserted by McCulloch and his troops and by General Pearce with his Arkansas State forces, moved northward toward the Missouri River, skirmished with a force under General J. H. Lane on September 7 at Dry Wood Creek, drove Lane out of the State, and followed as far as Fort Scott which had been abandoned. On the 10th he was at Rose Hill whence he marched for Warrensburg, which was reached on the 11th, Everett Peabody's 13th Missouri at that place retreating to Lexington. On learning

* Frémont to Lincoln, September 8, *Official Records*, vol. iii., p. 477.

† For the proclamation see *Official Records*, vol. iii., pp. 466-467. See also Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. iv., pp. 416-417; Williams, *The Negro Race in America*, vol. ii., pp. 255-256.

‡ *Diary of John Hay* quoted in Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. iv., p. 415.

|| Moore, *Rebellion Record*, vol. iii., p. 129.

* *Official Records*, vol. iii., pp. 469-470.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 477-478.

‡ *Ibid.*, pp. 485-486; Williams, *The Negro Race in America*, vol. ii., pp. 256-257.

of Price's northward movement Frémont ordered to Lexington a force of 2,800 men with 7 6-pounder guns in command of Colonel James A. Mulligan, of the 23d Illinois. Mulligan threw up intrenchments on College Hill northeast of the city which on the morning of the 12th were bombarded from four different points by Price. After a sharp skirmish Mulligan's outworks were captured and his troops driven behind the main line. At the end of the day Price withdrew to await reinforcements and ammunition; and Mulligan strengthened his position and prepared for a siege. On being reinforced to 25,000 men and his ammunition coming up, Price moved on the city on the 18th, took possession, closed in upon Mulligan and began a siege. To the east, northeast and southwest of Mulligan's works were the divisions of Rains and Parsons; on the river bank and immediately beneath Mulligan's works was Benjamin A. Rives' division, supported by James H. McBride's command and a part of Harris'. From a dwelling on the bluff, 125 yards from the works, fire was opened on the Confederates but the latter charged and captured the house and also the bluff immediately north of it. This house was retaken by the Union troops, but was soon regained and the adjoining heights fortified. Firing continued all day of the 19th; the water supply gave out but Mulligan encouraged his men to hold on until reinforcements arrived. It was no use, however, and

at 2 o'clock on the afternoon of the 20th, being without water or rations and short of ammunition, Mulligan displayed a white flag. In this siege Mulligan lost 42 killed, 108 wounded and 1,624 prisoners, besides 7 guns, many horses and a large amount of stores. Price's loss was 25 killed and 72 wounded. Price remained at Lexington until September 30, when, pressed by the Union advance from Jefferson City, he abandoned the place and retreated toward Arkansas, leaving a guard of 500 men with the prisoners taken. On October 16 a squadron of cavalry under Major F. J. White surprised the party, captured 70, and released the prisoners.*

The first impression of the people in the North on the publication of Frémont's proclamation was favorable to it, but, when Lincoln modified it, opinions changed, so strong were his reasons and so strong a hold did he have on the people. If Frémont had been honest and patriotic the annulment of his decree would have ended the matter; but his mismanagement of the western department and the charges of corruption at St. Louis imperatively demanded correction. When Blair and Meigs reached St. Louis on September 12 it did not take the Postmaster long (even though he was decidedly friendly to Frémont) to make up his mind that the removal of Frémont would be for the benefit

* *Official Records*, vol. iii.; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. i., pp. 273, 307-313; Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. iv., p. 426 *et seq.*; *Confederate Military History*, vol. ix., pt. ii., pp. 64-66.

of the country. Colonel Francis P. Blair, brother of Montgomery Blair, had been firmly convinced of Frémont's incapacity and in public print sharply criticised his action. Frémont placed Blair under arrest, whereupon the latter preferred formal charges against the general and the latter in turn entered formal counter-charges against Blair.* Thereupon President Lincoln determined to obtain more complete and exact knowledge of the state of affairs, and sent Secretary of War Cameron and Adjutant-General Lorenzo Thomas to investigate. On their arrival Cameron and Thomas were informed by General David Hunter that the latter's division of the army, though then under orders to march, could not be put in proper marching condition for a number of days. Hunter stated also his opinion that General Frémont was not fitted for the command and that though he himself was second in command he knew nothing whatever of the plans and purposes of his chief.† The letters of General Pope to Hunter and of Brigadier-General Samuel R. Curtis to Lincoln were of the same purport.‡ Thus the opinions of three experienced army officers coincided with the general drift of evidence which had come to the President from civilian officers and citizens. On October 21 Cameron and Thomas arrived

at Washington and made their report. The President could no longer hesitate and on October 24 directed that Frémont be relieved and that General Hunter be called temporarily to take his command. This letter was to be delivered to Frémont unless when the messenger reached him he should have "under personal command fought and won a battle or [should] then be actually in a battle or [should] then be in the immediate presence of the enemy in expectation of a battle."** As none of these conditions prevailed, the order was given to General Frémont and on November 2 he turned over his command to General Hunter. Upon taking command Hunter learned that ostensible preparations had been made and orders issued for a battle under assumption that the enemy was at Wilson's Creek advancing to an attack. Hunter sent a reconnoissance to Wilson's Creek and found that no enemy whatever was there or was expected there, Frémont having been duped by his own scouts. Accordingly after Frémont had taken his leave of the army, Hunter drew back the Federal army from Springfield to Rolla and a large part of it was afterward transferred to another field of action.†

* Lincoln to Curtis, October 24, 1861, *Official Records*, vol. iii., p. 553.

† Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. iv., pp. 433-439; Rhodes, *United States*, vol. iii., pp. 476-482. Regarding the abandonment of Springfield see Greeley's opinion in his *American Conflict*, vol. i., p. 594. He calls the retreat "sneaking back to our fastnesses along the lines of completed railroads and within striking distance of St. Louis."

* Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. iv., pp. 413-414.

† *Ibid.*, p. 430.

‡ For these letters see Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. iv., pp. 431-432.

CHAPTER III.

1861-1862.

NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE EAST.

Condition of the navy — The capture of Hatteras Inlet — DuPont's expedition to Port Royal Bay — Engagements at Port Royal Ferry, Scarey Creek, Camp Bartow, Camp Alleghany, Carnifex Ferry, Gauley Bridge and Romney — McClellan's inaction — Battle of Ball's Bluff — Scott's resignation — The necessity for an advance — Lincoln's patience with McClellan — The council of war — Lincoln's war orders.

At the outbreak of the war the Federal navy was small and was rapidly falling into decadence. Of its 90 ships more than one-half had become useless and many of the others were on distant cruises.* Through the indefatigable exertions of Secretary Welles and his assistant Gustavus V. Fox, and by the purchase and charter of merchant steamers, a navy was improvised. Prior to Lincoln's inauguration seven sloops of war had been authorized by Congress and construction work was immediately begun at the several navy yards, while 23 similar gunboats were contracted for with private concerns. Three ironclads were designed and contracted for also, the achievement of one of them becoming historic.

One of the greatest needs of the navy was suitable harbors which might be used as coal depots and as points of rendezvous or harbors of refuge for the blockading fleet. In July the Navy Department began to study this problem, the solution of

which was rendered much easier by an event which occurred on the seacoast of North Carolina. At Hatteras Inlet the Confederates had built two forts and armed them with guns brought from Norfolk: Fort Hatteras, nearest the inlet with 25 guns and Fort Clark, half a mile to the north, with 5 guns. The forts which were garrisoned by over 700 men, were under command of Major W. S. G. Andrews. Perceiving the importance of having command of this inlet an expedition for its capture was organized. In the forenoon of August 26, 1861, a Union fleet of 7 vessels carrying 143 guns, under command of Flag-officer Silas H. Stringham, and 3 transports, carrying 930 men and a light battery, under command of General Butler, set sail from Hampton Roads, arriving off Hatteras Inlet the next afternoon. At 10 A. M. of the 28th Stringham began the bombardment of the forts, and a little later about 300 troops, with two howitzers, were landed on the island above the forts. Fort Clark was silenced before noon, the greater part of its gar-

* Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. v., p. 3.

rison retreating to Fort Hatteras, some escaping from the island by boats. At night the fleet withdrew, but renewed the attack on Fort Hatteras early on the morning of the 29th, and before noon the fort surrendered, with a loss of 30 killed and wounded. The Union loss was 1 wounded.*

Before the expedition against Hatteras set sail, another expedition had been planned on a somewhat extended scale. Captain Samuel F. DuPont was ordered to organize the naval expedition and General Thomas W. Sherman a force of 12,000 men to accompany it. The Board of Naval Strategy had carefully investigated, and in reports of July 5 and 13 recommended that either Bull's Bay, Port Royal Sound or Fernandina should be captured and occupied. It was agreed between DuPont and Sherman to seize Port Royal Bay, 56 miles south of Charleston and 25 north of Savannah. On October 29 the fleet of 16 war vessels and nearly 40 transports carrying Sherman's 12,000 men with supplies set sail from Hampton Roads. On the following day the fleet was struck by a furious storm off Hatteras and scattered. Four vessels and a few lives were lost, one war vessel was disabled and, with two transports, returned to Hampton Roads, but by November 6 the fleet had reassembled off the entrance to Port Royal Bay,

the gunboats preceding, having driven into the harbor three Confederate vessels that had run out and opened fire upon them. The bay was defended by two earthworks, one on each side of the entrance, and some shore batteries. To the north on Bay Point, on St. Phillips Island, stood Fort Beauregard, and to the south on Hilton Head stood Fort Walker. These were strong and well-constructed works mounting 42 guns, 22 of which were in Fort Walker and garrisoned by nearly 3,000 men under command of General Thomas F. Drayton. Besides these land works there were three small Confederate gunboats of 2 guns each in the bay under command of Commodore Josiah Tatnall. The *Wabash*, DuPont's flag ship, carrying 46 guns, was to lead in the attack followed by 9 other vessels a ship's length apart, and a flanking column of 5 gunboats was to move on the right. In this formation the fleet was to pass up the roads on the Bay Point side, bombarding Fort Walker as they passed, until each vessel had reached a point two miles above the fort, when they were to come back on the opposite side, deliver their broadsides on Fort Walker and enfilade its two water faces. Having completed the circuit the line was to repeat the movement until the forts surrendered. At the same time the five flanking gunboats were to pass and attack Fort Beauregard and, on reaching the turning point two miles above, to remain there and prevent Tatnall's gunboats

* *Battles and Leaders*, vol. i., pp. 632-633; Maclay, *History of the Navy*, vol. ii., pp. 239-246; Butler's report of August 30 in *Official Records*, vol. iv., pp. 581-587; *Confederate Military History*, vol. iv., pp. 24-28; vol. xii., pp. 16-18.

from making a dash upon the transports. At 9 A. M. on November 7 the fleet crossed the bar, DuPont leading the *Wabash* up the bay and receiving the first fire from both forts at 9:26. The fleet continued firing as they went until two miles beyond the forts, then turned to the left in a wide circle and went back past Fort Walker at 800



yards distance, opening upon it broadside after broadside. The gun fire from the fleet was a terrific continuous roar, shells flying into the fort "not 28 in a minute but as fast as a horse's feet beat the ground in a gallop."* The Confederates replied with a well maintained fire notwithstanding that they were being almost buried under the dirt thrown up by the Union shells. At the same time the flanking column of gunboats steamed up the bay, poured broadsides into Fort Beauregard, and drove Tatnall's fleet into Scull Creek. Taking a position near the shore and

flanking Fort Walker, the gunboats opened upon it a destructive fire to which no response was made as the one gun on that flank of the fort had been disabled. On the third circuit when the Union war vessels were maintaining a still more terrific fire against Fort Walker it was observed that no reply was made. "What could flesh and blood do against such a fire? * * * The *Wabash* was a destroying angel hugging the shore; calling the soundings with cold indifference; slowing the engine so as only to give steerage way; signalling to the vessels their various evolutions; and at the same time raining shells, as with target practice, too fast to count."* Accordingly a small party was sent ashore, the Confederate flag was hauled down, and at 2:20 P. M. the Union flag was run up. At 5 o'clock Fort Beauregard was abandoned after its commanding officer had spiked the guns and destroyed the greater part of the powder and it was occupied the next morning by General I. I. Stevens' brigade. Meanwhile the transports had come into the bay and landed General H. G. Wright's brigade at Hilton Head. The Union loss was 8 killed and 23 wounded and the Confederate loss 11 killed, 48 wounded, and 7 missing.† After this battle the navy explored the various sounds and creeks in the

* Letter of Rogers, November 9, 1861, Moore, *Rebellion Record*, vol. iii., Docs., p. 112.

† *Official Records*, vol. vi.; *Naval War Records*, vol. xii.; Maclay, *History of the Navy*, vol. ii., pp. 250-261; Ammen, *The Atlantic Coast*; Bat-

* Moore, *Rebellion Record*, vol. iii., Docs., p. 112.



From the original Brady negatives.

1. VIEW OF PORT ROYAL.

2. SECTION OF FORT WALKER AT HILTON HEAD, PORT ROYAL.

vicinity, capturing some abandoned guns.

While the navy was thus employed the army completed a large and strongly intrenched camp at Hilton Head surrounding Fort Walker, and on December 11 occupied Beaufort. Toward the end of December the Confederates erected a strong fort on the mainland opposite, and commanding Port Royal Ferry on the Coosaw. The position was held by the 14th South Carolina regiment, 4 companies of the 12th South Carolina, about 45 cavalry and a section of Leake's battery under the supreme command of Colonel James Jones. A battery had been put in position opposite Seabrook's Point and obstructions were placed in the river above and below the ferry to prevent an attack by the gunboats. To clear the river General I. I. Stevens' brigade reinforced by two regiments, in all about 3,000 men, was to cross the Coosaw below Port Royal Ferry, advance up the left bank of the river and attack the work from the rear while two gunboats and several smaller armed vessels under command of C. R. P. Rodgers were to enter the Coosaw by Beaufort River. A naval coöperating force was to move up Broad River and thence to the Coosaw to attack the battery opposite Seabrook's Point. At 1 A. M. on January 1, 1862, the embarkation began. At 1:30 the troops moved to-

ward Port Royal Ferry, the gunboats and launches shelling the woods in advance of the skirmish line. When a mile had been covered a masked battery opened on Stevens' column but this was soon captured, whereupon the fort was abandoned, the enemy leaving one gun. The gunboats cleared the river and the captured fort was then leveled to the ground. In this engagement the Union loss was 3 killed and 14 wounded and the Confederate loss 8 killed and 23 wounded.*

Meanwhile toward the end of July, Wise had been driven from the Kanawha valley. There were but three routes across the mountains separating West Virginia from the Shenandoah Valley that were practicable for military operations; the Northwestern turnpike on the north; the Staunton and Parkersburg turnpike farther south, and the Kanawha turnpike leading past Gauley Bridge, still farther south. While McClellan was seizing the first two, a column under General Jacob D. Cox was operating on the latter. At the time General Garnett was sent to Rich Mountain, General H. A. Wise was ordered to raise a force for the defense of the Kanawha Valley, and General J. B. Floyd was directed to raise a brigade for service in southwestern Virginia. On July 2 McClellan ordered General Cox, with a brigade, to cross the Ohio at

tles and Leaders, vol. i., pp. 671-691; Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. v., pp. 14-19; *Confederate Military History*, vol. v., pp. 29-35; vol. vi., pp. 58-59.

* Stevens, *Life of General I. I. Stevens*, vol. ii.; Ammen, *The Atlantic Coast; Official Records*, vol. vi.; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. i., p. 686 *et seq.*; *Confederate Military History*, vol. v., pp. 35-36, 39.

Gallipolis and conduct a campaign against Wise, and on the 6th he was ordered to march on Charleston and Gauley Bridge. Cox crossed the Ohio, with about 3,000 men, drove in some of Wise's advance detachments, and on July 11 moved up the Great Kanawha River, on the evening of the 16th reaching the mouth of the Pocotaligo, a large creek which enters the Kanawha from the north, where he heard that 200 troops and two guns under Colonel Patton were in position above the mouth of Scarey Creek on the south side of the Kanawha, and about three miles distant. It was necessary to dislodge Patton, whose guns commanded the river. Cox landed on the north side of the river, and on the 17th Colonel John W. Lowe, with the 12th Ohio, two companies of the 21st, and some cavalry, in all 1,020 men and 2 guns, was landed on the south side of the river and advanced upon Patton, reaching the bank of the creek about 3 P. M. The guns were put in position and the cavalry advanced, but were speedily driven back by the Confederate guns. The artillery then opened on both sides and, after some sharp firing, Patton's men were seized with panic; but reinforcements coming up, they were rallied, and the Confederates advanced and took position along the bank of the creek, across which there was a severe contest. A small Union force was sent across the creek to turn the Confederate left and seize their guns; but, not waiting for this movement to de-

velop, the main body charged across the creek and drove the Confederates up the hillside, back upon their guns, and another panic ensued. But more reinforcements coming up, the Confederates rallied and poured such a telling fire into the advancing Union line that it fell back in disorder, leaving dead and wounded on the field, recrossed the creek, and continued the retreat. The Union loss was two officers and 12 men killed and 47 men wounded; the Confederate loss, one officer and four men killed, and nine wounded.*

This check delayed Cox until he could get land transportation, which came up on the 23d, and the next day he advanced, took Charleston on the 25th, which Wise had hurriedly abandoned, and on the morning of the 29th reached Gauley Bridge, Wise retreating before him and not halting till he reached Greenbrier and the White Sulphur Springs, where he was joined by General Floyd. The whole of West Virginia, with the gateways to the East, were now in Union possession, but the Confederates did not let the possession go unchallenged and made efforts to recover the lost ground.

After the defeat and death of General Garnett, General W. W. Loring took command of the Confederate forces in northwestern Virginia, and being strongly reinforced began preparations to retake Cheat Mountain. Before these preparations were com-

* *Official Records*, vol. ii.; *Confederate Military History*, vol. ii., pp. 24-29.

pleted, General R. E. Lee was assigned to the command of all the Confederate forces in West Virginia, and early in August planned to break through the Alleghanies and recover the country west of the Ohio. His point of attack was the Union position covering Beverly and the road westward. McClellan had been called to Washington, leaving General Rosecrans in command in West Virginia; General J. J. Reynolds had command of the Union troops holding intrenched positions at Cheat Mountain summit, Elk Water and Huttonsville. Two Confederate columns were sent by the Staunton road against Cheat Summit and one by the Lewisburg and Huntersville road against Elk Water. At the same time another column was ordered to pierce the line between Elk Water and Cheat Summit, a distance of eight miles through a trackless mountain forest, to gain the rear of both positions. The movement began on September 11. A part of Lee's command succeeded in reaching the rear of the Union troops at the Summit, a part attacked by the Staunton road in front, and both were repulsed. The column sent against Elk Water appeared before that position but, upon the failure of the other columns, made no attack, and on the 15th all the columns retired to their old positions. Lee was greatly disappointed and deeply mortified at his failure, and was under a cloud from which he did not emerge till after he had succeeded to the command of the

Army of Northern Virginia, in June of 1862. No further effort was made by the Confederates to regain the ground lost in the northwest, nor was a general Union advance attempted, but there were sharp encounters at Camp Bartow, or Greenbrier River, and Camp Alleghany.

On October 2, 1861, the Confederates held Camp Bartow, where the road from Beverly to Staunton crosses the Greenbrier River, with about 2,500 men and eight guns, under command of General H. R. Jackson. General J. J. Reynolds, commanding the Union troops at Cheat Mountain Summit, 12 miles west, concluded to feel Jackson's position and, if possible, to force it. He marched at midnight of the 2d with about 5,000 men and 13 guns, drove in a picket post west of the Greenbrier on the morning of the 3d, and, coming to within 600 or 700 yards of Jackson's intrenched position beyond the stream, opened on it with his artillery, the Confederates promptly replying. Several guns were disabled on either side, and Reynolds then, under cover of a demonstration on Jackson's left, moved with six regiments to turn his right. The regiment to make the demonstration on the left crossed the stream, but was quickly driven back, and when the six regiments were about to cross the stream on Jackson's right they were met by such a severe fire of artillery and musketry that Reynolds deemed further effort inadvisable and withdrew with a loss of 43 killed and

wounded. The Confederate loss was 39 killed and wounded.*

After the affair at Camp Bartow on October 3, 1861, the Union troops had remained at Cheat Mountain Summit. General R. H. Milroy, who was in command on December 12, 1861, determined to attack Camp Alleghany, the summit of Alleghany Mountain, to which the Confederates had fallen back from Camp Bartow, and which was held by Colonel Edward Johnson, with 1,400 men and 8 guns, partially intrenched. With 1,800 men Milroy marched to Camp Bartow on December 12 and made his dispositions. One column of 900 men, under Colonel James A. Jones, was to ascend the mountain, until near its summit, when, leaving the road, it was to move to the left and attack Johnson's right and rear, while another column of 900 men, under Colonel G. C. Moody, was to move down the Greenbank road and by a circuitous route, concealed by heavy forests, assail Johnson's left. The attacks were to be made simultaneously at 4 A. M. of the 13th. Jones started at midnight, gained his assigned position on time, and waited for Moody, but his presence being discovered, he was quickly engaged and for a time met with success, driving the Confederates before him; but Johnson rallying his troops on that flank and fighting desperately, Jones was repulsed after a two-hours' con-

test, leaving his dead and many wounded on the field. While Jones was being driven from Johnson's right Moody was slowly approaching his left. He had been delayed by the difficulties of his route, and it was after 8 o'clock when he became engaged, and was met by such a severe fire of artillery and musketry that he could make no progress, but continued a desultory skirmish until afternoon, when he fell back, and the whole force, reuniting at Camp Bartow, marched back to Cheat Summit. The action was the most severely contested in the West Virginia campaign of 1861. The Union loss was 20 killed, 107 wounded, and 10 missing; the Confederate loss was 20 killed, 98 wounded, and 28 missing.*


Meanwhile, on August 23, General John B. Floyd, who had marched from Lewisburg, crossed to the north side of Gauley River at Carnifex Ferry, West Virginia, with five regiments of Virginia infantry, 100 cavalry and 5 guns, aggregating about 2,600 men. The 7th Ohio under Colonel E. B. Tyler was ordered by General Rosecrans to Cross Lanes, two miles from Floyd's position, which he reached on the night of the 25th. Early on the morning of the 26th, having raised two flat boats which Floyd had sunk, Tyler crossed the Gauley at Carnifex Ferry and surprised him, routing the regiment with a loss in killed

* *Official Records*, vol. v.; *Confederate Military History*, vol. ii., pt. ii., pp. 43-44; vol. iii., pp. 168-171; vol. vi., pp. 70-72.

* *Official Records*, vol. v.; *Confederate Military History*, vol. ii., p. 45 *et seq.*; vol. iii., pp. 171-177; vol. vi., pp. 73-74.

and wounded of 45 and 96 prisoners. About 200 men escaped to Gauley bridge and about 400 were collected and rallied by Major John S. Casement, who led them over the mountains to Elk River and thence to Charleston.* Floyd's intention in crossing the Gauley, was to force the retreat of General J. D. Cox from Gauley bridge down the Kanawha valley where he proposed to follow him and make a raid of 50 miles into Ohio; but General H. A. Wise, who commanded one of the Confederate brigades, refused to obey Floyd's orders to cross the Gauley, nor could even the authority of Lee reduce the Virginian governor to real subordination.† Thereupon Floyd abandoned his idea of invading Ohio and intrenched his position in a bend of the Gauley, both flanks resting on precipices rising abruptly from the river. His presence considerably annoyed Rosecrans, who turned his attention from the Cheat Mountain region where he had been confronting General Lee. Leaving General J. J. Reynolds to take care of Lee, Rosecrans took seven and one-half regiments of Ohio infantry,

two batteries of artillery, and three companies of infantry, marched from Bulltown September 9, crossed Big Birch Mountain, and, driving the 36th Virginia and a company of cavalry before him, on the morning of September 10 reached Cross Lanes about



2 P. M., where he learned that Floyd was intrenched two miles away. General H. W. Benham, commanding the leading brigade, was ordered to advance cautiously but not to engage Floyd until the entire column came up unless he saw a good opening. Benham drove in Floyd's pickets, and, getting the impression that the latter was in full retreat, rashly


* *Battles and Leaders*, vol. i., pp. 143-144.

† *Ibid*, p. 145.

pressed forward, deploying to the left and coming under a sharp fire from the right of the enemy's guns. He made some spirited charges upon these works but was repulsed, and then called for help. Rosecrans hastened up with the brigades of Colonels E. P. Scammon and R. L. McCook, and going to the front was surprised to learn that his head of column had been engaged before he had time to plan an attack. It was too late to withdraw without giving the appearance of defeat, and attacks were made in which Scammon and McCook participated, but darkness was rapidly coming on, the men were exhausted after their long march, and Rosecrans ordered the troops to withdraw, intending to renew the fight in the morning. Floyd, however, had reported that his position could be subjected to a destructive cannonade, and during the night he retreated across the Gauley, destroyed the foot bridge behind him and also the flat boats, and retreated with Wise to Sewell Mountain. The Union loss in this engagement was 17 killed and 141 wounded, while the Confederates, being well protected behind their works, had none killed and only 21 wounded.*

After some delay Rosecrans advanced to the top of Big Sewell Mountain, 34 miles from Gauley Bridge, and began skirmishing with the Confederates. Lee, with a part of Loring's

command, joined Floyd on September 29 and assumed command. The two opposing armies that lay opposite each other upon the crests of Big Sewell, separated by a deep gorge, were about equal in number, but each commander had exaggerated ideas of



the strength of the other, and it was difficult for either to make an offensive move. On the night of October 5 Rosecrans began to fall back and at the end of four days his brigades were in camp between Hawk's Nest and Gauley Bridge. When Lee discovered Rosecrans' retreat he ordered the cavalry to follow; when satisfied that he had gone clear to Gauley Bridge he began repairing the road from Sewell Mountain to Lewisburg,

* *Official Records*, vol. v.; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. i., pp. 145-146; *Confederate Military History*, vol. ii., chap. iii., pp. 37-39.

and projected a campaign for Floyd down the left bank of New River and then to the mouth of Loop creek, the head of navigation of the Kanawha to intercept Rosecrans' communications, while an effort was being made to press him in front. Floyd lost no time; on October 10 he started and after a difficult march over mountain roads, crossed New River at Richmond Ferry, and toiled over the Raleigh, Fayette and Kanawha turnpike, through Fayetteville, and on the 22d camped on Cotton Hill, five miles beyond Fayetteville, in the elbow south of the junction of the New and Gauley rivers. On November 1 he opened on the post at Gauley Bridge with artillery.* The ordnance stores at the post were moved into a gorge out of range of the Confederate guns and a battery was established high up on Gauley Mountain to reply. This artillery duel continued for ten days. Meanwhile, hoping to capture Floyd by turning his position from below, the brigades of Benham and Robert C. Schenck were sent forward, while Cox, who was in command at Gauley Bridge, was to coöperate. On the 10th Cox crossed his brigade in boats over New River, and after a sharp fight of two days drove Floyd from Cotton Hill. The coöperative movement on the part of Benham and Schenck's brigades on Floyd's left and rear failed because Floyd, learning of the movement, retreated on the 12th, abandoning wagons and supplies

and did not cease his retreat until he reached the Holston Valley Railroad.*

In the northeast General B. F. Kelley, who had been guarding a part of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, marched from New Creek on the night of October 25 with detachments of Ohio and West Virginia troops and two companies of cavalry for the purpose of occupying Romney, West Virginia. After a sharp engagement on the 26th the Confederates were driven from their intrenchments and the town was captured together with all the Confederate trains, 2 guns, 300 stand of arms, and much camp equipage. A supporting column of the 2d Maryland under Colonel Johns, marching from the mouth of Patterson's Creek through Frankfort and Springfield, was met by the 114th Virginia militia under Colonel A. Monroe at the bridge over the south branch, 7 miles from Romney, was defeated and fell back to Patterson's Creek with a loss of 6 or 8 in killed and wounded. On the approach of winter Lee was placed in charge of the Southern coast defences; Wise was ordered to Richmond, and most of the Confederate forces were withdrawn except a small one under Floyd. The others went into winter quarters. Meanwhile General McClellan had assumed command of the division of the Potomac (July 27) and was energetically working to make Washington secure and to

* *Battles and Leaders*, vol. i., p. 147.

* *Battles and Leaders*, vol. i., p. 148; *Confederate Military History*, vol. ii., pt. ii., p. 34 et seq.

organize the army of the Potomac. In a letter to Cameron, he says:

"I find no army to command. A mere collection of regiments cowering on the banks of the Potomac, some perfectly raw, others dispirited by the recent defeat at Bull Run. Nothing of any consequence had been done to secure the Southern approaches to the capital by means of defensive works; nothing whatever had been undertaken to defend the avenues to the city on the northern side of the Potomac. The troops were not only undisciplined, undrilled and dispirited; they were not even placed in military position. The city was almost in a condition to have been taken by a dash of a regiment of cavalry."*

Again in his report of August 4, 1863, he says:

"When I assumed command in Washington on the 27th of July, 1861, the number of troops in and around the city was about 50,000 infantry, less than 1,000 cavalry, and 650 artillerymen, with 9 imperfect field batteries of 30 pieces. * * * There was nothing to prevent the enemy shelling the city from heights within easy range."†

General McClellan came to his work with large prestige and great things were expected of him by all. He had remarkable executive ability, an aptitude for system, and an immense capacity for long continued labor. He was surrounded by an able and willing staff, all heartily devoted to him and inclined to give him the greater share of credit for their own work. In the saddle a larger part of the day, he visited the several camps and came thoroughly to know his officers and men. He was a man of great personal attractiveness, soon gained the love

of his soldiers by his winning personality, and inspired a remarkable affection and regard in everyone from the President to the humblest orderly. But he was pursued by a hallucination that the enemy largely outnumbered him and that they would attack his position on the Virginia side of the Potomac and also cross the river north of Washington.* Though on October 27 he reported an aggregate of strength of 168,318 men, of whom 147,695 were present fit for duty,† and though the Confederate army at no time was as large as the Union force, McClellan seemed to fear being overwhelmed by a superior army. On August 16 he wrote to his wife: "I am here in a terrible place; the enemy have from three to four times my force."‡ On the 25th he wrote: "Friend Beauregard has allowed the chance to escape him. I have now some 65,000 effective men; will have 75,000 by the end of the week. Last week he certainly had double our force. I feel sure that the dangerous moment has passed."§ Nevertheless, at this time the total effective force of the Confederate army was less than 41,000.§

Early in October General McClellan ordered a reconnoissance to ascertain

* *Official Records*, vol. xi., part iii., p. 3. See also *McClellan's Own Story*, p. 84; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. ii., pp. 112-122.

† *Official Records*, vol. v., p. 10. See also Rhodes, *United States*, vol. iii., p. 492; Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. iv., p. 442.

‡ *McClellan's Own Story*, p. 87.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 89.

§ Johnston's *Narrative*, p. 81.

* *Report of George B. McClellan upon the Organization of the Army of the Potomac and Its Campaigns in Virginia and Maryland from July 26, 1861 to November 7, 1862.*

† *Official Records*, vol. vi., p. 11.

the enemy's strength on the right in the neighborhood of the Potomac. General Charles P. Stone, having his headquarters at Poolesville, was within easy striking distance of Conrad's and Edwards' Ferries which, some four miles from each other, afforded the means of crossing the Potomac at this part of its course. Midway between the two ferries was Harrison's Island, about three miles long and 200 yards wide, Conrad's Ferry being at the upper end of the island. On the 19th, in accordance with his instructions, General George A. McCall moved forward and occupied Dranesville, 17 miles west of Washington in Fairfax County, Virginia. This being accomplished, McClellan sent a telegram to Stone informing him of McCall's movement, that heavy reconnoissances would be sent out the same day from Dranesville, and directing him to keep a sharp watch on the enemy who had moved away from Leesburg. "Perhaps," he added, "a slight demonstration on your part would have the effect to move them."* Accordingly on the evening of October 20, Stone sent General Willis A. Gorman to make a demonstration of crossing at Edwards' Ferry, while a scouting party of the 15th Massachusetts crossed from Harrison's Island to within about a mile of Leesburg, returning with the report that they had found a small camp of the enemy in the woods. Thereupon Stone ordered

Colonel Charles Devens, of the 15th Massachusetts, to take five companies over in the night to destroy this camp at daybreak. When proceeding to execute this order Colonel Devens found that the scouting party had made an erroneous report and when Stone learned of this he sent over the rest of the regiment and later the 20th Massachusetts (Colonel William R. Lee) and Colonel Milton Cogswell's Tammany regiment (42d New York), the whole being under the command of Colonel Edward D. Baker of the 71st Pennsylvania (the "California regiment," Lieutenant-Colonel Isaac J. Wistar). At daylight Colonel Devens with 650 men reached the top of the bluff (Ball's Bluff) but found the Confederate camp to have no existence, and about noon he retired near the bluff where he was soon reinforced. Meanwhile about 2 o'clock in the morning Baker marched to Conrad's Ferry and there experienced great difficulty in transporting his troops over the river. Instead of arriving on the field early in the morning, it was 2 o'clock in the afternoon. He immediately took command and, although he was at a great disadvantage, determined to fight. By this time Devens had fallen back in line with Baker's, Lee's and Milton Cogswell's regiments, and a new disposition was made of all the troops on the ground to resist the enemy then advancing. In making this new arrangement both flanks were left exposed and the reserves were placed in an unprotected

* *Official Records*, vol. v., p. 290.

position immediately in the rear of the centre. For two hours the battle raged with fierce energy on both sides but about 4 o'clock Colonel Baker was killed while striving to encourage his men, and a scene of disaster followed. After a brief and ineffectual effort by Colonel Cogswell to move to the left, the Union troops rushed down the side of the bluff, closely followed by the Confederates. Endeavoring to cross in the flat boats, many of the troops were drowned, some were shot in the water, and a great part of the entire command was captured. The loss on the Union side was 49 killed, 158 wounded and 714 missing, while the Confederate loss was 33 killed, and 115 wounded and missing.*

As soon as the news of this disaster reached General Stone he sent instructions to Gorman to intrench himself at Edwards' Ferry and act on the defensive. On the morning of the 22d Banks arrived with reinforcements and assumed command. The Confederates attacked Gorman the same day and were easily repulsed, but McClellan, thinking that the enemy were strengthening themselves at Leesburg, withdrew all his troops to the Maryland side.† This second defeat on the soil of Virginia caused a profound feeling of discouragement

all over the North, though there was little tendency to attribute the defeat to General McClellan.

Meanwhile there had been considerable friction between Scott and McClellan, as a result of which Scott resigned on October 31, attributing his resignation to the infirmities of age and diseases from which he suffered.* McClellan, whose popularity was now in the ascendant, and for whom Lincoln entertained strong personal regard, was made Scott's successor and, on November 1, assumed the position of general-in-chief of the Union armies.

Upon McClellan's assuming command of the army, Senators Trumbull, Chandler, and Wade called upon the President and urged the importance of immediate action, but Lincoln and Seward defended McClellan in his deliberate purpose not to move till ready. They called upon McClellan also, and in the course of the conversation Wade said that an unsuccessful battle was preferable to delay, since defeat could be repaired easily by the swarming recruits. McClellan, however, said that he would rather have a few recruits before a victory than a large number after a defeat.† Yet for financial as well as for political reasons, it was desirable that something be done at once. The expenses

* Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. iv., pp. 453-457; John D. Baltz, *The Battle of Ball's Bluff*, in *United Service Magazine*, ser. iii., vol. iv., pp. 46-66; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. ii., pp. 123-134; *Confederate Military History*, vol. iii., pp. 188-192.

† *Official Records*, vol. v., p. 290.

* For details see Wright, *Life of Scott*, p. 311 et seq.; Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. iv., pp. 461-464; *Official Records*, ser. iii., vol. i., p. 538.

† Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. iv., p. 767.

of the government were becoming frightful. According to Chase:

"The average daily drafts on the treasury for two weeks past have been a million and three quarters (\$1,750,000) at least. All the first loan was exhausted some time since, and a large part of the second has been already anticipated. * * * The banks do not expect to be called on at the rate of more than a million a day; nor do I think they could stand a much larger drain with all the help which the national subscription gives."*

From a military point of view conditions seemed favorable for an advance, since on October 27 the aggregate strength of the Army of the Potomac was 168,318, of which number 147,695 were present for duty, though for various reasons 13,410 were unfit for the field, thus reducing the effective force to 134,285.† At the same time Johnston had only 41,000 effective soldiers.‡ But McClellan could not make up his mind to advance nor to abandon all idea of offensive operations until spring. He dallied with opportunity, taking fright at the supposedly enormous army before him and powerful political enemies behind him. Writing to his wife, he says:

"I am concealed at Stanton's to dodge all enemies in shape of 'browsing' presidents, etc. * * * I have a set of men to deal with, unscrupulous and false. * * * The people think me all powerful. Never was there a greater mistake. I am thwarted and deceived by these incapables at every turn."*

* Chase to Lars Anderson, October 2, Schuckers, *Life of S. P. Chase*, pp. 430-431.

† *Official Records*, vol. v., p. 10.

‡ Johnston's *Narrative*, p. 81. There is some difference in the statements of the numbers of the two forces. Johnston's statements are generally accepted as being substantially correct, and after all allowances the statement frequently made that McClellan had three men to Johnston's one is as near correct as it is possible to get. See Alexander S. Webb, *The Peninsula: McClellan's Campaign of 1862*, p. 169; Swinton, *Army of the Potomac*, p. 72.

pulous and false. * * * The people think me all powerful. Never was there a greater mistake. I am thwarted and deceived by these incapables at every turn."*

But if McClellan had cause to complain of the men behind him, Lincoln had still greater cause to complain of McClellan's treatment of him. The young general failed to recognize Lincoln's capacity for dealing with men and large affairs, thinking that he was merely honest and meant well.† He ignored Lincoln, but the latter took no notice of his slights and there was no cessation of their friendly relations. On November 20 McClellan reviewed the Army of the Potomac at Munson's Hill. There were 50,000 men in line and all appeared ready for battle. After the review, however, drilling was resumed. The general continued his organizing work, passing many hours of each day in the saddle, riding from camp to camp with tireless energy, until finally in December he fell ill with typhoid fever. Instead of appointing another general to his place, the Administration, the country, and the Army of the Potomac waited almost with folded hands on his recovery.

McClellan's inaction was a deep disappointment to the people. On January 6, 1862, Lovejoy declared in the House:

"It is no wonder that the people are growing impatient; it is no wonder that that impatience is becoming earnest in many portions of the country and is almost reaching a point beyond that of passive emotion. The whole nation is waiting for

* *McClellan's Own Story*, pp. 176-177.

† *McClellan's Own Story*, p. 176.

the army to move forward. They have furnished the men and the money and why does not the army move?"*

Chase had lost confidence in McClellan,† but Lincoln defended him in public, though he urged him in private to lose no time.‡ Finally, on January 10, learning that General McClellan was still unable to see him, Lincoln called a council of Generals McDowell and W. B. Franklin, Seward, Chase, and the Assistant Secretary of War. The President was in great distress and said: "If something were not soon done the bottom would be out of the whole affair; and if General McClellan did not want to use the army he would like to borrow it provided he could see how it could be made to do something."|| General McDowell expressed the opinion that an energetic movement upon Centreville and Manassas would force the enemy from his works, and compel him to accept battle on terms favorable to the Union army. General Franklin rather favored an attack on Richmond by way of the York River. On the 13th another conference was called at which McClellan was present. Lincoln explained the plans considered at the previous council, and then asked McClellan what and when anything could be done. McClellan refused to lay bare his plans unless ordered to

do so, whereupon Lincoln asked him if he had fixed upon any particular time for a movement. McClellan replied that he had, and Lincoln adjourned the meeting.* A fortnight passed without action on McClellan's part. At the end of his patience Lincoln, on January 27, issued General War Order No. 1, stating that on February 22 a general movement of the land and naval forces of the United States would be made against the insurrectionary forces.† Four days later (January 31), he issued Special War Order No. 1, directing "that all the disposable forces of the Army of the Potomac * * * be formed into an expedition for the immediate object of seizing and occupying * * * Manassas Junction."‡ But February 22 came and passed, and the President's order to move had not been obeyed. On March 8 President Lincoln issued General War Orders Nos. 2 and 3: the first directing General McClellan to divide the Army of the Potomac into four army corps to be commanded respectively by Generals Irvin McDowell, E. V. Sumner, S. P. Heintzelman, and E. D. Keyes. The forces to be left in defence of Washington were to be under the command of General James S. Wadsworth, and a fifth corps was to be

* *Congressional Globe*, 37th Congress, 2d session, p. 194.

† Warden, *Life of Chase*, p. 397.

‡ Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. v., p. 155.

|| Raymond, *Life of Lincoln*, p. 773; Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. v., p. 156.

* See Rhodes, *United States*, vol. iii., pp. 580-581; Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. v., pp. 157-158; *McClellan's Own Story*, p. 156; Swinton, *Army of the Potomac*, p. 79.

† Richardson, *Messages and Papers*, vol. vi., pp. 100-101; *Official Records*, vol. v., p. 41.

‡ Richardson, *Messages and Papers*, vol. vi., p. 101; *Official Records*, vol. iv., p. 41.

formed and placed in command of General N. P. Banks. Order No. 3 directed that, in case of a movement, a sufficient force should be left in and about Washington to insure its safety; that not more than two army corps should be sent to a new base of operations until the Potomac had been freed from the enemy's batteries and

from obstructions, and that the movement should begin not later than March 18.* Evidently Lincoln was exercising every effort to get McClellan started, though he hoped that, once a movement were begun, McClellan could handle the army well and do great things with it.

CHAPTER IV.

1861-1862.

OPERATIONS IN THE WEST: THE SHILOH DISASTER.

The engagement near Milford — Halleck's orders to Grant — The battle of Belmont — The battle of Mill Springs or Logan's Cross Roads — The capture of Forts Henry and Donelson — The occupation of Nashville — Van Dorn's defeat at Pea Ridge — The capture of New Madrid and Island No. 10 — The campaign and battle of Shiloh.

The retirement of General Scott in November, and the elevation of McClellan to the chief command, brought with it many changes in the minor commands. On November 9 the Department of the Ohio was formed and Brigadier-General D. C. Buell was placed in command with instructions to move into east Tennessee, but for months he lay practically idle, disputing with McClellan as to the best course to pursue.* Meanwhile the Department of the West had been divided into the Department of Kansas (embracing the State of Kansas, the Indian Territory west of Arkansas, and the Territories of Nebraska, Colorado, and Dakota) with Hunter in its command; and the Department of the

Missouri (embracing the States of Missouri, Iowa, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Illinois, Arkansas, and that portion of Kentucky west of the Cumberland River) with General H. W. Halleck in command. Halleck arrived at St. Louis on November 18, 1861, and took command of his Department the next day. On the 21st he ordered that no fugitive slaves should be permitted to enter the lines of any camp or of any force on the march, on the ground that important information had been conveyed to the enemy by this means. At this time guerilla warfare prevailed throughout the section, and on December 23 Halleck issued an order fixing the penalty of

* Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. v., chap. iv.

* Richardson, *Messages and Papers*, vol. vi., pp. 110-111. See also Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. v., pp. 169-171.

death upon all persons engaged in destroying railroads and telegraphs.* On December 7 Halleck placed General John Pope in command of the forces in northern Missouri, with the design of anticipating and capturing guerilla bands. On December 15 Pope encamped near Sedalia, and on the 16th pushed forward to occupy a position between Warrensburg and Clinton; and from that point proceeded against the enemy, who, on December 19 were completely defeated by Colonel J. C. Davis near Milford, with a loss of only 2 killed and 8 wounded. Davis captured 2,000 prisoners, 1,000 stand of arms, 1,000 horses, 65 wagons, tents, baggage, and supplies.†

This news was extremely gratifying to the President, who was greatly discouraged, as we have seen, by the situation at Washington. Lincoln desired that Buell, Halleck, and McClellan should coöperate, but in reply to his telegrams received word from Buell and Halleck that there was no arrangement between them, and also that the military machine was without a program.‡ This only tended further to discourage Lincoln, but he was soon to learn that a movement had begun which presaged momentous results. On January 6, 1862, Halleck had instructed Grant at Cairo to make a demonstration in force at Mayfield

and in the direction of Murray. Grant was to threaten Camps Beauregard and Murray, to create the impression that not only was Fort Donelson at Dover to be attacked, but that his own column was merely an advance guard of a great army sweeping down towards Nashville. Flag Officer A. H. Foote was to assist by a gunboat demonstration.* These instructions were received by Grant on January 8, and a movement was begun on the evening of the next day. Brigadier-General J. A. McClelland marched southward to Mayfield midway between Fort Henry and Columbus. Brigadier-General C. F. Smith starting from Paducah marched to Calloway near Fort Henry, while Foote and Grant, with three gunboats, ascended the Tennessee to Fort Henry.

Some time before this Grant had been sent to clear southwestern Missouri of guerillas. On the evening of November 6, 1861, he left Cairo with about 3,000 men, with the object of breaking up the Confederate camp at Belmont Landing on the Missouri opposite Columbus. On the morning of November 7 he landed his troops at Hunter's Point, three miles above Belmont, and marched to a place favorable for an attack. By this time the single regiment stationed at Belmont had been reinforced by five regiments from Columbus under General Pillow. The attack began about 11

* For Price's protest and Halleck's reply see *Official Records*, vol. viii., p. 515.


† *Official Records*, vol. viii., pp. 447, 452.

‡ *Official Records*, vol. vii., pp. 524-526.

* *Official Records*, vol. vii., pp. 533-534.

o'clock, and was severely contested on both sides. The Confederates were driven out of their camp and took shelter under the steep river bank, but Grant's troops frittered away their victory by a disorderly exultation which soon brought its retribution. General Polk sent several regiments across the river to cut off the Union retreat, which, instead of an orderly march from the battle-field, became a hasty scramble to get out of danger.

the State on the Big Sandy River, and had intrenched himself near Paintville. Colonel James A. Garfield was sent after Marshall with a brigade of infantry and about 300 cavalry. Marshall hastily retreated on January 7, pursued by Garfield's troops. Early on the morning of the 10th the Confederates made a stand at Middle Creek Forks, three miles beyond Prestonburg, but were soon driven from the field by Garfield's troops. The



Finally, however, the Union troops cut their way through to the boats and escaped with a loss of 79 killed, 289 wounded, and 117 missing. The loss on the Confederate side was 105 killed, 409 wounded, and 117 missing.*

This action was soon followed by another which took place early in January. Humphrey Marshall had gathered a force of 3,000 Confederates in the extreme eastern part of


Union loss was only 2 killed and 25 wounded. By this battle Kentucky was freed from Marshall, and Generals George H. Thomas and Albin Schoepf were at liberty to look for Zollicoffer who had established himself in a fortified camp at Mill Springs, a bend of the Cumberland, where its junction with White Oak Creek afforded water protection on both sides. At this place Zollicoffer had built his works and there had encamped 12,000 men and 800 cavalry, with 3 pieces of artillery. Early in

* Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. v., pp. 113-115; M. F. Force, *From Fort Henry to Corinth*, pp. 20-23; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. i., pp. 348-357.

January Zollicoffer was joined by General George B. Crittenden, who took general command with the brigades of Zollicoffer and W. H. Carroll under him. General Leonidas Polk held the

Green, the centre. General George H. Thomas was on the Union left, with General Schoepf immediately opposite Zollicoffer; while General Buell, with headquarters at Louisville, was in close communication with the Union centre which threatened Bowling Green and Nashville. General Thomas was sent against Zollicoffer's forces (now commanded by General Crittenden) from the direction of Lebanon. On the 18th Thomas reached Logan's Cross Roads, about ten miles from Crittenden's intrenchments. The latter officer, in order to prevent Thomas from concentrating his forces, marched at midnight of the 18th with Zollicoffer's and Carroll's brigades, consisting of 8 regiments of infantry, 6 guns, and 4 battalions of cavalry, and attacked General Thomas soon after daylight on January 18.

The Union troops, consisting of 6 regiments of infantry, 1 battery and some cavalry, were brought rapidly into action. Finally, when 3 fresh Union regiments fell on the Confederate right, and the 2d Kentucky was pouring a galling fire upon the centre, the 9th Ohio made a bayonet charge completely turning the Confederate left, and compelling them to retire in confusion. At this point General Schoepf's brigade reached the field, and the whole force continued in pursuit, reaching the Confederate intrenchments during the night, and premeditating an assault the next day. During the night, however, the Confederates retreated, leavingartil-




Confederate left at Columbus. General J. B. Floyd reached Fort Donelson on February 13 and had under him Generals Pillow, Buckner, and Bushrod R. Johnson; and General A. S. Johnston was at Bowling

lery, cavalry horses, mules, wagons, and camp equipage. In this battle Zollicoffer was killed. Mistaking a Union for a Confederate regiment, he told its commanding officer, Colonel S. S. Fry, that he was firing on friends. Unaware that Zollicoffer was an enemy, Fry ordered his men to stop firing, but at this moment one of Zollicoffer's aides rode up, and seeing the true state of affairs began to fire at Fry. Thereupon the latter drew his revolver and shot Zollicoffer through the heart. The Union loss was 39 killed and 207 wounded, and the Confederate loss 349 in killed and wounded.* This decisive victory broke up the Confederate line in Kentucky, opened a path into east Tennessee, and proved the commencement of a series of successful military operations in the West.

We have already seen that Grant, Foote, and Smith had made a reconnaissance from Fort Henry about the middle of January. Foote had with him the *Cairo*, *Carondelet*, *Cincinnati*, *Louisville*, *Mound City*, *Pittsburgh*, and *St. Louis*, which had been constructed during the summer and fall of 1861 by James B. Eads.† As he had the coöperation of the fleet, Grant asked permission of Halleck to

attack and capture Fort Henry, and in this request for authority was joined by Foote on January 28.* Halleck assented and sent Grant written instructions by mail, which were received on February 1.† Accordingly, on the morning of February 2, Foote's flotilla, followed by a fleet of transports carrying Grant's troops, left



Cairo, and on the morning of the 4th anchored six miles below Fort Henry. The fort was defended by 17 guns and its land approaches were covered by 3,000 men under General Lloyd Tilghman. About 11:20 A. M. on the morning of the 6th, Foote steamed up toward the fort, and attacked it with four iron clads, and Tilghman with about 90 men to work 11 guns bearing on

* Henry M. Cist, *Army of the Cumberland*, pp. 9-20; Thomas B. Van Horne, *Army of the Cumberland*, vol. i., p. 57; Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. v., pp. 115-117; Shaler, *Kentucky*, pp. 273-275; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. i., pp. 387-392.

† Regarding the Union ironclads and gunboats, see Boynton, *History of the Navy during the Rebellion*, vol. i., pp. 117-243.

* Grant's *Memoirs*, vol. i., p. 287; *Official Records*, vol. vii., pp. 120-121.

† *Official Records*, vol. vii., p. 121.

the river returned the fire. After a contest of an hour and a quarter, two of the heaviest guns in the fort were silenced, and the gunboat *Essex* had been disabled, drifting helplessly out of the fight. The remaining gunboats continued their attack, and when five more of the guns in the fort were disabled Tilghman hauled down his flag and surrendered with 78 men, after having lost 16 killed and wounded. The 3,000 men in the rifle pits retreated to Fort Donelson. The fleet had 29 killed and wounded. Grant who had landed his troops six miles below the fort arrived too late to take part in the action.* On the 6th Grant telegraphed to Halleck that Fort Henry had been captured and that he would attack and destroy Fort Donelson on the 8th.†

On account of heavy rains which made the roads impassable for artillery and wagons, Grant was unable to fulfil his prophecy to the letter. Moreover, Foote was compelled to return to Cairo for repairs to his fleet, and the movement was deferred until the morning of February 12, when Grant marched across the country with about 16,000 men, arriving before Fort Donelson in the evening. The fort was on a commanding hill, 120 feet above the level of the Cumberland, with 3 heavy batteries command-

ing the river, and a line of rifle-pits to defend the land approach. On the morning of the 13th the fort and works were held by about 18,000 men under the command of General Floyd, the rifle-pits being held by General Buckner on the right, and General Pillow on the left. The afternoon of the 12th and all day of the 13th were spent in digging up ground and making the investment as complete as possible.* On the 13th there was some fighting in which the Union troops were worsted. On the night of the 13th Foote with his gunboats and reinforcements arrived, the latter including Charles Cruft's brigade and several regiments from Fort Henry and Cairo. On the 14th the assault was begun by an attack from six gunboats, but at the end of an hour and a half Foote was compelled to withdraw, two of his ironclads being disabled, and the other two being partially so, besides which he had lost 54 men killed and wounded.† As Foote had been wounded it was concluded that he ought to return to Cairo with his fleet and repair damages, while Grant completed his investment, fortified his lines, and awaited the arrival of reinforcements and the return of Foote.


The Confederate generals, Floyd, Pillow, and Buckner, however, decided to break the right of Grant's investing line and escape to Nashville. Accordingly, they determined to make a sortie early the next morn-

* Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. v., pp. 120-121; Rhodes, *United States*, vol. iii., p. 582; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. i., pp. 358-372; Maclay, *History of the Navy*, vol. ii., pp. 325-338; Force, *From Fort Henry to Corinth*, pp. 24-32.

† *Official Records*, vol. vii., p. 124.

* *Grant's Memoirs*, p. 298.

† *Official Records*, vol. vii., p. 159; Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. v., pp. 195-196.




From the original Brady negatives.

1. ONE OF THE BIG GUNS AT FORT DONELSON.

2. PART OF THE SHILOH BATTLEFIELD, SHOWING A SECTION OF THE UNION ENCAMPMENTS.

ing (the 15th). Meanwhile, as above stated, Grant had received reinforcements which were formed into a division of 10,000 men under General Lew



Wallace and put in the line between McClernand and Smith. Thus Grant's force had been raised to 26,000 men. At 6 o'clock on the morning of the 15th, Pillow, on the Confederate left, supported by part of Buckner's command, advanced with 10,000 men and forced back the right of McClernand's line until, by 11 o'clock, he was in complete possession of the Charlotte Road. McClernand called for assistance, and in the absence of Grant, who had gone to confer with Foote, Lew Wallace sent Cruft's brigade to his support, but the Confederates con-

tinued to gain the advantage, pushing back McClernand's two right brigades and their supports. The Confederates then had a chance to escape, but instead pursued their retreating foes.* Meanwhile Buckner had attacked McClernand's left, but was repulsed. Rallying his men, however, he renewed the attack, and the whole right wing of Grant's army was pressed back, the Confederates still following up their advantage, when Wallace threw John M. Thayer's brigade to the right and, after a sharp fight, drove them back to their intrenchments. At 2 o'clock Grant came on the field and found his army driven from position and the way open for the Confederate escape. He rode rapidly to Smith's quarters and directed him to charge the enemy with his whole division. Smith led his column under a severe fire and seized the Confederate works in his front on the high ground surrounding the fort. Wallace and part of McClernand's force, advancing on the right, gained the greater part of the ground lost early in the day, and by night the line of investment was recovered.† Grant made preparations to renew the attack the next morning, but during the night of the 15th the Confederate commanders decided to abandon the fort. Thereupon Floyd and 1,500 Virginia troops escaped by means of two small steamers, Pillow crossed the river in a skiff, and Col-

* Rhodes, *United States*, vol. iii., pp. 586-589.

† *Ibid*, pp. 590-592.

onel N. B. Forrest took out 500 of his cavalry and a number of infantry and artillery over the road which was submerged by the overflow of the Cumberland.

At an early hour on the 15th, as Grant was about to renew the attack, a note came from Buckner proposing the "appointment of commissioners, to agree upon the terms of capitulation," and suggesting an armistice till 12 o'clock. Grant replied, however, "no terms except unconditional and immediate surrender can be accepted. I propose to move immediately upon your works."* Accordingly, the Confederate general was compelled to accept terms which he denominated "ungenerous and unchivalric." Grant telegraphed to Halleck that day: "We have taken Fort Donelson and from 12,000 to 15,000 prisoners including General Buckner and General Bushrod R. Johnson; also 20,000 stands of arms; 48 pieces of artillery; 17 heavy guns; from 2,000 to 4,000 horses; and a large quantity of commissary stores."† The exact number of men surrendered was near the latter figure given by Grant, being more than 13,500. The total Union loss was 510 killed, 2,152 wounded, and 224 missing. The Confederate loss in killed and wounded was 2,000.‡

This important victory was gratifying to the North. It caused the Con-

federates to abandon Bowling Green and Columbus and to evacuate Nashville, and resulted in a Union advance of over 200 miles of territory before the enemy could rally or reorganize. Bowling Green was evacuated February 14 and General Mitchel took immediate possession. The Confederates reached Nashville on the 16th, but under Johnston's command passed on to Murfreesboro, 32 miles beyond. Commodore Foote with his gunboats ascended the Cumberland, destroying the extensive iron works six miles above Dover and reaching Clarksville February 19, but the enemy had fled. The fall of Donelson threw Nashville into consternation. Floyd destroyed the bridges over the Cumberland and hastened away.* On February 24 the Union army reached Nashville, which was formally surrendered by the mayor into General Buell's hands. Since by the taking of Nashville, Columbus was seriously in danger Beauregard and Johnston, on February 18, issued orders to destroy part of the track and bridges of the Memphis and Ohio Railroad preparatory

Personal Memoirs, vol. i.; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. i., pp. 398-437; *Confederate Military History*, vol. vii., pt. ii., pp. 36-40; vol. viii., pp. 19-27; vol. ix., pt. i., pp. 57-62; Shaler, *Kentucky*, pp. 277-279.

* Pollard says: "An earthquake could not have shocked the city more. Congregations at the churches were broken up in confusion and dismay; women and children rushed into the streets wailing with terror; trunks were thrown from three-story windows in the haste of the fugitives, and thousands hastened to leave their beautiful city in the midst of the most distressing scenes of terror and confusion and of plunder by the mob."

* *Official Records*, vol. vii., p. 161.

† *Ibid.*, p. 625.

‡ Maclay, *History of the Navy*, vol. ii., pp. 339-345; Force, *From Fort Henry to Corinth*, pp. 33-65; Swinton, *Decisive Battles of the War*; Grant's


to a removal of the forces at Columbus to Island No. 10, about 45 miles below on the Mississippi River. This was soon afterwards accomplished.

Meanwhile the Confederates had been driven out of Missouri into Arkansas. Sharp skirmishing took place at Mount Zion on December 28, 1861, and at Fayette on January 8, 1862, but without material result. The Union troops under Generals Sigel and Alexander Asboth, and Colonels J. C. Davis and Eugene A. Carr were combined late in January under the command of General S. R. Curtis. Early in February these divisions pushed rapidly from Rolla toward Springfield, where General Price had taken up his headquarters. A sharp skirmish took place near Springfield, and Price, finding his position untenable, ordered a retreat on the night of February 12-13, the Union troops entering the town early the next morning. Curtis pursued Price, crossed the State line into Arkansas on the 18th, and defeated Price, who, having received some reinforcements, attempted to make a stand at Sugar Creek. On February 23 Curtis entered and took possession of Fayetteville, capturing a number of prisoners and a considerable quantity of stores and baggage. Part of the town was burned by the Confederates before their flight over the Boston Mountains.

Curtis was ordered by Halleck not to penetrate further into Arkansas, but to hold his position and keep the

enemy south of the Boston Mountains. Meanwhile the Confederate Major-General Earl Van Dorn had been sent to take command of the Trans-Mississippi district of Department No. 2. Upon his arrival in the West Van Dorn found the Confederate forces united in the Boston Mountains, 45 miles south of Sugar Creek where Curtis had established his headquarters for better security with 10,500 infantry and cavalry and 49 cannon. On March 5 Van Dorn advanced with his whole force which according to official records was 16,202 infantry and cavalry and about 50 cannon. General Sigel advanced early on the morning of the 6th toward Sugar Creek and withstood the Confederate attack in front, on the flanks and rear for nearly six hours, when he was reinforced by General Curtis. By this movement Sigel's division was brought to the west end of Pea Ridge where he formed a junction with Generals J. C. Davis and Carr. The men rested on their arms during the night of the 6th awaiting the expected attack on the morrow. During the night Van Dorn made a bold flank movement, swinging his army to the left and reaching Pea Ridge in the rear of Curtis to cut off his communications and reinforcements. Curtis, however, becoming informed of the movement, faced his army to the rear, his left on the creek and his right at Elkhorn Tavern at the crest of the ridge, the Confederate left being at


the latter. At daylight of the 7th the Confederates made a fierce assault which for a time seemed to carry all before it; but it was in two unrelated divisions. James McIntosh and Mc-



Culloch on the right ambushed and outflanked Peter J. Osterhaus, while Van Dorn and Price at Elkhorn Tavern decimated Colonel Carr's forces. The latter carried on the fight for seven hours without reinforcements until about one-quarter of his troops were either killed or wounded. The Confederate right made a final effort to break the Union line and join the left, but Curtis brought up his last reserves and in a desperate combat in the woods both McIntosh and McCulloch were mortally wounded; whereupon their troops retreated, and Sigel, reinforcing Carr, stopped the progress of Price who was badly wounded. The Union troops were reformed during the night of the 7th, and early on the morning of the 8th the fight was renewed. The Confederates fought desperately and stubbornly, but they were quickly driven

into precipitate and scattered retreat. Sigel pursued them for several miles toward Keetsville and the cavalry still farther. The Union loss was 203 killed, 980 wounded and 201 captured or missing, while Van Dorn states his loss to have been between 800 and 1,000 killed and wounded and about 300 missing.*

Meanwhile, after evacuating Columbus (March 2, 1862), the Confederates turned their attention to holding the next barrier on the Mississippi River. This was at a point less than 100 miles below Cairo where the Mississippi makes two large bends. At the foot of the first bend lay Island No. 10 and from that point the river flows northward to New Madrid, Missouri, passing which it resumes its southward




course. The island, the Tennessee shore of the river, and the town of Madrid were strongly fortified and

* See Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. v., pp. 288-293; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. i., pp. 275-277, 314-337; Force, *From Fort Henry to Corinth*, pp. 12-16; *Confederate Military History*, vol. ix., pt. ii., pp. 77-83; vol. x., pt. ii., pp. 65-89.

occupied with large garrisons — about 3,000 men at the former and 5,000 men at the latter.* General John Pope was selected to lead an expedition against the place. He began his march on February 2 from above Cairo, and on March 3 appeared before New Madrid with his whole force, numbering 20,000. He found the place occupied by several regiments of infantry and some companies of artillery. The fortifications consisted of earthworks mounting 20 guns with lines of intrenchments while several gunboats carrying from 4 to 8 heavy guns each, in command of Commodore George N. Hollins, were anchored along the shore between the upper and lower redoubts. Pope decided against any attempt to occupy the town, contenting himself with surrounding the place with siege-works in which he could protect his men. He then sent a body of troops under Colonel Joseph B. Plummer to occupy Point Pleasant several miles below, so as to cut off the Confederate reinforcements and supplies. When Pope got his heavy siege guns into position and began to bombard the town the Confederates, realizing the futility of attempting to defend it, hastily retreated during the night, leaving a large quantity of stores, artillery, etc.

The Confederates now held Island No. 10 and the Tennessee shore, but their retreat was cut off by the swamps beyond and Pope's batteries

below. On the 13th Foote left Cairo with 7 ironclads and 10 mortar boats, and, having been joined at Columbus by Colonel Napoleon B. Buford with his regiment and other troops, about 1,500 in all, moved down the river and on Sunday, the 16th, began the bombardment of Island No. 10, with no



particular result. The only way of escape open to the Confederates, should it become necessary, was across the Tennessee peninsula, a few miles to Tiptonville below New Madrid, whence they could reach Memphis or its vicinity. To cut off the Confederate means of escape the project of a canal was revived by which steam transports could be

* Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. v., p. 294.

brought from above across the peninsula to New Madrid below.* Colonel J. W. Bissell of the engineer regiment was placed in charge of the work, and finally built a canal 12 miles long, completing the work on April 4.† But two gunboats were needed to protect the transports in crossing troops. Accordingly Commander Henry Walke of the *Carondelet* was granted permission by Foote to run the batteries at Island No. 10.‡ On the night of April 3-4, in a furious storm of lightning and thunder, the *Carondelet* passed the entire series of Confederate batteries in the midst of a rain of shot and shell, and a little after midnight lay unharmed at the New Madrid landing. On the morning of the 7th the gunboat *Pittsburgh* performed the same feat in safety, and the problem of Pope's difficulties was solved.¶ Finding their case hopeless, the Confederates attempted to retreat during the afternoon and night of the 7th, and early on the 8th, ascertaining that they were completely cut off, they laid down their arms and surrendered at discretion.§ In his report Pope says:

"Three generals, 273 field and company officers, 6,700 prisoners, 123 pieces of heavy artillery all of the very best character and latest patterns. 7,000 stand of small arms, an immense quantity of ammunition of all kinds, etc., are among the spoils." ¶

* See *Official Records*, vol. viii., pp. 86, 625.

† *Battles and Leaders*, vol. i., pp. 460-462.

‡ *Official Records*, vol. viii., p. 121.

¶ Maclay, *History of the Navy*, vol. ii., pp. 349-358.

§ *Battles and Leaders*, vol. i., pp. 437-445.

¶ *Official Records*, vol. viii., p. 375. The loss

The victory at Donelson had not been followed up to its full fruition. The delay of a fortnight or more enabled the Confederates to establish another line farther to the South and again to interpose a formidable resistance. Grant was of the opinion that—

"if one general who would have taken the responsibility had been in command of all the troops west of the Alleghanies we could have marched to Chattanooga, Corinth, Memphis and Vicksburg with the troops we then had; and as volunteering was going on rapidly over the North there would soon have been force enough at all these centres to operate offensively against any body of the enemy that might be found near them." *

Grant seemed to be the one for such a command, but as such an arrangement would have supplanted Halleck, Grant was not considered for the position. There was much jealousy on the part of Halleck who repeatedly complained of Grant's conduct to the War Department and placed General Smith in command of the expedition up the Tennessee.† Smith started on March 10, made good his landing at Savannah, and, on the 14th sent General W. T. Sherman with a division of 19 steamboats to ascend the river toward Eastport

of this island was keenly felt in the South, since the Confederates were sure that the position was impregnable. Pollard says: "There could be no excuse for the wretched management and infamous scenes that attended the evacuation.

* * * No single battlefield has yet afforded to the North such visible fruits of victory as had been gathered at Island No. 10."—*First Year of the War*, pp. 291-294. See also Force, *From Fort Henry to Corinth*, pp. 66-90.

* Grant's *Memoirs*, p. 317.

† *Official Records*, vol. vii., p. 679 *et seq.*


and begin the work of destroying railroad communications. Sherman advanced but finding the country above Pittsburg Landing under water, fell back to that point and recommended its occupation to General Smith. Sherman established his division on March 19 at Shiloh Church about 2½ miles back from the Landing, with General Stephen A. Hurlbut's division encamped one mile back from the river. On March 17 Grant arrived at Savannah and sent McClernand's and C. F. Smith's division under W. H. L. Wallace to Pittsburg Landing, Benjamin M. Prentiss' division following later. Little or no attention was paid to lines of battle or reserves, both Grant and Sherman regarding the concentration as preparatory to an advance upon Corinth. General Lew Wallace was stationed at Crump's Landing, about six miles below Pittsburg and on the same side of the river. No attention was paid to fortifying, and neither abatis nor rifle-pits were constructed or timber felled, for, as Sherman said: "We did not fortify our camp against an attack because we had no orders to do so and because such a course would have made our raw men timid"; and, in a court-martial case, he testified: "To have erected fortifications would have been an evidence of weakness and would have invited an attack." There was no expectation that the Confederates would make an attack, Grant in his *Memoirs* saying, "The fact is I regarded the campaign we were engaged

in as an offensive one and had no idea that the enemy would leave strong intrenchments to take the initiative when he knew he would be attacked where he was if he remained." This conviction led not only to neglect of defensive preparations but to the selection of camp grounds without regard to a line of battle and chiefly without reference to available facilities and the convenience of water. Three of Sherman's brigades were established about Shiloh Church and the fourth about two miles distant. This space was later filled in part by Prentiss' division, leaving extensive gaps on each of his flanks. McClernand's division was camped to the left and rear of Sherman and nearly at right angles to the latter, with its flanks toward the enemy's position. Hurlbut's division was a mile to the rear of Prentiss, and W. H. L. Wallace's division about the same distance in Sherman's rear.

After the battle of Mill Springs, Beauregard was sent West to assist Albert Sidney Johnston in what was considered a grave situation. He put forth his greatest exertions to equip an army, calling upon the governors of the contiguous States for help. On March 23 Beauregard joined Johnston at Corinth and the two generals determined to surprise Grant before Buell could join him. On April 3 the Confederate party left Corinth, but the weather was stormy and the roads were bad, causing such a delay

that the attack planned for April 5 could not be made until Sunday, April 6. Though there had been con-

more than some picket firing," and that he did not "apprehend anything like an attack" on his position. Upon



siderable show of Confederate cavalry several miles to the front on April 4, the Union generals were not apprehensive of an attack. On the 5th Sherman wrote to Grant: "I have no doubt that nothing will occur to-day

receiving this report Grant telegraphed Halleck:

"I have scarcely the faintest idea of an attack (general one) being made upon us, but will be prepared should such a thing take place. General Nelson's division has arrived. The other two of General Buell's column will arrive to-morrow

and the next day. It is my present intention to send them to Hamburg some four miles above Pittsburgh when they all get here. From that point to Corinth the road is good and a junction could be formed with the troops from Pittsburgh at almost any time." *

Nevertheless, at this very time Hardee's corps was in line of battle within a mile and a half of Sherman's headquarters, having deployed in this position at 10 A. M. of April 5, with General Braxton Bragg's corps forming as a second line and Polk's and Breckinridge's corps, the rear of Johnston's army, closing up. Such was the situation Saturday night in the Union camps. Probably few of the battles of the Civil War have given rise to such controversy as the battle of Shiloh, the main point of controversy being whether the Union troops were surprised. Halleck stated that every division had notice of the enemy's approach hours before the battle commenced and Grant and Sherman have maintained the same.† The quotations given above, however, would seem to prove that, while the Union commanders knew of the proximity of a large Confederate force, they had no idea that an attack would be made. On April 5 Grant telegraphed Buell: "The enemy at and near Corinth are probably from 60,000 to 80,000."‡ Colonel Ammen, who commanded a brigade of Nelson's division in Buell's army, informed Grant that his troops

could march on to Pittsburg Landing if necessary. Grant replied:

"You cannot march through the swamps; make the troops comfortable; I will send boats for you Monday or Tuesday or some time early in the week. There will be no fight at Pittsburg Landing; we will have to go to Corinth where the rebels are fortified. If they come to attack us we can whip them as I have more than twice as many troops as I had at Fort Donelson." *

General Prentiss, after the war, said: "In reference to the still general inquiry 'Was our army surprised at Shiloh?' I can only reply for myself that I had not the slightest idea that a general engagement was to be fought on that day." He said further: "We were not prepared on the 6th of April" but, "admonished by the action of the enemy on Friday evening," he had strengthened his pickets. General Andrew Hickenlooper, who commanded a battery in Prentiss' division, said:

"There had been no order or system in camping; no relation of one command to another; no defined front or known rear, except an impassable river. There was no common directing head or superior officer beyond the rank of division commander placed on the firing line whom all would recognize and promptly obey. * * * The night before had been passed by the Union troops in merrymaking until the camp sunk into a peaceful slumber from which they were aroused by the roar of musketry and the booming of the guns of the 5th battery."

Early on the morning of April 6, the Confederates made a vigorous onslaught. Prentiss' pickets were the first to encounter the Confederate advance, and being strongly reinforced attacked Hardee's oncoming line. The latter pushed rapidly forward

* *Official Records*, vol. x., pt. ii., p. 93.

† See *Official Records*, vol. x., pt. i., p. 99, and Grant's and Sherman's *Memoirs*.

‡ *Official Records*, vol. x., pt. ii., p. 93.

* *Official Records*, vol. x., pt. i., p. 330.

and threw strong flanking forces into the wide gaps on Prentiss' flanks, thus turning both as well as Sherman's left and the right of David Stuart — Sherman's isolated brigade. Sherman's brigades formed on their color line, a portion of the troops being called from their breakfast for the purpose. They advanced between 200 and 300 yards, met the enemy in force, and checked their advance for a time, Sherman meanwhile sending to McClelland for a battalion of cavalry to join one of his "for the purpose of discovering the strength and design of the enemy." By 10 o'clock most of the advance Union camps had been captured by the enemy. There was much stubborn and even remarkable fighting during the day, in which Sherman, Prentiss, McClelland and Hurlbut were personally conspicuous. Sherman was wounded twice and had several horses shot under him. McClelland, Hurlbut, W. H. L. Wallace and Prentiss were equal to the demands made upon them, but nothing could permanently resist the well ordered Confederate movement. Force describes the battle as "a combat made up of numberless separate encounters of detached portions of broken lines continually shifting position and changing direction in the forest and across ravines."* As the day advanced the Union line was rapidly disintegrating. Many of the troops were raw and fled panic-stricken at

the first charge,* while some of the officers showed cowardice as well as inefficiency. Prentiss' division (the 6th) and the second division under W. H. L. Wallace held one of the key-points of the Union left centre against the assaults of the enemy, but found that the withdrawal of troops on the right and left produced gaps that offered openings to the enemy. Grant had given instructions to hold this position at all hazards and, after consultation, Prentiss and Wallace decided to obey this order notwithstanding the dangerous exposure. But as the Confederates quickly took advantage of the offered openings, Prentiss and Wallace were quickly surrounded, and only portions of their commands succeeded in making their way out. Wallace was mortally wounded, and Prentiss and fragments of the two divisions numbering 2,200 men were captured soon after 5 o'clock. Sherman's organization was destroyed and he, with a small force of his own, was fighting stubbornly with McClelland whose organization, though much broken, was still maintained. About 2 o'clock General Johnston was mortally wounded and died in half an hour.† The transfer of command to Beauregard caused a lull in the fighting, but by 5 o'clock the Union line had been forced back into the corner between the Tennessee River and Snake Creek, an area which included the Landing. Here the line presented

* From *Fort Henry to Corinth*, p. 124.

* Sherman says "at least 10,000."

† Rhodes, *United States*, vol. iii., p. 623.

a front of about a mile and a half to the enemy. Just as an assault on this position was being made on the right of the Union lines, Ammen's brigade and Nelson's division of Buell's army, which had marched from Savannah through the swamps, were ferried across the river; then two regiments advanced and opened fire upon the right regiments of the enemy which, in charging forward, had nearly reached the Landing. The assault was checked without severe fighting, but the arrival of fresh troops thus became known and the Confederate attack ended for the day. At this time Grant's line in front of the Landing was held by the broken organizations of Hurlbut, W. H. L. Wallace, McClernand and Sherman, while portions of various organizations were available within the protected area. Buell himself arrived at one o'clock in the afternoon and spent the rest of the day learning conditions, studying the ground, and, at night, posting his troops for the conflict to take place the next day.

Beauregard's disorganized and shattered army, worn out with the exertions of the day, was little fitted to cope with the body of fresh troops that had joined Grant. During the night Lew Wallace arrived with 5,000 men; the remainder of Nelson's division, General T. L. Crittenden's and part of General A. M. McCook's division of Buell's army, amounting in all to about 20,000 men, had reached the scene of action. Nelson's division

was ferried over at night and advanced on the left; Crittenden's was placed on Nelson's right; and two brigades of McCook's division were established still farther to the right. Along the Union right centre Grant's reduced divisions which had fought the battle of Sunday were gathered and reorganized, McClernand and Sherman in front, Hurlbut and remnants of W. H. L. Wallace's division with some new detachments in reserve. Buell's left and centre advanced early in the morning of the 7th and became engaged with the enemy's pickets immediately after daylight, the main line being encountered at 6 o'clock. McCook's two brigades moved at once into action and were established still further to the right. The Army of the Ohio pressed steadily forward and at 4 o'clock had gained possession of the old camps of Stuart, Prentiss and part of McClernand's. Two brigades of T. J. Wood's division came up toward the close of the battle, but only one reached the front. The action closed soon after 4 o'clock, and at 5 p. m. the Army of the Tennessee reoccupied its former camp. Meanwhile, when Buell first advanced, he had been joined by Colonel J. M. Tuttle of W. H. L. Wallace's 2d division, who gathered about 1,000 men of his own command and without orders proceeded to Buell's lines and fought with him throughout the day. At daylight Grant gave Sherman orders to advance on the right. He thereupon sent his staff officers to col-

lect his men, and moved forward about 7 o'clock. Two hours later, under Grant's orders, Hurlbut went to the support of McClernand, who with Sherman was then engaged near his former camp. Lew Wallace had advanced earlier and held the right of Grant's army. This division finally swung around upon the ground originally occupied by Sherman, there coming into contact with the right of McCook of Buell's line. Here the battle ended, with the Confederate army in full retreat upon Corinth. According to the best estimates Grant had 33,000 men at the opening of the battle and Lew Wallace's reinforcements the second day were 5,000. The official reports give Johnston's strength at 39,000 to 40,000. Grant's losses were 1,513 killed, 6,601 wounded and 2,830 captured or missing, total 10,944. Buell lost 241 killed, 1,807 wounded and 55 captured or missing, total 2,103. The total Union loss thus was 13,047. The Confederate loss is stated to have been 1,723 killed, 8,012 wounded, 959 missing, total 10,694.*

* See *Official Records*, vols. x., and lii., part i.: *Battles and Leaders*, vol. i., pp. 465-610; Grant's *Personal Memoirs*, vol. i.; Sherman's *Memoirs*, vol. i.; Van Horne, *History of the Army of the Cumberland*, vol. i.; Swinton, *Decisive Battles of the War*; Force, *From Fort Henry to Corinth*, pp. 91-182; Rhodes, *United States*, vol. iii., pp. 619-625; Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, chap. xviii.; Thomas Worthington, *A Correct History of Grant at the Battle of Shiloh* (1880); W. W. Wallace, *The Battle of Shiloh*, in *Journal of the Military Service Institute*, vol. xxvi., pp. 14-25 (1900); Tully, *The Civil War in the United States; Shiloh, or the Battle of Pittsburg Landing* (1898); F. A. Shoup, *The Cost of War in '62*;

The prevailing opinion was that Grant had been saved from a disastrous defeat by the arrival of Buell's army. Certainly Grant was very careless in his conduct of the campaign. When the details of it became known much bitterness of feeling sprang up, particularly in the Western States from which his troops came. All sorts of charges were made against him and pressure was brought to bear on the President to remove him. Colonel A. K. McClure in a conversation with Lincoln advocated Grant's removal, but Lincoln, in a tone of earnestness, said: "I cannot spare this man; he fights."* When Halleck received news of the victory he immediately went to Pittsburg Landing, where he arrived on April 11 and took command of the army. On the 22d Pope with his division numbering about 25,000 troops arrived at the Landing from New Madrid, thus increasing the effective troops to 100,000 men. Appointing General Thomas commander of the right wing, Buell of the centre, and Pope of the left, he named Grant his second in command.† Grant was exceedingly displeased by this, since he considered it really a displacement, and would have left the army had

Shiloh, in *United Service Magazine*, ser. iii., vol. viii., pp. 67-80 (1905); *Pittsburg Landing, Shiloh, and the Investment of Corinth, drawn from Original Sources, Official Reports, etc.* (1862); *Confederate Military History*, vol. vi., pp. 94-95; vol. vii., pt. ii., pp. 41-51; vol. viii., pp. 33-43; vol. ix., pt. i., pp. 63-73; vol. x., pt. i., pp. 165-172.

* McClure, *Lincoln and Men of War Times*, p. 179.

† *Official Records*, vol. x., part ii., pp. 138, 144.

not Sherman dissuaded him.* Beau-
regard had also been reinforced to
an effective strength of 50,000 troops.
Toward the close of April Halleck
began his move on Corinth, marching

slowly and cautiously and intrenching
himself at every step. In this position
we will leave him, to glance at opera-
tions in other fields.

CHAPTER V.

1861-1862.

OPERATIONS ALONG THE SEACOAST.

Engagement at Fort Pickens, Pensacola — Burnside's expedition to Roanoke Island — Capture of Elizabeth City — The expedition against Newbern — The capture of Fort Macon — The surrender of Fort Pulaski — The battle of South Mills — The battle of Secessionville.

On April 12 to 13, 1861, reinforcements under Colonel Harvey Brown arrived at Fort Pickens, Florida, so that by the close of the month the fort was garrisoned by about 900 men. The works were strengthened, and toward the end of June a regiment of New York troops known as Billy Wilson's Zouaves was landed on Santa Rosa Island and encamped. At Pensacola the Confederates had gathered a formidable force of about 8,000 men under Braxton Bragg, awaiting an opportunity to drive out or capture the Union troops. For this purpose an expedition of 1,000 men under General R. H. Anderson crossed over to Santa Rosa Island on October 9 and landed several miles beyond Fort Pickens. Anderson divided his force into three battalions under Colonels John K. Jackson, James Chalmers and J. Patton Anderson. After a march of three or four miles, the shooting of a sentinel by some one of

Chalmers' command gave the alarm to the Union camp. Jackson's battalion of Georgians then pushed through thickets to the middle of the island, driving the Union outposts before them and, charging bayonets, entered the camp, which they found deserted. Here they burned the storehouses and sheds. As daylight came before arrangements could be made for further concerted action, General Anderson ordered all back to the boats. During the withdrawal a sharp skirmish occurred with two companies of Union troops that attempted to intercept the retreat. The total Confederate loss was 18 killed, 39 wounded, and 30 captured; the total Union loss was 64.

Further up the coast the operations were more extensive. After the capture of Forts Hatteras and Clark at Hatteras Inlet on August 29, 1861, the Confederates began to erect works on Roanoke Island to command the narrow channel connecting Albemarle


* Rhodes, *United States*, vol. iii., p. 628.

and Pamlico Sounds.* On January 7, 1862, General Ambrose E. Burnside had collected an army of 12,829 men divided into three brigades under

passed into Pamlico Sound on February 4, when orders were given for the advance on Roanoke Island. On the 5th the start was made with 65 vessels, including transports. On the 7th the armed vessels engaged the Confederate batteries on the west side of Roanoke Island and also some Confederate gunboats, which were soon driven off. The forts were silenced and, on the morning of the 8th, Burnside debarked over 8,000 troops and a battery at Ashby's harbor. Early in the morning the advance was begun, Parke on the right, Foster in the centre, and Reno on the left. While



Generals John G. Foster, Jesse L. Reno, and John G. Parke.† Burnside was to seize Roanoke Island, capture Newbern and Fort Macon, open the harbor of Beaufort, and, if possible, to advance from Newbern and seize the railroad to Goldsboro. By the night of January 10 more than 80 vessels of all kinds had gathered at Fortress Monroe, 20 being war vessels carrying over 60 guns under command of Flag Officer L. M. Goldsborough. The expedition set sail on January 11 and



Foster pressed the front and engaged with his artillery, Reno, marching at times waist-deep in the mud of the swamps, gained the right of the Con-

* *Official Records*, vol. iv., p. 682.

† *Ibid.*, vol. ix., p. 358.

federate position, while Parke, in the same manner, gained the left. After a fight lasting three hours a simultaneous charge was made, and the entire Confederate position was taken. This cleared the road. Burnside marched to the head of the island, where the forts on the shore and their entire garrisons were captured. The Union loss was 37 killed, 214 wounded and 13 missing. The Confederate loss was 23 killed, 58 wounded and 62 missing, and about 2,650 captured, including 159 officers besides 5 forts, 32 guns and 3,000 stand of arms.*

The Confederate vessels then fled to Albemarle Sound, a distance of 30 or 40 miles into Pasquotank River toward Elizabeth City. Commander S. C. Rowan, with 14 vessels, set out in pursuit the next morning and, on February 10, came upon the Confederate gunboats drawn up in front of Elizabeth City. Rowan promptly attacked, and after a brief but spirited contest William F. Lynch, the Confederate commander, set the boats on fire and retreated. The fort at Cobb's Point, mounting four guns, was abandoned, and the principal buildings in

the city were set afire.* By prompt action, however, Rowan succeeded in checking the flames and was soon in possession of Elizabeth City and other points. In this expedition Rowan had two killed and six wounded.


Carrying out the original instructions, another expedition, naval and military, sailed from Roanoke Island against Newbern on the Neuse River. On March 6 the troops started from Roanoke Island, and by the night of the 11th the entire land and naval force was off the mouth of Slocum's Creek, south of the Neuse and about 15 miles below Newbern. Four miles below the city on the southern side of the river and opposite some obstructions in the stream, was Fort Thompson, mounting 13 heavy guns. From the fort inland was a line of rifle-pits and redoubts extending about two miles to and beyond the Atlantic and North Carolina Railroad. In the fort and on this line were 41 heavy guns and 19 field-pieces. The position was held by 7 North Carolina regiments, a battalion of militia, and 3 batteries of artillery, numbering about 5,000 men, in command of General L. O'B. Branch. Burnside's troops, 13 regiments of infantry, about 9,000 men and 8 guns were landed by noon of the 13th, the gunboats under Rowan moving up the river abreast of the infantry and shelling the road and woods in advance. At 7 A. M. on the 14th General J. G. Foster with the 10th Connecticut and the 23d, 24th,

* *Official Records*, vol. ix.; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. i., pp. 640-645; 660-670; Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. v., pp. 243-246; L. Traner, *Burnside's Expedition in North Carolina, The Battles of Roanoke Island and Elizabeth City* (1880); W. L. Welch, *The Burnside Expedition and the Engagement at Roanoke Island* (1890); B. P. Poore, *The Life and Public Services of Ambrose E. Burnside* (1882); W. B. Avery, *The Marine Artillery with the Burnside Expedition* (1880); A. E. Burnside, *The Burnside Expedition* (1882); Maclay, *History of the Navy*, vol. ii., pp. 262-270; Thomas F. Edmunds, *Operations in North Carolina, 1861-1862* (1912); *Confederate Military History*, vol. iv., pp. 32-37; vol. xii., pp. 19-25.

* *Battles and Leaders*, vol. i., p. 645; Maclay, *History of the Navy*, vol. ii., pp. 271-273.

and 28th Massachusetts moved up the road on the right; General J. L. Reno moved along the line of the railroad with the 21st Massachusetts, 9th New Jersey, 51st New York, and 51st Pennsylvania; while General J. G. Parke with the 4th and 5th Rhode Island and 11th Connecticut moved in the centre on a country road, as a reserve. About 8 A. M. Foster attacked Fort Thompson and soon

More important than these small expeditions was that under command of Brigadier-General Parke against Fort Macon, a work commanding Beaufort Harbor, North Carolina, constructed of brick and stone and mounting nearly 50 guns. On March 19 General Parke advanced with his brigade toward Beaufort, captured Moorehead City and Beaufort, and proceeded to invest the fort, which was



garrisoned by about 450 men. When surrender was refused, Parke cut off the communications of the fort, planted 11 siege guns and, at 5:40 A. M. on April 25, in coöperation with four vessels of the navy, opened fire. Hour

the entire division became engaged. After a stubborn resistance lasting four hours the Confederates broke and retreated to Newbern, burning behind them the railroad and turnpike bridges over Trent River. Burnside crossed the Trent in boats and in the afternoon occupied the city, capturing many heavy guns and other material. The Confederate loss was 64 killed, 101 wounded, and 413 captured or missing; the Union loss was 90 killed and 380 wounded.*

after hour the bombardment was maintained, but about 4 o'clock in the afternoon the garrison surrendered.*

Simultaneously with the operations in North Carolina other important victories had been gained along the Atlantic coast. Fort Pulaski, erected by the United States at Cockspur Island for the defence of Savannah, Georgia, and commanding both channels of the Savannah River, had been seized by Georgia State troops on January 3, 1861. It was a brick work with walls $7\frac{1}{2}$ feet thick and 25 feet

* Woodbury, *Burnside and the 9th Army Corps*, pp. 51-68; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. i., pp. 647-652; Maclay, *History of the Navy*, vol. ii., pp. 273-278; *Confederate Military History*, vol. iv., pp. 37-41.

* *Battles and Leaders*, vol. i., pp. 652-654; *Confederate Military History*, vol. iv., pp. 43-44.



Upper photo from the original Brady negative. Lower photo taken from the *Photographic History of the Civil War*. Copyright by the Patriot Publishing Company.

1. SECTION OF THE UNION CAMP AT NEWBERN, N. C.
2. SECTION OF THE DEMOLISHED WALL OF FORT PULASKI.

high above water and, in January of 1862, mounted 48 heavy guns and was garrisoned by nearly 400 men. General Q. A. Gillmore was placed in charge of the operations to reduce it. In February of 1862, two regiments of infantry, two companies of engineers, and two companies of artillery reached Tybee Island, and soon constructed 11 batteries of 36 large guns. At sunrise of April 10 General David Hunter, who had succeeded General T. W. Sherman in command of the Department of the South, sent an officer to demand the surrender of the fort, but its commander, Colonel C. H. Olmstead, refused. Accordingly, at 8 o'clock, the bombardment was begun and lasted until dark. At sunrise of the 11th firing was resumed, and by noon the fort was so severely damaged that at 2 o'clock a white flag was raised. Gillmore received the surrender and allowed honorable terms to the officers and men, 385 in number, found therein. Large quantities of stores, ammunition, etc., and 47 guns were captured, with a loss to the Union army of only one killed.*

After the capture of Roanoke Island and Newbern, rumors reached General Burnside that the Confederates were building ironclad gunboats at Norfolk, Virginia, with the intention of running them through the Dismal Swamp Canal and Roanoke River to make descent on the Union flotilla in

Albemarle and Pamlico Sounds. Accordingly, Burnside determined to destroy the locks of the canal at South Mills near Camden and to blow up the banks of the Currituck Canal. The expedition was to be in charge of General J. L. Reno, who, with the 21st Massachusetts and the 51st Pennsylvania, sailed from Newbern to Roanoke where, on April 18, he was joined by Colonel Rush C. Hawkins' brigade (the 9th and 89th New York and 6th New Hampshire) with 4 guns, making the aggregate number under his command 3,200 men. Early on the morning of April 19 the army advanced. When within two miles of South Mills, Reno's advance was halted by an unexpected fire of artillery, whereupon Reno pushed his guns into action. Colonel A. R. Wright with 585 men of the 3d Georgia, some North Carolina militia, and a company of cavalry, had taken position across the road with four guns. The artillery commanded the road, while both flanks, which were in a dense wood in the rear, were covered by skirmishers. After an artillery duel of an hour the 51st Pennsylvania and the 21st Massachusetts were ordered to turn the Confederate left, while Hawkins with the 9th and 89th New York attempted to turn the right, the 6th New Hampshire supporting the artillery on the left of the road. On reaching the Confederate left the 51st Pennsylvania and 21st Massachusetts opened fire, and about the same time the 9th New York made a gallant charge upon

* See Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. v., pp. 248-250; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. ii., pp. 1-12; *Confederate Military History*, vol. vi., pp. 88-91.

the Confederate guns, but was repulsed. On being joined by the 89th New York, the 9th rallied, and both went forward to join the 21st Massachusetts which, with the 51st Pennsylvania, had kept up so steady a fire that the Confederates withdrew their guns and retired a mile to the rear. On the left of the road the 6th New Hampshire advanced to within 200 yards of the right of the 3d Georgia and, pouring in a volley, hastened its retreat. The firing lasted four hours. At 10 o'clock, having failed in the object of his expedition, Reno marched back to his boats and the troops returned to Roanoke Island and Newbern. The Union loss was 13 killed, 101 wounded and 13 missing; the Confederate loss was 6 killed, 19 wounded and 3 missing.*

In May of 1862, General David Hunter, commanding the Department of the South, began preparations for throwing troops upon James Island to make a quick advance upon Charleston, South Carolina. On June 2 the advance of General I. I. Stevens was landed, and next day made a reconnoissance in force to within a short distance of a battery at Secessionville, about two miles from Stone River. The gunboats coöperated in the movement, which was but partially successful, the Confederates, under Lieutenant-Colonel Ellison Capers, 24th South Carolina, defending the posi-

tion, and inflicting upon Stevens a loss of 17 killed and wounded, and taking 22 prisoners. On the 8th Stevens made another reconnoissance, came under artillery fire, and withdrew with a loss of 7 killed and wounded. On the same day General Wright's division arrived from Edisto Island, and next day marched to near Grimball's Landing, two or three miles to the left of Stevens, who was covering the position opposite Legareville, on John's Island. It was determined to carry the battery by a rush, and thus open the way to Charleston, only 10 miles distant, and orders were given for an assault to be made at dawn of June 11; but Colonel T. G. Lamar, now in the command of the Confederate works at Secessionville, assumed the offensive and, toward evening of the 10th, attacked Wright's pickets and advance posts with infantry and artillery but was repulsed, suffering severe loss and inflicting upon Wright a loss of about 25 killed and wounded. Accordingly a battery was constructed, but it failed to silence the Confederate guns, and Benham (who had now succeeded to the command) proceeded to assault the work. He had for the purpose 3,100 men under General Wright, and 3,500 under General Stevens. The work was defended by six heavy guns and about 1,000 men, and there were supports near that came up at the close of the action. Stevens, with his 3,500 men, was to make the assault, and Wright, moving from Grimball's Landing, was to co-

* *Official Records*, vol. ix.; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. i., pp. 654-656; *Confederate Military History*, vol. iv., pp. 41-42; vol. vi., pp. 96-97.

operate by moving on his left and rear. Stevens had two brigades, Colonel Fenton's (8th Michigan, 7th Connecticut, 28th Massachusetts) and Colonel Daniel Leasure's (46th and 79th New York and 100th Pennsylvania), and four guns. At 4 A. M. the column moved forward, Fenton leading, with a storming party of two companies of the 8th Michigan, closely followed by the other 8 companies of the regiment, the 7th Connecticut, and the 28th Massachusetts. Leasure followed Fenton. Lamar had knowledge of the movement and had sent for reinforcements, and as the leading regiment came within 300 yards and deployed into line his guns opened their canister-fire, and at the same time heavy volleys of musketry from dikes

and hedges were poured upon the right flank of the assaulting column. The Union regiments closed up rapidly and made a rush for the work, but became entangled in the abatis, and at 5 o'clock, after a severe contest of 25 minutes, they fell back 500 yards to a hedge, under cover of artillery, with a loss of over 500. At 9 o'clock Benham ordered Stevens back to the camp. The Union loss was 107 killed, 487 wounded, and 89 missing, an aggregate of 683. The Confederates reported a loss of 52 killed, 144 wounded, and 8 missing. Late in June the Union troops were ordered to withdraw from James Island and, for some time after, no further attempt was made to capture the city.*

CHAPTER VI.

1861-1862.

WORK OF THE CONFEDERATE AND UNION CONGRESSES.

Davis' message to the Confederate Congress — Financial measures — Conditions in Richmond and Charleston — Lincoln's annual message to Congress — Reports of the department officials — Condition of the Treasury — Spaulding's financial plan — Morrill's minority report — Passage of the legal tender act — Resolutions relating to slavery — Abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia — Lincoln's plan of compensated emancipation — Charges of corruption against Secretary Cameron — His appointment to a foreign mission — Appointment of Stanton as Secretary of War.

On November 18, 1861, the Confederate congress met at Richmond. Members were present from six of the seceded States sufficient to form a quorum, and the next day Davis sent in his message.* It was a document prepared with care, and evi-

dently intended to produce effect abroad quite as much as at home.

* *Official Records*, vol. xiv.; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. iv., p. 21; Hazard Stevens, *Military Operations in South Carolina in 1862, against Charleston, Port Royal Ferry, James Island and Secessionville* (1912), and *Life of I. I. Stevens*; Walter B. Capers, *The Soldier Bishop—Ellison Capers* (1912); *Confederate Military History*, vol. v., pp. 86-92.

* See Moore, *Rebellion Record*, vol. iii., p. 404.

There was a triumphant note in the message as he spoke of the succession of glorious victories at Bethel, Bull Run, Springfield, and other places, of the waxing strength of the Confederacy and of its well-regulated financial system. The financiering extolled by Davis consisted in meeting the expenses of the war by loans and the issue of treasury notes.* Between July 1 and November 16 less than 1 per cent. of the receipts had come from customs and miscellaneous sources, more than \$20,000,000 had been raised by loans, and \$31,000,000 had been expended. A direct war tax imposed in August had not yielded any returns. So averse were the people to taxation that most of the States assumed this tax, paying it to the government, and raising the means by issuing State bonds and treasury notes.† The proceedings of Congress were of no great importance. Kentucky and Missouri were admitted into the Confederacy; about \$60,000,000 was appropriated for the army and \$4,000,000 for the navy; and a resolution was adopted refusing to make any advance to planters, or to purchase their products. The session of the provisional Congress terminated February 17, when it was immediately succeeded by the permanent Congress.

But while Davis appeared not to be discouraged, there were others who

* Details of these transactions are given in the next chapter.

† Davis, *Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government*, vol. i., p. 495.

did not take such a roseate view of the situation. The pressure of the blockade had begun to work hardship on the people of the South. Articles of necessity had advanced enormously in price, coal and wood were scarce, the supply of medicines was becoming low, and the scarcity of lint and surgical plaster was felt seriously by the surgeons in the hospitals. Shifts were made to get along without the comforts and necessities of life. At first the people mixed rye with their coffee, and when the supply of that article ran short, substituted wheat or chickory. Many of the people dressed entirely in homespun, their clothes and even their hats and shoes being plantation-made. Fortunately, in 1861, the crops of wheat and corn were large, and this supply lasted for a considerable length of time. One of the greatest problems, however, was that of transportation, for at times the railroads were unable to do more than transport troops to the front and keep the armies supplied. The cotton and tobacco crops were ready for the market, and both France and England were willing to pay high prices for these staples, but the Union blockade was an effectual barrier against its exportation and thus the Confederacy lost a large amount of money on which it had depended.

But in spite of discomforts and business depression, life in Richmond does not seem to have been especially severe in the latter half of 1861. Dividends were paid by the bank and

railroad companies; the civil and criminal courts held their appointed terms; the theatres were open, and generally crowded; and the Fourth of July and Christmas were celebrated in the usual merry manner. Charleston, however, presented a different picture. Public amusements were almost entirely forgotten, for the blockade had created widespread depression, since the prosperity of the section depended on the marketing of the cotton crop. When the Union troops captured Port Royal, and commanded the adjacent islands on which sea-island cotton was grown, the planters applied the torch to the year's product. Moreover, on December 11, the city had been visited by a disastrous fire entailing a loss estimated at more than \$5,000,000. Nevertheless, the spirit of the people was undaunted, and the anniversary of the secession of the State was celebrated with noisy enthusiasm.*

On December 2 the second session of the Thirty-Seventh (Union) Congress convened, Senators and Representatives from 25 States being present. On the next day President Lincoln sent in his annual message.† In a few brief paragraphs he spoke of the foreign relations of the country, and of the efforts of the Confederacy to induce other nations to side with them against the North. His references to foreign affairs differed from

those in his previous message, the complacent tone having given way to one of sorrow and anxiety. Although he was as optimistic as possible under the circumstances, it was evident that he was laboring under a great weight. In his resumé of domestic affairs he spoke of the financial conditions in encouraging terms, stating that the revenues were nearly \$87,000,000 and the expenditures about \$85,000,000, thus leaving a balance of \$2,000,000. "It is gratifying to know," he said, "that the expenditures made necessary by the rebellion are not beyond the resources of the loyal people and to believe that the same patriotism which has thus far sustained the government will continue to sustain it until peace and union shall again bless the land. * * * It is gratifying to know that the patriotism of the people has proved equal to the occasion and that the number of troops tendered greatly exceeds the force which Congress authorized me to call into the field." The reports of the secretaries were submitted. The Secretary of War estimated the strength of the army at 660,971, citing this as an evidence of the wonderful vigor of our institutions, since this vast army had been procured without conscriptions, levies or drafts. He discussed also the question as to what was to be done with slaves abandoned by their masters, recommending this problem to the earnest attention of Congress. The Secretary of the Navy reported 212 available vessels of all classes,

* Rhodes, *United States*, vol. iii., pp. 544-552.

† For which, see Richardson, *Messages and Papers*, vol. vi., pp. 44-58.

and 52 others in process of construction. The seamen in service numbered 22,000. Undoubtedly the most important report was that of the Secretary of the Treasury. During the first quarter of the fiscal year (July 1 to September 30), he stated that the actual expenses of the Government had been \$98,239,733.09, leaving a balance on October 1 of \$4,292,776.18. Up to December 1 he had realized \$197,000,000 from loans, of which \$100,000,000 had been obtained from three-year bonds bearing 7.30 per cent. interest, and nearly \$46,000,000 from the negotiation of \$50,000,000 twenty-year 6 per cent. bonds on a 7 per cent. basis. Nearly \$25,000,000 of notes payable on demand without interest had been issued, and the balance had been obtained by the sale of or by the payment to creditors of 6 per cent. notes, part of which ran for 60 days and part for two years. He estimated the expenditures for the fiscal year (1861-1862) at \$543,500,000. As the ordinary revenues would not amount to more than \$40,000,000, he recommended enough additional taxation to provide an aggregate of \$50,000,000. The balance must come from loans, some of which had been negotiated, but about \$250,000,000 remained to be provided for.* The loans of which Chase spoke, amounting to \$146,000,000, had been taken by the banks of New York, Boston, and Philadelphia. These transactions were made on a specie basis, involving the

actual disbursement by the banks of a large amount of coin. On December 28, however, the managers of the New York banks decided to suspend specie payments, and gold soon brought a slight premium. This condition had to be considered by Congress when financial matters were brought before it.

In January of 1862 Congress passed a joint resolution declaring its purpose to raise at least \$150,000,000 by taxation and additional duties on imports. Accordingly a sub-committee of the Ways and Means Committee worked out a tax bill. But as considerable time must elapse before such a bill could pass both House and Senate and receive the President's signature, another sub-committee was appointed, with E. G. Spaulding as chairman, to advise immediate means for carrying on the war. The problem was to raise \$100,000,000 to prevent the government from stopping payment. Spaulding planned to issue \$100,000,000 of non-interest-bearing notes which would be receivable for all debts due the United States and legal tender in payment of all public and private debts, and to make legal tender also the \$50,000,000 in Treasury notes authorized in July of 1861. There were to be \$500,000,000 of legal tender notes which were to be exchangeable at par for 6 per cent. 20-year bonds. This plan in the form of a bill was reported to the House, and the debate began. Many denied the power of Congress to make Treas-

* Rhodes, *United States*, vol. iii., p. 559.

ury notes legal tender. Justin S. Morrill, of Vermont, asserted that the cost of carrying on the war would be greatly increased by inflating the currency, while Roscoe Conkling argued that the bill was of very doubtful constitutionality, and that its moral imperfections were equally serious, since it would "proclaim throughout the country a saturnalia of fraud, a carnival for rogues."* After the introduction of the legal tender bill, the New York, Philadelphia, and Boston bankers sent delegates to Washington to oppose its passage. On January 15 Chase and the delegates agreed upon a scheme for a National banking act, and a method by which they could avoid making the Treasury notes legal tender. The plan of the delegates, however, was not satisfactory to the majority of the bankers in their home cities, and as the Boston bankers withheld assent to the proposed arrangements, Secretary Chase no longer objected to the legal tender clause.† Morrill introduced the minority report from the Ways and Means Committee. He proposed to have \$200,000,000 of the \$500,000,000 of bonds issued at 7.30 per cent. besides \$100,000,000 of Treasury notes bearing interest at 3.65 per cent. payable in two years, which notes should be receivable for all debts due the United States save duties on imports,

and should be paid out for government supplies and salaries, and exchangeable at par for the 7.30 bonds, but they were not to be made legal tender. So the choice lay between a voluntary loan from bonds and from interest-bearing Treasury notes which were not legal tender, and a forced loan without interest.* The majority in the House considered the measure a wise, judicious, and excellent one, believing that, since the Government could not be carried on without money, it was necessary to give it the support sought for in this bill; accordingly, on February 6, the legal tender act passed the House by a vote of 93 to 59 and was then sent to the Senate. Here the legal tender clause was opposed by Fessenden and Collamer, and advocated by Sumner and Sherman. A motion was made to strike out the legal tender clause, but this was lost by a vote of 22 to 17, whereupon with several amendments the bill passed the Senate, the most important amendment being that the \$500,000,000 of bonds were made 5-20's, the interest on which was required to be paid in coin to be procured by exacting payment of customs duties in the same currency. The bill passed the Senate on February 25 by a vote of 30 to 7, and was approved by President Lincoln the same day.†

During the current session an im-

* See E. G. Spaulding, *History of the Legal Tender Paper Money Issued during the Great Rebellion*, pp. 18-21.

† *Ibid*, p. 21 *et seq.*; Warden, *Life of Chase*, p. 406.

* H. C. Adams, *Public Debts*, pp. 144-146.

† Rhodes, *United States*, vol. iii., pp. 562-572; Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. vi., p. 11.

portant slavery question came up for discussion. The opinion of the Northern public was divided, some holding that slavery, being the primal cause of the war, ought to be abolished at once and forever, while the conservatives wished to have the war conducted irrespective of the question of slavery, or at least on a non-interference basis. In the House slavery was denounced, and movements were made looking to the immediate emancipation of slaves who had left their masters. On December 5 a bill was introduced "to confiscate the property of rebels, to liberate their slaves, and employ or colonize the same and for other purposes," which was referred to the Committee on Military Affairs. On December 20 the Committee on the Judiciary was instructed to report a bill amending the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850. In the Senate, on December 4, Saulsbury moved that commissioners be named to meet commissioners appointed by the Confederates for the purpose of adjusting existing difficulties peaceably; but this motion was laid on the table. The next day Trumbull introduced a bill "for the confiscation of the property of rebels, and giving freedom to the persons they hold in slavery," which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary. On March 24 a bill was introduced in the House by Arnold, of Illinois, the purport of which was to render freedom National and slavery sectional. This was taken up for discussion on May 9, in the midst of the

exciting and encouraging news from New Orleans. Some of the members, like Cox, of Ohio, groaned over "the whole negro business. Heaven is sick," he exclaimed, "and earth is weary of this damnable and dangerous iteration." The House passed the bill on May 12 by a vote of 89 to 50, and it was soon passed by the Senate by a vote of 28 to 10. As finally passed it was: "An act to secure freedom of all persons within the territory of the United States."* Meanwhile a bill for the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia had been introduced in the House, and after reference to the Committee on the District was reported favorably, March 12. A bill with the same object had been reported also in the Senate in February. The border slave States opposed it vigorously, and efforts were made to fasten on to the bill a compulsory colonizing of the negroes, but to no purpose.† In spite of opposition, however, the bill passed the Senate on April 3 by a vote of 29 to 14,‡ and the House on April 11 by a vote of 92 to 38. As thus adopted, the bill abolished slavery in the District of Columbia, appropriated \$1,000,000 to compensate the owners of slaves, at a rate

* *Congressional Globe*, 37th Congress, 2d session, p. 1340; App., p. 364.

† For Sumner's "Resolutions declaratory to the relations between the United States and the territory occupied by certain States and now usurped by pretended governments without constitutionality or legal right," offered February 11, see *Appleton's Annual Cyclopaedia*, 1862, p. 345.

‡ Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. v., p. 216.

not exceeding \$300 for each, and provided means for the voluntary colonization of negroes in Haiti or Liberia.* On April 16 President Lincoln sent a brief message to Congress, approving the act and asserting his gratification "that the two principles of compensation and colonization are both recognized and practically applied in the act." He stated, however, that there was no provision for minors, *femes coverte*, insane, or absent persons, and presuming this omission was a mere oversight, recommended that it be supplied by a supplementary act.† Action was speedily taken for the negroes thus freed. Primary schools were organized as soon as possible, and everything was done on a liberal scale to secure for the blacks the privileges which they had long enjoyed in the free States.‡

Meanwhile President Lincoln had taken a step far beyond either of these measures. For a long time he had had under consideration a measure establishing a system of compensated abolishment.|| These schemes culminated in his message of March 6, 1862, when he recommended the adoption of the following resolution:

"Resolved, that the United States ought to co-operate with any State which may adopt gradual

* *Congressional Globe*, 37th Congress, 2d session, App., p. 347.

† Richardson, *Messages and Papers*, vol. vi., pp. 73-74.

‡ McPherson, *History of the Rebellion*, pp. 211-212.

|| Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. v., pp. 201-208.

abolishment of slavery, giving to each State pecuniary aid to be used by such state, in its discretion, to compensate for the inconveniences, public or private, produced by such change of system." *

Lincoln reinforced this recommendation by argument in his message, and added some cogent reasons in private letters to influential persons. To Senator McDougall he wrote that less than one half day's cost of the war would pay for the slaves in Delaware, at \$400 per head. Again, computing the number of slaves in Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, Missouri, and the District of Columbia at 432,622, he figured the cost of the slaves in these States to be \$173,048,800. This sum, enormous as it was, would be less than the cost of 87 days of war, which Lincoln estimated would come to \$174,000,000; so he had no doubt that his scheme of compensated emancipation would be an immense saving to the country. He recommended, if his plan should be adopted, that the sum to be paid to each State by the United States be ascertained by taking the number of slaves in the State, according to the census of 1860, and multiplying that number by \$400 (the estimated average value of slaves), this sum to be paid by the United States in 20 equal annual instalments in 6 per cent. bonds of the United States.† The President discussed this plan with

* Richardson, *Messages and Papers*, vol. vi., pp. 68-69; *Congressional Globe*, 37th Congress, 2d session, p. 1102.

† See the letter in Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. v., pp. 210-211.

Congressmen from the border slave States of Delaware, Maryland, West Virginia, Kentucky, and Missouri, urging them to support the measure.* On the same day on which this interview was held, Roscoe Conkling introduced into the House the joint resolution recommended by the President in his message of the 6th, and debate on the subject began. Moderate Republicans generally supported the resolution, and even pronounced anti-slavery men expressed a willingness to favor the plan if the loyal slave States would consent to relinquish their portion of the disturbing and dangerous evil. Despite the opposition of a few border slave State Republicans and some persistent Democrats from the free States, the resolution was passed on March 11 in the House by a vote of 89 to 31, and in the Senate on April 2 by a vote of 32 to 10, receiving the President's signature on April 10, 1862.†

In his annual report, Secretary of War Cameron had suggested that the slaves should be armed, and when employed as soldiers should be freed. Without submitting this report to Lincoln, Cameron sent the printed copies to the postmasters of the chief cities with instructions to hand them to the press as soon as the President's message should be read in Congress.‡

* McPherson, *History of the Rebellion*, p. 210 et seq. See also Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, pp. 211-213.

† Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. v., p. 214; Rhodes, *United States*, vol. iii., p. 635.

‡ Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. v., p. 125.

When Lincoln ascertained this, he insisted that the copies sent out be recalled by telegraph, and that the report be modified according to his own policy in regard to slavery.* One portion of Cameron's report was astounding — that relating to "the economical administration of affairs displayed by the various branches of the service." On the whole the management of the War Department had been efficient and honest, but in many cases large contracts had been given to Cameron's political followers and henchmen as rewards for past services. Probably none of the money filched from the public treasury by exorbitant prices and commissions and the delivery of unfair goods found its way into Cameron's pocket, yet there is much evidence leading one to suppose that he was at least cognizant of crooked and corrupt practices. Charges of corruption and incompetency were numerous. Writing to Fessenden Senator Grimes says: "The truth is we are going to destruction as fast as imbecility, corruption, and the wheels of time can carry us," and he refers also to "the flood of corruption that is sweeping over the land and perverting the moral sense of the people. The army is in most inextricable confusion and is every day becoming worse and worse."† Writing to Cameron on November 27, 1861, Chase says:

* *Ibid*, vol. v., pp. 126-127. See also Rhodes, *United States*, vol. iii., p. 573.

† Salter, *Life of Grimes*, p. 156.

"I feel that I must decline to submit establishments based upon mere conjecture, the aggregate of which will in the absence, comparatively, of results, carry conviction to the minds of the people of the entire want of system in the management of our military affairs. * * * The want of success of our armies, and the difficulties of our financial operations, have not been in consequence of a want or excess of men, but for want of systematic administration. If the lack of economy, and the absence of accountability, are allowed to prevail in the future as in the past, bankruptcy, and the success of the rebellion, will be necessary consequences. * * * I have heretofore objected, and do now object, to rendering the Treasury of the United States liable for one thousand million of dollars in addition to already outstanding debt, when by proper system and proper economy the same results can be obtained by the expenditure of half the sum." *

Nesmith, of Oregon, and Hale declared that high officials had been guilty of corruption, while Powell, of Connecticut, said:

"If the statements contained in the report of the committee of investigation of the other House on government contracts are true, the head of the War Department and the head of the Navy Department must be written down in public opinion as possessed of a very great degree of stupidity or knavery. From one or the other they cannot escape."†

While there were many to censure Cameron, Welles seems to have possessed the unbounded confidence of the majority. Accordingly, the House refused to censure Welles, by a vote of 72 to 45, but censured Cameron by the vote 79 to 45.‡ Meanwhile Cameron had signified his weariness of the onerous labors of the War Department, and hinted to the President that he would prefer a foreign mission. Nothing was said for several

weeks, but on January 11, 1862, Lincoln sent Cameron a curt dismissal, and nominated him as minister to Russia.* There was little opposition to Cameron's appointment, as many were inclined to defend him. On December 25, 1861, Chase wrote to Murat Halstead:

"You are unjust to Cameron * * * . I have seen him closely as most men here, and I am sure he has acted honorably and faithfully and patriotically. * * * He challenges investigation of all his transactions on the score of corruption, and may do so, I believe, with entire safety."†

Furthermore, as Sumner moved Cameron's confirmation without the customary reference, it is obvious that he did not believe the charges against him.‡ The President appointed Edwin M. Stanton Secretary of War in Cameron's place. The appointment was acceptable to Seward and Chase, to Congress, and to the country, for he had the confidence of all. He immediately took hold of the War Department with an iron hand; he centered the telegraph in his department, so that the publication of military news could be supervised, expanded his military bureaus, and in every way labored to bring his department up to a standard of efficiency that it had not before known, with what success we shall see. Before giving further details of military operations, however, let us glance at the financial operations of the Confederacy and the foreign relations of the two governments.

* Schuckers, *Life of Chase*, p. 280.

† *Congressional Globe*, 37th Congress, 2d session, pp. 203, 207.

‡ *Congressional Globe*, p. 1888.

* Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. v., p. 128.

† Schuckers, *Life of Chase*, p. 281.

‡ DeForest, *Life of Sumner*, vol. iv., p. 63.

CHAPTER VII.

1861-1865.

CONFEDERATE FINANCES.*

The chief fiscal problem of the Confederacy — Solution sought in issues of bonds — Inefficacy of the funding act of 1863 — Other impotent acts — Farmers' fear of government notes — Cotton the means of floating a foreign loan — Defective taxation and lax methods of collection — The note-issue policy — The great amount of outstanding treasury notes — Temporary resort to barter — Precariousness of the Confederate army — Fiscal policy not responsible for failure of the war.

The great fiscal problem before the Confederate government during the brief course of its existence was to secure sufficient funds to carry on the war with the Union. No sooner had war been declared than large quantities of money and valuable articles convertible into money were placed at the disposal of the Confederacy by Southern sympathizers, who, feeling that their entire hopes of future prosperity rested on the success of secession, were willing to contribute to the limit of their resources to further the cause. In addition to the funds thus secured, something over \$1,000,000 was realized through the seizure of funds at United States custom houses and mints situated in the South. But such sources of revenue, welcome as they were, could not last long, and every day the need of money became more urgent.

* As the financial transactions of the Confederacy throughout the war were not so extensive as those of the North, it has seemed best that the entire story be told in one chapter as conducive to a clearer comprehension, rather than to scatter the various items here and there in chronological order.

Accordingly, on February 28, 1861, the Confederate government authorized a \$15,000,000 issue of bonds, running for ten years and bearing interest at 8 per cent. These bonds were quickly taken up, the specie held by Southern banks being generally transferred to the Confederate treasury in exchange for them. The government lost no time in sending the specie abroad for the purchase of ships and war supplies, of which they then stood in desperate need. A small export tax was levied on cotton, and it was from the proceeds of this that the government expected to meet the interest on the bond issue. This first loan was the forerunner of a long series, no less than \$150,000,000 being borrowed during 1861 alone. None of these issues, however, proved as successful as the first. There seemed to be no medium of redemption save treasury notes; these therefore sank in value with the changing scale of the paper currency, which, influenced by the shifting fortunes of war, was extremely unstable during this whole period. Of the government's two

forms of promises to pay, the notes were decidedly the more popular, representing as they did purchasing power as contrasted with decidedly uncertain investment.

Such an attitude naturally tended to embarrass the government and legislation was consequently framed with a view to making the purchase of the bonds more attractive. Through a provision in the Confederate loan act of May 16, 1861, inducements were held out to note-holders to exchange their notes for Confederate government bonds. These inducements did not prove particularly effective, even though they were renewed in the subsequent acts of August 19, 1861, and April 12, 1862. At the suggestion of the Confederate Secretary of the Treasury, C. G. Memminger, of South Carolina, mild compulsion was then resorted to (through a provision in the act of October 13, 1862) whereby all notes not "funded" in 8 per cent. bonds within six months of the time of enactment were, after that date, rendered transferable only for 7 per cent. bonds. For a time this relieved the situation somewhat, but the general distrust of the bonds always operated against their successful placement. As the war progressed, it became more and more apparent that drastic measures would have to be resorted to if the Confederate army was to receive the financial support it required. The funding act of March 23, 1863, provided that if notes were not funded within four months the privi-

lege would be lost by forfeit. This was the means of having about \$100,000,000 in notes converted into bonds. But the aid was only temporary, for the places of the old notes were almost immediately taken by the new issues which became necessary in order to keep up a semblance of financing the war. A law of February 17, 1864, attempted to deal with the later issues of notes by providing that those still outstanding should be funded in bonds before a specified date, following which all those still remaining in circulation should be taxed out of existence. This law proved as ineffective as were its prototypes of the French and American Revolutions, and marked the beginning of the end of the finances of the Confederacy which then steadily and rapidly disintegrated. Early in the summer of 1864 a new Secretary of the Treasury was appointed in the person of G. A. Trenholm, of South Carolina. By that time, however, affairs were in such a state that it cannot be held as evidence of unfitness against the new officer that he did not possess sufficient ability to turn a tide which was irresistible.

In the entire annals of finance there is hardly a more discouraging story than the fiscal history of the Confederacy. Even when the bonds were sold, payment was made in the notes of the same government — which were depreciating in value all the while and with which it consequently became more and more difficult to pur-

chase supplies. An attempt was made to obviate this in the act of May of 1861, by the authorization of a series of produce loans. The object of these was to do away altogether with the necessity of getting in the notes and then promptly expending them for supplies at exorbitant rates. Instead, it was proposed to exchange bonds directly for the needed commodities.

This measure, like most of the fiscal legislation of the Confederacy, did not, however, work out according to expectations. Farmers having really desirable supplies were loath to part with them for such flimsy security when they could command the high rates of war times and be sure of getting them in money. Perhaps the only commodity which the government secured in any considerable quantity by this means was cotton, for the cotton planters had been cut off from their regular markets by the Federal blockade and welcomed all openings that promised any return, however small. The Confederate government thus came into possession of large quantities of cotton, as well as some tobacco; but, as neither of these could be used by the army to great advantage, they remained idle during practically the whole war, deteriorating rapidly through exposure to the elements or the destructive concomitants of campaigns.

Finally in 1863 a portion of the cotton supply on hand was ingeniously utilized in floating a foreign loan. Bonds amounting to \$15,000,000 were

placed in Europe, with the stipulation that the principal be met in cotton from the government's supply at 6 pence per pound, a rate not only far lower than the prevailing one at that time, but presumably lower than cotton was likely to go for many years. Hopes mounted high in the Confederacy when this piece of fiscal strategy was consummated, but, unfortunately, a large portion of the funds secured by this scheme was lost through mismanagement. Those who took up the bonds fared no better, since these, in common with all the other obligations of the ill-starred Confederacy, were wiped out by the outcome of the war, while the hypothecated cotton never became available. The only persons to receive any particular benefit from the entire transaction were certain foreign shipbuilders and merchants whose services the Confederacy employed.

The tax system of the Confederacy was very weak at all times, while the difficulty of collecting the necessary data delayed its imposition at the outset. On August 19, 1861, the Secretary of the Treasury was authorized to levy an income tax of $\frac{1}{2}$ of 1 per cent., the amount to be apportioned among the various States. Owing to the lack of any organized collecting machinery, the assessment and levy went forward very slowly, and it was not before June of 1862 that any receipts whatever were realized from this source. As a matter of fact, even when returns did begin

to come in they could really be regarded only in the light of a disguised note-issue, for, as a general rule, the amounts apportioned were assumed by the States themselves and then met with an issue of State treasury notes. From June of 1862 to June of 1863, inclusive, about \$18,000,000 was collected in this way.

Beginning with April 24, 1863, a series of acts which did not terminate before 1865 imposed a long list of heavy taxes, but the administration of these was so lax that the resulting revenue was almost negligible. The State and municipal taxes levied, likewise played a comparatively insignificant part in the general financial scheme. From the outset reliance was placed almost entirely upon note issues and bonds, and how the latter failed we have already seen.

The note-issue policy of the Confederate government amounted to an exchange of the services and goods of the people for the government's promises to pay — at first at a definite time with interest, later at an indefinite time and without interest — the notes which took the place of coin and other forms of currency. The first issue of treasury notes, which came on March 4, 1861, was for only \$1,000,000, interest-bearing, and falling due in one year. The \$1,000,000 was doubled before the issue fell due, though the smallest permissible denomination remained at \$50. Within a few months of this issue, however, pressing circumstances made neces-

sary the issue of \$20,000,000 non-interest-bearing treasury notes redeemable in two years; and under this act denominations as low as \$5 were allowed.

Five months after the beginning of hostilities, the Confederacy brought out another issue of such notes, this time of \$100,000,000, to which \$50,000,000 more was added before the close of that year. Both of these issues were made redeemable six months after the ratification of peace. Toward the close of 1861 interest-bearing call-certificates also made their appearance. More issues followed in April of 1862, the most notable among these being one of \$100,000,000 bearing an annual interest of 7.3 per cent. Here the underlying principle was that the inducement of interest would cause investment and consequently keep the notes out of circulation — the problem which the Confederacy was constantly struggling to solve from the outset. Once again, however, the hopes of the administration were doomed to disappointment, for, instead of decreasing it, the new issue actually increased the volume of currency in circulation.

All the while a growing demand for notes of small denominations was making itself felt. The answer to this came in April of 1862, in the form of an issue of \$1 and \$2 notes aggregating \$5,000,000. Later this amount was doubled, and in 1863 an issue of fractional currency was added. An act passed in September of 1862 removing all limits on note

issues was followed by the funding acts of 1863 and 1864, aiming to reduce the excessive issues which had previously prevailed. These two measures defeated their own ends, however, by authorizing new types of issues, and the result was that the notes in general circulation went on increasing until the close of the war. Another provision of the funding act of 1864, which operated toward the same end, was that postponing the time of redemption of notes until two years after the ratification of peace. Probably a more reckless paper money policy has never been followed by any government. As a result the face value of outstanding treasury notes, which in July of 1861 was only \$1,000,000, had increased to \$1,000,000,000 by the end of the war.

The redundancy of the currency, coupled with the growing doubt—bred of the progress of the war—as to the government's ability ever to redeem any of its notes, led to the depreciation of the latter almost as quickly as they were issued. When hostilities were begun gold was at a premium, and it soared higher and higher as the war continued. In September of 1862 one gold dollar was equal to two paper ones; in December of 1863, to twenty paper ones; and early in 1865 to sixty paper ones. This unbroken depreciation of paper led to the suggestion that the acceptance of notes at their face value be made obligatory. In the North this policy was put into practice, but the strict

constructionist principles of the Confederate statesmen prevented the passage of any such legal-tender measures. What slight attempts were made along this line were indirect and unavailing. Meanwhile the depreciation of the currency was attended by a proportionate advance in the cost of all commodities. Food prices in the depreciated "money" reached unheard-of heights.

Such an alarming increase in the price of necessities naturally brought a cry for more currency. To this the banks, which almost at the outset of the war had suspended specie payment, responded with huge issues of bank notes; while State governments, corporations, and even private individuals added to the enormous volume of circulating tokens. It is impossible accurately to estimate the total volume of all forms of paper currency circulating in the South during this period, but there can be no question that the aggregate reached a fabulous figure. All of this circulation did little good, however, for the reason that notes of all sorts were made redeemable in Confederate treasury notes and consequently immediately reflected any depreciation in the value of the latter. The general complications were still further increased by the appearance of many counterfeits, so that in some sections of the South currency of all forms was done away with altogether and business was conducted on a basis of barter.

Such conditions naturally gave rise to the wildest sort of speculation. Farmers, wearied of receiving payment in depreciated paper, ceased, to a great extent, producing crops, nor could the most rigid legislation alter their resolution. The resultant suffering to the army was incalculable. For the most part, the Confederate army was compelled to live on whatever it could get hold of in the course of its marches and campaigns. Naturally the final outcome of the war annulled whatever slight value might still attach to any of the Confederate bonds or notes.

A great part of the accumulated wealth of the South, together with

much of its industrial and commercial capital, was sacrificed in the course of the fruitless struggle for secession. The set-back which agriculture received was also lamentably great. Despite the disaster which accompanied it at all points, however, the currency policy of the Confederacy should not be too severely criticised. In principle it was essentially the same as that adopted by the North during the same period. It was the vastly greater resources of the latter which prevented the Federal Administration from resorting to such extreme measures as the Confederate government was forced to adopt.*

CHAPTER VIII.

1861-1865.

FEDERAL FOREIGN RELATIONS DURING THE WAR.†

Skilful handling of the Union's foreign affairs during the Civil War — Seward's vigilance in preventing European intervention — His rehabilitation of our consular service — Hasty recognition by England, France, and Spain of Confederate belligerent rights — Seward's remonstrances and warnings to England — Union grievances against Great Britain — The "Alabama claims" — English fears as to our designs on Canada — The policy of France — Seward's bearing toward Mexico, Central America, and other Spanish-American countries — Russia's good services to the Union cause — Other foreign relations.

The United States in its most dangerous crisis was fortunate in having its foreign affairs under the efficient direction of William H. Seward, whose optimism and eternal vigilance held back the foreign influences that were so impatient to intervene in the long contest. Persistently and vigorously declaring the right of the United States to manage its own

domestic concerns, including that of independent action in suppressing insurrection within its own borders, Seward just as firmly opposed the

* See William Lee, *The Currency of the Confederate States of America* (1875); J. C. Schwab, *The Confederate States of America; Financial and Industrial History*.

† Prepared for this History by J. M. Callahan, Professor of History and Political Science, University of West Virginia.

intervention of foreign powers in the internal affairs of our neighboring republics. His official correspondence, a monument to his unwearied powers and his varied ability, is a credit to American diplomacy, for the amount of work he accomplished is amazing and the circumstances under which he performed it severely tested his ability and patience. In the face of desponding notes from our ministers abroad he never despaired of the Republic, but labored constantly to re-inspire all despondent hearts with the hope of ultimate success. The simple inscription on his tomb at Auburn fittingly furnishes the key to his service to his country in its darkest hour: "He was faithful."

"The Union at all hazards" was the principle underlying our foreign policy during the war and was the backbone of all of Seward's instructions to ministers. The chief duties of diplomatic agents, he insisted, were to counteract the plans of the Confederates and to assure foreign nations of American determination and ability to maintain the integrity of the Union without foreign assistance or interference. They were instructed to urge the duty of generous forbearance and to refrain from indulgence in expressions of harshness or even impatience in regard to the operation of the Confederates. Seward's foreign policy was marked by patience, good judgment, and forbearance. Of necessity, it was largely a defensive policy and its chief merit lay in what

it prevented, viz: the concerted action of the two leading powers of Europe, compelling them indefinitely to postpone recognition of the Confederacy and to respect a blockade which, though not always complete, caused much inconvenience and even suffering. Its frank and independent spirit, unfaltering optimism and unobtrusive firmness secured observance of the laws of neutrality and conducted us through many perils "with no break of peace and no sacrifice of the honor or dignity of the country." It exhibits a record of broad statesmanship of which America may well be proud.

One of the earliest problems of the new Administration was to fill the European missions with loyal and trustworthy representatives who might be able to undo the irreparable injury inflicted upon the Union by unfaithful or indifferent ministers. While partisans of the new Confederacy holding the conviction that cotton was king were vigorously urging the claims of the new government and expecting material assistance, the friends of the Union abroad were lukewarm and divided, and its diplomatic and consular agents too often remiss in their duties. The Administration was fortunate, however, in the changes it brought about in the most important foreign capitals. In England Charles Francis Adams and the consuls at Liverpool and London proved invaluable to the Union by their tireless vigilance. They con-

stantly felt the pulse of the English nation and promptly recorded each variation. In France Mr. Dayton performed his duties with ability until his death, and was ably aided by consul John A. Bigelow, who at a critical moment succeeded to the duties of minister. In Mexico Thomas Corwin had a strong hold on public opinion, and other missions of lesser importance were also well conducted.

Seward found the foreign relations of the United States in a serious condition. Declining to enter into negotiations with commissioners sent by the Confederate government to secure peaceful secession, he turned his attention to dangers from abroad. Being familiar with the international questions which had arisen on both sides of the Atlantic for many years and fully alive to the possibilities and dangers of European intervention in American affairs, Seward at once grappled with the serious problems of international politics. On April 1, after hearing of Spanish movements in the Dominican republic and in Cuba to introduce Spanish authority within the territory of that republic—and possibly suspecting that Louis Napoleon had plans which might prove a menace to the American policy—he said, in submitting “some thoughts for the President’s consideration”:

“I would demand explanations from Spain and France categorically, at once. I would seek explanations from Great Britain and Russia, and send agents into Canada. Mexico and Central America to arouse a vigorous continental spirit of independence on this continent against Euro-

pean intervention. And, if satisfactory explanations are not received from Spain and France, I would convene Congress and declare war against them.”

Asking the Spanish minister for an explanation of the actions of the Spanish authorities of Cuba, he declared that if such actions were sanctioned by Spain the President would be obliged “to meet the further prosecution of enterprises of that kind in regard to either the Dominican republic or any other part of the American continent or islands with a prompt, persistent and, if possible, effective resistance.” At the same time, he wrote to the ministers of Mexico, Guatemala, Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Honduras, and New Granada confidentially enclosing a copy of his note to Tassara. To Romero, the Mexican minister, he wrote:

“The President suggests that you bring this subject to the government of Mexico to the end that it may adopt such measures in this exigency as the safety and the welfare of the respective states existing on the American continent, and its islands, including perhaps Mexico, shall seem to require.”

Seward’s earlier views of foreign policy were soon modified, however, by the difficult problems connected with the struggle to save the Union, which overshadowed all other questions. With Great Britain and France, which seemed to have a secret agreement to act together in American affairs, diplomatic relations were vitally important. Many feared that England, opposed as she was to the American tariff policy, was not averse

to the annihilation of her commercial rival by a process of division. The Emperor of France, with schemes of conquest which included a French foothold on the American continent, favored a movement which would have relegated the Monroe Doctrine to innocuous desuetude. The Lincoln Administration felt that both England and France (and also Spain, which followed them) were hasty in practically recognizing the belligerency of the Confederate faction before it had exhibited an armed vessel on the ocean or achieved a single victory save that over the small handful of men who surrendered Fort Sumter. In spite of the fact that its proclamation of a blockade "in pursuance of the law of nations" which acknowledged the existence of a state of war, it contended that war did not exist in an international sense, and that foreign powers should take no cognizance of the insurgents on territory over which the United States had not relinquished its sovereignty. Claiming that the practical effect of this hasty policy—apparently the first step toward ultimate recognition of independence—was to encourage Confederate piratical depredations on the high seas under the name of privateering and to prolong a war in which the integrity of the American Union was at stake, Seward continued to the close of the war to press earnestly for the withdrawal of belligerent rights so hastily granted. The subject was a source of serious con-

tention and constant friction, for from the very beginning of the struggle, anticipating foreign complications from which the Confederates would seek to gain advantage, Seward directed negotiations looking toward the accession of the United States to the principles of international law against privateering to which England and France had committed themselves by the convention of Paris in 1856, but he was unable to obtain the consent of either power save on the stipulation that such accession should not apply to the existing war in which the Confederacy found it necessary to resort to privateering.

Seward's first serious anxiety as to foreign relations was caused by information through Russia of the resolution of the British and French governments to act in concert on questions relating to the Civil War. With the knowledge that combined pressure might prevent the United States from regulating its own internal affairs, Seward notified the American ministers in Europe that he could not recognize any combination or understanding of the powers on this subject and would insist on dealing with each government separately.

Still feeling, perhaps, that a foreign war might prove a remedy for disunion, he issued warnings in menacing tones against recognition of the Confederacy or receiving its agents even for unofficial intercourse. On April 10, though apprehending no actual or permanent dismemberment of the

Union, he instructed Adams thus to warn England of her duty and interest—"You will in no case listen to any suggestions of compromise by this government, under foreign auspices, with its discontented citizens," and continued:

"If, as the President does not at all apprehend, you should unhappily find her Majesty's government tolerating the application of the so-called seceding states, or wavering about it, you will not leave them to suppose for a moment that they can grant that application and remain the friends of the United States. You may even assure them promptly in that case that if they determine to recognize, they may at the same time prepare to enter into alliance with the enemies of this Republic. You alone will represent your country at London and you will represent the whole of it there. When you are asked to divide that duty with others, diplomatic relations between the government of Great Britain and this government will be suspended, and will remain so until it shall be seen which of the two is most strongly entrenched in the confidence of their respective nations and of mankind. * * * Recognition by her of the so-called Confederate States would be intervention and war in this country. Permanent dismemberment of the American Union in consequence of that intervention would be perpetual war—civil war. The new Confederacy which in that case Great Britain would have aided into existence must, like any other new state, seek to expand itself northward, westward and southward. What part of this continent or the adjacent islands would be expected to remain in peace?"

Again, on May 21, he wrote:

"British recognition would be British intervention, to create within our territory a hostile state by overthrowing this Republic itself. * * * We see how, upon the result of the debate in which we are engaged, a war may ensue between the United States and one, two, or even more European nations. War in any case is as exceptional from the habits as it is revolting from the sentiments of the American people. But if it come it will be fully seen that it results from the action of Great Britain, not our own; that Great Britain will have decided to fraternize

with our domestic enemy without waiting to hear from you our remonstrances and our warnings, or after having heard them. War in defense of national life is not immoral, and war in defense of independence is an inevitable part of the discipline of nations."

In the summer of 1862, learning that Russell agreed that the time had come for a "tender of good offices" with the view to ending the war, Adams asked Seward for instructions to guide his action in such a contingency. Seward's reply illustrates the inflexible dignity which won him respect abroad and perhaps saved the United States from the embarrassment of foreign mediation or intervention:

"If the British government should in any way approach you, directly or indirectly, with propositions which assume or contemplate an appeal to the President on the subject of our internal affairs, whether it seems to imply a purpose to dictate, or to mediate, or to advise, or even to solicit, or to persuade, you will answer that you are forbidden to debate, to hear or in any way receive, entertain, or transmit, any communication of the kind. * * * If the British government, either alone, or in combination with any other government, shall acknowledge the insurgents, * * * you will immediately suspend the exercise of your functions. * * * We approach * * * the danger of a war with Great Britain and other States with a caution which great reluctance has inspired. But I trust that you will also have perceived that the crisis has not appalled us."

During the long struggle there were various causes of complaint against England: the shelter given to privateers in her ports; the subserviency of a portion of the British press to Confederate interests; blockade-running; the investment of British capital in Confederate loans and the sale of

war supplies to the Confederacy by British merchants; the Confederate use of British ports as naval bases for the construction and equipment of "piratical" vessels; and the clamor for intervention which, however, grew fainter after the Union victories of 1863 and finally died away. The controversy resulting from the capture of Mason and Slidell from the Steamer *Trent* in 1862 was fortunately adjusted by Seward without prejudice or passion and with a skill which won a tribute of respect and admiration for the Administration, produced a temporary reaction in England, and disappointed the Confederate expectations of a war between England and the United States. In another critical controversy resulting from a decision of the Chief Baron of the Exchequer in the *Alexandra* case in 1863, practically annulling the enlistment act and protecting the equipment of hostile vessels in neutral ports, the danger of war with the United States was avoided by the changed attitude of the Palmerston ministry and Parliament, resulting from the firm protest of Seward, together with the victories of Gettysburg and Vicksburg, and the perilous situation of European politics.

A record of claims for damages inflicted by the *Alabama*, which had been constructed at Liverpool, was made up and held in reserve by Seward for presentation to England at an opportune moment. During the latter half of 1863, while the *Alabama*

was doing serious damage to American commerce on the high seas, Adams began his famous correspondence with Russell in regard to the "Alabama claims," which England finally paid under the Geneva arbitration, and exacted from the British government a stricter vigilance in the detection and detention of vessels built in British ports under contracts with Confederate agents. Adams' quiet hint of another war had its effect, and henceforth the British ship-yards ceased to trouble the peace of the Union. The detention of two ironclads, designed by Bulloch to break the blockade at Charleston and Wilmington, was a serious blow to the Confederacy, combining with the victories of Grant and Meade to depress the Confederate loan then on the market.

After the crisis of the Civil War in the summer of 1863, when the Confederacy was seen to be disintegrating, the possibility of *post-bellum* American expansion into a disunited Canada was recognized in England, for in Central British America, along the Red River region, there were threats of annexation to the United States. Eastern Canadians, contemplating the complications which might result from foreign questions growing out of the war, scented danger, and suggested that England should involve herself in war with the United States and establish the neutrality of Canada, whose material interests were largely dependent upon the

northern part of the United States. The Confederate seizure of the steamer *Philo Parsons* on Lake Erie in September of 1864 and the later raid on St. Albans, Vermont, by Confederates from Canada, produced an unhealthy excitement along the northern border of the United States and resulted in notice by the American government to terminate the reciprocity treaty of 1854. The condition of affairs also stimulated Canada to take steps toward confederation in order to counteract the American ambition for territorial acquisition—an ambition so pronounced as to arouse much concern in England.

The policy of France toward the United States was largely determined by Napoleon's policy in Mexico. The emperor offered mediation just after he had recognized the belligerent rights of the Confederacy, and again after Forey's troops had set sail for Mexico. Failing to impress the courteous but unyielding Seward with his proposals for mediation as a remedy for national ills, he entreated that commissioners should be appointed from the contending sections to ascertain whether separation could longer be avoided. His proposition was declined by Seward in a letter so remarkable for its dignity and courage and its forcible presentation of our patriotic determination to maintain the Union in its integrity at any cost, that no further suggestion of mediation was ever made. Although Napoleon's officiousness had been re-

buked by Congress, he informed the leaders of the Confederate sympathizers in Parliament that he was ready to recognize the Confederacy as soon as England could be induced to take the first step. In the later phase of the Mexican struggle there were rumors of negotiations between the emperor and leading confederates looking toward disintegration of the Union, a cession of Texas and Louisiana to France, and the formation of imperial states on the western frontier to seduce California and New Mexico from the Union.

To Mexico and Central America and other Spanish-American countries which later invited the United States to defend them against the designs of France or other European powers, Seward replied that the integrity of the American Union, for which his government was struggling, was the best guarantee of the security of other American nations. For weak, exhausted Mexico he favored neither intervention nor peaceable annexation; but in order to preserve its integrity unimpaired by European or Confederate aggression, he approved a treaty (which the Senate refused to ratify) providing for an advance of interest on the Mexican debt and a mortgage on certain Mexican lands as security. Against the later occupation of Mexico by the French, whose emperor was a master of ambiguities and an adept in intrigues, he gave discreet warnings which could be quoted to advantage at a more convenient

season when the United States might be able to take a more active part in the Mexican drama. The immediate bearing of the new Franco-Mexican empire upon the future politics of this continent, and especially upon the American struggle against secession, became a subject of much speculation and concern. Although the wings of Confederate imperialistic ambition had been clipped by the recovery of the Mississippi, the possible preponderance of the American Union on the continent would be essentially modified by the establishment of a Franco-Mexican empire which, designed as a direct blow at the Monroe doctrine, might amalgamate with the weakened Confederacy in order to offset the growing strength of the United States and extend French dominion southward from Mexico to the gateway of the isthmus, there to construct a canal and lay tribute on the commerce of the world. Although France frequently disclaimed any intention to hold permanently or to colonize any part of Mexico, or to interfere with the right of the Mexicans to maintain their own form of government, the United States Government—while appearing to rely on the constant assurances of France—could not conceal her sensitiveness to foreign intervention, and Seward steadily urged that the interests of all concerned required an early and satisfactory solution of complications which might lead to war between France and the United States. Although after May

of 1864 Maximilian was engaged in establishing an empire which seemed for the moment successful, signs were not wanting, either North or South, that the Monroe Doctrine would some day be invoked and vindicated.

After England and France, the European power most important in the eyes of the United States was Russia. In that darkest hour of American history, when the integrity of the Union (and consequently the peace of the world) was in danger, and the powers of western Europe seemed to regard that danger with cold indifference, if not with interested approval, when our British kin called us the “dis-United States,” and our old ally France had become our worst enemy—the only European assurance of warm sympathy and good will was extended from the steppes of Russia, whose minister at Washington had used his efforts to prevent secession. The continuous growth of cordiality between Russia and the United States after the opening of the war had a significance which other European powers did not fail to interpret. In 1861 she gave to the Government at Washington the first information of the efforts of Napoleon to effect a coalition of the three great powers against the United States. In the same year she agreed to coöperate with the United States in establishing cable connections between St. Petersburg and San Francisco by way of Behring Sea; and later, impressed with the importance

of American ownership of the west coast of the Pacific in connection with the increasing trade with the Far East, expressed a belief that proper efforts might result in the purchase of a larger foothold there. Thus, while the emperor of France was proposing to aid the Confederates and while Great Britain was failing to prevent the building in her waters of vessels designed for the destruction of American commerce, Russia warmly indorsed, in many ways, the struggle of the North. On October 29, 1862, for instance, after the gloomy news of defeats of Union forces, and when France was hoping to induce England and Russia to join her in proposing to the United States and Confederate authorities an armistice of six months, Gortchakoff, on receiving through Bayard Taylor a letter from President Lincoln to the Czar, expressed much concern and sympathy regarding the desperate condition of the Northern cause. This sympathy took a very practical turn when, in the summer of 1863, Russia sent her fleets to American waters as an expression to the world of her sentiments, and discussion became rife as to whether the evident mutual friendship of the two nations might not finally lead to a permanent alliance between the land of absolutism and that of republicanism. In August of 1864 courtesies were extended to Clay in St. Petersburg as a sequel of the welcome given to the fleet of Lessoffsky, where the toasts and speeches

breathed a spirit of very close attachment. The real character of that *entente cordiale* has been a subject of controversy. Some have thought that the intimacy was a mere flirtation, kept up to overawe England. Others believed that there was some understanding by which Russia was to lend active assistance to the United States in case the latter should be attacked by England and France. It is not likely that such a flirtation or such an understanding would have been made matter of record, but the government archives furnish some interesting diplomatic history bearing on this subject.

Relations with less important powers cannot be considered within the limits of this article. The influence of Spain and other European states which echoed the sentiments of the governments of England and France, or of Switzerland and Italy, whose sympathies were with the United States, was scarcely felt. In Asia, both China and Japan favored the United States and extended commercial facilities to American merchants.

Among the most important treaties negotiated between the United States and other powers during the war were the following: one with Great Britain for the suppression of the slave trade and for the settlement of certain claims of the Hudson Bay and Puget Sound agricultural companies; one with Mexico for extradition of criminals and for postal facilities; one

with Bolivia concerning navigation; one with Liberia to secure commercial privileges; one with the Ottoman Empire for trade facilities; one with Ecuador and Peru for the adjustment of claims; and some with various Indian tribes. There were agreements with Belgium relating to import duties and the capitalization and extinguishment of the Scheldt dues, and

the abolition of the Brunshausen dues was also secured. Treaties with Japan provided for the reduction of import duties and the payment of the Shimonosiki indemnities. There were also treaties adjusting claims with Costa Rica and Colombia, of commerce and navigation with Venezuela and Honduras and Haiti, and a consular convention with Denmark.*

CHAPTER IX.

1861-1865.

CONFEDERATE FOREIGN RELATIONS DURING THE WAR.†

The first Confederate embassy — Seward's refusal to receive it — Confederate efforts to form an alliance with Mexico and Spain — Basis of Southern confidence — Recognition of the belligerent rights of the Confederacy by European powers — Accession to the rules of the Declaration of Paris of 1856 — Confederate commissions and their reception in Europe — Southern resentment of British neutrality — Napoleon's readiness to help raise the blockade — Attempts at a Franco-Spanish alliance — Foreign intervention doomed by Lee's reverses — Last hopes of the Confederacy dissolved.

The foreign affairs of the Southern Confederacy, which until the fall of 1861 were first under the immediate direction of Robert Toombs, of Georgia, and then of R. M. T. Hunter, of Virginia, were conducted during the last three and a half years of the war by Judah P. Benjamin, of Louisiana, whom some one has called the "brains of the Confederacy." Through these three secretaries of state, President Davis commissioned many diplomatic, consular and secret agents to negotiate treaties or to further Confederate interests. Certainly the failure of the Confederacy was not due to any backwardness in

courting the favor of foreign nations. In the hope of securing a peaceful disruption of the Union, the Confederacy began its outreaching overtures by the

* Consult *American Annual Cyclopaedia*, 1861-65; Baker (ed.), *The Diplomatic History of the War for the Union*, (vol. v. of *Works of William H. Seward*); Bancroft, *Seward* (1900); Bigelow, *France and the Confederate Navy* (1888) and *Retrospections of an Active Life* (1910); Callahan, *Diplomatic History of the Southern Confederacy* (1901) and *Evolution of Seward's Mexican Policy* (1909); *Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States for 1861-65*; Lothrop, *William H. Seward* (1898); Moore, *International Law Digest*; Montague, *Historical Account of the Neutrality of Great Britain* (1870); F. W. Seward, *Seward at Washington* (1891); Wharton, *Digest of International Law* (1886).

† Prepared for this History by J. M. Callahan, Professor of History and Political Science, University of West Virginia.

appointment of a commission to Washington on February 27, 1861, "to consult on matters of interest to both nations" and to conclude treaties of commerce. Influenced by the belief that there would be a strong Northern sentiment opposed to coercive measures, and expecting that the United States could be induced to evacuate Fort Sumter, the members of this commission waited a month at Washington for a reply from Seward, who finally (on April 8) flatly refused to receive them.

The attempt made at the opening of the war, when many of the hold-over United States consuls in Mexico were in sympathy with the secession movement, to open friendly relations with Mexico with a view to securing advantages along the southern border, was equally disappointing. Ready to take advantage of the divided condition of Mexico, the newly organized Confederacy was willing to recognize any and every government, state or national, and to make treaties with governors or with presidents to suit the exigencies of the occasion. It endeavored especially — though in vain — to induce the constitutional government at Mexico to refuse to grant permission for the transit of United States troops from Guaymas to Arizona and "to reconsider its refusal to entertain any proposition which might seem to recognize the Confederate States in any way except as a part of the United States." J. T. Pickett, who was commissioned in May of 1861

to sound the Juarez government on the subject of an alliance, sought unavailingly to open communications. For six months he awaited at the capital the "golden opportunity" for the Confederate States to fulfil "a portion of that inevitable destiny" which impelled them to seek more acquisitions toward the south and an outlet to the Pacific. Failing to open negotiations, he acted more like a bully than a diplomat, seeming only anxious to precipitate a crisis out of which should grow a "natural" alliance with Spain and the partition of Mexico.

The Confederate hope of success lay largely in the expectation that the dependence of Europe on the supply of Southern cotton would compel either early recognition of independence or later intervention to stop the war. No serious consideration was given to the possibility of a blockade such as became a determining factor in the result of the contest. In England, financial and business circles and "society" were largely in sympathy with the Confederacy, among these sympathizers being Carlyle, Dickens and the historian Grote. The Confederate leaders boasted that within six months the distress and disorganization of trade produced by the cotton famine in England, resulting from the blockade of Southern ports, would precipitate a conflict between Great Britain and the United States. The trend was certainly in that direction, for as early as April, 1861, President Davis had in-

vited applications for letters of marque and reprisal with the sole purpose of attacking Northern commerce on the high seas; and when Lincoln replied with a proclamation of a blockade of part of the Southern coast, which rendered foreign vessels and goods liable to confiscation in Southern ports, the belligerent rights of the Confederacy were recognized by England (on May 13) by a proclamation of neutrality, which was followed a month afterward by similar declarations from France, Spain, the Netherlands and, later, by other powers. The British and French governments, by joint proposal to the Confederate government through the secret agency of Robert Bunch, the British consul at Charleston, secured Confederate accession to three rules of the Declaration of Paris of 1856, omitting the first clause, which related to privateering. Although the Confederates won a distinct advantage in the refusal of the chief European powers to regard privateering as piracy, they were greatly disappointed by England's refusal to allow either belligerents to bring prizes into her ports. With their own ports blockaded, they were forced to destroy such vessels as they captured.

Even before the beginning of hostilities, the Confederate government had appointed a commission, consisting of W. L. Yancey, P. A. Rost, and A. Dudley Mann, to go to Europe, with instructions to endeavor to secure the recognition of the Confeder-

acy as an independent nation. At London the commissioners had a private interview with Lord Russell, to whom they stated that the tariff was the principal cause of secession, but received little encouragement. At Paris Rost was informed by a confidential friend of Napoleon that recognition by both England and France was a mere matter of time. It was found, however, that public opinion against slavery would embarrass both England and France in arriving at a conclusion in favor of recognition. Later, learning that France could not lead in a policy of intervention or interference, the commissioners ineffectively presented to Russell new written arguments in favor of recognition, and stated, as an inducement for recognition, that the cotton crop would be delivered at Southern wharves and ports whenever there was a prospect of the blockade being raised — not before. Disappointed by the attitude of the European powers toward the blockade, Yancey soon resigned. Mann was sent to Belgium, and Rost was expected to go to Spain to seek recognition by giving assurance that the South no longer desired Cuba and by representing that mutual interests seemed to invite a Spanish-Confederate alliance. Although Mercier, the French minister at Washington, continued to advise intervention for the purpose of raising the blockade, and although Russell intimated that perhaps the time had come to offer good

offices for pacification as a step toward intervention on a large scale, Palmerston was not ready to act.

In the meantime J. M. Mason and John Slidell had been appointed commissioners to England and France respectively, on an errand similar to that of the Yancey party. Delayed by their capture from the British steamer *Trent* by an American vessel under command of Captain Wilkes, they did not reach Europe until after the crisis arising from the *Trent* affair had been passed. Finally arriving at London, Mason, in an unofficial interview with Russell, pressed the claims of the Confederacy to recognition, protested against the ineffective blockade, and urged the political and commercial interests of England in the establishment of the independence of the South as a free-trade nation. He declared that the South would no longer need to threaten the peace of the world by annexation of contiguous territory to preserve her balance of power against the North. The dispatch reporting the interview never succeeded in getting through the blockade, but subsequent events showed that Russell gave no encouragement to it. Several months later, although the Confederates had clearly been favored in the case of the *Alabama*, Mason wrote that the refusal of the British government to take a decided position in favor of recognition was "vexatious." He attributed its dilatoriness to the "open mendacity of

Seward"; and Benjamin, contrasting Russell's "rude incivility" with the friendliness of French statesmen, severely berated him in correspondence which was intercepted and published. In the spring of the following year, when Mason, following Benjamin's instructions, presented new inducements to secure communication with Europe and the restoration of Southern commerce, Russell merely thanked him for the information contained in his note and seemed disposed to leave the belligerents to settle their own quarrel. "With those willingly deaf," said Mason, "it is vain to argue." The Confederate authorities at Richmond, angered by their failure to establish diplomatic relations with England, and by the evidently increasing care which the British government exercised to prevent giving offence to Seward, refused to recognize the old exequators of the British consuls who remained in the Southern States under the authority of Lord Lyons at Washington; and President Davis ordered that no further communication should be allowed "between consuls of neutral nations in the Confederate states and the functionaries of those nations in the United States."

Slidell's interviews at Paris proved more encouraging. Napoleon announced his readiness to cooperate in declaring the blockade ineffective, and said that he had twice addressed the British government through the French ambassador at London with

a view towards taking steps to break it, but had received no response. He informed Lindsay, a friend of the Confederacy in the British Parliament, that he was prepared promptly to coöperate with England in sending a fleet to the mouth of the Mississippi to demand free ingress and egress for merchant vessels. If he had such plans, their execution was prevented both by the vigilance of Russell and Palmerston and by the capture of New Orleans by the Federal forces. In July he listened encouragingly to Slidell's suggestion of a Franco-Confederate alliance and the suggestion of the latter to pay him in cotton for vessels built in France to break the blockade.

In October of 1862, as a preliminary step in a plan to break the blockade, Napoleon formally proposed to England and Russia a triple alliance in an effort to secure a six months' armistice. Finding that Russell declined to take any immediate action and that Russia, keeping the promise made to Bayard Taylor earlier in the war, also refused to act, he made an offer of mediation through the French minister at Washington two months later, which Seward politely declined. Any further efforts which Napoleon may have contemplated were doubtless conditioned by the problem of the Mexican expedition and the complications which resulted from the Polish revolt. In the spring of 1863 Davis and Benjamin, disclaiming all designs against Cuba and agreeing to guar-

antee the island to Spain, hoped to induce the government at Madrid to take the initiative in recognition. Instructions to this purport were sent to Slidell, who conferred with the Spanish minister at Paris and planned, with the concurrence of Napoleon, to induce Spain to take the initiative and coöperate with France in breaking the blockade; but any basis for hope in this direction was terminated by the news of the Union victories at Gettysburg and Vicksburg. For the crisis came in the middle of 1863, when Lee was in the heart of the North. While Napoleon was holding friendly conferences with Slidell and consenting to the building of a Confederate navy in French ports, only waiting for Lee to take Washington as a suitable preliminary to the recognition of the Confederacy, Roebuck and Lindsay, having assured themselves that Napoleon had proposed joint mediation to the English government, made an attempt at a stroke of amateur diplomacy by having a resolution introduced in Parliament to force England into coöperation with France on a policy of recognition, and precipitated a debate which lasted until July 13, when the resolution was withdrawn only a few days before the arrival of the news of the great Confederate defeats. If Lee had won at Gettysburg, if Vicksburg had not fallen, and if the draft riots in New York had not failed, possibly there would have been European intervention with ironclads.

As the residence of Mason in Lon-

don seemed "no longer conducive to the interests nor consistent with the dignity of the Confederacy," he was advised to withdraw to the Continent, and therefore, early in 1864, was appointed commissioner with duplicate full powers addressed in blank, so that he could take advantage of any opportunity that might occur in any European capital to represent the Confederacy. Conferring alternatively with Slidell at Paris and with Southern sympathizers in the British Parliament who were seeking to embarrass the Palmerston ministry, he watched the ebbing tide of the Confederacy's fortunes and hoped against fate until the last. For the South still trusted to new expedients to win the apparently lost cause. Some yet indulged the hope that foreign complications or fear of a reunited American nation would induce European powers to intervene; others were willing to be included in the new empire of Mexico, whose leaders were asking France for an emperor; a few favored the abolition of slavery as a means to secure recognition of independence. As late as the spring of 1864, L. Q. C. Lamar, returning from a fruitless mission to Russia, still believed that the Confederacy was favored by the majority in the English Parliament, by Napoleon, by Austria and Spain and Italy through the Pope; and that Mexico, under the rule of Maximilian, might be secured as an ally.

After England's seizure of the *Alexandra* in April of 1863 and the subse-

quent detention of other vessels in the fall of that year, and in view of the difficulties attending the efforts to construct Confederate vessels in British ports, the Confederates had counted on success in obtaining a navy in French ports under contracts made in April and July, with Napoleon's sanction, by Captain Bulloch with M. Arman, a deputy of the French legislative body. It was agreed that the destination of the ships should be kept secret. When the signing of the contracts was disclosed to Bigelow and Dayton in the fall of 1863 through information furnished by a clerk of one of the shipbuilders, Napoleon found it inconvenient in the face of American protests to continue his sanction of the Confederate plans. Of the prospective navy, therefore, only one vessel, the *Stonewall*, was ever delivered to the Confederate agents. The failure of the scheme was a painful disappointment, a blow from an unexpected quarter. Although there were rumors of prospective French aid until the visions of both the Confederacy and Napoleon vanished in the fall of Richmond, Davis no longer had any confidence in the profuse professions of the emperor. "We have no friends abroad," he said.

The last effort of the Confederacy to secure foreign recognition or aid was made on a basis of emancipation and the government seizure of cotton to purchase a navy. By the close of 1864 Davis and Benjamin had resolved

to offer emancipation for recognition or intervention by England and France, and, at the same time, to contract with London and Paris syndicates to furnish cotton to them in payment for funds necessary to procure a navy with which the blockade might be broken. Although at that late period no policy could have secured the success of secession, Duncan F. Kenner, of Louisiana, an intimate friend of Benjamin, was sent on a secret mission to England and France, with instructions to negotiate on this basis and with power to sell all the cotton in the Confederate States, if necessary, the proceeds to be invested in vessels and war material. Through Slidell he obtained an interview with Napoleon, who asked to defer his reply. On March 14, 1865, Mason secured an interview with Palmerston at which he learned that the Confederacy could offer no terms which had any chance of acceptance. He learned from Lord Donoughmore that it was too late to secure recognition by the abolition of slavery. At the same time Benjamin received through Seward, by way of General

Grant's lines around Richmond, a note from Russell protesting against the machinations of Confederate agents to involve Great Britain in foreign complications by attempting to procure war armaments in British waters. A week later, while preparing to escape from Richmond, Benjamin diplomatically declined to receive through the United States authorities a command from a neutral, and returned the note of protest to Grant's lines.*

* Bigelow, *France and the Confederate Navy* (1888); and *Confederate Diplomats and Their Shirt of Nessus: a Chapter of Secret History*, in *Century Magazine* (May, 1891); *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. li.; Bulloch, *Secret Service of the Confederate States in Europe* (1883); Butler, *Life of Judah P. Benjamin*; Callahan, *Anglo-Confederate Relations* (1898); *Diplomatic History of the Southern Confederacy* based on the original manuscript copies of the diplomatic correspondence of the Confederate government (1898); and *Cuba and International Relations* (1899); *Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States for 1861-65*; Mason, *Public Life and Diplomatic Correspondence of James M. Mason* (1903); Moore, *Digest of International Law* (1906); *Parliamentary Debates* of 1862 and 1863; Richardson, *Messages and Papers of the Confederacy* (1905); Scharf, *History of the Confederate Navy* (1896); *Southern Historical Association Papers*, vol. vii., *passim*; vol. xiii., p. 455 and vol. xiv., p. 454.

CHAPTER X.

1861-1865.

ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES OF THE CONFEDERACY IN INDUSTRY AND TRADE.*

The manufacture of arms — The establishment of iron-furnaces — Powder-works — Clothing and shoe factories — Cotton and woolen mills — Salt-works — The raising of food crops — Deterioration of railways — Operations of the postoffice department — Foreign and domestic trade relations.

By overthrowing their existing system of industry and trade, the Civil War involved the Confederate States in many difficult problems. As compared with the North, the South had made small progress in manufactures. It had been an agricultural section, sending its cotton, tobacco, rice and sugar to the North and Europe, and receiving in return manufactured goods and supplies. The war cut off trade with the North, except such commercial intercourse as went on illicitly, or, in some instances, with the connivance of the authorities on both sides. As for imports from Europe, they were made precarious and inadequate by the North's vigorous blockade of the Southern coast.

Arms and military supplies for carrying on the war were a prime necessity of the Confederacy. At the beginning United States arsenals in various parts of the South fell into the hands of the Confederate soldiers, and a considerable quantity of arms was thus obtained. Loans were negotiated and the proceeds used to purchase military supplies abroad. But to make adequate preparation for war

was a task calling for the exertion of all of the industrial capacity of the South. Such iron works and machine shops as existed in the South were put at the disposal of the Confederate government and equipped and operated as factories for the production of implements of war. Valuable machinery was saved from the United States arsenal at Harper's Ferry and put into effective use. Among the more important establishments manufacturing arms for the Confederate government was the Tredegar Iron Works at Richmond. Here were made heavy ordnance, plates for ironclads, and shells. When the Gosport navy yard, near Norfolk, was abandoned by the Federals at the opening of the war, the attempt to destroy the United States warship *Merrimac* was only partially successful. The Confederates took possession of the yard, reconstructed the *Merrimac*, and protected its sides with plates made at the Tredegar Iron Works. Rechristened

* Prepared for this History by William H. Glasson, Professor of Economics, Trinity College, Durham, N. C., Joint Editor of the *South Atlantic Quarterly*.

the *Virginia*, the Confederate iron-clad met the *Monitor* in momentous conflict.

Among the many places at which arms and munitions of war were manufactured, Augusta, Atlanta, Columbus, Fayetteville, Macon, Selma, and San Antonio deserve special mention. As an illustration of the scale on which these activities were carried on, it is said that at Selma, in Alabama, 6,000 persons were employed in the military industries, and that after the war 14 forge and furnace stacks remained to mark the site of the arsenal.

Iron was in great demand for the manufacture of implements of war, but, notwithstanding the rich deposits of this ore in the Southern States, iron furnaces were few and of small productive capacity. In 1860 Virginia and Tennessee were the only Southern States reported as producing pig iron, and together their output was but 27,500 tons out of 884,000 tons for the country. It was not long, with this scant production, before the scarcity of iron began to be seriously felt. Existing furnaces were operated at capacity, and many new ones were established in Virginia, Tennessee, Alabama, North Carolina and other States. Some of the furnaces were operated directly by officers of the government's "Nitre and Mining Bureau," and others with governmental assistance; where such aid was given, the government received preference in the sale of the output. James Ford Rhodes estimates that

the production of iron in the Confederacy after 1861 may have reached 50,000 tons per annum, which was not only inadequate for war purposes, but railroads and other iron-consuming industries had to go without the needed metal. The *Richmond Enquirer* reported that the rails of the street railroad in Richmond were taken up to be made into armor for a gunboat. Such was the scarcity that an association of ladies was formed whose serious purpose was to advertise an appeal all through the Confederacy for broken pots and pans with which to build an armored steamer. Such conditions account for the fact that, with the exception of nails, manufactures of iron during the war were confined to military articles.

Gunpowder was greatly needed at the outbreak of hostilities, and the Confederacy was practically destitute of facilities for its manufacture. A number of factories were soon established, but there was a dearth of nitre, or saltpetre, the principal ingredient of gunpowder. A systematic search for this was made, and abandoned mines and deposits were re-worked. The government stimulated the industry by offering a high price for the product, and in 1862 proposed to advance half the capital necessary to bring plants into production. An official Nitre and Mining Bureau, referred to previously, had been organized to explore for saltpetre, iron, lead, copper, and other needed mining products and to super-

vise their production. This bureau worked for the government nitrous earths in mountain caves and elsewhere. In the summer of 1862 nearly 400 men were employed in 16 caves with the result that, by October, about 200,000 pounds of saltpetre had been obtained. This, however, being insufficient, an even greater supply was obtained by importation from Mexico and Europe. Although numerous small powder-manufacturing concerns were established throughout the South, the principal government factories were located at Augusta and at San Antonio. The Augusta mills had the largest capacity, producing 1,000,000 pounds a year. Nearly enough powder was made in the South to supply the armies of the Confederacy. Associated with the powder mills in Augusta was a large factory for the manufacture of percussion caps and cartridges.* It was planned to centralize ammunition making at Macon, and extensive buildings constructed for that purpose were nearly ready at the close of the war.

Lead was also needed for the manufacture of bullets. Much that had been otherwise used was secured and melted

down. An illustration of this is found in the case of the patriotic Charleston editor who donated to the government all the lead pipe in his house. The deposits in Wythe County, Virginia, were an important source of supply until the works were destroyed by Union troops in December of 1864. Their output was from 60,000 to 80,000 pounds a month. Lead was also obtained by working deposits in Missouri.

To maintain the armies of the Confederacy in the field involved the problem of supplying the soldiers with clothing, shoes, and other necessary personal and camp equipment. State military authorities displayed activity in providing for their own men. A clothing factory was organized at Raleigh in 1861 to equip the North Carolina troops. At Memphis during 1861 about 1,500 men and women were employed in manufacturing clothing, knapsacks, and military supplies. The *Richmond Examiner* of January 2, 1862, speaks of a factory at Raleigh turning out daily about 100 pairs of wooden shoes. In 1862 the Confederate government established a shoe factory in Richmond, the operatives being soldiers who were obliged to work without the aid of machinery. Later, another shoe factory was inaugurated at Montgomery, but the united product of the Richmond and Montgomery factories was not more than 1,000 pairs a day. Besides the above mentioned establishments and others conducted by individual States and

* The writer is indebted for much information regarding the industries of the South during the Civil War to *The Confederate States of America* by Professor J. C. Schwab, of Yale University. Professor Schwab has gathered many of his facts from files of Southern newspapers and from other sources not readily accessible to all readers and students. Other important assistance in the study of this subject is afforded in *The History of the United States* by James Ford Rhodes, vol. v., chap. xxviii.

by the Confederate government, there were many private persons and associations that contributed articles to supply the needs of the soldiers in the field. Carpets were frequently given to be made into blankets, and ladies met to use their skill with the needle in work for the comfort of the men in the ranks. But, in supplying clothing, the South was less successful than in providing powder and arms, and the soldiers often suffered from the lack of proper clothes, especially of articles made of wool.

Such cotton and woolen mills as there were in the South in 1861 were operated at full capacity, and a movement was soon started to establish new mills. Some of the States offered subsidies, and the industry also received governmental aid by the importation of textile machinery from abroad. Yet Mr. Rhodes considers that it is doubtful whether the production of cotton cloth increased in the South during the war. The attempt of the States to develop this branch of manufacture was hampered by the lack of proper machinery, by the destruction of mills by the Northern armies, and by the great profits which attracted available capital into blockade running.

The lack of salt was early a source of anxiety to the government and people of the Confederacy. This was a vital matter to the army because of the importance of salt meat as part of the ration. In some localities sea water was evaporated to provide a

supply. In other places the dirt floors of smoke houses were dug up and leached in order that the salt with which they were impregnated might be recovered. State governments adopted various plans to assist and stimulate salt production. North Carolina established salt works at Morehead City on the coast. After these were destroyed by the Union troops, works were operated near Wilmington. The most important salt region was in the Holston Valley in southwestern Virginia. Here the State of Virginia engaged in the manufacture of salt, and regulations were made for the distribution of the supply. At Saltville, wells were driven 200 to 300 feet for brine. The production for some time during the war was 2,000 barrels or more per day. Though the State of Virginia obtained the greater part of the supply, other States established works in the Saltville region. Alabama, Georgia and North Carolina undertook to export the needed commodity, and there was considerable friction between these States and Virginia over the distribution of the supply. The salt works in this locality continued in operation until 1865. In Louisiana it is variously estimated that from 10,000 to 30,000 tons of salt were obtained from the works at Petite Anse, in the coast swamp region, before they were taken by the Union forces in 1863. The salt licks of northwestern Louisiana were a scene of great activity during the war, being frequented by families,

companies, and representatives of communities in quest of the much-needed article. There were also important salt works in Alabama.

In all of the industries which have thus far been discussed the Confederate government had a very direct interest, for they were necessary to its military success; but the necessities of the Southern people caused many minor manufacturing industries to spring up. Schwab mentions establishments for the manufacture of paper, hats, hosiery, printers' ink, glass, matches, candles, pottery and many others. None of these seems to have been of much importance.

The fundamental agricultural industry of the South continued, except where interfered with by military operations. When the whites left home to join the army, the negroes generally remained at work on the plantations so that, in white districts, the labor force was scarce. The crops seem, as a rule, to have been good. There was a considerable tendency to turn from the raising of cotton to the production of food crops, such as corn and wheat. This movement received official encouragement from the Confederate and State governments. Many planters, however, were loath to forsake the cotton crop, desiring to hold their cotton for speculative profits. The raising of food crops was unattractive to those who feared that their product would be impressed for the army at unremunerative rates. When good food crops were raised,

they were often withheld from the market. The tax of one-tenth of agricultural produce in kind, which was inaugurated in 1863, aroused great hostility. Such conditions, rather than the failure of the harvests, probably explain the scarcity of food in the army and in the cities. Doubtless deficient transportation facilities also played an important part in preventing the supply of adequate food to the army, when it might have been obtained if an efficient system of railroads had been maintained. Again there was considerable destruction of crops and food products by the Northern armies. To keep up the food supply, laws were passed forbidding the distilling of grain. However, the Confederate government itself engaged in the distilling business and produced a great quantity of whiskey.

The prompt transportation of soldiers, food, and military supplies was of vast importance to the Confederacy, but in this respect the South was at a disadvantage as compared with the North. At the outbreak of the war, the Confederacy had but 30 per cent. of the railroad mileage of the country, and, as Southern territory came under the control of the Union armies, this was soon reduced to about 20 per cent. The Southern railroads were mainly local in character; there was a lack of extensive systems, and it was early seen that military necessity required the completion of through lines. The Confederate congress therefore made grants in the form of bonds in

aid of various railroads. To assist the extension of the Richmond and Danville Railroad southward to connect with the North Carolina railroads at Greensboro, the congress granted \$1,000,000 in February of 1862, and other grants were made in aid of railroads in Georgia and Louisiana. In all, the appropriations by the Confederate congress to assist railroad construction amounted to more than \$5,000,000. Many of the States supplemented this action by enacting railroad aid laws during the war, such legislation being but the continuation of a policy which had prevailed in many Southern States in the 50's. Military reasons afforded an added argument to railroad promoters.

The operation of Southern railroads during the war was marked by progressive deterioration. It was impossible to make needed repairs. The Confederate government took control of the railroad machine shops for military purposes. The existing stock of cast and wrought iron, which might have been used for car wheels and rails, was impressed and used in the manufacture of ordnance and wagon tires, and for other army service. Iron production in the South during the war was too small to afford relief to the railroads. At the close of hostilities Southern railroads were in a condition of physical wreck. In their crippled condition, government business so occupied the railroads that private business had to be neglected.

Profitable government contracts enabled the roads to show large profits in currency, and in some cases to increase their dividends. But they made no proper allowance for depreciation, and it took many years to restore them to even tolerable condition.

The poor railroad service interfered with the regular carriage and delivery of the mails under the post-office department of the Confederacy. This department was organized by John H. Reagan as postmaster-general with the aid of employees drawn from the Post-Office Department at Washington. They brought with them blank forms and necessary papers used in the dispatch of business. The date fixed for the Confederacy's taking over the postal service within her borders was June 1, 1861. There were initial difficulties, such as the failure to have the Confederate postage stamps ready before October. By the end of 1861 the department had about 8,300 post-offices open. The provisional constitution of the Confederacy required the post-office department to be self-sustaining after March 1, 1863. It seemed a difficult task to comply with this provision, but steps were taken, as soon as possible, to lessen expenses and increase revenues. Payments to the railroads were much reduced. Some mail routes were discontinued, and on others trips were made less frequently. The franking privilege was abolished. Rates on letter postage were raised. A deficit in the

postal revenue was turned into a surplus in the last quarter of 1862. The department continued to produce a surplus revenue in the remaining years of the war. Though there were many complaints of the postal administration, it seems to have done better under adverse circumstances than might have been expected.

There remains for discussion the matter of the trade relations of the Confederacy with the United States and foreign nations. At the very beginning of the war there was much sentiment in favor of freedom of trade with all nations other than the United States. But there was soon a change, and, during the first year of the war, trade limitation was strongly advocated. It was thought that, by depriving England, France, and other European nations of cotton, their manufacturing interests might be so injuriously affected as to force them to interfere in behalf of the Confederacy. The government for a time supported this policy, although there were those who urged that the Confederacy ought to enlarge its exports and market its cotton at a good price, in exchange for needed supplies. By 1862 the pressing needs of the army and the insufficiency of internal production had caused the government to reverse its policy and send out all the cotton possible. Bacon, saltpetre, arms, shoes, medicines, etc., were secured in return. Four government steamers were soon engaged in carrying out cotton and bringing in sup-

plies. The governments of North Carolina and other States also engaged in trade with foreign countries. Numerous importing and exporting companies were formed to carry on blockade running, and a few successful voyages meant extraordinary profits. Frequently private companies and the government made shipments on joint account. In 1864 the Confederate government required the private owners of blockade-running vessels to admit the government to a half share in the freight capacity of their vessels. On the whole, the efforts to send cotton from the South to Europe seemed to have had only limited success, and the reported receipts in Europe were comparatively small. So far as the government was interested in this trade because of the need for supplies, there were complaints of mismanagement, monopoly, and violation of contract. Pollard, an able Southern writer, says that the results of the traffic were far below the necessities of the country, and that through mismanagement great quantities of meat were left to rot at Nassau and Bermuda.

In Texas, agents of the Confederate government speculated in cotton which was exported to Mexico. A cotton bureau was established in Texas in 1864. It made contracts with persons who undertook to transport cotton across the boundary into Mexico and to bring back in return supplies for the government.

During the war there developed a

large trade between the South and North. So anxious were the authorities at Washington to get cotton to supply the North and Europe that they were reluctant to interfere with this commerce between the lines, and such generals as Butler at New Orleans were also found willing to facilitate the traffic. On the part of the South the inducement to trade was the chance to obtain much needed foodstuffs, salt, clothing, medicines, and even powder and arms. Nominally the Confederate government was opposed to traffic with the North. Penalties were prescribed by law for engaging in such trade. Early in the war President Davis was strongly convinced of the desirability of confining cotton in the South and refused to authorize the exchange of cotton for meat, even when the need of the subsistence department was represented as most urgent. There was, however, a lack of harmonious action among the Confederate executive officers and military commanders in dealing with this trade, and in the later years of the war a great deal of it was either authorized by, or carried on with the tacit consent of, the Confederate authorities. There was much in such traffic between the lines that was demoralizing to both sides. Both Federal and Confederate officers were charged with obtaining personal profit from the trade with the enemy. As to the balance of advantage from this commerce between North and South, Rhodes concludes "that it was of

greater advantage to the Confederacy than to the Union. For the South it was a necessary evil; for the North it was an evil and not a necessary one."

The best energies of the Confederacy were devoted to obtaining an adequate supply of arms and ammunition for its soldiers. Here a great measure of success was attained, and the Confederate armies were not defeated because of lack of arms. Less success was achieved in supplying subsistence and clothing, and there was resultant distress and suffering. The military struggle called for all the strength of the South and there was little progress in the arts of peace. Much as was achieved by the Confederacy in the face of great difficulties, there did not come about a complete and effective industrial reorganization of the country.*

* The best work of reference for the general reader is Professor John Christopher Schwab's *The Confederate States of America* (New York, 1901). This contains an extensive bibliography of the industrial and financial history of the Confederacy. James Ford Rhodes's *History of the United States* is also helpful, especially vol. v., chap. xxviii. *The South in the Building of the Nation* (Richmond, 1909) contains in volume v. (*Economic History, 1607-1865*) numerous short articles on various phases of the economic history of the Confederacy. Other useful references are Jefferson Davis, *The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government*; E. A. Pollard, *The Lost Cause* (New York, 1866); W. L. Fleming, *Civil War and Reconstruction in Alabama* (New York, 1905); *Confederate Military History* (12 vols., Atlanta, 1899); W. F. McCaleb, *The Organization of the Post Office Department of the Confederacy*, in *American Historical Review*, vol. xii., pp. 66-74; *Official Records: A Compilation of the War of the Rebellion*, series i.-iv. (Washington, 1880-

CHAPTER XI.

1862.

THE MERRIMAC AND MONITOR: THE SIEGE OF YORKTOWN.

Gloom in the South over the fall of Donelson — Davis' inaugural address — His proclamation of martial law — Jackson's operations in the Shenandoah Valley — Johnston's retreat — Destruction of the *Cumberland* and *Congress* by the *Merrimac* — The battle between the *Monitor* and *Merrimac* — The battle of Kernstown — The commencement of McClellan's forward movement — The battle at Lee's Mills — The siege and evacuation of Yorktown.

The fall of Fort Donelson gave the South a taste of the bitterness of defeat which the North had experienced after Bull Run. None appreciated the magnitude of the disaster better than Albert Sidney Johnston who wrote to Davis, March 17: "The blow was most disastrous and without remedy."* When Nashville was evacuated the people were seized with panic, and disorder, turbulence, and rapine ensued. At Richmond all was consternation. Loud complaints were heard against the management of the campaign, and Davis at once ordered Floyd and Pillow to be relieved from command. Though much pressure was brought to bear on Davis to remove Johnston, he steadily refused. February 22 was the day appointed for the provisional government to give place to the permanent government of

the Confederacy and for the inauguration of its President and Vice-President. When Davis delivered his inaugural address every heart was gloomy at the news of the defeats suffered by the Confederate army, and this dejection was reflected in Davis' address:

"At the darkest hour of our struggle, the provisional gives place to the permanent government. After a series of successes and victories which covered our arms with glory we have recently met with serious disasters. But in the heart of a people resolved to be free these disasters tend but to stimulate to increased resistance. * * * With humble gratitude and adoration, acknowledging the Providence which has so visibly protected the Confederacy during its brief but eventful career, to Thee, Oh, God! I trustingly commit myself and prayerfully invoke Thy blessing on my country and its cause."

In another part of the address he said:

"Although the tide for the moment is against us, the final result in our favor is not doubtful. The period is near at hand when our foes must sink under the immense load of debt which they have incurred—a debt which in their effort to subjugate us, has already attained such fearful dimensions as will subject them to burdens which must continue to oppress them for generations to come."*

1901); statutes of the Confederate States; State statutes; reports of Confederate cabinet and other officers; Southern newspapers. Exact citations of original sources, many of which are not generally accessible to readers, are to be found in the bibliography appended to Professor Schwab's *Confederate States of America*.

* *Official Records*, vol. viii., p. 260.

* See Alfried. *Life of Davis*, p. 348 et seq.

In his message to the Confederate Congress Davis admitted that "events have demonstrated that the government had attempted more than it had power successfully to achieve. Hence, in the effort to protect, by our arms, the whole territory of the Confederate States, seaboard and inland, we have been so exposed as recently to encounter serious disasters." His allusion was to the losses of Fort Donelson, Roanoke Island, etc., but not deeming it possible "that anything so insane as a persistent attempt to subjugate these States could be made" he did not disguise the strong probability "that the war would be continued through a series of years." The Confederates stood adversity no better than the Federals. On February 27 a secret session of the Confederate Congress passed an act authorizing Davis to proclaim martial law. On March 1, therefore, he issued his proclamation to that effect, covering the city of Richmond and the adjoining county to the distance of 10 miles, and declared the suspension of the privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus*.* This at first pleased the law-abiding citizens of the community, but their delight was shortlived. General Winder, to whom was delegated practically unlimited power, prohibited the distillation of spiritous liquors and ordered the dram shops closed. But he did not use his arbitrary power with discretion. Extraordinary arrests of responsible citizens were

made, a vexatious passport system was established, and the independence of the press was much curtailed. Winder's police was composed largely of disreputable men and his rule became a positive tyranny. He was responsible to no one but Davis, who sustained him, but finally public opinion asserted itself so strongly that, on April 19, the Confederate Congress modified the law under which these extraordinary powers had been exercised.* Such were the conditions in Richmond when the Federal army began its advance toward the South.

In the meantime, the Confederate armies had been exceedingly active. Early in January, General Jackson left Winchester and advanced northward toward Hancock, about 40 miles distant. He drove out four companies of Union troops at Bathe and then demanded the surrender of Hancock, which General Frederick W. Lander refused. Some desultory firing was engaged in by both sides, but Jackson soon moved westwardly while Lander prepared to cross into Virginia. Colonel Dunning at Romney attacked the enemy stationed at Blue's Gap, 16 miles distant on the road to Winchester, and routed them completely. Lander joined Benjamin F. Kelley at Cumberland and went thence to Romney, but finding that Jackson had nearly surrounded him with a large force, he marched all night to Springfield. Subsequently Moorfield was captured and an attack

* Mrs. Davis, *Life of Davis*, vol. ii., p. 185.

* Rhodes, *United States*, vol. iii., pp. 601-603.

was made on a Confederate force at Bloomery Gap, when several officers and 75 men were captured. On February 24 Colonel John W. Geary, of Banks' command, crossed the Potomac and took possession of Harper's Ferry. The heights being secure, a strong force occupied Charlestown on the 28th on the advance to Winchester. On March 3 Martinsburg, on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, was occupied, and Smithfield on the 6th. The enemy in the direction of Winchester were evidently falling back, and it was expected that a stand would be made at that place by Jackson. On the 11th Jackson evacuated Winchester, which was immediately occupied by Union troops under Generals Charles S. Hamilton and Williams. General James Shields now quartered his brigade at Winchester, which place was made the headquarters of General N. P. Banks. The left flank of the Confederates being threatened, they hastened their retirement along the entire line from Aquia Creek to the Shenandoah. Aware that he stood in jeopardy, the Confederate general prepared to move his forces out of Manassas to a more secure position. Beginning his preparations on February 22, he commenced the retreat on March 7, and four days later had his army safely on the south bank of the Rappahannock River. Constantly expecting an attack, he deemed it impossible to remove all the property accumulated at Manassas Junction, and therefore a large amount of

clothes, blankets, baggage, stores and provisions was burned.

On Sunday evening, March 9, McClellan heard of Johnston's movement and immediately gave orders for the occupation of Centerville and Manassas. When the Union army occupied these places they found that they had been confronting phantom ordnance and soldiers. Being deficient in artillery, Johnston had made rough wooden imitations of guns (Quaker guns) which were exhibited to give the idea of immense strength in the artillery branch. The whole business took on a tinge of the ludicrous. For months McClellan had been moving cautiously against a supposedly large army well supplied with artillery, but when Manassas was occupied he found that he had been hoodwinked.

On Sunday, March 9, the day that the news of the evacuation of Manassas reached Washington, the President received word of the havoc wrought by the Confederate ironclad *Merrimac* in Hampton Roads. It will be remembered that, when the Confederates attacked the Norfolk navy yard, the steamer *Merrimac* was scuttled and abandoned by McCauley. Subsequently the Confederates raised and converted her into an ironclad, cutting down her hull and placing a bomb-proof covering of raw iron over her main deck. Her bow and stern were sharpened and clad in steel, and a ram was added. Almost at the same

time the *Monitor* was under construction at Brooklyn.

About noon of March 8 the *Merrimac* steamed into Hampton Roads accompanied by two gunboats; several other armed steamers followed and were prepared both to give aid and share in the expected victory. The Union steam frigates *Minnesota*, *Ranoke*, and *Congress*, each of 50 guns, the sailing frigate *St. Lawrence*, 12,



and the sloop *Cumberland*, 24, lay off Newport News and Fortress Monroe, and toward these the *Merrimac* proceeded. The *Congress* and *Cumberland* made ready, and when the *Merrimac* was less than a quarter of a mile away the *Congress* delivered her broadside, but the balls rebounded from the *Merrimac's* iron sides without inflicting the least injury. The *Merrimac* reserved her fire until within easy range, gave the *Congress* a broadside as she passed, and then steered directly for the *Cumberland*,

drove her iron prow through the side of the Union frigate near the water line, crushing it, and poured in a terrific fire of shells. Backing clear she continued her fire, and then steered for the *Congress*. The *Cumberland* soon sank. Seeing the fate of the *Cumberland* the commander of the *Congress* ran his ship ashore to escape destruction, but from a point 150 yards astern the *Merrimac* raked her decks with shells until at last a hot shot set her on fire and completed her destruction. As the *Cumberland* sank the Confederate steamers *Patrick Henry*, 12, and *Jamestown*, 2, came out of the James River and joined the *Merrimac*. The *Minnesota* had grounded where the *Merrimac* could not approach within a mile, since she drew 22 feet. The firing of the latter was so bad that only one shot struck the frigate, and the other Confederate vessels were driven off after inflicting much damage with their rifled guns. The *Merrimac* then returned to Norfolk. More than half the crew of the *Cumberland* were lost and the crew of the *Congress* were made prisoners, but with the exception of the officers were released. The total loss was about 250, whereas the Confederate loss was nominal. This battle ended the day of wooden navies.

Telegraphic news of these events reached Washington the next day and created tremendous consternation, since the wooden frigates were impotent against this new engine of destruction. But long before the news

arrived in Washington a strange craft quietly slipped into the waters of Hampton Roads and at 2 o'clock on the morning of the 9th anchored alongside the *Minnesota*. This was the *Monitor*, which, after barely escaping shipwreck twice on her voyage from New York, had arrived to save the day for the North.* The *Monitor* was of 1,255 tons displacement whereas the *Merrimac* was of 3,200 tons. The *Merrimac* was armed with two 7-inch and two 6-inch rifles, and six 9-inch smooth bores, while the *Monitor* had only two 11-inch Dahlgren guns in a revolving turret in the centre of her deck. At 6 o'clock on the morning of the 9th the *Merrimac* approached to complete the work begun on the previous day. Steering directly for the *Minnesota*, the *Merrimac* began to fire but the *Monitor*, commanded by Lieutenant John L. Worden, swept in between the two vessels, steered directly for the *Merrimac*, and began firing. At close quarters the *Merrimac* brought her bow guns to bear, but missed. There was little to fire at except a low turret about 20 feet in diameter. The first reply of the *Monitor* was a solid 11-inch shot which shook the *Merrimac* from stem to stern. The answer was a broadside, followed by others in rapid succession without producing the slightest effect on this "cheese box on a raft." On the other hand,

at every opportunity the *Monitor* struck with her 11-inch solid shot, pounding the heavy armor and straining the timbers of her adversary. Finally the *Merrimac* left the *Monitor* and crowded on steam for the *Minnesota*. On reaching point-blank range she received a full broadside and a shot from a 10-inch pivot gun without suffering the slightest damage. In reply she raked the *Minnesota* with shell, set her afire, and, but for the *Monitor*, which had followed under full steam and now swept between the two, the *Minnesota* would have shared the fate of the *Congress* and *Cumberland*. In changing position to meet the *Monitor*, the *Merrimac* grounded and the *Monitor* continued her hammering with 11-inch shot. As the *Merrimac* was floated she attempted to ram the *Monitor*, but her prow glanced off. She then started for the *Minnesota* for the purpose of ramming her, but when within easy range the *Merrimac*, with all the Confederate ships, changed course and headed for Norfolk. Her officers subsequently stated that, in attempting to ram the *Monitor*, the iron prow of the *Merrimac* was injured and the vessel was leaking. The armor was reported damaged, the stem twisted, the muzzles of two guns shot away, and the steam pipe and smokestack riddled. Others state that the withdrawal of the *Merrimac* was due to the retirement of the *Monitor* from the action, owing to an injury to Captain Worden. A shell from the *Merrimac*

* Into the controversy as to whether the revolving turret was originally suggested by Theodore R. Timby or John Ericsson we cannot enter, leaving the dispute to the partisans of these men.

struck the forward side of the pilot house directly in the sight hole and exploded, cracking the second iron log and partly lifting the top, leaving an opening. Immediately behind this spot Worden was standing and received the full force of the blow in the face. He was partly stunned and utterly blinded by the powder. This caused the *Monitor* to withdraw temporarily from the action. Before she returned the *Merrimac* had gone down the river. The *Merrimac* did not again engage the *Monitor*, and after the evacuation of Norfolk, which occurred on May 9, she was destroyed by the Confederates. The *Monitor* was lost in a violent gale off the coast of North Carolina December 31, 1862.*


The relief of the Union government and people was great. The welcome news reached Washington the same night, changing deep anxiety to lively exultation. Lincoln at once saw clearly the immense advantage of the *Monitor's* victory and ordered that the vessel should not be placed in jeopardy, fearing that if she were unduly exposed some accident might

* See Moore, *Rebellion Record*, vol. iv., Docs., p. 266 et seq.; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. i., pp. 692-750; Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. v., chap. xiii.; Rhodes, *United States*, vol. iii., pp. 608-613; Soley, *The Blockade and the Cruisers*; Swinton, *Decisive Battles of the War*; E. V. White, *The First Ironclad Naval Engagement in the World* (1906); Boynton, *History of the Navy During the Rebellion*; Duyckinck, *The Late Civil War*, vol. ii., p. 308 et seq.; William C. Church, *Life of John Ericsson* (1891); Dwight Goddard, *Short Story of John Ericsson* (1904); Maclay, *History of the Navy*, vol. ii., pp. 282-324; *Confederate Military History*, vol. xii., pp. 28-54.

happen. He therefore ordered that on no account should she attempt to go to Norfolk alone and should not be separated from the other vessels, but if the *Merrimac* came out into favorable waters they should all attack her.*

On March 19 General Shields with his division at Winchester had learned that Jackson was strongly posted near Mount Jackson and resolved to draw him into a position where he could attack him to greater advantage. Shields sent his troops off toward Centreville as though beginning a retreat, but leaving Ashby's cavalry to watch the movements of the enemy. On March 22 a skirmish took place near Winchester during which Shields was badly wounded. During the night a strong force was placed in advance on the Strasburg Road in a masked position near Kernstown. The next day Jackson attacked this position and endeavored to turn Shields' left flank, but after a severe struggle was repulsed. The Union right was then attacked with but little success. E. B. Tyler's brigade attempted to carry the Confederate batteries and hurl Jackson's left flank back upon the centre. With his Stonewall brigade and other troops Jackson was finally compelled to fall back upon the reserve. He made an attack to retrieve the losses of the day but, being unsuccessful, fled in some disorder, leaving Shields in possession of the field with

* Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. v., p. 232.



THE BATTLE BETWEEN THE MONITOR AND THE MERRIMAC.

300 prisoners, two guns, four caissons and 1,000 stand of small arms. The Confederates continued the retreat and, during the following week, were pursued to Woodstock and thence to Edenburg, about 20 miles beyond Strasburg. In this engagement Shields had a force of about 7,000 men, and lost 118 killed, 450 wounded and 22 missing. The Confederates considerably outnumbered the Union forces, and lost about 720 killed and wounded.*

Meanwhile, on March 8, having consented to McClellan's plan for a campaign on the peninsula, Lincoln issued a general war order No. 2 dividing the army of the Potomac into four corps commanded, respectively, by Generals Irvin McDowell, E. V. Sumner, S. P. Heintzelman, and E. D. Keyes. Part of the forces under General James S. Wadsworth was left to defend Washington, while a 5th corps, commanded by General N. P. Banks, was to be formed of his and General Shields' divisions.† This order was followed by special war order No. 3 issued on March 11, relieving McClellan of the command of all military departments save that of the Potomac,‡ the ostensible reason being that the general would be actively engaged in the field, though undoubt-

edly it represented the waning confidence of Lincoln and Congress in him.* By the same order General Halleck was placed in command of the Department of the Mississippi, and the Mountain Department (the region west of the Department of the Potomac) was placed under the command of Frémont. On March 13 McClellan and his corps of officers held a council of war at Fairfax Court House, where they decided in favor of the peninsula plan of campaign, provided the navy would silence the batteries on York River. Lincoln made no objection to this plan, but in a letter dated March 13 stipulated that a sufficient force should be left at Manassas Junction to prevent its reoccupation by the Confederates, and that Washington be left entirely secure.† McClellan planned to move in two columns, one on the right directly to Yorktown, and another along the James River westward of and beyond Yorktown to the vicinity of Williamsburg. Should the Confederate works at Yorktown and Williamsburg offer serious resistance, he designed to land General McDowell's first corps, reinforced if necessary, on the left bank of the York or on the Severn, and move it on Gloucester and West Point in order to take in reverse whatever force the enemy might have on the peninsula and compel him to abandon his positions. During the latter part

* *Battles and Leaders*, vol. ii., pp. 283-284, 303-309; Webb, *The Peninsula*, p. 89; *Confederate Military History*, vol. iii., pp. 218-222.

† Richardson, *Messages and Papers*, vol. vi., p. 110.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 111; *Official Records*, vol. v., p. 54; Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. v., pp. 178-179.

* Rhodes, *United States*, vol. iii., p. 615.

† Richardson, *Messages and Papers*, vol. vi., p. 111.

of March troops were embarked for Fortress Monroe, and on the morning of April 2 General McClellan himself arrived to take command in person. According to his own report he had the next day, ready to move, about 58,000 men and 100 guns besides the division artillery.* On the 4th the movement began, Heintzelman's corps on Yorktown and that of Keyes on its left. Heavy rains had made the roads very bad, and although the Confederates had abandoned some points, yet when Keyes reached Lee's Mills he found the post too strong to be carried, as he had been directed, by assault.† On the morning of the 6th Heintzelman arrived in front of Yorktown, but found that the Confederate forces there were too strong to be overcome. The Confederates under General J. B. Magruder held a line across the peninsula from the mouths of the Warwick River and Deep Creek on James River, to Yorktown on York River. A line about 12 miles in length was covered a great part of the distance by boggy and difficult swamps and quite well fortified by redoubts at the road crossings. McClellan estimated Magruder's force at from 15,000 to 20,000, but Magruder states that his force consisted of 11,000 men, of whom 6,000 were required for the fortifications at Yorktown and only 5,000 to hold the line across the peninsula.‡ The ex-

istence of this line was a surprise to McClellan who knew that Yorktown was fortified, but had no knowledge of the line extending from that place to the James River, and his movement on Yorktown was predicated on the belief that he could turn it by his left. It was a part of McClellan's plan also that McDowell's corps should turn Yorktown by the right, by landing at Gloucester Point north of York River. But two or three days' reconnoissances convinced McClellan that he could not break through Magruder's line, and he therefore resolved upon a regular siege. He was engaged in bringing up troops and guns preparatory to siege operations and was asking for heavy reinforcements and more siege guns when, on the 5th, he received from the adjutant-general of the army, at Lincoln's direction, an order detaching McDowell's corps of 33,400 from his command, under the plea that such a course was essential to the safety of Washington. McClellan protested against this, and urged that McCall's and Franklin's divisions of McDowell's corps should be sent him, and, a few days later, ordered Franklin's division to report to him, which it did on the 29th. Meanwhile, on the 9th, President Lincoln wrote McClellan urging him to strike a blow.*

Instead of piercing the Confederate lines by assault, however, McClellan

* Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. v., p. 358.


† *Official Records*, vol. xi., pt. i., p. 10.

‡ *Ibid*, vol. xi., pt. i., p. 405.

* For the entire letter see *Official Records*, vol. xi., pt. i., p. 15. See also Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. v., pp. 362-364; Rhodes, *United States*, vol. iii., pp. 616-617.

encamped before Yorktown and began the siege in a deliberate and scientific manner, probably losing more men by disease in the swamps of Virginia than an assault would have cost him. Active reconnoissances were kept up in all directions. Between Lee's Mills and Wynn's Mills the Confederates, under Howell Cobb, had thrown up intrenchments and constructed re-

loss. The effort was renewed later in the day, when detachments of the 4th, 5th and 6th Vermont regiments attempted to cross the Warwick, but were driven back. The Union loss during the day was 156 killed and wounded and 9 missing, whereas the Confederate loss did not exceed 75 killed and wounded.* This failure convinced McClellan that he could not



doubts for artillery. On April 16 General W. F. Smith, with his division of Keyes' corps, was ordered by General McClellan to reconnoiter Cobb's position, stop his work, and, if necessary drive him from it. Brooks' Vermont brigade was thrown forward and, after an artillery fire of more than six hours (part of the time from 18 guns), four companies of the 3d Vermont crossed the stream and seized the rifle-pits of the 15th North Carolina, but were driven back with severe

carry the Confederate position by assault, and he therefore devoted his attention entirely to siege operations against Yorktown. Under the direction of General Fitz-John Porter, who was made director of the siege, J. G. Barnard, chief of engineers, and General W. F. Barry, chief of artillery,

* *Official Records*, vol. xi.; Webb, *The Peninsula*, pp. 64-65; *McClellan's Own Story*; Allan, *History of the Army of Northern Virginia*; Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. v., pp. 368-370; *Confederate Military History*, vol. iv., pp. 46-48.

the operations were conducted elaborately and with great skill. Barry reported that 101 pieces, Parrott guns, mortars, and howitzers, were placed in batteries from 1,500 to 2,200 yards away from the Confederate works. McClellan kept this immense armament silent for weeks while he was continually adding to it, though he could easily have compelled the Confederates either to surrender or retreat, and it was against the advice of his ablest staff officers that the batteries were not opened as fast as they were completed.* On April 17 General Joseph E. Johnston had been assigned to the defence of the peninsula and Richmond, and his forces, after the arrival of G. W. Smith's and Longstreet's divisions, amounted to 53,000 men, including 3,000 sick and disabled.† He made no strenuous effort to interfere with McClellan's operations, but determined to hold his position until McClellan was ready to attack and then to fall back without waiting to have his troops driven

from their works.* By April 30 McClellan had present for duty 115,102 men, including Franklin's division which had been sent to him to turn Yorktown by Gloucester Point or West Point, but which, since its arrival on the 20th, had been kept on board the transports.† On May 1 McClellan proposed to open fire on the morning of the 6th with all his guns, and to press the siege until final assault should be deemed practical, but on April 27 Johnston learned that McClellan's batteries were approaching completion, and accordingly made his dispositions for retreat. On the night of May 3, leaving some serviceable heavy guns behind, he evacuated Yorktown and fell back to Williamsburg on the way to Richmond.‡

* Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. v., p. 371.

† Nicolay and Hay (*Life of Lincoln*, vol. v., p. 375) make the aggregate present for duty 112,392 and the total aggregate present and absent 130,078. See, however, the figures given in McClellan's account in *Battles and Leaders*, vol. ii., pp. 160-187.

‡ *Battles and Leaders*, vol. ii., p. 189 *et seq.*; Webb, *The Peninsula*, chap. iii.; Allan, *History of the Army of Northern Virginia*; Barnard, *Peninsula Campaign*; *McClellan's Own Story*.

* *Official Records*, vol. xi., pt. i., pp. 130, 348.

† Johnston's *Narrative*, p. 117.



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1. UNION BATTERY No. 4, ONE OF THE FIFTEEN BATTERIES PLANTED BY MCCLELLAN TO THE SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST OF YORKTOWN.
2. UNION BATTERY No. 1, TWO MILES BELOW YORKTOWN, JUST IN FRONT OF THE FARENHOLDT HOUSE.

CHAPTER XII.

1862.

THE CAPTURE OF NEW ORLEANS.

The occupation of Ship Island — The arrival of Butler and Farragut — The bombardment of Forts Jackson and St. Philip — The surrender of New Orleans — The surrender of Forts Jackson and St. Philip — Butler's administration in New Orleans.

While these events were taking place in the East, efforts were being made to open a pathway up the Mississippi. The first important step was the occupation of Ship Island. Lying intermediate between Santa Rosa Island and the mouths of the Mississippi near the entrance to the interior, it was connected with New Orleans by Lake Borgne and Lake Pontchartrain, and was one of the most valuable stations along the coast. A force of 2,500 troops under General J. W. Phelps was sent to Ship Island; other troops arrived in January of 1862, and on February 25 General Benjamin F. Butler sailed from Hampton Roads to assume command of the land forces intended to operate against New Orleans, that city being the natural objective point of the campaign. By the end of March, Butler had 14,000 men at the island, mostly raw recruits. By the middle of April he succeeded in embarking 6,000 troops for the Mississippi, who were to coöperate with the naval force there being organized and perfected by Captain David G. Farragut. Captain Farragut, then 60 years of age,

was chosen to command the naval forces, and on February 3 set sail from Hampton Roads with his fleet of which the steam sloop *Hartford* was the flagship. In his instructions of January 20, Secretary Welles had informed Farragut that a fleet of armed vessels and armed steamers enough to manage them, all under command of Commodore D. D. Porter, would be attached to the squadron. With this flotilla Farragut was directed to take New Orleans and then aid in opening the river above. By the middle of April the expedition was before the forts below New Orleans, Farragut with 17 men of war and 177 guns besides Porter's flotilla of 19 mortar schooners and 6 armed steamships for guard and towing service. Butler with a contingent of 6,000 men accompanied the expedition, the remainder of his troops being detained at Ship Island for want of transports.* The Confederate defences were of three kinds. About 80 miles below New Orleans on either side of the river were Forts Jackson and St. Philip,

* *Official Records*, vol. vi., p. 708.

the former containing 74 and the latter 52 guns, their garrisons consisting of about 700 men each. The Confederates had also constructed a river barrier a mile and a half below the forts consisting of log rafts and dismantled schooners anchored at intervals and connected by strong chains. The third defence was an improvised fleet of 16 gunboats, several of them armed with iron prows and one of them (the *Manassas*) being an iron-plated ram. In charge of the coast defences was General J. K. Duncan and General Mansfield Lovell was in command of several thousand troops at New Orleans.

On April 16 Farragut ascended the river with his fleet, anchoring the mortar boats from 2,500 to 4,000 yards below Fort Jackson. The bombardment was opened on the 18th, each vessel firing for ten minutes. During the first day 1,400 shells were thrown, but no perceptible injury was inflicted, though the citadel in the centre of the fort was set on fire. Two of the mortar boats were penetrated by shots from the fort. On the second day one of the mortar boats was sunk and considerable damage was done to the officers' quarters in the fort. During the night the chain barrier was broken and a passage was opened for the fleet. During the third and fourth days the mortar boats kept steadily at work, slowly but surely accomplishing the reduction of the fort. For six days the bombardment continued during which Porter threw 16,000 shells,

but as the forts had not surrendered Farragut decided to try his own ships.* At 2 o'clock on the morning of the 24th Farragut gave the signal to advance, Porter at the same time increasing his bombardment to its utmost rapidity. The fleet was arranged in two divisions: First, the column of the red, consisting of the *Cayuga*, flag gunboat, *Pensacola*, *Mississippi*, *Oneida*, *Varuna*, *Katahdin*, *Kineo*, *Wissahickon*, carrying 67 guns and in command of Captain Theodorus Bailey—this to engage Fort St. Philip; while the second division, the column of the blue, commanded by Farragut and led by his flagship, the *Hartford*, consisting of the *Brooklyn*, *Richmond*, *Sciota*, *Iroquois*, *Kennebeck*, *Pinola*, *Itasca* and *Winona*, in all 9 ships carrying 87 guns,† was to ascend the west bank of the river and attack Fort Jackson. At about 2.30 on the morning of April 24 the two columns steamed forward. As the divisions passed through the barrier the forts opened upon them but the ships waited until they were abreast of the works and then with grape and canister quickly cleared the ramparts and drove the fort gunners from their posts. In his report of May 6, 1862, Farragut says that, as the fire became general and the smoke dense, the Union boats had nothing to aim at but the flash of the Con-

* George W. Brown, *The Mortar Flotilla at Forts Jackson and St. Philip* (1888).

† Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. v., pp. 260-261.

federate guns and it was very difficult to distinguish friends from foes. While the *Hartford* and her consorts were thundering against Fort Jackson, the division of the red led by the *Cayuga* ran the gauntlet of the two forts and then encountered the Confederate gunboat flotilla. Accounts of the conflict vary. It was still dark when the Union gunboats pushed among the Confederates, but soon all 11 of the Confederate vessels were destroyed or captured. Meanwhile Farragut's division was experiencing considerable trouble. Three of the rear gunboats failed to pass the forts at all while one of the large ships, the *Brooklyn*, became entangled with the barrier of hulks and rafts and was "feebly butted" by the ram *Manassas*. While still under the fire of Fort Jackson the *Brooklyn* was attacked by a large Confederate steamer but the *Brooklyn's* port broadside delivered at the short distance of only 40 or 60 yards completely demolished this vessel. The Confederates set fire rafts adrift, one of which was pushed by a tugboat toward the *Hartford* while passing Fort St. Philip. Swerving aside to avoid the raft, the *Hartford* ran aground, whereupon, perceiving the advantage, the tugboat pushed the blazing raft against the flagship. In an instant the whole side and rigging was enveloped in flames, but fortunately the fire was quickly extinguished and the ship's engines were able to back her from her imminent peril, after which she continued

her trip up the river, silencing the guns of Fort St. Philip as she passed. Commander Melancton Smith of the *Mississippi* then attacked and captured the *Manassas*, but being unable to man the prize, he riddled her with shot and she soon after blew up and sank. The Union fleet lost the *Varuna* and considerable damage was done to the other ships. The loss of life on the Union fleet was 37 killed and 147 wounded, while in the forts there were 14 killed and 39 wounded; the loss in the Confederate navy is unknown.*

Farragut then steamed up to New Orleans which now lay helpless under the Union guns. News of his approach put the population of the city in a ferment. Having only 3,000 troops and 18 days' provisions for the people, the Confederate general, Mansfield Lovell, resolved to evacuate the place and all its dependencies.† Removing such supplies and arms as he could, Lovell ordered the destruction of the remaining war material and property. According to Far-

* Mahan, *The Gulf and Inland Waters*; Maclay, *History of the Navy*, vol. ii., pp. 366-407; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. ii., pp. 14-91, 99-102; Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. v., pp. 259-266. See also James Barnes, *David G. Farragut* (1899); Loyall Farragut, *Life of David G. Farragut* (1879); P. C. Headley, *Life and Naval Career of Vice-Admiral David Glasgow Farragut* (1865); Mahan, *Admiral Farragut* (1892); John R. Spears, *David G. Farragut* (1905); Brady, *The Southerners* (1907); J. E. Homans, *Our Three Admirals* (1899); L. P. Brockett, *Our Great Commanders* (1865); *Confederate Military History*, vol. x., pt. i., pp. 35-48, vol. xii., pp. 57-62.

† *Official Records*, vol. vi., p. 513.

ragut, "the destruction of property was awful. If the necessities of war palliate such sacrifice the same excuse cannot justify the order of the Richmond authorities and the fleeing governor's proclamation to the planters of that exposed interior, to burn their cotton, in obedience to which an infatuated zeal wrought the destruction of millions of private property, serving no end except to impoverish the community."* At noon of the 25th Captain Bailey was sent ashore to demand the surrender of the city. Great excitement prevailed and as Bailey with a single escort walked from the landing to the city hall, he was insulted in the grossest manner by the low street rabble.† Mayor John T. Monroe refused to surrender the city as he had no military authority. General Lovell likewise refused to surrender but agreed to evacuate so that the civil authorities might act as they deemed proper. Bailey returned and reported these equivocal answers whereupon the next morning (April 26) Farragut wrote to Monroe, peremptorily demanding—

"the unqualified surrender of the city and that the emblem of sovereignty of the United States be hoisted over the city hall, mint and customs house by meridian this day, and that all flags and other emblems of sovereignty, other than those of the United States, shall be removed from all public buildings by that hour. * * * I shall speedily and severely punish any person or persons who shall commit such outrages as were witnessed yesterday, armed men firing upon helpless women and children for giving expression to their pleasure at seeing the old flag."

* See Farragut's report April 25, *Official Records*, vol. vi., p. 883.

† *Battles and Leaders*, vol. ii., pp. 91-99.

In reply, Mayor Monroe said that the city was Farragut's by reason of superior force and recommended the people to his care. Accordingly on the morning of April 27 Farragut ordered Captain Henry W. Morris of the *Pensacola* to hoist the Union flag over the mint, which was done. Four men, however, succeeded in cutting the halyards and running away with the flag. On their joining the crowd the flag was dragged through the streets, publicly insulted, and torn into shreds. One of the men, William B. Mumford, was captured, was tried early in June by military commission, convicted of treason, and on General Butler's approval of the sentence was hung on June 7.* The mayor and common council indulged in further dilatory correspondence, whereupon on April 28 Farragut threatened to bombard the city unless the demand for surrender were complied with. On the 29th he sent a strong guard of marines with howitzers to take down the Confederate flag from the public buildings and raise that of the United States in its stead; and never afterward was the Union flag hauled down.†

Meanwhile operations continued against Forts Jackson and St. Philip.

* Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. v., pp. 278-279. See also *Official Records*, vol. xv., p. 465, and for Davis' proclamation of December 3 respecting the execution, *Official Records*, vol. xv., p. 906.

† Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. v., pp. 268-269; *Confederate Military History*, vol. x., pt. i., pp. 49-59.

After Farragut passed the forts Porter demanded their surrender but the Confederate commander refused. Butler proceeded with his troops to the rear of Fort St. Philip, cutting off retreat, while Porter sent six of his mortar boats to the rear of Fort Jackson. On the 26th Porter again asked their surrender, but Lieutenant-Colonel Edward Higgins replied that he had no official notice of the capitulation of New Orleans and could not entertain the proposition. But at midnight of April 27 the soldiers in Fort Jackson mutinied, spiked the guns, deserted the fort with their arms and surrendered to Butler's pickets. Accordingly the Confederate commanders had no alternative and on the afternoon of April 28 accepted Porter's terms of capitulation which were duly signed that afternoon at an interview between the officers on the steamer *Harriet Lane*.^{*} The importance of this victory cannot be over-estimated. The disaster astounded the South and led by inevitable steps to the abandonment of the great valley of the Mississippi.[†]

^{*} Pollard (*First Year of the War*, p. 319) says that the forts could have been held if the men had stood to their guns, but the Confederate commander surrendered in fact to his own garrison.

[†] "The extent of the disaster is not to be disguised. It was a heavy blow to the Confederacy; it annihilated us in Louisiana; separated us from Texas and Arkansas; demolished our resources and supplies by the loss of one of the greatest grain and cattle countries within the limits of the Confederacy; gave to the enemy the Mississippi River, with all its means of navigation for a base of operation; and finally led,

General Butler took possession of New Orleans with his forces on May 1. The withdrawal of General Lovell and the abandonment of Forts Pike and McComb at the entrance to Lake Pontchartrain left Butler with no immediate campaign on his hands, but the task of governing the city was sufficient to absorb all his energies during the time in which he was in supreme control. When he took command of the city the people were close to starvation and to avert this danger was the general's first urgent effort. His second work was to quell and to control the dangerous element of the population, to which end he issued a proclamation clearly stating the position of affairs and signifying his determination to restore order, maintain public tranquillity and enforce peace and quiet under the laws and constitution of the United States. But business and trade were virtually dead; the laboring classes were without occupation; and Butler saw that immediate action must be taken. Moreover, the weather was hot, the streets were filthy, and yellow fever might be expected at any time. Accordingly on May 9 Butler issued a general order asserting that to the extent possible within his power he would see that the hungry were fed and the distressed relieved with provisions. Soon 35,000 persons were being fed daily through Butler's man-

by plain and irresistible conclusion, to our virtual abandonment of the great and fruitful valley of the Mississippi."—Pollard, *First Year of the War*, p. 321.

agement, of whom only a few more than 3,000 were native Americans. Butler was greatly gratified by the result of his action when not less than 14,000 persons took the oath of allegiance within a month after his arrival. As the city government neglected the streets and the general sanitary condition of the city, Butler appointed to the office of city surveyor Colonel Thorpe who immediately employed 2,000 men and subsequently 3,000 in sweeping the streets, purging the canals, repairing the levee, removing the nuisances and in many other ways rendering the city clean and decent. To provide funds for the support of these thousands of employes, Butler on August 4 issued a general order declaring that "those who have brought upon the city this stagnation of business, this desolation of the hearthstone, this starvation of the poor and helpless, should, as far as they may be able, relieve these distresses." A fund of \$1,250,000 had been subscribed for defence against the Union forces, and Butler exacted a *nunc pro tunc* from many of these generous but disloyal spirits—which *coup d'état* netted over \$300,000. Certain cotton brokers who had advised planters not to send cotton to New Orleans were mulcted \$29,000, thus making the total yield \$342,000. Moreover, Butler discovered about \$800,000 in specie at the office of the Netherlands consulate. On May 10 Butler ordered the money to be seized, but the consul urged the inviolability

of a foreign representative and refused to give up the key to the vault. Nevertheless it was forcibly taken out of his pocket, the vault was opened and the money removed, being placed the next day in the United States mint. The foreign consuls in the city protested to the Government at Washington whereupon Seward sent Reverdy Johnson to New Orleans to investigate. On the latter's advice the money was surrendered to those who claimed it as foreign property and thus Butler's trouble brought little reward.*

During the course of Butler's administration at New Orleans his soldiers were considerably annoyed by the population, especially the female portion. The men satisfied their longings for vengeance by sullen mutterings, but the women behaved themselves toward the officers and men in such wise that it speedily became altogether intolerable. Not content with merely entertaining feelings hostile to Union officers and soldiers, they indulged in obtrusive manifestations of them, relying upon the respect and privileges accorded their sex for immunity from retort or retaliation. No indignity that could be thought of was left untried. They turned their backs to avoid looking at the soldiers,

* Respecting the foreign consuls and their conduct in New Orleans see Parton, *General Butler in New Orleans*, pp. 354-406. In general see also *A Review by Judge Pierrepont of Gen. Butler's Defence before the House of Representatives in Relation to the New Orleans Gold* (1865); B. F. Butler, *Autobiography and Personal Reminiscences. Butler's Book* (1892).

stepped from the sidewalk into the street so as not to meet them, drew away their skirts to indicate a dread of contamination, turned up their noses, flaunted miniature secession flags in their presence, uttered uncomplimentary remarks in their hearing, and in one case deliberately spat in the face of an officer in full uniform as he was on his way to church. One woman emptied from a balcony a vessel of dirty water on Admiral Farragut and another officer in full uniform.* The question of the means of abating this evil was not so easy to determine, for ordinary punishments of arrest, fine and imprisonment were inapplicable. The offences were too vague, the cases too numerous, and not even a fraction of these female malignants could be brought into a police court. Accordingly, on May 15, after considerable study, Butler published his general order No. 28, which announced that—

“as the officers and soldiers of the United States have been subject to repeated insults from the women (calling themselves ladies) of New Orleans, in return for the most scrupulous non-interference and courtesy on our part, it is ordered, that hereafter, when any female shall, by word, gesture, or movement, insult or show contempt for any officer or soldier of the United States, she shall be regarded, and held liable to be treated, as a woman of the town plying her avocation.”†

In other words, in order to avoid the imputation of being a woman of the town, it would be necessary to stop

all such proceedings as mentioned above. Whatever may be thought of Butler's choice of phraseology, its effect was immediate. The insults ceased, in no instance was the order misunderstood on the part of the troops, and not one arrest was made under the order.* Mayor Monroe and others attempted to have the order rescinded, but Butler sent him with several others to Fort Jackson and placed the city under martial law.† In various part of the North Butler was sharply and bitterly criticised, and even in England the order was called infamous and “the model Republic” was sneered at.‡ The ladies of the city were much incensed,

* Pollard's language respecting “the vulgar and drunken Butler” is particularly violent, he asserting that the order stigmatized as prostitutes all the ladies of New Orleans.—*Second Year of the War*, pp. 17–21. In this connection see also M. Southwood, “*Beauty and Booty*” the *Watchword of New Orleans* (1867).

† Butler's note addressed to the mayor requires, as a matter of justice, to be quoted:—“Sir—There can be, there has been, no room for misunderstanding of general order No. 28. No lady will take any notice of a strange gentleman, and *a fortiori* of a stranger, in such form as to attract attention. Common women do. Therefore, whatever woman, lady or mistress, gentle or simple, who, by gesture, look or word, insults, shows contempt for, thus attracting to herself the notice of my officers and soldiers, will be deemed to act as becomes her vocation of common woman, and will be liable to be treated accordingly. This was most fully explained to you at my office. I shall not, as I have not, abated a single word of that order; it was well considered. If obeyed, it will protect the true and modest woman from all possible insult. The others will take care of themselves. You can publish your letter if you publish this note, and your apology.”

‡ See the *Saturday Review* of June 14 as quoted by Rhodes (*United States*, vol. iv., p. 93).

* Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. vi., p. 280; Rhodes, *United States*, vol. iv., p. 93, note.

† *Official Records*, vol. xv., p. 426; *Confederate Military History*, vol. x., pt. i., pp. 60–61.

and their bitterness made itself felt in the remonstrances of the French minister at Washington. It is probable that this order was the main cause of Butler's removal from the command of New Orleans, which was brought about by Seward in December.*

CHAPTER XIII.

1862.

OPERATIONS AT CORINTH, FORT PILLOW, MEMPHIS, AND VICKSBURG.

Halleck's Corinth campaign — Mitchel's raid in Alabama — The Capture of Fort Pillow — Defeat of the Confederate fleet at Memphis — Farragut's operations at Vicksburg — The battle of Baton Rouge — Destruction of the *Arkansas* — The engagement at St. Charles, Arkansas

On April 9 Grant reported to Halleck that the enemy was concentrated at Corinth. He said that it would demoralize the troops to retire to the opposite bank of the river but that it was quite unsafe for them to remain longer in the present situation without large reinforcements.* Accordingly, after the surrender of Island No. 10, Halleck transferred General Pope and his army from the Mississippi River to the Tennessee. On April 22 Pope landed at Hamburg, four miles above the battlefield of Shiloh, with a force of 20,000 men. Halleck had arrived before him, reaching Pittsburg Landing on April 11. Beauregard had retreated to Corinth, about 20 miles from Shiloh, at the junction of the Mobile and Ohio and the Memphis and Charleston Railroads. So long as the Confederates held Corinth, Nashville was endangered on the one hand, while on

the other hand operations against Memphis could not be undertaken to any advantage. Halleck therefore saw that he must give this matter his earliest attention. Previous to this, however, General O. M. Mitchel after Buell's departure from Nashville, March 28, proceeded with his division of about 10,000 men toward the main stations of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad in northern Alabama, the most valuable points in this direction being Stevenson or Bridgeport on the east or Decatur on the west. On April 10 he reached Shelbyville, about 57 miles from Nashville, and the next day gained a point about 10 miles distant from Huntsville. Mitchel prepared to capture the city early the next morning, and before dawn his troops marched in. On the 12th Stevenson and Decatur were occupied, and from the latter city the troops advanced to Tuscumbia. The

* *Official Records*, vol. x., pt. ii., pp. 99-100.

* See *Life of Seward*, vol. iii., p. 139.

extension of his lines, however, in order to hold the railroad, rendered his situation somewhat precarious since the enemy in force began to threaten him at various points. On April 24, therefore, the Union troops retired from Tuscumbia to Jonesborough, a station on the railroad near Decatur, and three days later Decatur was evacuated, the troops returning to Huntsville and then hastening to Bridgeport, where the Confederates were now making a stand on the bridge. On April 29 Mitchel ordered an attack upon the enemy and drove them back upon the Bridgeport road. The Confederates failed in an attempt to blow up the bridge and the Union forces secured possession of it, thus giving them control of the crossings of the river from Chattanooga westwardly.*

Meanwhile Halleck was busily preparing for an advance on Beauregard at Corinth. His right wing comprised the Army of the Tennessee under Grant; the centre consisted of the Army of the Ohio under Buell; and the newly arrived Army of the Mississippi under Pope formed the left wing.† Two days later (April 30) General Thomas was given command of the right wing and his division of the Army of the Ohio was added to it. The order also organized a reserve corps under General McClernand and provided that Grant should retain the general command of the district of

West Tennessee, including the army corps of the Tennessee, but should act as second in command under Halleck.* On April 29 the army began its advance gradually but steadily; in the picturesque language of General Sherman, it moved "with pick and shovel,"† for day after day it was engaged in bridge-building, road-making and intrenching. General Sherman took possession of Monterey May 1, and two days later Halleck was within about eight miles of Corinth. His army numbered more than 100,000 men while Beauregard had only 50,000 effective troops. Pope advanced his forces on the left, some 10 miles, by extreme exertions, and on May 3 ordered a reconnoissance toward Farmington, four miles east of Corinth. There the Confederates occupied a commanding position, but were driven out by assault. On May 20 Halleck commenced regular siege operations, investing Corinth on the north and east at about four miles' distance, the interval being gradually narrowed by second and third parallels, until on the 27th the army was within 1,300 yards of the Confederate works and well protected with batteries and heavy guns. On the 29th Pope opened upon the Confederate intrenchments and soon drove back their advance battery. In the afternoon of the same day Sherman established another battery within 1,000 yards of the Confederate

* *Battles and Leaders*, vol. ii., p. 701 et seq.

† *Official Records*, vol. x., pt. ii., p. 138.

* *Ibid*, vol. x., pt. ii., p. 144.

† *Ibid*, vol. xvii., pt. ii., p. 83.

works,* and skirmishing parties were sent out at daybreak the next morning. On the 30th Halleck marched into the empty intrenchments at Corinth, only to find that the 50,000 men composing Beauregard's army were retreating at leisure to Baldwin and Okolona, about 50 miles to the south.† Soon afterward Pope left the West to take command in Virginia. In July Halleck resigned his command, and on the 23d, by order of the President, became general-in-chief of the armies of the United States. Buell remained in Corinth until June 10 when he moved along the line of railroad toward Chattanooga, soon afterward going toward Louisville to checkmate Bragg's designs on Kentucky. On June 18 Cumberland Gap was occupied by General G. W. Morgan and was held by him until the autumn, when upon the invasion of Kentucky he was compelled to retire.

Meanwhile, Commodore Foote, who had done excellent work at Island No. 10, left New Madrid on April 12, and with his mortar boats and transports proceeded down the Mississippi to attack Fort Pillow or Wright, situated at Chickasaw Bluff, about 40 miles above Memphis, near Islands Nos. 33 and 34. Pope was to aid Foote by a land attack, but he had been called

away to assist in the operations against Corinth. The fleet remained, however, and bombarded the fort almost daily. On May 9 Commodore Foote, who was suffering from a severe wound received at Fort Donelson, was relieved by Captain C. H. Davis.* On May 10 the Confederate gunboats and a ram attacked the flotilla. The ram attempted to run down the gunboat *Cincinnati*, Captain R. M. Stembel, and so badly damaged her that she soon afterward sank. The engagement then became general, but after an hour of severe fighting the Confederate gunboats remaining after one had been sunk and two blown up withdrew. The Union fleet then prepared to make a vigorous assault on Fort Pillow, but on the night of June 4 the Confederates evacuated the fort and fled down the river toward Memphis. Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Ellet pursued the enemy, and on reaching Fort Randolph, 12 miles below, found the place entirely abandoned, guns dismantled, and other evidences of hasty departure. On June 5 the squadron arrived within two miles of Memphis where it anchored for the night, awaiting the decisive engagement to take place the next day.†

Soon after daylight on June 6 the Union flotilla, in command of Davis, started down the river for Memphis.

* See Duyckinck, *Late Civil War*, vol. ii., pp. 440-442.

† Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. v., chap. xix.; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. ii., pp. 717-720; Force, *From Fort Henry to Corinth*, pp. 183-191; *Confederate Military History*, vol. vii., pt. ii., pp. 52-58; vol. ix., pt. ii., pp. 86-87; vol. x., pt. i., pp. 172-173.

* J. M. Hoppin, *Life of Andrew Hull Foote, Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy* (1874).

† Maclay, *History of Navy*, vol. ii., pp. 358-360; Greene, *The Mississippi*, pp. 14-15.



Upper photo from the original Brady negative. Lower photo taken from the *Photographic History of the Civil War*. Copyright by the Patriot Publishing Company.

1. A SECTION OF FORT PILLOW, ERECTED BY THE CONFEDERATES ON THE EAST BANK OF THE MISSISSIPPI, ABOUT 40 MILES ABOVE MEMPHIS, TENN.
2. THE SQUADRON OF FLAG-OFFICER DAVIS, LYING AT ANCHOR TWO MILES ABOVE MEMPHIS IN JUNE OF 1862.

This fleet consisted of the *Benton*, 16, *Louisville*, 13, *Carondelet*, 13, *Cairo*, 13, *St. Louis*, 13, with the rams *Queen of the West*, *Switzerland*, *Monarch*, and *Lancaster*. Altogether the fleet had 68 guns. The Confederate fleet consisted of the *Little Rebel*, 2, *Bragg*, 3, *Beauregard*, 4, *Price*, 4, *Sumpter*, 3, *Thompson*, 4, *Lovell*, 4, *VanDorn*, 4—a total of 8 vessels and 28 guns.* The Union rams were tied to the river bank but after the firing began they cast loose to take part in the conflict. One of them, however, disabled her rudder and the other remained out of range, so that only the *Queen of the West* and the *Monarch* participated in the fight. These two pushed into the Confederate line and threw it into confusion. The Union gunboats hastily followed and because of their vastly superior armament soon put the Confederate fleet to flight. The battle ended about 10 miles below the city. The *Lovell*, *Beauregard* and *Thompson* were disabled and the *Little Rebel*, *Price*, *Sumpter* and *Bragg* were captured, the *VanDorn* escaping. On the Union side only the *Queen of the West* was disabled. In the fight, however, the Union fleet suffered an almost irreparable loss. Ellet was wounded by a pistol shot, from the effects of which he died at Cairo on June 21. Immediately after the fight the mayor in reply to a summons to surrender informed Captain Davis that there were no troops in the town with which to oppose him. Ac-

cordingly the next morning Colonel G. N. Fitch with a detachment of troops which had accompanied the fleet landed and took possession of the city.*

Meanwhile after receiving the surrender of New Orleans late in April Farragut pushed several of his ships up the Mississippi and was soon gladdened by the surrender of all the important cities below Vicksburg, where he arrived on May 20. Up to this time the Confederates had taken no steps to fortify Vicksburg, thinking that their defences on the upper river at Columbus, Island No. 10, and Fort Pillow afforded ample protection. When Farragut captured the lower forts and the upper defences had fallen, the Confederates made haste to create a formidable barrier to navigation at Vicksburg. On May 12 several Confederate regiments arrived at Vicksburg and began to throw up fortifications so that by the time Farragut arrived before the city six batteries were ready for service. On reaching Vicksburg, Farragut demanded its surrender, but the Confederate commander refused. The guns of the Union gunboats could not reach the heights, and Farragut had only two regiments of land forces with him. Hence, as he could not attack by land, there was nothing to do but to return to New Orleans, which

* Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. v., pp. 343-345; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. i., pp. 449-459; Maclay, *History of the Navy*, vol. ii., pp. 360-363.

* Greene, *The Mississippi*, p. 15.

he did on June 1. On reaching there he was ordered to renew the attack, and adopted immediate measures to comply. In the meantime, however, the Confederates had taken advantage of his absence, had planted some more batteries, and were better able to cope with his fleet than ever before. Farragut reached Vicksburg about June 25 accompanied by Porter with 16 mortar boats and by General Thomas Williams with 3,000 troops and 2 batteries. Farragut had also 3 vessels of war and 7 gunboats carrying in all 106 guns. Opposing the Union land forces were 16,000 Confederate troops under General Earl VanDorn, and the Confederates had also 40 heavy guns in position to oppose the Union fleet. On reaching Vicksburg Williams' brigade was landed on the Louisiana shore and with the aid of 1,200 negroes began digging a canal across the peninsula opposite the city. With his 106 guns and Porter's 16 mortar vessels Farragut attacked the Confederate batteries, but they were so high that little or no damage was inflicted. Having failed to silence the batteries, Farragut with 2 vessels and 5 gunboats ran the batteries on June 28. The fire lasted about two hours and his loss was 15 killed and 42 wounded, but he inflicted no damage on the Confederate works.* Meanwhile the Union fleet under Captain C. H. Davis had descended the

Mississippi and on July 1 joined Farragut above Vicksburg, at the mouth of the Yazoo River. A sudden rise in the river destroyed the canal being constructed by Williams, who then proposed to return to Baton Rouge. Before the embarkation commenced, however, a startling accident took place on July 15. Early in May the Confederate ram *Arkansas* had been carried up the Yazoo River. Knowing this, early on the morning of July 15 some light gunboats of Davis' flotilla were sent up the Yazoo to obtain information regarding the *Arkansas* and if possible to destroy her. Unexpectedly the Union gunboats encountered the *Arkansas*, now iron-clad and mounting 10 guns. The Union gunboats retreated, closely followed by the *Arkansas*. Not one of Farragut's vessels having steam up the Confederate ram passed through the entire fleet and proceeded without injury to the shelter of the batteries at Vicksburg.* Farragut was much chagrined at this and determined to repass the batteries the same evening, intending to bombard and destroy the ram in passing. He passed the batteries in safety but the darkness prevented the destruction of the ram which received no damage. In this passage Farragut lost 20 killed and wounded.† On July 20 Farragut received orders to return to New Orleans and after Williams had

* Maclay, *History of the Navy*, vol. ii., pp. 410-412, Greene, *The Mississippi*, pp. 18-22.

* Maclay, pp. 412-419; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. iii., p. 572 *et seq.*; Greene, pp. 23-24.

† Maclay, pp. 419-421.

FEDERAL NAVAL OFFICERS.



From the original Brady negatives.


1. DAVID G. FARRAGUT.
3. D. D. PORTER.
5. J. A. DAHLGREN.

2. A. H. FOOTE.
4. S. F. DU PONT.
6. J. A. WINSLOW.

embarked his men started down the river on July 27, Davis on the same day going up the river to Helena.

Since Farragut had been unsuccessful at Vicksburg, the Confederates determined to regain possession of Baton Rouge. The ram *Arkansas* was to attack the Union gunboats, while Breckinridge from Camp Moore

gunboats the Confederates were driven off. The Union loss was 84 killed, 266 wounded and 33 missing, among the killed being General Williams. The Confederate loss was 84 killed, 315 wounded and 57 missing.* The *Arkansas* did not take part in the fight and the next morning Commander W. D. Porter in the *Essex*



was to assault the city by land. The Union forces at Baton Rouge consisted of about 2,000 effective men under General Thomas Williams. On August 4, learning of the approach of the Confederates, General Williams placed his troops in position outside the town, and the next morning was attacked by the Confederates. For five hours the battle raged, but at the end of that time with the aid of the

determined to make another effort for her destruction. On the morning of August 5 the *Essex* steamed up the river, attacked the *Arkansas*, and finally blew her up after her crew to the number of 200 had escaped.

Meanwhile another expedition had

* *Battles and Leaders*, vol. iii., pp. 582-584; Greene, *The Mississippi*, pp. 24-27; *Confederate Military History*, vol. vii., pp. 80-82; vol. ix., pt. i., pp. 75-77; vol. x., pt. i., pp. 65-73.

started to meet the army under Curtis and open communication with it. This expedition consisted of the gunboats *St. Louis*, *Lexington*, *Conestoga*, and *Mound City*, and the 46th Indiana regiment under Colonel Graham N. Fitch. The fleet reached the mouth of the White River 170 miles below Memphis on June 14, and while cautiously ascending the river on the 17th suddenly came upon the Confederate works on a high bluff on the south side of the river in the vicinity of St. Charles, Arkansas, about 85 miles from the Mississippi. On learning of the approach of the Union vessels, the Confederates sunk the gunboat *Mau-repas* across the channel and transferred her guns to the shore-battery. On June 17 a detachment of Federal troops landed below the bluffs, and the gunboats opened the attack upon the Confederate position, the *Mound City* leading; when she was within 600 yards of the shore a 42-pound shell entered her casemate and exploded her steamdrum; badly crippled she was towed out of action by the *Conestoga*, and the other boats continued the attack. The commanding officer of the land forces very shortly

signaled them to stop firing, and the troops successfully stormed the Confederate battery. The Confederate loss was 6 killed, 1 wounded, and 8 missing; the most serious Federal loss was on the *Mound City*, the majority of her crew being killed by the escaping steam, or in consequence of jumping into the river. Of 175, only 3 officers and 22 men were saved. As there were no Confederate works farther up the river, this action gave control of the White River to the Federals.* The expedition was unsuccessful, however, failing to open communications with Curtis. After some skirmishing with the Confederates, and having destroyed some ferry boats at the mouth of the Arkansas, Curtis returned to Helena and in September was appointed to the command of the Department of Missouri, consisting of the States of Missouri and Arkansas and the adjacent Indian Territory. Helena continued to be occupied by the Union troops, but active operations were suspended. This closed General Curtis' campaign.

* Mahan, *The Gulf and Inland Waters*, p. 50; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. iii., pp. 552-553; Greene, *The Mississippi*, pp. 17-18.

CHAPTER XIV.

1862.


END OF THE PENINSULA CAMPAIGN: JACKSON'S VALLEY CAMPAIGN.

The battle of Williamsburg — The engagement at Eltham's Landing, West Point — The naval attack on Fort Darling at Drewry's Bluff — McClellan's dilatory tactics — The battle at Hanover Court House — The battle of Fair Oaks or Seven Pines — The beginning of Jackson's Valley campaign — The battle of Kernstown — The battle of McDowell — The engagement at Front Royal — The battle of Winchester — The engagement at Harrisonburg — The battles of Cross Keys and Port Republic — Frémont's resignation — Stuart's ride around the Army of the Potomac — The battles of Oak Grove, Mechanicsville, Gaines' Mills, Peach Orchard (or Allen's Farm), Savage Station, Glendale (Frazier's Farm, Charles City Cross Roads, or White Oak Swamp), and Malvern Hill — McClellan's retreat to Harrison's Landing.

The evacuation of Yorktown took McClellan completely by surprise. He had made no provision for such a contingency, but he gave orders for immediate pursuit, while he himself remained at Yorktown to superintend the embarkation of Franklin's division on transports which were to go up the York River. By noon of the 4th General George Stoneman's cavalry and four batteries of artillery, followed by Hooker's division of infantry on the direct road from Yorktown to Williamsburg, and Smith's division from Lee's Mills, were on the road to harass the Confederate rear and cut off those who had marched from Lee's Mills and by that road. Johnston had assembled his army at Williamsburg whence his head of column (Magruder's division) was ordered to continue the march toward Richmond. Stoneman overtook Stuart's Confederate cavalry about midway between Yorktown and Williamsburg driving it steadily back to the works in front of Williamsburg.

The battle was opened early the next morning by Joseph Hooker, who advanced on Fort Magruder. Cuvier Grover's brigade began the attack at 7 o'clock by driving in the Confederate skirmishers and two batteries were pushed to within 700 yards of Fort Magruder, the fire of which was silenced by 9 o'clock. As Lafayette McLaws had gone on toward Richmond on the evening of the 4th, Longstreet was left in command of the Confederate forces. He immediately placed the brigades of R. H. Anderson and Roger A. Pryor with some field-guns in the works previously held by McLaws. Anderson on the right and Pryor on the left were thrown against Hooker, followed in quick succession by C. M. Wilcox, who reinforced Anderson, and by A. P. Hill, George E. Pickett's brigade being brought up about 10 o'clock. These five brigades attacked Hooker's three brigades in an attempt to turn the left held by Patterson's New Jersey brigade. The brigades of Grover

and Taylor were sent to Patterson's support, but the odds were too great




and Hooker's line gradually fell back. He called for reinforcements, but not before 3 o'clock did Kearny's division arrive on the field. The latter made

a vigorous assault, and by nightfall had regained a part of the field from which Hooker had been driven with a loss of about 1,600 men.

Meanwhile E. V. Sumner, who had been directed by McClellan to take command of the troops ordered in pursuit of the Confederates, had been employed in reconnoitering on Hooker's right with the intention of turning the Confederate left. Toward noon General W. S. Hancock with five regiments and a battery was sent to seize a redoubt apparently unoccupied on the Confederate left, one of four redoubts northward of Fort Magruder; he had accomplished this by midday and also occupied a second empty redoubt. He then sent back for reinforcements, as he was now confronted by the enemy. Twice Sumner ordered two brigades to reinforce Hancock and twice he countermanded the order, finally sending him orders to return. In the meantime D. H. Hill's division had been recalled and was ordered to the left of the Confederate line. General Jubal A. Early, the first to arrive with his brigade, obtained permission from General Johnston to attack one of the batteries which was annoying the Confederate troops near Fort Magruder. At about 5 o'clock Hill and Early with two regiments each pushed forward through dense undergrowth to an open field, Early in advance. When they came within easy range Hancock, who was falling back, turned upon Early, poured in two effective

FEDERAL GENERALS.



From the original Brady negatives.

1. H. W. HALLECK.
4. N. P. BANKS.
7. O. O. HOWARD.
10. JOHN SEDGWICK.

2. G. B. McCLELLAN.
5. A. E. BURNSIDE.
8. J. B. McPHERSON.
11. D. E. SICKLES.

3. B. F. BUTLER.
6. GEORGE STONEMAN.
9. J. A. McCLERNAND.
12. G. G. MEADE.

volleys, and charged, driving Early back upon Hill and both from the field, inflicting a loss of nearly 400 men, among them Early, who was severely wounded. Hancock's loss was 31. At about this time McClellan arrived on the field and made dispositions for the conflict which he expected would be renewed on the following morning, but during the night Johnston evacuated Williamsburg, leaving D. H. Hill to bring up the rear. The Union troops engaged numbered about 20,000 and the Confederates, about 15,000. The Union loss, mostly in Hooker's division, was 456 killed, 1,410 wounded and 373 missing or captured. Incomplete Confederate returns show a loss of 102 killed, 1,458 wounded and 133 captured or missing.*

Franklin did not start from Yorktown until the 6th, reaching Eltham's Landing above West Point at 1 p. m. where he embarked his troops and awaited orders. The greater part of the Confederate army was already beyond striking distance, but to protect its trains a division attacked Franklin on the morning of the 7th and engaged him until 3 p. m. when it withdrew. The Union loss was 48

killed, 110 wounded and 28 missing; the Confederate loss, 8 killed and 40 wounded.* Stoneman's cavalry opened communication with Franklin at Eltham's Landing and the Army of the Potomac marched from Williamsburg on the 8th, passing through Barhamsville, Roper's Church, and New Kent Court House, headquarters being established at Cumberland on the south side of the Pamunkey on the 15th, and on the 16th at White House where a permanent depot was organized. General Johnston crossed the Chickahominy and on May 17 encamped his army about three miles from Richmond.

Meanwhile at McClellan's request the President had ordered Flag-Officer Louis M. Goldsborough if he deemed it proper to send the *Galena* and two gunboats up the James River to silence some Confederate batteries there. On the morning of May 8 Captain John Rodgers with the *Galena*, *Aroostook*, and *Port Royal* went up the river, silenced one of the batteries, drove two Confederate gunboats up the river, and then proceeded against Fort Darling on Drewry's Bluff, eight miles below Richmond, a strong position, mounting 5 heavy guns manned by the crews of the destroyed *Merrimac* and other ships at Norfolk in command of Captain Farrand of the Confederate navy. On the morning of the 15th, being joined by the

*See Johnston, *Narrative of Military Operations*; McClellan's *Own Story*; Allan, *History of the Army of Northern Virginia*; Webb, *The Peninsula*, pp. 69-82; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. ii., pp. 189-207; *Official Records*, vol. xi.; Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. v., pp. 376 et seq.; J. N. Copee, *The Battle of Williamsburg, Va., May 5, 1862* (1896); *Confederate Military History*, vol. iii., pp. 270-273; vol. iv., pp. 48-57; vol. v., pp. 43-47.

* *Battles and Leaders*, vol. ii., pp. 221-222; *Confederate Military History*, vol. iii., pp. 273-274; vol. v., pp. 47-49.

Monitor and the *Naugatuck*, Rodgers opened fire, the *Galena* leading and anchoring within 600 yards of the fort. The *Monitor* could not bring her guns to bear and the brunt of the action was borne by the *Galena*, which after a contest of 3½ hours withdrew, having been struck 28 times and losing 24 men killed and wounded. Two of the Confederate guns were dismounted and Farrand reported a loss of 7 men killed and 8 wounded.*

Meanwhile McClellan's calls for reinforcements were becoming urgent and persistent. On May 14 he stated that he had only 80,000 to fight double his numbers and that the Government should send him by water every man that could be mustered.† Anxious to leave nothing undone to help and encourage McClellan, Lincoln afterward concluded to send McDowell with his 40,000 men from Fredericksburg overland to join McClellan, either north or south of the Pamunkey River. McDowell was ordered, however, to keep himself always in a position to save Washington from attack and so to operate as to put his left wing in communication with McClellan's right wing. In order to do this more quickly McClellan was ordered to extend his right wing north to Richmond.‡ Nevertheless, though he knew on May

11 that the *Merrimac* had been destroyed and though word of the promised reinforcement did not reach him until a week later, McClellan went on with his scientific siege operations in a leisurely manner and made no effort to inflict a crushing blow while he had the Confederate army in front of him in full retreat. On the contrary on receiving Lincoln's note he protested that McDowell should be placed explicitly under his orders in the ordinary way, saying that Lincoln's order to McDowell rendered it impossible for him to use the James River as a line of operations and forced him to establish depots on the Pamunkey and to approach Richmond from the north.* In this manner the ten days following the battle at Williamsburg were passed and not until the 21st had McClellan brought together and established his army in line on the Chickahominy at White House. He then began to build bridges over the stream which consumed ten days more because of the difficult nature of the work. He then pushed the corps of Heintzelman across the river and retained those of Sumner, Franklin and Porter on the north side.

On May 25 the corps of Keyes and Heintzelman had crossed the river while on the right an important reconnaissance, followed by the capture of the place, had been pushed to Mechanicsville, a village near the Chickahominy, five miles west of Cold Harbor and about the same distance from

* See Allan, *Army of Northern Virginia*; *Naval War Records*, vol. vii.; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. ii., pp. 207, 222-223, 263, 269-270.

† *Official Records*, vol. xi., pt. i., pp. 26-27.

‡ *Ibid.*, pp. 26-27. See also Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. v., pp. 382-383; Webb, *The Peninsula*, pp. 85-86.

* *Official Records*, vol. xi., pt. i., pp. 28-29.

Richmond. Keyes' corps on the right held the advance beyond the Chickahominy, being encamped on both sides of the railroad in the vicinity of Seven Pines and Fair Oaks, and the corps of Heintzelman was in the rear, also along the railroad, in the neighborhood of Savage Station. In the advance in this quarter Silas Casey held the front with his division of about 4,000 men, nearly all raw troops. His force was stationed within six miles of Richmond, his pickets extending to within five miles of the city. D. N. Couch's division of Keyes' corps was next behind on the railroad. Everything was pushed rapidly forward and on May 25 an order was issued by McClellan requiring the troops beyond the Chickahominy to hold themselves ready for battle at a moment's notice. But just on the eve of the approaching great contest near Richmond, McClellan received information that R. H. Anderson's Confederate brigade and Stuart's cavalry were near Fredericksburg, and that L. O'B. Branch's brigade was in the vicinity of Hanover Court House, 17 miles north of Richmond to his right and rear. These brigades threatened his communications and were in a position to reinforce Jackson, then in the Shenandoah Valley, or to intercept and oppose McDowell, whose advance was then eight miles south of Fredericksburg. Accordingly McClellan ordered General Fitz-John Porter with about 12,000 men to drive the enemy from these positions, to destroy the bridges

over the South Anna and Pamunkey Rivers, and to cut the railroad directly connecting Richmond with northern Virginia. General G. K. Warren's small brigade had already been detailed to destroy the bridges, had broken off all means of communication over the Pamunkey as far as Hanover Court House, and was then posted at Old Church. On the morning of the 27th Warren moved toward the Court House on a road running parallel to the Pamunkey. Porter started from New Bridge on the Chickahominy at 7 A. M. on the morning of the 27th with G. W. Morell's division of infantry and W. H. Emory's cavalry brigade and some artillery, and, marching by way of Mechanicsville northward toward the Court House, about noon his cavalry and the 25th New York infantry encountered a portion of Branch's brigade supporting two pieces of artillery, and attempting to hold the road leading to the Court House. Porter brought up a Union battery and Daniel Butterfield's brigade deployed, then charged, and drove the Confederates from the field, capturing one gun. On the other hand a part of the 25th New York was captured by the Confederates. Supposing that the Confederates had retreated in the direction of Hanover Court House, Porter pursued and the cavalry under Emory and the 17th New York overtook and captured a large number of the 28th North Carolina. On nearing the junction of the Ashland and the Court

House roads a part of John H. Martindale's brigade was sent toward Ashland to guard that flank against any approach of the Confederates from Richmond and to destroy the railroad running to that city. Martindale struck Branch's brigade near Peale's Station, was immediately attacked, and driven back some distance. On learning of this attack Porter, whose advance had reached Hanover Court House, faced about his entire column and marched toward Martindale's position, soon striking Branch on the left and rear and routing him. Branch retreated to Ashland and formed a junction with Anderson's brigade which had fallen back from McDowell's front. After destroying the railroad in several places and opening the way for McDowell's advance from Fredericksburg, Porter returned on the night of the 29th. In the engagement of the 27th the Union loss was 62 killed, 223 wounded and 70 missing. The Confederate loss was 73 killed, 192 wounded and 730 prisoners, of whom about 150 were wounded.*

McClellan had felt very keenly the necessity of McDowell's support, and he hoped every day to have that general's aid and coöperation in view of the direct assault to be made on Richmond. On May 17 Lincoln ordered McDowell with Shields' division taken

from Banks to move from Fredericksburg toward Richmond and to join McClellan.* This plan seems to have become known to the Confederate general, Johnston, who realized the importance of keeping McDowell at a distance from Richmond. With great shrewdness he sent Jackson on a dash through the Shenandoah Valley (details of which will be given later) for the purpose of so frightening the authorities at Washington that McDowell's further advance would be stopped immediately and McClellan's calculations based upon McDowell's coöperation rendered void. The Confederate plan worked well for on May 24 McDowell was ordered to hasten to the rescue of Banks, then hard pressed by Jackson. McClellan had an army of from 100,000 to 110,000 troops while Johnston's force was about 63,000.† On May 25 General Casey's di-

* *Official Records*, vol. xi., pt. i., p. 28.


† *Official Records*, vol. xi., pt. iii., p. 204. General Gustavus W. Smith estimates the forces of the two armies as follows:

Union Army present for duty:	
Sumner's corps	17,412
Heintzelman's corps	16,999
Keyes' corps	17,132
Porter's corps	17,546
Franklin's corps	19,580
Engineers, cavalry and provost guard...	4,767
Total	93,436

Besides these about 5,000 troops were on detached service. Johnston estimated the strength of his army at 73,928, but other authorities place it at 62,696. The *Official Records* show that on May 21 Johnston's army numbered 53,688, consisting of

Smith's division	10,592
Longstreet's division	13,816

* Webb, *The Peninsula*, pp. 93-96; Allan, *Army of Northern Virginia*; *Official Records*, vol. xi.; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. ii., pp. 319-322; *McClellan's Own Story*; *Confederate Military History*, vol. iii., p. 276; vol. iv., pp. 57-62.



From the original Brady negative.

HANOVER COURT HOUSE.

vision of the 4th corps advanced from Seven Pines to Fair Oaks, and threw up works covering the road. On the 30th two brigades of Kearny's division of the 3d corps were advanced about one-quarter of a mile in front of Savage Station to within supporting distance of Casey. General Couch's division of the 4th corps was at Seven Pines and General Hooker's division of the 3d corps was on the border of White Oak Swamp. Johnston from his works three miles in front of Richmond learned that Keyes had advanced his line to Fair Oaks, and as this offered an excellent opportunity for an attack he determined to make it the next day, proposing to throw 23 of his 27 brigades against Keyes and Heintzelman, and, with four brigades along the line of the river from New Bridge to Meadow Bridge, prevent the rest of McClellan's army from crossing the Chickahominy. He proposed to advance against Keyes' corps by way of the Charles City, Williamsburg and Nine Mile roads and drive it back in disorder on Heintzelman, and then capture or annihilate those two corps before any assistance could reach them from the north bank

of the river. There was some misunderstanding of orders and much consequent delay, but at noon of the 31st General D. H. Hill's division of four brigades deployed in double line on either side of the Williamsburg road, advanced on Casey's division at Fair Oaks and after a severe fight of two hours drove it back upon Couch's division at Seven Pines. Hill now received a reinforcement of one brigade while Couch and Keyes were reinforced by two brigades of Kearny's division. The struggle was then renewed at Seven Pines with the result that the entire Union force was driven back to a line of intrenchments about a mile in the rear, which position was held.

General G. W. Smith with several Confederate brigades was watching the Chickahominy under orders to engage any troops that might cross the stream to assist Keyes and Heintzelman, or if none came he was to fall upon the right flanks of the Union lines engaged. Smith waited for some time, and then, believing that no Union troops would cross to the south bank of the stream, attempted to make a flank attack but it miscarried because of the timely arrival of General Sumner on the south bank of the Chickahominy. Only four of Sumner's regiments had formed when Smith attacked. Two more regiments soon followed and these six with Couch's troops checked all efforts of Smith's four brigades to dislodge them and

Magruder's division (including that of

D. R. Jones)	15,920
D. H. Hill's division.....	11,151
Cavalry and reserve artillery.....	2,209

Ten days later this force had been increased by A. P. Hill's division estimated at 4,000 and Huger's division estimated at 5,008, making a total of 62,696.—See *Battles and Leaders*, vol. ii., p. 219. See also R. M. Hughes, *Life of Johnston*, p. 148.

they saved the day at Fair Oaks. Israel B. Richardson, meanwhile, had been unable to get more than one brigade of his division over the lower bridge and was obliged to move up and follow John Sedgwick's division over the grape-vine bridge. This so delayed him that his division did not come up until nightfall when it formed on Sedgwick's left, extending toward a brigade of Heintzelman's corps, while Hooker, coming to the support of the defeated troops in the Williamsburg road, filled vacant spaces in the line. There were now three corps across the Chickahominy in continuous order ready for action the following morning. Near the close of the day General Johnston, the Confederate commander, was severely wounded and the command developed upon General G. W. Smith. On the morning of June 1 the Confederates attacked and at some parts of the line the fighting was severe, but the advantage remained with the Union troops who regained most of the ground lost the previous day. On June 1 General Robert E. Lee was placed in command of the Army of Northern Virginia but he did not take charge of affairs on the field until the fighting was over and on June 2 withdrew to his lines around Richmond, from which Johnston had advanced on May 31. The Union forces engaged at Fair Oaks numbered about 36,000 and their losses were 4,384 killed and wounded and 684 missing. The Confederate forces numbered about 32,000 and

their losses were 5,729 killed and wounded, and 405 missing.*

We have seen that McDowell did not join McClellan because he had been ordered to assist Banks then hard pressed by Stonewall Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley. Active operations in the Valley began late in February by the movement of two Union divisions across the Potomac to Harper's Ferry and an advance on Winchester near which Lander's division from Romney and the south branch of the Potomac joined the column. On March 8 and 9 General Johnston evacuated Manassas and Centreville and Jackson with his 5,000 men under Johnston's order abandoned Winchester on the night of the 11th as he was about to engage General Banks, and retreated up the Valley 42 miles to Mount Jackson followed by Shields' (formerly Lander's division) of Banks' corps. On March 20 Shields moved back to Winchester followed by Jackson. Informed on the march that part of Banks' corps was being sent from the Valley to reinforce McClellan east of the Blue

* Allan, *Army of Northern Virginia; Battles and Leaders*, vol. ii., pp. 211-263; *Official Records*, vol. xi.; Walker, *History of the Second Army Corps*; Webb, *The Peninsula*, pp. 97-117; *McClellan's Own Story*; Michie, *Life of General McClellan*; Rhodes, *United States*, vol. iv., pp. 23-28; Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. v., pp. 386-391; G. W. Minder, *The Battle of Fair Oaks; a Reply to General Joseph E. Johnston* (1874); E. C. Stedman, *Kearny at Seven Pines*; J. W. DePeyster, *Personal and Military History of Philip Kearny* (1870); *Confederate Military History*, vol. iii., pp. 277-280; vol. iv., pp. 62-71; vol. v., pp. 49-56; vol. vi., pp. 161-163.



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1. REAR VIEW OF THE OLD FRAME HOUSE, ORCHARD, AND WELL, AT SEVEN PINES, WHERE SOME OF THE FIERCEST FIGHTING AT THE BATTLE OF FAIR OAKS TOOK PLACE. AFTER THE BATTLE 400 SOLDIERS WERE BURIED HERE.

2. THE "REDHOT BATTERY" AT FAIR OAKS. THIS BATTERY (MC CARTHY'S) AND MILLER'S BATTERY OPENED UP SUCH A HEAVY FIRE THAT THE CONFEDERATES WERE CHECKED. THE GUNS BECAME SO HOT THAT ONLY WITH THE GREATEST CARE COULD THEY BE SWABBED AND LOADED.

Ridge, Jackson, in order to detain it in the valley, pressed Shields closely, his advance cavalry under Turner Ashby engaging Shields on the afternoon of the 22d near Kernstown, in which action Shields received a severe shell wound. On the afternoon of the 23d Jackson came up and being informed that Williams' division of Banks' corps had left Winchester and was moving through the Blue Ridge for Manassas Junction, though Shields had but four regiments in his front he determined to crush these and thus to recall Williams and detain him in the Valley. Shields had nearly 7,000 infantry and cavalry and 24 guns, two of his brigades on the ridge covering the road one-half mile north of Kernstown, both under command of Colonel Nathan Kimball. Jackson had about 3,000 infantry and 27 guns. Kimball was too well posted to attack in front, so leaving Ashby with the cavalry and a small brigade of infantry to hold the road and threaten Kimball's centre and left, Jackson seized a low ridge on Kimball's right, where he placed his artillery and infantry. General Erastus B. Tyler's brigade, which had been held in reserve, was now brought up and made unsuccessful efforts to dislodge Jackson, whereupon Kimball, drawing from his left and centre, formed a column of seven regiments and in a terrific fire of artillery and musketry came up on Tyler's left, finally breaking Jackson's line. Kimball pressed his advantage so that, as night fell,

Jackson was in full retreat, leaving one piece of artillery and three caissons on the field beside his killed and wounded.* The Union loss was 118 killed, 450 wounded and 22 missing. The Confederate loss was 80 killed, 375 wounded and 263 missing.†

Jackson's action had the desired effect. Williams, then on the march through Snicker's Gap of the Blue Ridge, was recalled and Banks again pursued Jackson up the Valley as far as Harrisonburg, 66 miles from Winchester. Jackson fell back to Swift Run Gap in the Blue Ridge on the road to Gordonsville where he awaited an opportunity to strike Banks in flank and rear should he advance from Harrisonburg to Staunton. The Union forces were now widely scattered. Banks had a little army in the Shenandoah Valley; Frémont, for whom the Mountain Department had been created, had another in West Virginia; while McDowell was marching to reinforce McClellan, also keeping in mind the protection of the National capital. Frémont's appointment was due to the importunity of Republican politicians. Having yielded to the solicitation of Frémont's friends, Lincoln detached Louis Blenker's division of 10,000 from McClellan and gave it to Frémont who promised to undertake a campaign across the mountains with a view to seizing the railroad near

* *Official Records*, vol. xii., pt. i., p. 379.

† See Allan, *Jackson's Valley Campaign*; *Official Records*, vol. xii.; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. ii., pp. 302-313.

Knoxville and relieving the Unionists of east Tennessee. Thus when Banks had driven Jackson back from Kernstown, the situation in the Shenandoah Valley was as follows: At Harrisonburg was Banks with about 8,000 men with orders from President Lincoln to fall back to Strasburg. Shields' division of 10,000 men at New Market had been ordered to join General McDowell at Fredericksburg. Frémont had 15,000 troops at various points in the Shenandoah Valley. One of these detachments, about 3,500 strong, was under Robert H. Milroy at a place called McDowell on the Staunton and Parkersburg turnpike, 40 miles from Staunton. Another detachment under Schenck, about 2,200 strong, was at Franklin, 34 miles north of McDowell. Jackson's force now consisted of about 20,000 troops,* while the Union forces opposed to him were half again as large without taking into account McDowell's army of 30,000. After considerable correspondence with General Lee, Jackson was allowed to choose the plan of action which seemed best to him.† Accordingly he promptly matured his plans, but, thinking Banks' intention when at Harrisonburg was to advance on Staunton, 25 miles distant, he awaited an opportunity to strike him in flank, but Banks did not give him the chance he was looking for.

Meanwhile, Staunton was threat-

ened from another direction. Edward Johnson's command of about 3,000 men with three batteries which had held Monterey, 50 miles from Staunton on the road to West Virginia, was being driven back by the brigades of Milroy and Schenck, Milroy arriving at McDowell, 12 miles east of Monterey on May 1, where he awaited a junction with Schenck who had been ordered to march from Romney and Moorefield, thence to join Milroy by way of Franklin. Johnson, pressed by Milroy in front and threatened by Banks in rear, had fallen back to West View, seven miles from Staunton on April 20. On the afternoon of the 30th Jackson, leaving Kimball at Swift Run Gap to hold Banks in check, marched with 8,000 men and a good supply of artillery to Mechum's River Station of the Virginia Central Railroad, from which point the troops were taken by train to Staunton, while the artillery and trains went by road through Rockfish Gap. On the evening of May 5 all the troops had arrived and on the evening of the 6th Johnson advanced from Buffalo Gap, the next day pushed back Milroy's advance party and on the morning of the 8th reached Sitlington's Hill where, two miles away in the valley, he saw Milroy's forces drawn up in battle order to receive him.

The battle was opened by artillery against the hill where Johnson was forming his command. A desultory artillery fire and skirmishing were kept up until late in the afternoon

* Regarding the number see the note in Rhodes, *United States*, vol. iv., p. 13.

† See *Official Records*, vol. xii., pt. iii., pp. 866, 870, 872, 875, 878.

when Milroy, who had been joined by Robert C. Schenck with 1,500 men, attempted to drive Johnson from his position. Jackson then came up and sent his regiments to Johnson's assistance, whereupon, toward dark, Milroy withdrew to McDowell. The Union forces engaged numbered about 2,500 men and their loss was 28 killed and 225 wounded. The Confederates



had about 6,000 engaged and lost 75 killed and 424 wounded. On the morning of the 9th Schenck withdrew from McDowell and by easy stages reached Franklin on the 11th. Jackson quickly followed and overtook Schenck at Franklin on the 12th, but finding him too strongly posted for a successful attack, set out on his return march to McDowell, thence to Mt. Solon in the Shenandoah Valley near Harrisonburg where he prepared for the campaign that began with the defeat of a detachment of Banks' corps in an

engagement at Front Royal on May 23.*

Front Royal, Virginia, was 12 miles east of Strasburg and was the key to Luray Valley, down which Jackson was sweeping. On May 23, 1862, the town was held by Colonel John R. Kenly with nine companies of the 1st Maryland infantry, two companies of the 29th Pennsylvania, one company of the 28th New York, and a section of J. M. Knap's battery, under command of Lieutenant Atwell, in all about 900 men. Soon after noon of the 23d Stonewall Jackson drove in Kenly's pickets and advance guard and pushed entirely through the town. On a ridge about a mile north of the town Kenly made a stand and was there joined by 100 men of the 5th New York cavalry, but was soon flanked and pushed across both branches of the Shenandoah. On the north bank of the river he again made a stand and for some time resisted with artillery and musketry all efforts to cross. Jackson, however, sent his cavalry across the stream both above and below the bridges, flanking Kenly's position and compelling him to fall back toward the cross-road leading to Middletown. He had gone but a short distance when the rear guard of his cavalry became stampeded, resulting in the capture of all

* See *Official Records*, vol. xii.; Allan, *Jackson's Valley Campaign*; R. L. Dabney, *Life and Campaigns of Lieutenant General Thomas J. Jackson: Battles and Leaders*, vol. ii., pp. 279-280, 285-287, 298; *Confederate Military History*, vol. ii., pt. ii., pp. 56-58; vol. iii., pp. 228-232.


his infantry together with Atwell's two guns and the entire supply train. Nearly all the New York cavalry escaped. The Union loss was 19 killed, 56 wounded and 718 captured, while the Confederates lost only 11 killed and 15 wounded. Jackson pushed on after Banks, leaving Colonel Z. T. Conner with the 12th Georgia and a battery at Front Royal. On the 30th the 1st Rhode Island cavalry, the advance of McDowell's corps, dashed into the town, surprised Conner, and captured 156 officers and men and one gun, the loss in the cavalry being 8 killed and 5 wounded.*

This movement turned Banks' fortified position at Strasburg, so that, on the morning of the 24th, he retreated northward on the valley pike; he was struck in flank by Jackson at Middletown and Newtown but foiled the latter's efforts to intercept him and, after a running fight from Middletown to Winchester, halted late on the night of the 24th at Winchester to give battle. Banks had between 7,000 and 8,000 men and 16 guns. In order to cover the Front Royal and Millwood roads, Colonel Donnelly's small brigade supported by 8 guns was judiciously placed on rising ground. On the right Colonel Gordon's brigade held the low ridge running southwest from the town and west of the valley turnpike about half a mile from the suburb, its left resting on the turnpike

and its right extending westward along the ascending ridge in front of Winchester. Five companies of Michigan cavalry were held in reserve under cover of the ridge. Between Gordon and Donnelly was an interval of nearly a mile which was filled by the principal part of General John P. Hatch's cavalry brigade and two guns. Thus the line formed an arc covering Winchester from the west around by the south to the east. Jackson confronted this position with 16,000 men and 48 guns, the main body of his troops lying close to Gordon, while Richard S. Ewell with two brigades which had marched directly from Cedarville on Winchester came opposite Donnelly's position. Jackson proposed to hold Gordon in his present location, throw Ewell's forces against those under Donnelly, and then move his main body around Gordon's right and annihilate what was expected to be a disorganized and demoralized army. At about 4 o'clock on the morning of the 25th Ewell advanced the 21st North Carolina and opened with his artillery. From behind the stone fences a severe front and flank fire was poured into the North Carolina troops and as they fell back Captain Best's guns threw canister into their disordered ranks, causing a loss of 80 officers and men. Ewell then brought up two batteries and an artillery duel ensued which soon ceased as a heavy fog settled over the field. Ewell made two attempts to turn Donnelly's left and

* *Battles and Leaders*, vol. ii., pp. 288-289, 302, 310-311; *Confederate Military History*, vol. iii., pp. 235-238.

gain the Martinsburg Road in his rear. Donnelly checked these attempts, though he lost some ground, but at this moment he was ordered to fall back as Gordon had been driven from position and was retreating through Winchester.



At daybreak Jackson attacked Gordon's brigade with six of his own, and after several repulses got his artillery into position, opened on Gordon's front and gradually moved two brigades around Gordon's right. On detecting the movement Gordon poured a destructive fire into the Confederate ranks but could not stop them. With

almost perfect alignment the two brigades flanked Gordon's two right regiments and drove them back in some disorder, as they did also five companies of Michigan cavalry which were then brought up. At this juncture Jackson ordered forward his entire line of six brigades, whereupon Gordon sounded a retreat through Winchester. Hatch's cavalry and the artillery covered the retreat until the cavalry was well on the Martinsburg road. Including the engagement at Front Royal and the retreat from Strasburg to the Potomac May 23 to 25, Banks' loss was 62 killed, 243 wounded, and 1,714 missing. Jackson's loss was 68 killed, 329 wounded, and 3 missing.*

Meanwhile Frémont and McDowell, moving respectively from Franklin on the west and Fredericksburg on the east, were converging at Strasburg in Jackson's rear to cut him off, upon which he abandoned his demonstration on Harper's Ferry and, starting from Williamsport early on the morning of May 31, by a rapid march slipped through the net prepared for him and arrived at Strasburg on June 1, Frémont's skirmishers being within a mile of the road over which he passed. The next day Frémont set out on a stern chase along the valley pike while Shields' division (now of McDowell's corps), marching by the

* Allan, *Jackson's Valley Campaign*; *Official Records*, vol. xii.; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. ii., p. 282 et seq.; *Confederate Military History*, vol. iii., pp. 239-244; vol. vi., pp. 163-165.

Luray Valley, endeavored to reach Jackson's rear or strike him in flank. Frémont pressed Jackson's rear so closely that after several sharp encounters he was driven steadily through Woodstock, Edenburg and Mount Jackson. Jackson avoided any general engagement and upon his arrival at Harrisonburg sent his wounded to Staunton, then, on June 6, turning to the left, marched toward Port Republic. Later in the day Jackson's rear guard, consisting of two regiments of Virginia cavalry under Turner Ashby, halted two miles southeast of Harrisonburg. Colonel Percy Wyndham with the 1st New Jersey cavalry and a battalion of the 4th New York, moving from Harrisonburg, attacked Ashby and was defeated with a loss of several men killed and wounded and about 60 taken prisoners, including Wyndham himself. General Bayard then pushed forward with cavalry and infantry whereupon Ashby fell back, sending to Jackson for infantry support and receiving the 1st Maryland, and 44th, 52d, and 58th Virginia regiments. A few miles beyond Harrisonburg, Bayard attacked with the Pennsylvania "bucktails" under command of Lieutenant-Colonel T. L. Kane and in the engagement Ashby was killed and Kane was wounded and captured. Meanwhile on the left the 60th Ohio infantry and 1st Pennsylvania cavalry drove in the Confederate skirmish line without loss on either

side. The Confederates then retreated in the direction of Port Republic and the Union forces retired to Harrisonburg. The Union loss was 65 killed, wounded and missing and the Confederate loss, including Ashby, was 18 killed, 50 wounded and 3 missing.*

Early on the morning of June 8, 1862, General Frémont with 10,500 men and 44 guns marched from Harrisonburg in pursuit of Jackson. Frémont's cavalry drove in Jackson's and when eight miles beyond Harrisonburg Cluseret's brigade came upon General Ewell's division of about 5,000 men and 16 guns at Cross Keys, whereupon Frémont formed for an attack. Cluseret's brigade with artillery was on and near the road, and the brigades of Julius Stahel and Bohlen were sent to the left, while the brigades of H. Milroy and Schenck were on the right. Eight batteries were put on the line and opened a spirited fire. Stahel then attacked Ewell's right but his two left regiments were repulsed with great loss. Part of Ewell's troops pursued but were checked and driven back by Stahel's right regiment which was concealed in the woods. Reinforcing his own right Ewell then advanced beyond Frémont's left, poured an enfilading fire on his batteries which, not properly supported, were withdrawn, the infantry following a full mile. Mean-

* *Official Records*, vol. xii.; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. ii., pp. 279, 285, 288, 290-291, 308-309, 312.

while, just as Milroy and Schenck on the right were preparing to attack Ewell's left, Frémont ordered them to retire and reinforce his left, but by this time his left had been repelled and the entire line fell back at 6 P. M. to organize for a renewal of the contest on the morrow. During the night, however, Jackson ordered Ewell to withdraw to join in an attack on General Shields who was now approaching Port Republic by way of Luray Valley. Frémont followed Ewell to the south fork of the Shenandoah but the bridge had been burned, thus making it impossible for Frémont to assist General Shields.* Hence he was an idle spectator of the battle of Port Republic in which his comrades were defeated, and the day following he retreated to Harrisonburg. The Union loss at Cross Keys was 558 killed and wounded and 127 missing. The Confederate loss was 273 killed and wounded and 15 missing.†

Meanwhile Shields, commanding a division of McDowell's corps, was endeavoring to intercept Jackson by going up the Luray Valley. On June 1 Shields moved out of Front Royal, and halted his advance brigades at Conrad's Store and Columbia Bridge. On learning that Jackson was heading toward Port Republic and that Frémont had reached Harrisonburg in close pursuit, Shields advanced Colonel S. S. Carroll's and Tyler's bri-

gades to head off Jackson, while Frémont pressed on his rear and Shields himself with two brigades remained at Luray Valley to watch Longstreet who with 10,000 men was supposed to be moving into Luray Valley by the gap of the Blue Ridge. On the afternoon of June 7 Carroll with about 1,000 infantry, 150 cavalry and Clark's battery of 6 guns marched from Conrad's Store and halted toward night about six miles from Port Republic. Early the next morning Carroll with 150 cavalry and 4 guns (leaving his infantry to follow) drove in the Confederate outposts and seized the bridge over the south fork of the Shenandoah River, capturing some of Jackson's staff, while Jackson himself narrowly missed capture. After escaping across the bridge Jackson attacked Carroll with his batteries, and a regiment of infantry rushed over the bridge, drove Carroll away and captured one of his guns, inflicting a loss on Carroll of 39 men killed and wounded. Jackson then moved William B. Taliaferro's brigade into the village to hold the fords of the South River, a branch of the south fork of the Shenandoah, while Charles S. Winder's brigade was stationed to the north to check any possible advance by Carroll. Meanwhile the battle of Cross Keys was in progress and Jackson, hearing the sound of the engagement, rode to the field. At 2 P. M. Tyler arrived with his brigade to join Carroll and as senior officer took command. He had about 3,000 men and

* Cooke, *Life of Jackson*, p. 191.

† *Official Records*, vol. xii.; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. ii., pp. 291-292.

16 guns and took up a position with his right on the south fork of the Shenandoah and his left on commanding ground where was most of the artillery. On the night of June 8-9, having repulsed Frémont at Cross Keys, Jackson returned to Port Republic and early on the morning of the 9th



attacked Tyler's right with Winder's brigade with the intention of turning it but was repulsed. Rallying a part of his brigade and receiving reinforcements of a regiment from Taylor's Louisiana brigade, Winder again attacked Tyler but was again repulsed with considerable loss. Meanwhile some of Ewell's troops from Cross Keys came on the field and Richard

Taylor's Louisiana brigade was sent forward to turn Tyler's left and capture his guns, but failed to do so. Another attempt was made but meanwhile Tyler's infantry had come up and the Confederates were held in check. The battle had now raged for four hours and as Jackson had withdrawn all his forces from Frémont's front and had concentrated against Tyler, the latter gave the order to retreat. The Confederate infantry followed for four miles when Shields came up with the rest of his division and checked the pursuit, Shields then continuing the retreat to Conrad's Store. During the morning Jackson had put his trains in motion for Brown's Gap in the Blue Ridge and after the battle followed them. The Union loss at Port Republic was 67 killed, 393 wounded and 558 missing, the Confederate loss 816 wounded and missing.* On June 8 the President ordered Frémont and Shields to cease pursuit,† and Frémont fell back to Middletown to join Sigel and Banks who had advanced from Harper's Ferry to Williamsport while Shields retired to join his corps at Fredericksburg. The Valley campaign of 1862 established Jackson's fame as a leader. During the past 35 days he had marched about 300 miles and fought four battles. "Without gain-

* Allan, *Jackson's Valley Campaign*; *Official Records*, vol. xii.; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. ii., pp. 293-297; *Confederate Military History*, vol. ii., pp. 76-82; vol. iii., pp. 248-264.

† *Official Records*, vol. xii., pt. i., p. 653, pt. iii., p. 354.

ing a single tactical victory Jackson had yet achieved a great strategic victory, for by skillfully manœuvring 15,000 men he succeeded in neutralizing a force of 60,000. It is not perhaps too much to say that he saved Richmond."* On June 17 Jackson stole quietly away from Brown's Gap to join Lee on the Chickahominy. Munford's cavalry brigade and a few infantry were left in the valley to demonstrate in the direction of Strasburg and Munford was soon relieved by Robertson's brigade which took post at Harrisonburg and New Market. On June 26 General Pope was called to the command of the Army of Virginia formed by the corps of Frémont, Banks and McDowell. Frémont, however, refused to serve in a subordinate position and resigned, not again appearing in any conspicuous position save in 1864 when he was a candidate for the Presidency in opposition to Lincoln.† Upon assuming command of the Army of Virginia Pope withdrew Frémont and Banks from the Valley to the east of the Blue Ridge, leaving garrisons of a small brigade each at Winchester, Martinsburg and Harper's Ferry to cover the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. During July and August of 1862, the Shenandoah Valley enjoyed comparative quiet.

Meanwhile McClellan was quietly sitting in front of Richmond allowing

* Swinton, *Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac*, p. 128.

† Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. v., pp. 411-412.

the Confederates time and opportunity to strengthen their position and organize various expeditions to cut off his communications. On June 1 Robert E. Lee assumed command of the Confederate Army and at once summoned his general officers in council, encouraging them to greater effort and lifting them out of their despondency over the losses at the battle of Seven Pines. In this Lee was assisted by Davis who joined the council before its members separated.* Much had already been done in the way of bringing reinforcements from the South and under Lee this movement was vigorously pushed. He confidently expected that McClellan would make an early attack,† but the latter was still pursuing his dilatory tactics and seems not to have formulated any particular plan of attack, though he wrote that he expected to make one.‡ Lee then decided to take the initiative by crossing the Chickahominy and falling on Porter who commanded McClellan's right wing.||

Having decided upon his plan Lee ordered J. E. B. Stuart, commanding the cavalry, to make an expedition around the right and to the rear of McClellan's army to ascertain its position and movements. Stuart suggested that it was possible to ride

* Longstreet, *From Manassas to Appomattox*, p. 112; Long, *Life of Lee*, p. 163; Davis, *Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government*, p. 130.

† *Official Records*, vol. xi., pt. iii., p. 577.

‡ *Ibid*, pt. i., p. 46, and pt. iii., pp. 223, 225, 227, 229; *McClellan's Own Story*, p. 405.

|| See Longstreet, *From Manassas to Appomattox*, p. 120.

clear around McClellan and he was permitted to use his discretion in the matter. Accordingly on the morning of June 12, 1862, with portions of the 4th and 9th Virginia cavalry under Fitzhugh Lee and W. H. F. Lee, two squadrons of the Jeff Davis legion under Lieutenant-Colonel W. T. Martin, and a section of artillery under Lieutenant James Breathed, in all about 1,200 men, Stuart started from Kelly's Station and by night had reached a point near the railroad bridge over the South Anna, 22 miles from Richmond. In the morning he turned toward Hanover Court House to capture a detachment of Union cavalry but failed in this and continued on to Hawes' Shop and Old Church. He there met a squadron of the 5th United States cavalry, took a few prisoners, crossed Totopotomoy Creek and was nearing Old Church when he found his pathway obstructed by a squadron of 125 men under Captain W. B. Royall. The Confederates' charge drove the Union troops back and captured some prisoners, but lost Captain William Latané, of the 9th Virginia cavalry. By this time Stuart had passed entirely along McClellan's right and had gained sufficient information for Lee's purposes, but instead of returning he decided to go completely around McClellan's army, cut his communications, make him "tremble in his boots," cross the Chickahominy beyond his left at Forge Bridge, and then return to Richmond. Two squad-

rons were sent to Garlick's Landing on the Pamunkey while Stuart with the main body marched to Tunstall's Station on the York River Railroad where they surprised and captured a corps of 15 or 20 men. After burning several bridges, building others, and capturing a considerable quantity of public stores, the troops reached Richmond in safety. Besides the property destroyed, Stuart took 165 prisoners, 260 mules, and much harness, with a loss of only one killed and a few wounded.*

Meanwhile Jackson was swiftly and stealthily moving his army toward the Chickahominy and, to be present at a personal conference with Lee and the other generals, left his troops 50 miles from Richmond. It was a long, hard ride, but, on June 23, he met the commanding general, Longstreet, D. H. Hill and A. P. Hill. Lee explained his plan of battle and assigned to his generals the part they should play, Jackson saying that he would be ready to begin his attack on the morning of the 26th.† At this time Lee's force, including Jackson's command, numbered 80,762, while McClellan, after

* *Battles and Leaders*, vol. ii., pp. 271-275; H. B. McClellan, *The Life and Campaigns of Major-General J. E. B. Stuart, Commander of the Cavalry of the Army of Northern Virginia* (1885); Charles H. L. Johnston, *Famous Cavalry Leaders* (1908); Theodore S. Garnett, *J. E. B. Stuart* (1908).

† Longstreet, *From Manassas to Appomattox*, p. 121; Dabney, *Life of Jackson*, p. 434. See also *Official Records*, vol. xi., pt. ii., pp. 498-499; Davis, *Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government*, vol. ii., p. 132; Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. v., pp. 423-424.

receiving McCall's division of McDowell's corps, had at least 92,500 men, although in his official report of June 20 McClellan says he had 105,445, exclusive of Dix's force.* Fitz-John Porter's corps of two divisions, with McCall's division temporarily attached, was on the north bank of the Chickahominy, holding the right of the line. On the south bank of the river holding the left was Franklin's corps of two divisions and at Franklin's left in the order named Sumner's and Heintzelman's corps of two divisions each, while Keyes' corps of two divisions was in reserve. The bridges being repaired and the ground firm, McClellan determined to advance the left of his line preparatory to a general forward movement. Immediately in front of the most advanced redoubt on the Williamsburg Road was a large open field, back of which was a belt of timber 500 to 700 yards in width. Further on there was another field crossed by the Williamsburg Road and the railroad and commanded by a Confederate redoubt and rifle-pits. McClellan intended to push his lines through these woods in order to ascertain the nature of the ground and to place Heintzelman and Sumner in position to support an attack to be made by Franklin on the 26th on the rear of Old Tavern, which if successful would force Lee from the heights overlooking Mechanicsville

and clear the way for a general advance on Richmond. The movement began about 9 o'clock by the advance of Hooker's division of Heintzelman's corps on both sides of the Williamsburg Road. Hooker was supported by Kearny's division on the left, and on the right by Richardson's division of Sumner's corps. The Confederate pickets were driven in and Hooker struck A. R. Wright's and L. A. Armistead's brigades of Benjamin Huger's division which, with a part of Robert Ransom's brigade, made a stubborn resistance. At 11 o'clock, after Hooker on the right had advanced about 800 yards and Kearny nearly a mile, the entire Union force was ordered to fall back but Kearny firmly held his ground. At 1 o'clock in the afternoon McClellan reached the scene of action and ordered a another forward movement. Hooker, reinforced by a brigade of Couch's division, advanced and Kearny joined in on his left. William Mahone's brigade and the rest of Ransom's reinforced the Confederates and a severe fight ensued, lasting until dark. This battle, generally known as the Battle of Oak Grove (though also known as that of King's School House, French's Fields, and The Orchards), was of no particular importance to either side, though McClellan claims to have accomplished his object. It was the beginning of the "Seven Days' Battles." The Union loss was 67 killed, 504 wounded and 55 missing, while

* *Official Records*, vol. xi., pt. iii., p. 238; Webb, *The Peninsula*, pp. 119-120; Allan, *Army of Northern Virginia*, p. 69.

the total loss of the Confederates was only 441.*

After the battle of Oak Grove on June 25 McClellan was thrown upon the defensive by the sudden appearance of Stonewall Jackson toward his right flank beyond the Chickahominy and by Lee's movements upon it, made with the intent to turn McClellan's right, cut him off from his base at White House and force him to retreat down the peninsula. North of the Chickahominy, McClellan had but one corps in position — that of Fitz-John Porter, temporarily strengthened by George A. McCall's division of Pennsylvania reserves. McCall held the extreme right of the line at Mechanicsville and Beaver Dam Creek with three brigades, five batteries and 26 guns, his main position being along the east bank of the creek with his left resting on the Chickahominy, and his right and advance held by a regiment and a battery extending to a woods near and overlooking Mechanicsville. A strong picket line was in front from Mechanicsville Bridge to Meadow Bridge along the Chickahominy. A. P. Hill's Confederate division and Howell Cobb's legion were in plain view from the left, intrenched on the opposite side of the Chickahominy. At noon of the 26th Hill moved toward the Union lines and drove in the pickets at Meadow Bridge. McCall there-

upon formed his line with John F. Reynolds' brigade on the right covering the crossing of the road from Mechanicsville to Bethesda Church, Truman Seymour on the left covering at Ellerson's Mill the crossing of the road from Mechanicsville to Gaines' Mill, and George G. Meade's brigade with two batteries in reserve. A. P. Hill's division of 14,000 men was concentrated at Meadow Bridge under orders from Lee to coöperate with Jackson who was marching from Ashland to turn McCall's right. Hill sent Branch's brigade and a battery across the Chickahominy, 7 miles above Meadow Bridge, to communicate with Jackson's advance with the intention, after Jackson had crossed the Virginia Central Railroad, of crossing the Chickahominy, pushing down the river, and, uncovering Meadow Bridge, which Hill was then to cross, and sweeping down to Mechanicsville, uncover the Mechanicsville bridge which Longstreet's and D. H. Hill's divisions were to cross. All were then to push down the left bank of the Chickahominy and cut off McClellan's communications at White House on the Pamunkey, thus forcing him to abandon his operations against Richmond and to retreat down the peninsula.

Through unavoidable delays Jackson was half a day late. A. P. Hill with five brigades waited at Meadow Bridge to hear from Jackson, growing impatient as the hours went by. Finally at 3 o'clock he put his five

* *Official Records*, vol. xi.; Webb, *The Peninsula*, p. 118 et seq.; Allan, *Army of Northern Virginia; Battles and Leaders*, vol. ii., p. 323 et seq.

brigades and six batteries in motion. Charles W. Field's brigade seized Meadow Bridge and crossed, followed by the brigades of J. R. Anderson and James J. Archer. The brigades of Maxcy Gregg and W. D. Pender then crossed to support the right of the attacking column. Field's advance was met by severe artillery fire, but forming line with W. J. Pegram's battery in the centre it gradually forced the Union advance back from Mechanicsville to the main line behind Beaver Dam Creek. Lee had not intended to attack McCall in position but to have Jackson turn it, but Jackson did not come up in time and accordingly Lee ordered A. P. Hill to move. The brigades of Field, Archer, and Anderson marched against Reynolds along the Mechanicsville Road but met with a bloody repulse, though one of Anderson's regiments on the left made a temporary lodgment behind the creek. Parts of Porter's corps then came up and strengthened Reynolds' right. After this reverse, the brigades of Pender and R. S. Ripley, of D. H. Hill's division, attacked Seymour at Ellerson's Mill, but they too were repulsed with great loss. The assault was renewed and a still more bloody defeat resulted, some of the regiments losing all their field officers and half their men. It was then sunset and no further effort was made to renew activities, though firing was maintained until 9 P. M. The Union loss was 49 killed, 207 wounded, and 105 missing, while the

total Confederate loss was over 1,500.*

While the battle of Mechanicsville was still in progress, McClellan went to Porter's headquarters where he received a request from the latter for reinforcements so that he might hold his position at Beaver Dam Creek while McClellan with the main body of the army moved upon Richmond.† On returning to his own headquarters, however, McClellan decided that Porter's position was untenable and ordered him to withdraw his troops to the selected ground east of Gaines' Mill where he could protect the bridges across the Chickahominy which connected the Union right and left wings and were indispensable in case further retreat became necessary. Accordingly Porter began the retrograde movement at daylight on the 27th and executed it in perfect order and without serious molestation.‡ Porter's corps and McCall's division, numbering in all about 20,000 infantry and 2,500 cavalry, were the only Union troops north of the Chickahominy. Porter's line was formed in the shape of a semi-circle, its left resting on the low ground near the

* *Official Records*, vol. xi.; Webb, *The Peninsula*, pp. 125-128; Allan, *Army of Northern Virginia; Battles and Leaders*, vol. ii. pp. 327 *et seq.*, 347-353; *McClellan's Own Story; Confederate Military History*, vol. iii., pp. 286-287; vol. iv., pp. 76-82; vol. v., pp. 57-58; vol. vi., pp. 167-170.

† Webb, *The Peninsula*, p. 130 note.

‡ Rhodes, *United States*, vol. iv., p. 40. With regard to the evacuation of Beaver Dam Creek see Longstreet's criticism in *Battles and Leaders*, vol. ii., p. 398.

Chickahominy with its right bending around south of Old Cold Harbor. The line covered several of the bridges over the Chickahominy, and through the centre and right ran the roads from New Cold Harbor and Old Cold Harbor to Dispatch Station. George Sykes' division of the 5th corps was on the right, George W. Morell's division on the left and McCall's division in reserve. General Philip St. George Cooke with three small cavalry regiments watched the left while the artillery was placed in good positions sweeping the ground in front. On June 27 the Confederates advanced against Porter's position, A. P. Hill and Longstreet from the west and Jackson and D. H. Hill from the northwest. A. P. Hill led the advance from Mechanicsville and on reaching Powhite Creek near Gaines' Mill at noon Gregg's South Carolina brigade was so stoutly resisted by the 9th Massachusetts that Hill was checked and compelled to deploy a large force to push the Massachusetts regiment back, which was not done until 2 o'clock. Meanwhile Longstreet had come up on A. P. Hill's right and Jackson, Ewell, and D. H. Hill on his left. Shortly after 2 o'clock the main battle began with a tremendous assault by A. P. Hill on Porter's left division which resulted in the repulse of Hill with considerable loss. Longstreet came to his support, Jackson and D. H. Hill closed in on Porter's right, and for nearly two hours the battle raged, but Porter's line held

firm. However, Porter's force was too small to withstand a continued assault by 57,000 Confederates. At about 4 o'clock Henry W. Slocum's division of Franklin's corps came on the field, its three brigades were sent to reinforce the weak places along the line and by 5 o'clock the general attack had been checked. A few minutes later another attack was made but this too was futile. By this time all the Confederate forces were on the field. W. H. C. Whiting's division had come to the relief of A. P. Hill, and Stuart with his cavalry and artillery opened up on Porter's right. A fierce assault was then made and soon the Union troops were driven back with a loss of 22 guns and about 2,800 prisoners. Some of the commands fell back in much confusion, while others retired in good order upon the brigades of W. H. French and Thomas F. Meagher of Sumner's corps which had crossed the Chickahominy and now assisted in checking the Confederate pursuit.* During the night the Union troops crossed to the south side of the Chickahominy, destroyed the bridges behind them, and joined the rest of the army in its retreat to Harrison's Landing on the James River. The entire number of Union troops engaged was about 34,000, and the loss was 894 killed, 3,107 wounded, 2,836 missing—an aggregate of 6,837. The number of Confederate troops engaged was about

* Regarding the failure to send reinforcements prior to this time see Swinton, *Army of the Potomac*, p. 151.

57,000, of whom 8,751 were killed and wounded.*

Having determined to retreat to the James River, McClellan's trains were put on the road to cross White Oak Swamp and move to Haxall's Landing, and at 1 A. M. on the morning of the 28th Keyes' corps took up the march followed by Porter. Lee did not correctly understand McClellan's movements on the 28th, fortunately for the latter, and he pressed on, withdrawing his right under cover of his left which remained in the woods fronting Richmond, preventing General J. B. Magruder from getting any knowledge of what was going on. Late in the afternoon and night of the 28th Lee came to the conclusion that McClellan was retreating to the James River, but did not give an order to pursue until the morning of the 29th. Meanwhile Slocum's Union division of Franklin's corps marched for Savage Station which it reached on the morning of the 29th. The corps of Heintzelman and Sumner together with Smith's division of Franklin's corps remained in position on the 28th at and near Fair

Oaks, confronting the Confederate troops under Huger and Magruder thus covering and screening the movement of the rest of the army. At daybreak of the 29th Heintzelman drew out of his works on the left and fell back to Savage Station. Smith on the right drew away to join Slocum. Sumner, abandoning his works at Fair Oaks, retired to Orchard Station on the York River Railroad, destroyed a vast amount of stores accumulated for the use of the army and then marched to the Peach Orchard or Allen's Farm and formed line across the railroad, fronting Richmond with Richardson's division on the right and Sedgwick's on the left, Heintzelman's corps being still further on the left of Sedgwick's. When Lee learned of McClellan's movement he ordered Longstreet, A. P. Hill, D. H. Hill and Jackson to recross to the south side of the Chickahominy and strike McClellan in flank while Magruder was to pursue by the Williamsburg Road and Huger by the Charles City Road. Magruder advanced on both sides and perpendicular to the York River Railroad, his own division in the centre, McLaws' division on his right between the railroad and the Williamsburg Road and D. R. Jones' division on the left of the line. Jones, who was in advance, struck Sumner's line at 9 o'clock and attacked his right and centre with artillery and infantry. Though his guns were soon silenced by Sumner's three batteries, Jones kept up a persistent and determined

* *Official Records*, vol. xi.; Webb, *The Peninsula*, pp. 128-135; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. ii., pp. 331-346, 363-365; *McClellan's Own Story*; Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. v., p. 427 *et seq.*; Rhodes, *United States*, vol. iv., p. 40 *et seq.*; Allan, *The Army of Northern Virginia*; Davis, *Confederate Government*, vol. ii.; Swinton, *Army of the Potomac*; Ropes, *Civil War*, pt. ii.; Walker, *History of the Second Army Corps*; Longstreet, *From Manassas to Appomattox*; *Confederate Military History*, vol. iii., pp. 290-292; vol. v., pp. 58-65; vol. vi., pp. 170-172; and the biographies of the various generals engaged.

fire upon an advance position held by Colonel John R. Brooke's 53d Pennsylvania supported by the 71st Pennsylvania. At this point the action was very sharp and continued until 11 o'clock when Jones, finding that Jackson had not crossed the Chickahominy on his left, as was expected, and that Magruder was not supporting him, ceased the attack.*

Meanwhile Stonewall Jackson was advancing toward Savage Station. Franklin immediately withdrew Smith's division from an isolated and exposed position on Sumner's right and notified Sumner of the action, who at 12 o'clock fell back to Savage Station and united with Franklin to whom Smith's division had gone, only Slocum having been sent by McClellan across White Oak Swamp. Heintzelman with his corps had been ordered to hold the Williamsburg Road until dark at a point where were several field works and a skirt of timber between these and the railroad; but through a misunderstanding of orders in the afternoon he marched his entire corps save two batteries across White Oak Swamp. On reaching Savage Station, Sumner and Franklin drew up in line of battle in a large field to the left of the railroad, the left held by Sumner resting on the edge of the woods with Richardson's division forming his right and Sedgwick his left. Smith's division on the

right extended to the railroad with Hancock's brigade reaching into the woods to the right and front to hold the railroad. John W. Davidson's brigade was in reserve and Thomas W. Osborn's battery was on the line. It was after these dispositions had been made that Heintzelman withdrew, imperilling Sumner's left line. Magruder was so slow that not until 5 o'clock did McLaws' division begin the attack on Sumner's left. A hotly contested fight ensued at the Williamsburg Road. Six regiments of Sedgwick's and one of Richardson's were hastened to the threatened point. W. T. H. Brooks' Vermont brigade was thrown into the woods that Heintzelman had abandoned and at dark when the battle ceased the Confederates had been repulsed. Soon after the cessation of the fight Sumner continued his retreat across White Oak Swamp, abandoning to the Confederates 2,500 sick and wounded in the hospitals. He then united with Franklin and Heintzelman in preparing to dispute the Confederate advance. The total Confederate loss was about 400 killed, wounded, and missing, while the Union loss is not accurately known.*

Lee now concentrated for a heavy blow to cut McClellan's army in two and destroy it. On the morning of the 30th the Union army was across the White Oak Swamp creek covering

* *Official Records*, vol. xi.; Webb, *The Peninsula*, pp. 137-139, *Battles and Leaders*, vol. ii., p. 371.

* Walker, *History of the Second Army Corps*; Allan, *Army of Northern Virginia*; *Official Records*, vol. xii.; Webb, *The Peninsula*, pp. 139-141; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. ii., p. 366 *et seq.*

the roads leading to the James River and the great trains on their way to Malvern Hill and Harrison's Landing. Franklin on the right, with Smith's division of his own corps, Richardson's division of Sumner's, and Henry M. Naglee's brigade of Keyes' corps, was at the bridge crossing White Oak Swamp creek. Two miles to the left, holding the intersection of the Charles City, Darbytown and New Market Roads, were Sumner with Sedgwick's division of his own corps, Heintzelman's two divisions of Hooker and Kearny, Slocum's division of Franklin's corps, and McCall's divisions. Slocum on the right of Sumner's line was on the Charles City Road, about a mile in advance of the junction with the New Market and Quaker Roads; Kearny was on Slocum's left between the Charles City and New Market Roads; McCall was on Kearny's left and Hooker to the left and rear of McCall; Sedgwick was supporting McCall, but during the forenoon two of his brigades were sent to Franklin; Porter's and Keyes' corps were on the way to Malvern Hill.

General Lee planned that Jackson should force a passage of the bridge held by Franklin, turn his right and reach the Union rear; that T. H. Holmes should attack and turn the Union left so as to prevent its reaching the James River; while the divisions of A. P. Hill, Huger and Longstreet, supported by Magruder and concentrated at the cross roads, should cut

McClellan's army in two and prevent its retreat to the river. Early on the morning of the 30th Jackson moved through Savage Station on Franklin, but was checked. Holmes advanced on the Confederate right with 6,000 men and 6 batteries toward Malvern Hill, and was attacked by G. K. Warren's brigade of 1,500 men and 36 guns. The gunboats in the river opened upon him and he fell back in disorder, calling for help. Huger advanced down the Charles City Cross Roads in an effort to determine the Union position and to protect his own flanks, but his division became scattered and he spent the rest of the day in an artillery duel with Slocum. While this division frittered away the day, Longstreet and A. P. Hill were maintaining a furious contest.

Longstreet and A. P. Hill (the former in advance) moved down the Darbytown Road, and at Frazier's (or Frazer's or Frayser's) Farm came upon McCall's pickets. Longstreet at 3 o'clock, closely supported by A. P. Hill, attacked McCall, forced back Seymour's brigade and captured several guns. James L. Kemper's brigade on Longstreet's right was then attacked by Hooker with Cuvier Grover's brigade; Sumner's artillery, covering the opening between McCall and Hooker, opened fire and Kemper was swept back just as the brigades of George E. Pickett and Branch came to his support. They, too, were checked but maintained a stubborn fight until nightfall, when they were

joined by the brigades of Pender and Archer of Hill's division and held the ground from which Seymour had been driven. After a stubborn fight the batteries of A. M. Randol and Cooper were captured by C. M. Wilcox's brigade which had advanced on Pickett's left but a counter attack drove Wilcox back and Cooper's battery was retaken. Field's brigade, coming to Wilcox's support, forced back Meade's brigade and captured some guns but Meade rallied and drove Field back. Meanwhile Kearny's left had been attacked several times by the brigades of Roger A. Pryor and W. S. Featherston but the Confederates were thrown back in disorder. Slocum assisted Kearny with his New Jersey brigade and as Featherston's brigade was now in some disorder, Gregg's South Carolina brigade was sent to that part of the field. Late in the day Kearny's left was reinforced by John C. Caldwell's brigade of Richardson's division which had moved from Franklin's position. As darkness was coming on two regiments only got into line and fired, and shortly after the engagement ended. During the day McCall's was the only division which was driven back; it lost 14 guns and its commander, who was taken prisoner at the close of the engagement.* During the night the Union army fell back to Malvern Hill.†

The morning of July 1 found the whole Union army in position at Malvern Hill, an elevated open plateau on the left bank of the James River, about 60 feet high and about 1½ miles by ½ mile in area. There the last of the "Seven Days' Battles" was fought. At Malvern Hill the army was formed in a large arc, both flanks resting on the river and protected by gunboats. On the left was Porter's 5th corps and to his right in order came Couch's division of Keyes' corps, Heintzelman's two divisions (Kearny and Hooker), and the corps of Sumner and Franklin. J. J. Peck's division of Keyes' corps on Franklin's right formed the extreme right of the army, and it and Porter's left stood back to back. Along and in the rear of the line were numerous batteries of artillery. The approach to this strong position was over 400 yards of open ground swept by artillery fire, yet Lee boldly essayed to attempt it. Jackson had marched by the Willis Road and when in sight of Malvern Hill formed line with D. H. Hill on his right, Whiting's division on his left, and one of Ewell's brigades in the centre, the rest of Ewell's division and Jackson's own division being held in reserve. Magruder was supposed to take position on Jackson's right, but before he came up two of Huger's brigades arrived and were

* This battle is variously known as the battle of Glendale, Charles City Cross Roads, Frazier's Farm, and White Oak Swamp.

† *Official Records*, vol. xi.; Allan, *Army of Northern Virginia*; Webb, *The Peninsula*, pp.

143-150; *McClellan's Own Story; Battles and Leaders*, vol. ii., pp. 377 et seq., 396-405; *Confederate Military History*, vol. iii., pp. 294-298; vol. iv., pp. 83-84; vol. v., pp. 65-72; vol. vi., pp. 173-174.



From the original Brady negatives.

1. THE BATTLEFIELD OF MALVERN HILL.

2. LEE'S HEADQUARTERS AT MALVERN HILL, AFTERWARD USED AS A HOSPITAL

placed next to Hill. When Magruder came up about 2 o'clock, two brigades under Armistead and Wright with four batteries were ordered forward. As they emerged from the woods these batteries were promptly knocked to pieces by the fire of more than 60 Union guns and the two brigades were repulsed with considerable loss. This attack fell upon Porter's right and Couch's left, the latter being then reinforced by Caldwell's brigade of Sumner's corps. At 5:30 p. m. Magruder assaulted Porter's line and Couch's left with the brigades of Armistead, Cobb, Wright, Mahone and William Barksdale, but so terrific was the fire of artillery and musketry that they were driven back with great loss. Thereupon the brigades of Toombs, G. T. Anderson and Ransom were ordered forward, but Toombs got lost in the woods and Anderson and Ransom quailed before the hot fire of the Union batteries, then falling back.

While Magruder was thus engaged with Porter and Couch's left, D. H. Hill attacked Couch's right which, as the action progressed, was reinforced by some of Kearny's division, Caldwell's brigade and three regiments of Hooker's division under D. E. Sickles. Hill's five brigades were commanded by Generals Samuel Garland and Ripley and by Colonels J. B. Gordon, A. H. Colquitt and C. C. Tew. Before Couch's line could be reached it was necessary for the Confederates to cross 800 yards of clear ground in the face of the Union artillery.

When the advance was made the Union guns sent out such a terrific fire of shell and canister that Hill's brigades withered under it. Toombs' brigades were then sent to their support but the six brigades were again hurled back with a loss of half their men. Later in the evening Taylor's brigade of Ewell's division on Hill's left attacked the left of Kearny's division, but was repulsed. Half an hour later McLaws' division of two brigades (those of Paul J. Semmes and J. B. Kershaw) assaulted Porter's right. Semmes made some headway up the slope, but, being met by the 69th and 88th New York of Meagher's brigade, which Sumner had sent to Porter's assistance, was repulsed. Kershaw met the same fate, and his defeat at twilight marked the close of the battle, though it was 9 o'clock before the firing had entirely ceased. The Confederate loss was over 5,500, while the Union loss was less than 2,000.* Throughout the Seven Days' Battles (June 25 to July 1) the total Union loss was 1,734 killed, 8,062 wounded, 6,053 captured or missing, while the Confederate loss was 3,478

* Webb, *The Peninsula*, pp. 153-167; Allan, *Army of Northern Virginia; Battles and Leaders*, vol. ii., pp. 383-395, 406-427; *Official Records*, vol. xi.; *McClellan's Own Story*; Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. v., p. 436 et seq.; *Brief Account of the Battle of Malvern Hill*, in *National Cyclopaedia of American Biography*, vol. iv., p. 142; Carswell McClellan, *General A. A. Humphreys at Malvern Hill, Va., July 1, 1862, and at Fredericksburg, Va., December 13, 1862* (1888); *Confederate Military History*, vol. iii., pp. 298-302; vol. iv., pp. 84-91; vol. v., pp. 72-75; vol. vi., pp. 174-176.

killed, 16,261 wounded and 875 captured or missing.*

McClellan was urged to retreat no farther, but during the night he abandoned Malvern Hill, and by morning of July 2 his head of column was at Harrison's Landing. The Confederates did not come up to his position until July 4, but deeming it unwise to make any attack, Lee on the 8th marched the whole body of his army back to the vicinity of Richmond, thus ending the Peninsula Campaign. During the whole campaign the Union loss was 16,600 killed and wounded and 7,500 captured or missing. The Confederate loss was 27,000 killed and wounded and 2,000 captured or missing.† The failure of the campaign

was chiefly due to McClellan, who was completely unnerved by his absurd over-estimate of the enemy and perhaps also by the fact that he was persistently absent when battles were being fought. The campaign showed that while he was a good organizer he lacked aggressive generalship.* The elaborate preparations of the Union forces had come to naught, the siege of Richmond had fallen through, and the Union troops had been driven back 20 miles. All conditions united to brighten the Southern hopes.†

Civil War, vol. ii.; Walker, *History of the Second Army Corps*; and the biographies of the various generals engaged.

* See Rhodes, *United States*, vol. iv., p. 49 *et seq.* On the other hand, there was a tendency on the Confederate side of blaming those in command for the escape of the Union army. After reflection, however, the Southerners began to realize the stupendous task confronting their generals and to comprehend how great reason they had for rejoicing.

† For diverse opinions regarding the campaign, both from the Confederate and Union points of view, see Swinton, *Army of the Potomac*, p. 165; Pollard, *Second Year of the War*, pp. 73-76; Ropes, *Story of the Civil War*, pt. i., p. 225; Webb, *The Peninsula*, pp. 168-190.

* Rhodes, *United States*, vol. iv., p. 48. *Battles and Leaders*, vol. ii., gives the Union loss the same, but makes the Confederate loss 3,286 killed, 15,909 wounded, and 940 captured or missing.

† For further details in addition to the works already mentioned see J. B. Barnard, *The Peninsula Campaign*; Powell, *History of the 5th Army Corps*; Comte de Paris, *History of the*

CHAPTER XV.

1862.

POPE'S CAMPAIGN IN VIRGINIA.

McClellan's demands for reinforcements — Lincoln's visit to the army — Pope's appointment to the command — McClellan's correspondence with Halleck — The final embarkation of McClellan's troops — Jackson's movements — The battle of Cedar Mountain — The campaign and second battle of Bull Run (including Gainesville and Groveton) — Death of Stevens and Kearny at Chantilly — The restoration of McClellan to command.

At Harrison's Landing McClellan was in a place of comparative security, but he continued to ask for reinforcements. On July 1 he telegraphed: "I need 50,000 men and with them I will retrieve our fortunes."* Stanton answered immediately that 5,000 of McDowell's corps and 25,000 of Halleck's had been dispatched.† On July 1 Lincoln telegraphed that it was impossible to reinforce McClellan in the present emergency, for even if 1,000,000 men were at his disposal they could not be sent to him in time; hence he must maintain his ground if he could, "but save the army at all events, even if you fall back to Fort Monroe."‡ On July 2 Lincoln said that McClellan's request for 50,000 men was absurd, and further wrote:

"If you think you are not strong enough to take Richmond just now I do not ask you to try just now. Save the army, material and personal, and I will strengthen it for the offensive again as fast as I can. The governors of eighteen States offer me a new levy of 300,000 which I accept."

* *Official Records*, vol. xi., pt. iii., p. 281.

† *Ibid*, pp. 271, 281.

‡ *Ibid*, vol. xi., pt. i., p. 71.

|| *Ibid*, vol. xi., pt. iii., p. 286, 291.

McClellan's retreat and the fact that he attributed his disasters to lack of men did not diminish Lincoln's confidence in him. On July 3 he wrote to McClellan, "I am satisfied that yourself, officers and men have done the best you could. All accounts say better fighting was never done. Ten thousand thanks for it."* On the same day, however, McClellan increased his demand for reinforcements from 50,000 to 100,000,† which demand did not alter the kindly feeling of the President and Secretary of War, who immediately ordered forward reinforcements from A. E. Burnside, from Washington, and from David E. Hunter, and begged Halleck to send forward 10,000 infantry.‡ Nothing could have been warmer than Stanton's expressions of confidence and assurances of support. Nevertheless, on July 20, McClellan wrote that he had no faith in the Administration, and was tired of serving fools. He criticised the officials at Washington as a trifling set and as dolts with-

* *Official Records*, vol. xi., pt., pt. iii., p. 291.

† *Ibid*, p. 292.

‡ *Ibid*, pp. 291, 294, 298.

out common politeness, who wished his army to be destroyed and were bent on his own destruction.* Much disturbed by the conflicting reports regarding conditions in the Army of the Potomac, Lincoln visited Harrison's Landing on July 8. While there he conferred freely with McClellan and the more prominent officers in command. McClellan was the only one who believed the enemy to be threatening the army, while all the others thought Lee had retired for the purpose of making an attack on Washington or some other important place. Two generals favored the withdrawal of the army from the James River, while the rest opposed it. In his perplexity as to the next movement, Lincoln felt the necessity of better military advisers than those at Washington. On July 26 General John Pope had been appointed to the command of the Army of Virginia, consisting of the corps of Frémont, Banks, and McDowell. Hence Lincoln turned to Halleck, the commander in the West, who was generally considered an authority on the art of war and had written books on military tactics, on July 2 requesting him to come to Washington for consultation. Nine days later Lincoln appointed him general-in-chief of the forces of the United States.† Pope assumed command of the army on the 23d, and the next day started for McClellan's camp, where he arrived on the 25th.

Meanwhile the opposition to McClellan had grown in virulence. Pope made no attempt to conceal his belief in the incompetency of McClellan and the latter's indisposition to active movements.* Halleck, too, unreservedly condemned McClellan's late military operations, but seemed to believe that the latter would do very well under orders from himself.* On July 15 Burnside wrote to McClellan that he had lots of enemies.† Rumors of McClellan's disloyalty were evidently in the air, for Chase says: "I said that I did not regard General McClellan as loyal to the Administration, although I did not question his general loyalty to the country," showing that this question had been under discussion in the Cabinet.‡ It was about this time that Stanton and Chase proposed to Lincoln that Pope be sent to the James and that Mitchell be given the command of the Army of the Potomac.|| Lincoln would not do this; but owing to the fact that Pope had stated that cordial coöperation from McClellan could not be expected, he offered the command of the Army of the Potomac to Burnside, who promptly declined it. Accordingly, as we have stated, Halleck went to McClellan's headquarters to arrange for future action. McClellan informed Halleck that he had now planned to cross the James, attack Petersburg, and cut communication between Richmond and the States far-

* *McClellan's Own Story* (July 31, August 2, 10, 14).

† *Official Records*, vol. xi., pt. iii., pp. 286, 314.

* Schuckers, *Life of Chase*, p. 448.

† *McClellan's Own Story*, p. 472.

‡ Warden, *Life of Chase*, p. 440.

|| Schuckers, *Life of Chase*, pp. 447-448.

ther south. But Halleck considered this move impracticable, talked McClellan out of it, and urged him to form a junction with Pope's army, unless with a reinforcement of 20,000 men he could attack Richmond with the probability of success. McClellan thought 20,000 men insufficient and that 30,000 additional troops would be needed, but later said that he was willing to try with the number promised by the President.* Upon Halleck's return to Washington a shower of telegrams came from McClellan urging the dispatch of reinforcements. On July 30 he wrote: "Should it be determined to withdraw it I shall look upon our cause as lost and the demoralization of the army certain."† The most important officers under him, however, counseled immediate withdrawal and Halleck resolved upon this course, on July 30 directing McClellan to send away his sick as soon as possible, in order that he might be able to move in any direction.‡ On August 3 Halleck telegraphed McClellan, "It is determined to withdraw your army from the Peninsula to Aquia Creek. You will take immediate measures to effect this."|| In reply on August 4 McClellan said:

"Your telegram has caused me the greatest pain I ever experienced, for I am convinced that the order to withdraw this army to Aquia Creek will prove disastrous to our cause. I fear it

will be a fatal blow. * * * Here directly in front of this army is the heart of this rebellion. It is here that all our resources should be collected to strike a blow which will determine the fate of the nation. * * * I do now what I never did in my life before, *I entreat* that this order be rescinded."*

At last weary of argument, Halleck replied, "The order of the withdrawal * * * will not be rescinded and you will be expected to execute it with all possible promptness." On the 6th, therefore, McClellan expressed his readiness to obey "as soon as circumstances will permit; my artillery is none too numerous now."† Nevertheless McClellan determined to strike a blow before departing. He sent General Hooker to Malvern Hill, and there, after a sharp skirmish, the Confederates were driven away. The next day (August 5) he was so elated at this success that he telegraphed Halleck: "This is a very advantageous position to cover an advance on Richmond and only 14¾ miles distant, and I feel confident that with reinforcements I could march this army there in five days," to which Halleck curtly rejoined, "I have no reinforcements to send you."‡ Furthermore, being satisfied that McClellan was not moving with sufficient promptness, he telegraphed him: "There must be no further delay in your movements. That which has occurred was entirely unexpected and must be satisfactorily explained."||

* Rhodes, *United States*, vol. iv., pp. 103-104.

† *Official Records*, vol. xi., pt. iii., p. 342.

‡ *Ibid.*, vol. xi., pt. i., p. 76.

|| *Ibid.*, vol. xi., pt. i., pp. 80, 82. With regard to this see also Burnside's letter in *McClellan's Own Story*, p. 472.

* *Official Records*, vol. xi., pt. iii., p. 81.

† *Ibid.*, vol. xi., pt. i., p. 79.

‡ *Ibid.*, vol. xi., pt. i., p. 78; pt. iii., p. 359.

|| *Ibid.*, vol. xi., pt. i., p. 86.

It is evident that after August 4 McClellan's movements were prompt and that there was no unnecessary delay. On August 14, the day on which he made his final appeal to Halleck for permission to take the offensive, two of his corps marched toward Yorktown. On the 16th the last of the sick were sent off by water* and on the 17th McClellan telegraphed that he had left his camp at Harrison's Landing. Porter's troops sailed from Newport News on August 20, Heintzelman's from Yorktown on August 21, and Franklin's from Fortress Monroe on August 23. Sumner was delayed by lack of transports, but on August 27 reached Aquia Creek, which had also been the destination of the others. McClellan reported for orders at Aquia on August 24, and three days later, in response to a telegram from Halleck, went to Alexandria near Washington.

Meanwhile General Pope had begun his campaign. But at the very outset he made a tactless move when he issued an address to the officers and soldiers of the Army of Virginia, reflecting on the Army of the Potomac.† It was received with a storm of angry ridicule, and very seriously weakened Pope's hold upon his troops and the respect of the public. Moreover it rendered impossible any sincere sympathy and support from General Mc-

Clellan and those nearest him. On July 29 Pope had pretty well concentrated his army, which consisted of the corps of McDowell, Banks, and Sigel (Fremont having declined to serve), and numbered 43,000 men. Having threatened Gordonsville (an important railroad centre) he forced Lee to send Jackson from Richmond to oppose his advance, and left Washington on July 29 to take command of operations in the field. Generals Banks and Sigel were ordered to move to Culpeper Court House. Banks promptly obeyed his orders, reaching there shortly before midnight on August 8, but because of mistaking his roads Sigel did not arrive until the 9th. By that time Banks had gone forward to Cedar Mountain.*


On August 8 Crawford's brigade of Banks' corps marched from Culpeper Court House eight miles to Cedar Run to support George D. Bayard's cavalry brigade which was being slowly driven back by Stonewall Jackson, who, with three divisions of Lee's army, under A. P. Hill, C. S. Winder, and Ewell, was advancing from Gordonsville toward Culpeper. On the 9th Banks' entire corps at Little Washington was ordered to follow Samuel W. Crawford and Sigel was directed to send his troops from Sperryville to the same point. About noon Banks joined Crawford at Cedar Run and took position on level ground just beyond him, covering the road to Culpeper, with Crawford's brigade

* *Official Records*, vol. xi., pt. i., pp. 76-91; pt. iii., 378-379.

† This will be found in *ibid.*, vol. xii., pt. iii., pp. 473-474; John C. Ropes, *The Army Under Pope*, pp. 173-174.

* Ropes, *The Army under Pope*, p. 16 *et seq.*

CONFEDERATE GENERALS.



From the original Brady negatives.

1. STONEWALL JACKSON.
4. J. E. B. STUART.
7. N. B. FORREST.
10. J. B. MAGRUDER.


2. P. G. T. BEAUREGARD.
5. JOSEPH E. JOHNSTON.
8. EARL VAN DORN.
11. A. P. HILL.

3. A. S. JOHNSTON.
6. JUBAL A. EARLY.
9. RICHARD S. EWELL.
12. STERLING PRICE.

and six companies of the 3d Wisconsin of George H. Gordon's brigade on the right of the road partly concealed by woods. The remainder of Gordon's brigade was held in reserve on the hither side of the stream. On Crawford's left on the other side of the road was Geary's brigade, and beyond this were the brigades of Henry Prince and George S. Greene. Slightly in advance of all these were seven batteries of artillery on a plateau. In all, Banks had about 8,000 men. On the 8th Jackson crossed the Rapidan, and toward noon of the 9th attacked and drove back Bayard's cavalry, soon coming under fire of the Union artillery. Early was then ordered to advance, keeping to the right and close to the Culpeper road; while Ewell led his other two brigades further to the right along the slope of Cedar Mountain. Early advanced until he was checked by a severe artillery fire, when he halted under cover of a small hill; C. S. Winder's division and three batteries then came up on his left, Campbell's brigade being on the extreme left, then Taliaferro's, with Winder's brigade in reserve. While placing his batteries, Winder was mortally wounded by a piece of shell.

At five o'clock Banks advanced to the assault. Early's right held firm against Prince, but Crawford routed Campbell's brigade, swerved to the left and, with the assistance of Geary, fell upon and routed Taliaferro, and attacked Early's left. Early was in

a critical situation when fortunately Hill's division came up and, forming on his right and left, checked Crawford's forward movement, drove him and Geary back, and held Prince in check. Then the 10th Maine of Crawford's brigade, which had been kept in reserve, pushed forward on the ex-



treme right, but in less than ten minutes was compelled to retreat with a loss of nearly half its men. A battalion of Pennsylvania cavalry which charged down the road at the same time suffered a similar fate. Simultaneously, too, Gordon's brigade came on the field, moved a little to the right of the position formerly occupied by the 10th Maine, and was badly cut up by the brigades of Branch, Archer, and Winder. On being rallied the brigade again charged, but, under

cover of the woods, William D. Pender's brigade gained its right and rear, poured in a destructive volley, and drove it from the field. The artillery had now been withdrawn and the Confederates advanced. Prince's brigade fell back, leaving Prince and many of his men prisoners; and Greene, who had been hotly engaged on the extreme left, but had held Ewell's two brigades in check, was withdrawn. Darkness put an end to the contest, although the artillery fire was continued until midnight. The Union loss was 1,759 killed and wounded, and 594 missing; the Confederate loss was 1,338 killed and wounded, and 31 missing. Owing to fatigue and excessive heat both armies rested and recruited on Sunday (August 10), and the next day was spent in burying the dead. But on the night of the 11th Jackson retreated from the field, abandoning many of his wounded, recrossed the Rapidan and marched to the vicinity of Gordonsville.*

Meanwhile at Richmond Lee had been pondering how best he might strike at either Pope or McClellan.

* Ropes, *The Army under Pope*, pp. 19-30; Gordon, *The Army of Virginia*; Allan, *The Army of Northern Virginia*; *Official Records*, vol. xii.; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. ii., pp. 459, 495-496; F. Denison, *The Battle of Cedar Mountain; a Personal View, August 9, 1862* (1881); F. A. Peterson, *Military Review of the Campaign in Virginia and Maryland under Generals John C. Frémont, N. P. Banks, Irvin McDowell (and others) in 1862, etc.*; *Confederate Military History*, vol. iii., pp. 307-312; vol. iv., pp. 92-95; vol. vi., pp. 177-179. This Battle is also called the battle of Cedar Run or Slaughter's Mountain.

He knew that there was little harmony between McClellan and the Administration,* and judging McClellan by previous actions had no idea that an advance would be made on Richmond.† Early in August news arrived in Richmond that McClellan was retreating from the James, and ten days later Lee made up his mind that McClellan's intention was to reinforce Pope. Accordingly he decided to strike at Pope before McClellan reinforced him, and, in order to concentrate his troops upon Pope, ordered Longstreet with his command and Hood with two brigades to Gordonsville, he himself following on the 15th.‡ As he outnumbered Pope, Lee determined to make an attack, planning his movement for the 18th, but Pope learned of Lee's plans through the capture of a cavalry officer who had Lee's instructions to Stuart. Accordingly Pope retreated with all speed behind the Rappahannock River (in the vicinity of Kelly's Ford and Rappahannock Station), taking a position on the 20th with Sigel on the right, McDowell in the centre at Cedar Mountain, and Reno on the left, Banks' shattered corps being at Culpeper.¶ From Clark's Mountain Lee watched Pope's movement,§ and

* Long, *Life of Lee*, p. 183.

† *Official Records*, vol. xii., pt. iii., p. 825.

‡ *Official Records*, vol. xi., pt. iii., p. 674 et seq., and vol. xii., pt. iii., p. 928 et seq.

¶ Regarding his intentions when taking this position, see Swinton, *Army of the Potomac*, p. 176.

§ Longstreet, *From Manassas to Appomattox*, p. 162.

then arranged to cross at Sulphur Springs, turn Pope's right, and move upon his communications, but this plan failed. At the same time Pope planned to cross the river and attack Lee's right and rear, but a sudden flood prevented this movement.


Lee then directed all the soldiers in and about Richmond except two brigades to be sent to him, and devised a plan of cutting Pope's communications. In pursuance of this object he sent Jackson on the morning of August 25 with his corps of 25,000 men on a forced march, his object being to cross the Rappahannock above the Union army, move through Thoroughfare Gap, strike the Orange and Alexandria Railroad in Pope's rear, and cut him off from Washington; meanwhile Lee continued to threaten Pope's front for the purpose of misleading him. Jackson covered 25 miles the first day (the 25th), camping that night at Salem on the Manassas Gap Railroad. The next day (August 26), he passed through White Plains, Thoroughfare Gap, and Gainesville, unopposed and unobserved, by evening reached Bristoe Station, tore up the railroad track and the telegraph wires, and then sent Stuart with a body of cavalry to Manassas Junction, seven miles nearer Washington. Besides several prisoners and eight guns, Stuart seized a large amount of commissary and quartermaster's supplies, valued at \$1,000,000, and set fire to the stores. That night the Confederates feasted

on Northern bread and meat while Pope's troops went hungry. Pope had learned of Jackson's movement, but was uncertain as to his exact position. He thought that his fight should be made at Warrenton, and accordingly ordered the disposition of his troops with that object in view.* On the night of the 25th Pope's headquarters were at Warrenton Junction. Reynolds' division had joined him on the 23d. On the 25th the advance of Heintzelman's corps arrived from the Army of the Potomac, together with Hooker's and Kearny's divisions, and Fitz-John Porter with the divisions of George Sykes and George W. Morell of his corps. These two corps with Reynolds' division were the only reinforcements that Pope received from the Army of the Potomac until after the battle of Manassas. Full of confidence, Pope decided early on the morning of August 27 to march to Gainesville. The day was spent largely in marching, and a skirmish occurred between Hooker and Ewell at Kettle Run in which Hooker gained the victory. In the evening Pope arrived at Bristoe and, learning of Jackson's situation, issued orders at 9 o'clock to McDowell, who was at Gainesville, and to his other lieutenants to concentrate at Manassas, assuring them that if they would march promptly and rapidly they would bag the whole crowd, meaning Jackson,

* *Official Records*, vol. xii., pt. ii., p. 69; pt. iii., p. 675.

Ewell, and A. P. Hill.* At midnight on August 28 Pope with the van reached Manassas, but Jackson had fled, burning all the stores that he could not transport. Jackson had taken a position near the old battlefield of Bull Run to await the arrival of Longstreet, who he knew was rapidly approaching. Lee had not

one division on the Rappahannock, Lee started with Longstreet to unite with Jackson, and on the night of the 27th had reached White Plains. The next day he pushed on, but James B. Ricketts' division of McDowell's corps, learning that Longstreet's forces were entering Thoroughfare Gap, moved to the Gap and held Long-




been satisfied merely with cutting the Union communications and creating consternation in Washington, but had decided to join Jackson with Longstreet's wing, and upon a favorable opportunity to give battle.† Late on the afternoon of August 26, leaving

street back during the day and into the evening of the 28th. On the afternoon of the 28th, supposing that Jackson was east of Bull Run, Pope ordered his army to Centreville, Heintzelman and Jesse L. Reno by the fords of Bull Run, and McDowell, Reynolds and Sigel by the Warrenton turnpike. The advance along the turnpike was begun without the knowledge that Jackson was just north of it on the

* Ropes, *The Army under Pope*, p. 53; Allan, *Army of Northern Virginia*, p. 218; *Official Records*, vol. xii., pt. ii., p. 72.


† Allan, *Army of Northern Virginia*, p. 200.



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 1. THE BATTLEFIELD OF CEDAR MOUNTAIN. 2. THE BATTLEFIELD OF SECOND BULL RUN OR MANASSAS. 3. THE NEW BRIDGE AT BULL RUN, BUILT BY McDOWELL'S ENGINEERS. 4. PROVOST GUARD OF THE NINTH NEW YORK AT MANASSAS.

field of the first battle of Bull Run. The Union approach led Jackson to attack, thus revealing his position which Pope had been seeking in vain. This was the battle of Gainesville, which was bitterly contested between Taliaferro's division and two brigades of Ewell, and Rufus King of McDowell's division. The loss was heavy on

on the morning of the 29th was greatly relieved to find that his opponents had retreated and that he could get through the Gap unmolested. Accordingly at dawn of the 29th he began the march, and by noon was on the battle-field of Bull Run. By this time the battle of Groveton had already begun. About 9 o'clock in the morn-



both sides, and though it was a drawn battle,* the Union troops considered their situation so critical that they retreated, Ricketts' brigade to Bristoe Station, and King's to Manassas.† Longstreet had thought himself in desperate straits when he found himself opposed by the Union troops, but

ing, ignorant of the arrival of Longstreet's corps, Pope had issued to McDowell and Porter a joint order, directing them to move their commands toward Gordonsville and to establish communication between themselves and the main body on the Warrenton turnpike.* Pope expected that they would assail Jackson in flank and rear, but when the two met about

* Ropes, *The Army under Pope*, p. 77.

† Charles King, *Gainesville*, in *United States Magazine*, series iii., vol. iii., pp. 1128-1148 (1903); Ropes, *The Army under Pope*, chap. vi.

* *Official Records*, vol. xiii., pt. ii., p. 76.

three miles from Manassas Junction and about five miles from Gordonsville, they agreed that the order could not be fulfilled to the letter, as a dispatch had just been received from General John Buford stating that a considerable body of Confederates was approaching from the direction of Gordonsville. Believing that there was immediate need of the presence of one of them on the left flank of the main body of the Union army, McDowell resolved to take his corps in that direction, saying to Porter as he left: "You put your force in here and I will take mine up the Sudley Springs road on the left of the troops engaged at that point."* McDowell reached Pope at 5 p. m. and reported to him with King's division (commanded by Hatch, as King was ill). From this time dates the alleged neglect and disobedience of Porter which constitute the charges against him in what came to be known as the Fitz-John Porter case.†

At daylight of the 29th the Union forces were put in motion to pursue

Jackson. His line was mainly along an unfinished railroad, the left near Sudley Springs and the right on high ground north of the Warrenton road overlooking Groveton. The Union forces attacked throughout the day with brief intermissions. At midday there was a lull in the battle, but in the afternoon Pope attacked with vigor. At 4:30, observing that neither McDowell nor Porter had made an attack upon the Confederate right and rear, Pope sent Porter an order to push forward at once into action on the enemy's flank and if possible on his rear.* There is much discussion as to whether this order was delivered at 5 o'clock or 6:30, Porter claiming the latter hour. Porter made preparations to attack, but before they could be completed darkness came on and nothing was done that night. In spite of his disappointment at Porter's inaction, Pope fought on until dark. McDowell arrived late with King's division. As it moved into action it encountered the head of Longstreet's column which had achieved its junction with Jackson. In less than an hour in a bloody contest John B. Hood's division of Longstreet's force had ended the battle of Groveton. Such were the preliminaries of the second battle of Bull Run.†

* *Official Records*, vol. xii., pt. ii., sup., p. 904.

† For details of the case see Grant, *An Undeserved Stigma*, in *North American Review*, vol. cxxxv. (December, 1882); T. A. Lord, *Summary of the Case* (1883); Cox, *The Second Battle of Bull Run as Connected with the Fitz-John Porter Case* (1882); Rhodes, *United States*, vol. iv., p. 138; R. N. R. Phelps, *Stanton and Halleck in the Civil War*; Fitz-John Porter and the Second Bull Run (1905); *Proceedings of a General Court-Martial for the Trial of Major-General Fitz-John Porter* (1862); Porter, *Appeal to the President* * * * with documents (1869), and *Statement of the Services of the Fifth Army Corps in 1862 in Northern Virginia* (1878); T. C. Bullitt, *Argument of Counsel for Fitz-John Porter*

before the Advisory Board of Officers at West Point, Jan. 6, 1879; J. H. Choate, *The Case of General Fitz-John Porter* (1879); William C. Patterson, *Fitz-John Porter* (1880); Ropes, *The Army under Pope*, p. 53 et seq.

* *Official Records*, vol. xii., pt. ii., p. 509.

† Rev. F. Denison, *The Battle of Groveton*; Ropes, *The Army under Pope*, chap. viii.

The movement on August 30 covered the ground of McDowell's and Johnston's battle of the year before. Jackson's line occupied a position from Sudley Springs to the heights overlooking Groveton. Lee, whose forces were now all up, formed Longstreet's line across the Warrenton turnpike on high ground about a mile west of Groveton. On this ridge were a number of batteries under Stephen D. Lee and John B. Walton. The line then turned east, south of the turnpike, and extended toward the Sudley Springs road. The Confederate position south of the Warrenton road seemed not to be suspected by Pope who believed the Confederates to be retreating. At noon, therefore, after reconnoissances north of the road, he ordered a vigorous pursuit.* Porter was to push west on the Warrenton turnpike with King's division on his right and Reynolds' division on his left. Ricketts' division followed by Heintzelman's corps was to press on the Haymarket road, while the corps of Sigel and Reno acted as reserves.

In the morning the Confederate generals were apprehensive that Pope would get away from them,[†] but Lee, though eager for battle, had made up his mind that he would not take the initiative. While he waited, Pope made the very movement that he wished. At 4 o'clock Porter advanced with his own corps, and King's divi-

sion pushed in on Jackson's line with great pertinacity. Lee seemed willing to allow the Union troops to exhaust themselves in these futile attacks, but Jackson was finally compelled to call for assistance, and Longstreet was dispatched to make a counter attack. Longstreet, however, instead of sending troops, placed his batteries so as to enfilade Jackson's front and opened with a terrific flanking fire of artillery. The Union lines were repulsed with great loss, and all their efforts were expended in defending the position against Longstreet's forces south of the Warrenton turnpike. The whole of Longstreet's line went forward toward the road with a rush. There were five divisions: C. M. Wilcox, on the left, then N. G. Evans (Hood), R. H. Anderson, J. L. Kemper, and David R. Jones. When Jackson saw Longstreet's advance, he ordered his own line forward and gradually forced back the corps of Heintzelman and Reno. A fierce struggle took place for the possession of two elevated positions near the Henry and Chinn houses. The latter, known as Bald Hill, was carried by the Confederates after persistent and sanguinary fighting, but the Henry house hill was held against every assault, and Sykes' regulars who held it covered the retreat across the stone bridge to Centreville. The Union forces remained in possession of this hill until 8 o'clock, when, the last of the troops having retreated, they moved backward, destroyed the stone bridge,

* *Official Records*, vol. xii., pt. iii., p. 741.

[†] James Longstreet in *Battles and Leaders*, vol. ii., p. 520.

and rejoined the army which had then concentrated at Centreville. While the battle was not exactly a rout, it was a bad Union defeat. Though there was much straggling,* the main army had retreated in good order and Lee did not pursue. In the management of the battle Pope's chief tactical error lay in an obstinate persistence in the belief that the enemy were in retreat. Lee displayed his eminent generalship in a striking manner.†

Pope was reinforced at Centreville by the strong corps of Sumner and Franklin from the Army of the Potomac. Here also he found supplies, of which his army was badly in need, since it had fought for two days almost entirely without food or forage. The day after the battle General Lee set out in pursuit, marching his army by way of Sudley Ford around Pope's right at Centreville to seize Fairfax Court House and interpose between Pope and Washington; and that night Jackson who was in advance bivouaced at Chantilly on the Little River turnpike, with Longstreet some distance in the rear. The next morning General Stuart informed Jackson that a part of the

Union army was at Fairfax Court House and that Pope's trains were coming to that place from Centreville. Jackson moved cautiously toward Fairfax Court House, and on reaching Ox Hill, three miles from Chantilly, formed in battle order, with his artillery on the left of the road, and his infantry on the right extending in the direction of the Centreville road. At 1 P. M. Pope, having heard of Jackson's advance toward his rear, sent General I. I. Stevens with about 3,000 men of Reno's corps to hold Jackson in check until the army could be brought into position at Fairfax Court House. When Stevens' advance skirmishers drove back his own, Jackson sent a regiment forward, but its advance was immediately repelled by Samuel N. Benjamin's battery. Taking with him six regiments (2,000 men), Stevens at 4 o'clock began to move towards Jackson's position. When within 75 yards of a body of woods, Stevens' column was met with a terrific fire from Branch's brigade, and at first began to waver. For a moment the assault was checked, but Stevens, seizing the colors, sprang forward, routed Branch, and gained the enemy's position, though a moment afterward Stevens himself was killed. At almost the same moment a terrific thunderstorm burst over the field, wetting ammunition, blinding the men, and making fighting practically impossible. In the meantime Jackson brought up fresh men, and

* Franklin says that upon his arrival at the Warrenton turnpike at six o'clock he found it "filled with fleeing men, artillery, and wagons, all leaving the field in a panic. It was a scene of terrible confusion.—*Official Records*, vol. xii., pt. ii., p. 536.

† T. Worthington, *A Correct History of Pope, McDowell and Fitz-John Porter at the Second Battle of Bull Run, August 29, 1862*; Ropes, *The Army under Pope*, pp. 49-140

after a contest of more than an hour the six regiments were driven out of the woods and fell back to the point where they had been formed, on the right of which point David B. Birney's brigade of Kearny's division had come up. Meanwhile three regiments of Reno's command had been sent in on Stevens' right, only one of which, however (the 21st Massachusetts), became seriously engaged, being repulsed with great loss. General Kearny then arrived with a battery, met the 21st Massachusetts as it came out of the woods, and was leading it to the left when he was informed that the Confederates were advancing from the woods and through a cornfield on Birney. He spurred his horse into the cornfield to reconnoiter, ran upon the Confederate skirmish line and, observing his mistake, was about to ride back when he was shot through the body and killed.* A sharp encounter ensued, only to be ended by darkness, when the regiment withdrew and the Confederates retired to the woods, neither side having gained any advantage. Pope's army was then ordered by the authorities at Washington to withdraw within the defences of the city, while Lee marched across the Potomac into Maryland. The Union loss at Chantilly was about 800, that of the Confederates about 700.† Pope's losses throughout the campaign from August 16 to Sep-

tember 2 were 10,199 killed and wounded, and 4,263 captured or missing. The best estimates place the Confederate loss at about 8,500. During the campaign the Union forces numbered between 65,000 and 70,000, while the Confederates numbered only 54,000.*

During these operations, Halleck at Washington, and McClellan at Alexandria were endeavoring to forward reinforcements to Pope. When, on August 30, Secretary Stanton learned that McClellan had not been as prompt as he should have been in effecting the retreat ordered, he issued an order stating that General McClellan would thenceforth hold command of that portion of the Army of the Potomac that had not been sent forward to Pope.† Since this portion contained only 100 men this practically constituted an order of removal for McClellan. However, when news of the second Bull Run disaster reached Washington, Halleck telegraphed to

Official Records, vol. xii.; Ropes, *The Army under Pope*, chap. xi.

* Ropes, *The Army under Pope; Battles and Leaders*, vol. ii., pp. 449-541; A. L. Long, *Memoirs of R. E. Lee*; J. E. Cooke, *Stonewall Jackson*; Fitzhugh Lee, *Life of General R. E. Lee*; G. F. R. Henderson, *Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War*; Allan, *The Army of Northern Virginia in 1862*; Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. vi., chap. i.; Hazard Stevens, *The Second Battle of Bull Run* (1912); J. A. Monroe, *Battery D, First Rhode Island Light Artillery at the Second Battle of Bull Run* (1890); G. H. Gordon, *The Army of Virginia; Confederate Military History*, vol. iii., pp. 315-334; vol. iv., pp. 95-105; vol. v., pp. 124-139; vol. vi., pp. 179-180; vol. x., pt. i., pp. 230-236.

† *Official Records*, vol. xii., pt. iii., p. 739; vol. xi., pt. i., p. 103.

* *Battles and Leaders*, vol. ii., pp. 537-538; and the biographies of Kearny.

† Hazard Stevens, *Life of General I. I. Stevens*, vol. ii.; G. H. Gordon, *The Army of Virginia*;

McClellan that he was utterly tired out and wished his assistance in this crisis.* Accordingly on September 1 McClellan went to Washington and soon gave it as his opinion that everything valuable should be drawn in at once.† At the same time Pope advised that the army be brought back to the intrenchments in front of Washing-

ton. Therefore, upon learning of the full extent of the disaster, Lincoln, on September 5, in spite of the remonstrances of his Cabinet,* placed McClellan in command of all the troops in the field and directed Pope to report for orders to the Secretary of War,† this being tantamount to his removal from command.

CHAPTER XVI.

1862.

ACTS OF CONGRESS: POSTPONEMENT OF EMANCIPATION.

Military possession of railroad and telegraph lines authorized — The Pacific railroad bill — The imposition of internal and income taxes — Increase of tariff duties — Passage of the Confiscation Act — Hunter's emancipation proclamation — Lincoln's proclamation declaring it void — His conference with the border slave State Republicans — His message to Congress — His decision to postpone the Emancipation Proclamation — His reply to Greeley's letter.

Meanwhile the second session of the Thirty-Seventh Congress was still hard at work. By an act approved on January 31 the President was authorized to take military possession of the railroad and telegraph lines when the public safety required it. Another important step taken by Congress was the passing on July 1 of "An act to aid in the construction of a railroad and telegraph line from the Missouri River to the Pacific Ocean and to secure to the Government the use of the same for postal, military, and other purposes."

To provide annual revenues for the support of the Government and

to pay interest on the public debt, a voluminous tax bill was passed and approved on July 1. Under this act men in all classes of trade and all kinds of business were required to pay for licenses. A heavy tax was laid on tobacco and cigars, a duty of 20 cents per gallon was imposed on spirits, and \$1 per barrel on malt liquors. Taxes were levied on nearly all manufactured articles and on carriages, yachts, billiard tables, railroad bonds, legacies, passports, distributive shares of personal property, slaughtered cattle, hogs, and sheep; and a duty of 3 per cent. was laid on

* *Official Records*, vol. xi., pt. i., p. 103. See also Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. vi., p. 20; Rhodes, *United States*, vol. iv., p. 134.

† *Official Records*, vol. xi., pt. i., p. 103.

* Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. vi., pp. 21-22. See also Ropes, *The Army under Pope*, chap. xii.

† *Official Records*, vol. xii., pt. iii., pp. 807, 812-813; *McClellan's Own Story*, pp. 566-567.

all gains, profits, or incomes exceeding \$600, of every person residing within the United States, and on the gross receipts of railroads, steamships, toll bridges, and advertisements in newspapers, and on the dividends of banks, saving institutions, trust and insurance companies. One-tenth of 1 per cent. was exacted on the gross amount of auction sales, and 5 per cent. on incomes exceeding \$10,000, while the incomes of citizens residing abroad were taxed the same amount. Stamp duties were imposed on every kind of paper, also on playing cards, medicines or other preparations, perfumery and cosmetics.* The tariff was also increased.

During the first session of the Thirty-Seventh Congress a bill was introduced to increase the duties on tea, sugar, and coffee. The Government needed funds so badly that this bill was rushed through both Houses and was approved by the President on December 4, 1861. Toward the close of the session another tariff act was passed, advancing temporarily the duties on imports. The changes made were partly a substitution of new duties for those previously in force, and partly in addition to the old duties. In both cases tea, coffee, and sugar which were already taxed severely were left unchanged. Under the Morrill tariff all refined sugar brought a duty of three-quarters of a cent per pound, while under the war duty this was increased to two and a half, three,

and three and a half cents per pound according to grade. Upon imported iron (except pig iron), upon cotton and wool goods of all classes, and on almost all articles known as protected articles heavy additional taxes were laid. At the same time the free list was greatly shortened, so that there were only 99 articles left on it. This bill was approved by the President on July 14, 1862.*

The next important measure of this session was the Confiscation Act. The act as finally passed and approved continued the penalty of death for treason (though the discretion of the court might be exercised in commuting the punishment to confinement and imprisonment) and defined the crime of rebellion annexing a penalty to it. The President was directed to seize the estate, property, money, stocks, credits and effects of all military and civil officers of the Southern Confederacy, and after 60 days of public warning to confiscate likewise the property of all those engaged in armed rebellion or in aiding or abetting rebellion against the United States. The slaves of those convicted of treason or rebellion and the slaves of "rebel owners" who in any way came under the authority of the Federal Government were freed forever; the protection of the Fugitive Slave Act was denied to all owners of escaped slaves except those who were loyal to the Union and the military

* Rhodes, *United States*, vol. iv., pp. 58-60.

* Stanwood, *American Tariff Controversies*, vol. ii., pp. 127-128.

and civil officers were forbidden to surrender any fugitive to the claimant; the colonization of colored persons was authorized, as was the employment of negroes as soldiers; and the President was granted power to amnesty the Confederates by proclamation and to make exceptions from a general pardon.* The bill as finally passed was not so stringent in its provisions as the bill originally proposed; but even in this altered form it was more acceptable to the radicals than the measure proposed by the conservative Republicans and the Unionists of the border States. Nevertheless, after the conference, the Confiscation Act was passed by the House on July 11 and by the Senate the next day. Lincoln originally intended to veto this bill, and had already prepared his message to Congress to that effect, but Congress added an explanatory joint resolution which removed Lincoln's main objection to the bill itself, and therefore he allowed it to become law.†

The radical Republicans now became more censorious toward the President. First, they found fault with him because he was not conducting the war with vigor; second, because he did not remove General McClellan from command; third, be-

cause he did not strike at slavery. Many seemed to think that Congress was acting under duress and must learn the "royal pleasure" before an act could be passed.* Nevertheless Lincoln was thinking about slavery as earnestly as any of the radicals,† and was soon able to take action with regard to it. On March 31 General David Hunter had taken command of the Department of the South, comprising the States of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida. On May 9 he issued an order from Hilton Head in which, after asserting that the Department of the South was under martial law, he said: "Slavery and martial law in a free country are altogether incompatible. The persons in these three States, Georgia, Florida, and South Carolina, heretofore held as slaves, are therefore declared forever free."‡ Public attention was at once aroused. Hunter's course was applauded by some and denounced by others. The first knowledge of Hunter's proclamation came to Lincoln through the newspapers about the middle of May. Chase urged the President to let the order stand, but Lincoln said that no commanding general should do "such a thing upon my responsibility without

* See Woods' speech in *Congressional Globe*, 37th Congress, 2d session, p. 3375 *et seq.*

† Harris, *The Political Conflict in America*, pp. 264-265.

‡ *Official Records*, vol. xiv., p. 341; Richardson, *Messages and Papers*, vol. vi., p. 91; Williams, *The Negro Race in America*, vol. ii., p. 257; Robert C. Schenck, *Major-General David Hunter*.

* For Lincoln's note appended to his approval of this act, see Richardson, *Messages and Papers*, vol. vi., pp. 85-87. See also *Appleton's Annual Encyclopædia* for 1862, p. 274; McPherson, *History of the Rebellion*, p. 197.

† Rhodes, *United States*, vol. iv., pp. 60-64.

consulting me.'''* Accordingly on May 19 he issued a proclamation declaring Hunter's order void and appealing to the people of the border slave States to agree upon some plan of gradual abolishment of slavery and to accept the compensation for their slaves proffered them by the President and Congress.† This appeal, however, did not convince those to whom it was addressed; but it showed that Lincoln was desirous of ridding the Nation of slavery in a constitutional way. The proclamation received general approval throughout the country. Accordingly at a conference on July 12 Lincoln requested the Republicans of the border slave States (Maryland, Delaware, Kentucky, and Missouri) to adopt his policy, accept compensation for their slaves, and press the subject upon the attention of their constituency.‡ They replied that this policy seemed to interfere with the rights of the States; that it was a question whether Congress had the constitutional power to make an appropriation for such a purpose; that the country could not bear the expense involved; and that Congress was not sincere in making such an offer.||

* Warden, *Life of Chase*, p. 433.

† Richardson, *Messages and Papers*, vol. vi., pp. 91-92; Lincoln's *Complete Works*, vol. ii., p. 156. See also Rhodes, *United States*, vol. iv., pp. 65-66; Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. vi., pp. 94-95; Williams, *The Negro Race in America*, vol. ii., pp. 258-259.

‡ For his second appeal to them, see Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. vi., pp. 109-111.

|| McPherson, *History of the Rebellion*, p. 215; Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. vi., pp. 111-112; Rhodes, *United States*, vol. iv., p. 68.

Still Lincoln did not abandon hope, and on July 13 discussed the subject with Seward and Welles. The reverses suffered by the Union army compelled the conviction that a new policy must be adopted. Since the slaves were raising the food for the Confederate army and serving as teamsters and laborers on intrenchments, Lincoln came to the conclusion that it was absolutely essential for the salvation of the Nation that the slaves be freed.* Accordingly, on July 14, Lincoln asked the Senate and the House to pass a bill placing at his disposal a certain sum of 6 per cent. interest-bearing bonds of the United States to be used by him in paying for slaves in any State that lawfully abolished slavery within its territory.† This message was not well received in the Senate, and in the House action was postponed until the day before adjournment, when (on July 16) a bill was introduced providing for an issue of bonds amounting to \$180,000,000 to be used to compensate loyal slave owners in the border States and Tennessee when these States lawfully abolished slavery, and for an appropriation of \$20,000,000 to be expended in colonizing free negroes. However, as Congress was to adjourn the next day, the bill was not considered.‡

* See the diary of Secretary Welles quoted in Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. vi., pp. 121-123.

† Richardson, *Messages and Papers*, vol. vi., p. 84.

‡ Rhodes, *United States*, vol. iv., pp. 70-71. See also *Congressional Globe*, p. 3394.

Five days after Congress adjourned (July 22), Lincoln read to his Cabinet an emancipation proclamation which he proposed to issue, stating that on January 1, 1863, all slaves in States wherein the constitutional authority of the United States was not recognized should be thenceforward and forever free.* Most of the Cabinet members gave this policy unqualified support. Seward, however, questioned the expediency of issuing the proclamation at this time, stating that the depression of the public mind was so great that he feared the effect of so important a step. He suggested that its promulgation be postponed until Lincoln could give it to the country supported by a great military victory. Lincoln followed Seward's advice, and postponed the matter.†

When Lincoln made this decision all indications afforded a reasonable hope that the delay would be short. Disaster, however, hung upon the Union arms and, moreover, the military situation gave a new and serious character to the political conditions. The radicals and conservatives accused each other with being the cause of failure and clamored for a change of policy. While Lincoln had determined upon his course, circumstances precluded his divulging it, and he was obliged to maintain the appearance of indecision, thus only bringing

upon himself a greater flood of importunities. On August 20 Greeley wrote and printed in the *New York Tribune* a long open letter to Lincoln (known as "The Prayer of Twenty Millions"), accusing him of failing to execute the Confiscation Act and of being unduly influenced by certain "fossil politicians" from the border slave States, and complaining that a large proportion of the army officers were evincing more solicitude to uphold slavery than to put down the rebellion.* On August 22 Lincoln replied that his policy was as follows:

"I would save the Union. I would save it the shortest way under the Constitution. The sooner the national authority can be restored, the nearer the Union will be 'the Union as it was.' If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time save slavery, I do not agree with them. If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time destroy slavery, I do not agree with them. My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union, and is not either to save or to destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slave, I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves, I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would also do that. What I do about slavery and the colored race, I do because I believe it helps to save the Union; and what I forbear, I forbear because I do not believe it would help to save the Union. I shall do less whenever I shall believe whatever I am doing hurts the cause, and I shall do more whenever I shall believe doing more will help the cause. I shall try to correct errors when shown to be errors, and I shall adopt new views so fast as they shall appear to be true views. I have here stated my purpose according to my view of of-

* Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, pp. 125-126.

† See Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. vi., pp. 128-130, quoting F. B. Carpenter, *Six Months in the White House*, pp. 20-22.

* Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. vi., pp. 151-152; Rhodes, *United States*, vol. iv., pp. 72-73; Greeley, *The American conflict*, vol. ii., p. 249; Williams, *The Negro Race in America*, vol. ii., p. 253.

ficial duty; and I intend no modification of my oft expressed personal wish that all men everywhere could be free." *

Lincoln's reply received the widest publicity and undoubtedly was read by everyone at the North. Long before this Lincoln had had the majority of the people with him, and his reply made many new friends. In spite

of military misfortune he still had only to announce clearly his policy to obtain for it the support of the majority of the plain people. At an enthusiastic mass meeting in Chicago a poem was read based upon the July call for troops, and the words "We are coming, Father Abraham, 300,000 more," were on every lip.

CHAPTER XVII.

1862-1863.

LEE'S INVASION OF MARYLAND: SOUTH MOUNTAIN: ANTIETAM: FREDERICKSBURG.

Lee's failure to secure aid in Maryland — Beginning of the pursuit by McClellan — Jackson's capture of Harper's Ferry — The battle of South Mountain (Crampton's, Turner's and Fox's Gaps) — Lee's retreat to the Antietam — The battle of Sharpsburg or Antietam — Lee's retreat into Virginia — The engagement at Shepherdstown Ford — Stuart's raid into Pennsylvania — The removal of McClellan — Defeat of Burnside at Fredericksburg — The "Mud March" — The removal of Burnside from command.

Lee's success in routing Pope seems to have convinced the Confederate authorities that the present was a propitious time to invade Maryland. Lee wrote that he could not afford to be idle, since his soldiers were ragged and destitute, the army was deficient in material of war, and moreover the weakened and demoralized condition of the Union army invited attack.† Accordingly, on September 3, Lee put his troops in motion and on reaching Dranesville informed Davis of his intention of invading Maryland. On September 4, while at Leesburg, he

informed Davis that he intended to begin the march unless Davis should signify his disapprobation, but before his dispatch could have reached Richmond the Army of Northern Virginia had crossed the Potomac and the van led by Jackson had reached Frederick City (on the 6th).* Anxious to conciliate and give the people of Maryland "an opportunity of liberating themselves"† Lee on September 8 is-

* Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. vi., pp. 152-153; Lincoln's *Complete Works*, vol. ii., p. 227; Williams, *The Negro Race in America*, vol. ii., pp. 254-255.

† F. W. Palfrey, *The Antietam and Fredericksburg*, p. 15.

* It was Jackson's ride through the streets of Frederick City that gave occasion to Whittier to invent the story of Barbara Frietchie. Jackson was not a man who would give an order to fire at the window of a private house merely because he saw there "the old flag" and it is quite impossible that Barbara's remark, "Spare your country's flag" could have brought a "blush of shame" over Jackson's face. See Rhodes, *United States*, vol. iv., pp. 140-141: *Battles and Leaders*, vol. ii., pp. 618-619.

† *Official Records*, vol. xix., pt. ii., p. 593.

sued an address to the people of Maryland appealing to them to throw off tyranny, to regain their rights in connection with their Southern brethren, and to secure by his aid their ancient freedom of thought and speech.* Lee's invitations, however, were treated with indifference; the people gave no sign of rising.† As a whole, the State was loyal and adhered to the Union from motives of principle more than those of interest. The most serious obstacle with which Lee had to contend was the difficulty in securing subsistence. He proposed to pay for all the supplies taken, but his only medium of exchange was Confederate currency or certificates of indebtedness, and these the Marylanders refused to take. Moreover, caring little for the custom offered them by the officers and soldiers, the Frederick people closed their shops.‡ Learning that he could not subsist on the country, Lee decided to open a line of communication through the Shenandoah Valley. Here again Lee met with an obstacle, for Harper's Ferry, which commanded the valley, was held by a Union garrison. Lee expected the Union troops to evacuate upon his approach, and this would have been done had McClellan's advice been taken.¶ But Halleck refused to abandon the place, and thus Lee was compelled to

divide his army, sending Jackson into Virginia to capture Harper's Ferry while he and Longstreet proceeded toward Hagerstown.*

McClellan arranged to follow Lee and on September 5 started his troops from Washington. On September 10 he ordered a general advance, but almost immediately relapsed into his old habit of requesting reinforcements.† On the 11th he wrote to Halleck, specifying the troops that he wished and urging that it would be better to weaken the defences about Washington to strengthen his army than to risk the ruin and disaster "which would follow a signal defeat of this army."‡ Accordingly the President ordered Porter's corps to join McClellan and on September 12 a portion of the Union right wing entered Frederick City amid the joyful acclaim of its inhabitants.¶ At this juncture fortune favored McClellan. On the 13th one of his officers found Lee's special order of the 9th containing his entire plan of campaign.§ By this he learned that the enemy was before him, only a day's march away,

* Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. vi., pp. 132-133; Rhodes, *United States*, vol. iv., pp. 142-143.

† *Official Records*, vol. xix., p. 234.

‡ *Ibid.*, pp. 253-255.

¶ Regarding this see *McClellan's Own Story*, p. 571.

§ Rhodes, *United States*, vol. iv., p. 145. See also Gen. Nelson A. Miles, *My Recollections of Antietam*, in *Cosmopolitan Magazine*, vol. liii., no. 5, p. 582 (October, 1912). A copy of the order is in Palfrey, *The Antietam and Fredericksburg*, pp. 20-21. See also *Confederate Military History*, vol. iv., pp. 107-108.

* *Official Records*, vol. xix., pt. ii., 601; *Confederate Military History*, vol. ii., pp. 89-90.

† *Official Records*, p. 596.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 506 *et seq.*


¶ *Ibid.*, vol. xix., pt. i., pp. 43, 145; Palfrey, *The Antietam and Fredericksburg*, pp. 18-19.

that Lee's force was inferior to his own, and that it was divided. Accordingly he marched his army forward but before he could come up with the enemy and engage him Harper's Ferry had been captured.

As we have said, Lee believed that the Union garrison at Harper's Ferry under command of Colonel Dixon S. Miles would be withdrawn upon his approach, thus opening his line of communication through the Shenandoah Valley. But this was not done and it became necessary to dislodge the garrison. Accordingly, Lee decided to divide his army and capture the Union forces at Martinsburg and Harper's Ferry, and on the morning of September 10 the army was put in motion from Frederick. General John G. Walker with his division of two brigades crossed the Potomac at

Point-of-Rocks, 12 miles below Harper's Ferry, and on the 15th seized Loudoun Heights beyond the Shenandoah. Jackson with 14 brigades marched rapidly over the South Mountain at Turner's Gap, crossed the Potomac at Williamsport on the 11th, drove the garrison at Martinsburg under General Julius White into Harper's Ferry, and at noon appeared

before Bolivar Heights and invested Harper's Ferry from the Virginia side of the Potomac. McLaws with 10 brigades marched over Browns-ville Gap of the South Mountain, crossed Pleasant Valley, and after a severe engagement with Colonel Thomas H. Ford on the 12th and 13th



drove him from Maryland Heights into Harper's Ferry. Miles and his garrison of 12,000 men were now completely surrounded. General Lee, with nine brigades of Longstreet's command and D. H. Hill's division of five brigades, followed Jackson over South Mountain, leaving Hill near Boonsboro to support Stuart's cavalry which had been left east of the

Blue Ridge. Lee, with Longstreet, moved to Hagerstown, there to await the capture of Harper's Ferry and then to concentrate his army for a movement into Pennsylvania, the capture of Harrisburg and the destruction of the long railroad bridge over the Susquehanna.


Artillery fire was opened on the 14th, and late in the afternoon Jackson moved upon Bolivar Heights, drove in Miles' skirmishers, and secured an advantageous position on the left of the Union lines. During the night 1,500 Union cavalry crossed the river at Harper's Ferry to Maryland, and escaped. At the same time Jackson established 10 guns on the right bank of the Shenandoah on a plateau at the foot of Loudoun Heights, enfilading Miles' entire position at Bolivar Heights. Early on the 15th all the Confederate guns opened fire and after an hour partially silenced the Union guns. Jackson then advanced his lines and when he had come within 150 yards of the Union works at Bolivar Heights, Miles directed White to run up a white flag and arrange terms of capitulation. Soon after this, Miles was mortally wounded by a shell from a battery that had not seen the white flag. The Union loss was 44 killed, 173 wounded and nearly 12,000 prisoners; besides, the Confederates captured 70 guns, 13,000 small arms, 200 wagons and large quantities of valuable stores with a loss to themselves of only 41 killed and 247 wounded. Five days later the

Confederates abandoned Harper's Ferry, and it was again occupied by the Union troops on the 22d.*

Meanwhile McClellan with his army of 87,000 men† had reached Frederick City where he fortunately came into possession of Lee's "Order 191." Though he knew the exact position of every division of Lee's army, McClellan did not act promptly, but waited until 3 p. m. before ordering Alfred Pleasonton, then near Middletown, to ascertain whether the Confederates had moved in the direction indicated in the order. At 3:35 Jacob D. Cox's division of the 9th corps was ordered to march from Frederick to Middletown and support Pleasonton's cavalry in a reconnoissance to Turner's Gap. Pleasonton began the march, but found his way blocked by Stuart's cavalry. Late in the day McClellan decided to relieve Harper's Ferry and at the same time to crush Lee's isolated command at Boonsboro. Franklin's 6th corps and Couch's division were to pass through Crampton's Gap of South Mountain, break through the line of investment that McLaws had thrown across Maryland Heights and the foot of Pleasant Valley, relieving Miles at Harper's Ferry, and at the same time interpose between McLaws and that part of

* Allan, *Army of Northern Virginia; Battles and Leaders*, vol. ii., pp. 604-618; Rhodes, *United States*, vol. iv., pp. 146-147; Palfrey, *The Antietam and Fredericksburg*, pp. 22-26; *Confederate Military History*, vol. iv., pp. 116-117; vol. v., pp. 147-150.

† Regarding the number see Palfrey, pp. 6-7.




From the original Brady negatives.

1. HARPER'S FERRY BEFORE ITS CAPTURE.
2. THE SOUTH MOUNTAIN BATTLEFIELD.

Lee's army at Boonsboro and Hagerstown. Simultaneously Burnside with the 1st and 9th corps, supported by the rest of the army, was to march through Turner's Gap and fall upon Lee, who it was thought had Longstreet and D. H. Hill at Boonsboro.

General Franklin, who was at Buckeystown, six miles from Frederick and between it and the Potomac, marched at 6 A. M. of the 14th and at noon halted two miles from Burkittsville, which lay half a mile from the foot of Crampton's Gap. Franklin thought he was opposed by a strong body of troops, but in fact the Gap was held by only two small cavalry regiments, part of Mahone's brigade of infantry and two batteries, in all about 900 men under Colonel T. T. Munford. Brownsville Gap, a mile south of Crampton's Gap, was held by Semmes' brigade with 5 guns, while 300 of Semmes' men closely supported Munford's right, so that Franklin's 12,000 men were opposed by only 1,200 infantry and dismounted cavalry with 8 guns, on the winding road about half way up the mountain. It was determined to carry the Confederate position by assault, General Slocum's division advancing on the right of the road leading through the Gap while two brigades of General William F. Smith's division moved on the left of the road. At 3 o'clock Slocum's division was formed in two lines with J. J. Bartlett's brigade on the right, John Newton's brigade in the centre, and Alfred T. Torbert's New Jersey

brigade on the left. Without waiting for Smith's division or artillery to come up, Bartlett, Newton and Torbett, after a hasty consultation, ordered a charge. In the face of a tremendous fire the stone fences were carried and the Confederates driven up the steep hill. When approaching the crest of the hill, Howell Cobb's Georgia brigade which had just come up to support Munford, was encountered in the Gap, instantly routed,



and most of it captured. The Union troops pursued the retreating Confederates to the west foot of South Mountain where they were halted by darkness. In this battle the Union loss was 113 killed, 418 wounded and 2 missing, while the Confederate loss was 70 killed, 289 wounded and 603 captured or missing.

Meanwhile Burnside with the 1st and 9th corps, was busy at Turner's Gap, six miles to the northeast. The engagement was most severe at and south of Fox's Gap, about a mile south of Turner's, but as both actions were for the possession of the main


road which ran through Turner's Gap, this has given the Union name to the battle (which the Confederates called the battle of Boonsboro). With two batteries of artillery Pleasonton opened fire on the Confederate artillery in Turner's Gap early on the 14th, and Cox, with two brigades, marched along the old Sharpsburg Road to the left to take the Confederates in flank. As he approached Fox's Gap, one mile south, he was met by a severe artillery fire. When informed by Stuart that Pleasonton was advancing, D. H. Hill, whose five brigades had been halted near Boonsboro, three miles west of Turner's Gap, turned back to assist in checking the Union advance. When Hill arrived at the Gap before sunrise Stuart had gone to Crampton's Gap and Maryland Heights, leaving the brigades of Samuel Garland and Albert H. Colquitt of Hill's command to defend the Gap. Soon Hill learned that Cox was marching toward Fox's Gap which was held by Colonel Thomas L. Rosser with a regiment of cavalry and 2 guns. Garland's brigade was then sent to Fox's Gap, Colquitt's remained at Turner's Gap, while Anderson's was ordered up from Boonsboro. Hardly had Garland taken position when he was attacked by Cox and after a severe fight in which Garland was killed and Lieutenant-Colonel (afterward President) Rutherford B. Hayes of the 23d Ohio was wounded, Garland's brigade was routed, and Cox gained the crest of

the mountain but could not seize Fox's Gap since at that moment G. B. Anderson's brigade came up and formed in front and on his right covering the road through the Gap. Besides, he learned that D. H. Hill with five brigades was in his front and that Lee with Longstreet's command was hastening from Hagerstown. Accordingly Cox withdrew his advance parties and awaited reinforcements which came up at 2 o'clock—Orlando B. Willcox's division; this formed on Cox's right, covering the road from Fox's Gap. Meanwhile Hill had thrown R. S. Ripley's brigade from Boonsboro in front of Cox's and Robert E. Rodes' brigade on a hill north of Turner's Gap. Lee, leaving Robert Toombs' brigade near Hagerstown, marched back from there with the brigades of G. T. Anderson, Thomas F. Drayton, James L. Kemper, Richard B. Garnett, Albert G. Jenkins, N. G. Evans and the two brigades of Hood's division. Anderson and Drayton were the first to arrive, reaching the field at 3 p. m., and were sent to support Hill's troops at Fox's Gap, Drayton being on the left. The latter, advancing from the woods on the Gap, was encountered by Willcox, defeated and driven from the field with more than half of his brigade killed, wounded and captured. Samuel D. Sturgis' brigade then came up partly relieving Willcox, and near sunset General Jesse L. Reno appeared with Isaac P. Rodman's division, one of whose bri-

gades, and a battery, were sent to Cox's extreme left, the other holding the right. Reno rode forward to reconnoiter to the right of the Gap just as Hood's division came up on the Confederate left. There was a scattering fire on both sides, in which Reno was killed. At about the same time the Confederate right charged Cox's left held by H. S. Fairchild's brigade and J. C. Clark's battery, and their quick repulse ended the engagement at Fox's Gap with the Confederates still in possession. During this engagement, which had lasted from 9 A. M. until after sunset, the Union loss was 157 killed, 691 wounded and 41 missing. The Confederate loss in Cox's front was about 600 killed and wounded and the same number captured.

Meanwhile General Hooker with the 1st corps was severely engaged north of and at Turner's Gap. He had formed line at the eastern base of South Mountain with Meade's division on the right, Hatch's on the left and Ricketts' in reserve. John Gibbon's brigade of Hatch's division was left on the National Road to advance directly into the Gap. The position to be assaulted was held by the brigades of Rodes, Kemper, Jenkins, Garnett and Evans, all under the command of Longstreet. At about 4 o'clock the Union troops began the advance. On the left Hatch drove in the Confederate skirmishers and after severe fighting reached the wooded summit, dislodged the Confederates

from the stone fences behind which they had fled and drove them back to another line. At Hatch's left Gibbon was checked after a stubborn fight by Colquitt's brigade. On the right Meade drove back Rodes' brigade and its support and finally turning it swept to the left and reached the



highest point of the mountain commanding the summit of the Gap. It was now dark and Hooker rested after having lost 167 men killed, 712 wounded and 44 missing. The total Union loss for the possession of Turner's Gap, including Fox's Gap, was 325 killed, 1,403 wounded and 85 missing, while the Confederate loss was 248 killed, 1,013 wounded and 662 missing.*

* *Official Records*, vols. xix., li.; Palfrey, *The Antietam and Fredericksburg*, pp. 27-41; Allan, *Army of Northern Virginia*; *McClellan's Own Story*; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. ii., pp. 559-603; *Confederate Military History*, vol. iii., pp. 339-344; vol. iv., pp. 108-116; vol. v., pp. 141-147; vol. vi., pp. 180-184.

As a result, Lee abandoned his intention of invading Pennsylvania and ordered an immediate retreat to Virginia on the morning of the 15th, crossing the Antietam, with D. H. Hill leading. Lee hoped that McLaws might elude Franklin and join him near the Potomac but while on the march he learned that Franklin had carried Crampton's Gap, thus shutting up McLaw's in Pleasant Valley; therefore he ordered his column to halt at Keedysville to assist McLaws who was now directed to cross Elk Ridge if possible and join him at Keedysville or Sharpsburg or to cross the Potomac at Weverton below Harper's Ferry. Arriving at Keedysville, Lee heard nothing of McLaws and at daylight of the 15th resumed his march for Sharpsburg, still hoping that McLaws could elude Franklin by crossing Elk Ridge. At noon, before reaching Sharpsburg, he learned that Jackson had captured Harper's Ferry, whereupon he concluded not to retreat across the Potomac but to fight McClellan on the heights and banks of the Antietam. Accordingly he ordered Jackson to join him at Sharpsburg as soon as possible and immediately made dispositions to contest McClellan's passage of the Antietam until Jackson, Walker, McLaws and Anderson could join him by marching up the Virginia side of the Potomac.

According to the best computations, Lee had 55,000 men and McClellan 87,000. The latter employed

only about 60,000 men in the battle, while the number of Confederates actually engaged was probably far short of the number which the field returns gave as present for duty.* McClellan should have attacked Lee early on the morning of the 16th when Jackson was still three miles away at Shepherdstown,† when John G. Walker's division was still further distant, and McLaws', R. H. Anderson's and A. P. Hill's divisions were so situated that they could not have come up until the next day. But he frittered away the morning of the 16th by scheming, reconnoitering and changing the position of his troops. In the afternoon he began operations on the right by sending Hooker, who now commanded a corps, across Antietam Creek. A skirmish ensued which lasted until dark and that night Hooker's men lay close to the Confederate left wing. On the 16th Jackson and Walker joined Lee and the chance of splitting the Confederate army was lost, for meanwhile, McClellan had waited for his ammunition and supply trains to arrive and had put off the attack until the morning of the 17th.‡ On

* Rhodes, *United States*, vol. iv., p. 153 and footnote authorities.

† *Official Records*, vol. xix., pt. i., p. 1007.

‡ The Union army was divided into right, centre and left wings with a reserve. The right wing consisted of the first corps under command of Joseph Hooker divided into three divisions under Abner Doubleday, J. B. Ricketts and George Gordon Meade. The centre under the supreme command of E. V. Sumner consisted of the 2d corps divided into three divisions under I. B. Richardson, John Sedgwick and W. H. French

the morning of the 17th Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry brigade and some artillery formed the extreme Confederate left at Nicodemus' Hill. Next came Jones' division of Jackson's corps, in and in front of the west woods; on Jones' right in the open ground east of the Hagerstown turnpike was the bulk of Ewell's division; and on the left centre was D. H. Hill. Longstreet formed the centre and right and A. P. Hill on the extreme right came up in the afternoon. On the left Hood had been relieved by Ewell the night before and formed a reserve near the Dunkard church. On the 15th and 16th McLaws withdrew from Maryland Heights, recrossed the Potomac and early on the morning of the 17th


and the 12th corps commanded by J. K. F. Mansfield divided into two divisions under A. S. Williams and G. S. Greene. The left wing under command of A. E. Burnside consisted of the 9th corps under J. D. Cox divided into four divisions under O. B. Willcox, S. D. Sturgis, I. P. Rodman and J. D. Cox (in the battle, E. P. Scammon). Burnside refused to take personal command of the corps and merely transmitted orders through Cox. The reserve consisted of the 5th corps under Fitz-John Porter in two divisions commanded by George Morell and George Sykes; and the 6th corps under William B. Franklin in two divisions commanded by H. W. Slocum and W. F. Smith. D. N. Couch's division of the 4th corps which came from Pleasant Valley during the forenoon but which did not reach the scene of the battle until after dark of the 17th, was temporarily attached to the reserve. The cavalry was commanded by Alfred Pleasonton. The Confederate army was divided into two corps, the first under James Longstreet consisting of five divisions under J. B. Hood, Lafayette McLaws, D. R. Jones, R. H. Anderson, J. G. Walker; and the second under Stonewall Jackson consisting of four divisions commanded by A. P. Hill, D. H. Hill, J. R. Jones and A. R. Lawton.

rejoined Lee, taking post on the left of the Union forces. Hooker had crossed the Antietam and Mansfield took position in Hooker's rear, Sumner and Burnside remaining east of the stream. Inferring that the main attack would be on their left, the Confederates strengthened it accordingly so that the Union superiority in troops was frittered away in a series of disconnected attacks that gained but little advantage.

At daylight Hooker, lying nearly a mile north of the Dunkard church, made a vigorous onset with a reported strength of 14,856 men but with an actual strength of 10,000. The objective point was the elevated ground about the church. The march had its right on the turnpike and its left along the west edge of the east woods from which a withering fire checked it a little, while the right was raked by a flanking fire from the west woods. Finally the southern edge of the cornfield was gained and the battle began. In the storm of bullets, shot and shell that rained upon them Hooker's troops broke and fled through the corn to re-form in a hollow beyond. The Confederates then attacked but they in turn were driven back. Again the Union troops advanced only to be repulsed in disorder, and again the Confederates followed only to break and fly. This was one of the most frightful carnages of the war. Jackson's famous "Stonewall" division was nearly annihilated, more than half of two brigades and more than

one-third of another and all but two of the regimental commanders being killed or wounded. On the Union side 1,051 men in

corps, badly cut up, slowly retreated northward just as the advance of the 12th under J. K. F. Mansfield appeared. Early in the morning



Rickett's division were cut down and two brigades lost over 40 per cent. Hooker was wounded and borne from the field and was succeeded by Meade. Hood and D. H. Hill then came up to reinforce Jackson, and Hooker's

Mansfield was hastening to Hooker's assistance, but while deploying his troops about 7 A. M. was mortally wounded and A. S. Williams took command. His corps pressed on, however, cleared the



Nos. 1, 2, and 3 taken from the *Photographic History of the Civil War*. Copyright by the Patriot Publishing Company. No. 4 from the original Brady negative.

1. VIEW OF THE PRINCIPAL STREET IN SHARPSBURG, MD.
2. THE SUNKEN ROAD ("BLOODY LANE") AT ANTIETAM, CONNECTING THE HAGERSTOWN AND KEEDYSVILLE TURNPIKES, SHOWING THE CONFEDERATE DEAD AFTER THE BATTLE.
3. PART OF THE BATTLEFIELD AT ANTIETAM, SHOWING THE SMOKE ARISING FROM THE BATTERIES IN ACTION AT THE RIGHT. AT THE LEFT ARE THE CAISSONS OF THE ARTILLERY.
4. BACK OF THE RAIL FENCE ON THE HAGERSTOWN PIKE, WHERE THE CONFEDERATES UNDER "STONEWALL" JACKSON ATTEMPTED TO TURN BACK THE CHARGING UNION SOLDIERS UNDER "FIGHTING JOE" HOOKER.

corn-field of the Confederates and at 8:40 A. M. drove them across the turnpike and into the west woods. The 2d corps under Sumner then came up. This corps had not received orders to march until 7:20 A. M., after the 1st corps had been crippled and the 12th was in the thick of the action. Richardson's division waited for Morell's division of the 5th army corps to come up and this delayed the 2d corps another hour. Finally Sedgwick's division with Sumner at the head and French following, each with perhaps 5,000 men, crossed the Antietam with flanks absolutely unprotected.* Moving west by north until the centre was nearly opposite the Dunkard church, Sumner deployed and faced west, French forming on Greene's left. Sedgwick passed through the east woods in the corn-field, advanced swiftly in three lines, swept by Greene's right, and pressed on through the west woods, with his left on the church, to the western edge and a wood road along it. Meanwhile Walker and McLaws with six brigades had come up to reinforce the Confederates. One brigade had been drawn from the right to reinforce Early's brigade of Ewell's division and the whole body was hurled upon Sedgwick's left flank and rear.† More than 2,200 soldiers were struck down at a blow, Sedgwick being among the wounded. Sumner tried to change

front but the lines broke and scattered northward, sweeping away everything in their rush, and were only re-formed on the north hill where Meade and the 1st corps had taken refuge. The Confederate right then crossed the turnpike at the Dunkard church and made two assaults on Greene's position east of the church. They were repulsed with great slaughter whereupon Greene, making a counter charge, entered the woods beyond the church and succeeded in holding this position until noon, when the Confederates attacked him on both flanks and drove him from the church.

Meanwhile W. F. Smith of Franklin's corps had come on the field. W. S. Hancock (then a brigadier) obtained a regiment from Sumner, took position opposite the woods, silenced the Confederate batteries and drove away their skirmishers. A second brigade was placed on his left and with heavy loss advanced to near the church, but on sending for his reserve brigade to support it Smith found that it had been ordered away to support French. The latter, moving to the left, south of the east woods, drove back D. H. Hill's skirmishers to his main line in the sunken road where he engaged him for over an hour when he was joined by Richardson. At this place a long and sanguinary conflict ensued. The Confederates converted the "bloody lane" into a rough fortress with fence rails and before the Union troops could carry it they had lost nearly a third of their number.

* Francis A. Walker, *Second Army Corps*, p. 106.

† Allan, *Army of Northern Virginia*, p. 405.

About 1 o'clock they gained the position and, shortly afterward, French's troops were relieved by a brigade of Smith's division. Richardson withdrew his men to the ridge but about that time was mortally wounded and succeeded by Hancock. This practically ended the operations on the Federal right. When Richardson's line had been withdrawn an artillery duel took place. Meagher's brigade took the centre and about two regiments came from French to aid Richardson's division. The length of the Union ranks made it impossible for more than one line of troops to be formed, and so far advanced was this line that a part of it was continually swept by the fire of the batteries of the Confederate left, these batteries being protected by the west woods. An attack on the Union left was successfully repulsed by Hexamer's battery (obtained from Franklin) and Battery I, first artillery.

Meanwhile at 7 A. M. on the Union left Burnside had received an order to be prepared to carry by assault a stone bridge across the Antietam about a mile southeast of Sharpsburg.* At about 10 o'clock when the 1st and 12th corps and Sedgwick's division had ceased fighting, Burnside received another order to carry the bridge and the heights beyond and advance on the rear of Sharpsburg. Cox took charge of the operation, ordered a brigade to storm the bridge, Rod-

man to cross by a ford one-third of a mile below, and the two to carry the heights and unite there. Crook missed the bridge and could not get back to it under fire; Rodman missed the ford and was more than two hours crossing under fire. Finally a fresh storming party carried the bridge, Crook crossed some companies above and others at the bridge and Rodman and the rest united about 1 P. M. when the battle on the right was virtually over. Meantime Sturgis' division ran short of ammunition and was replaced by Willcox's and at 3 P. M. the corps was again ready to move though it had been much damaged by the Confederate artillery fire. The right wing drove back Jones' division and gained the suburbs of Sharpsburg, but the left was checked and the two wings became widely separated. Sharpsburg was almost in Cox's grasp when A. P. Hill's division, which had marched that day from Harper's Ferry, came upon the field, attacked Rodman's division on its undefended flank and by a concentric fire mowed down his men, Rodman being among the killed. A panic was averted by Scammon who changed front and checked Hill for a time. Cox called up Sturgis and for a time held his own but at length the corps was obliged to withdraw to the cover of the hills that bordered the Antietam. This ended the battle. The Union loss was 12,410, consisting of 2,108 killed, 9,549 wounded and 753 missing. The Confederate loss is given as 11,172, though the exact total

* Regarding this see the note in Rhodes, *United States*, vol. iv., p. 152.

was never known.* McClellan was in a quandary whether to renew the battle on the 18th or to defer it.† His first impulse was to renew it,‡ but he finally decided to rest his army and get the reinforcements which were arriving into position so that he could attack on the 19th.¶ Many blame McClellan for not following up the Confederates at once§ but as Lee did not move during the 18th McClellan's caution probably redounded to the benefit of the Union cause. The next day, however (the 19th), Lee unopposed retreated across the Potomac into Virginia and the pursuit by the Union troops was neither vigorous nor effectual.

When Lee withdrew he left some artillery and two small infantry brigades at Shepherdstown or Boteler's Ford to hold McClellan in check while he marched for the Opequon. On the

morning of the 20th in order to ascertain how far Lee had retreated, Porter ordered the divisions of Generals Morell and Sykes to make a reconnaissance beyond the Potomac. At 8 o'clock Sykes crossed the Potomac with Charles S. Lovell's brigade of regulars and about a mile out on the Charlestown road came upon the Confederates in force. He then fell back to the heights near the river stationing Warren's small brigade of two regiments on his left. The Confederates encountered by Sykes were A. P. Hill's division of six brigades and three brigades under General Early. While Hill's skirmishers were driving Lovell's brigade back, Barnes' brigade of Morell's division had crossed the river under orders to go on the road to Shepherdstown, but Sykes ordered it straight to the top of a high steep bluff on the river bank to connect with Lovell's right. Soon, however, Sykes concluded that the odds against him were too great and ordered the troops to recross which was done under cover of a heavy artillery fire from the Union batteries on the Maryland side. The withdrawal of the right, however, was not accomplished without disaster, the 118th Pennsylvania regiment, 737 officers and men, being driven over the bluff and losing many men by the fall. The Union loss was 63 killed, 101 wounded and 105 missing. A. P. Hill's loss was 30 killed and 231 wounded. On the 19th and 20th the total Union loss was 71 killed, 161 wounded and 131 missing, while the

* See *Battles and Leaders*, vol. ii., pp. 600-603, 620-695. For other accounts of the battle see Palfrey, *The Antietam and Fredericksburg*, pp. 42-135; Ropes, *Story of the Civil War*; Michie, *General McClellan*; *McClellan's Own Story*; Taylor, *Four Years with General Lee*; Longstreet, *From Manassas to Appomattox*; Rhodes, *United States*, vol. iv., pp. 149-153; Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. vi., pp. 137-141; Allan, *Army of Northern Virginia*; Walker, *Second Army Corps*; Miles, *My Recollections of Antietam*, in *Cosmopolitan Magazine*, vol. liii., pp. 580-589 (October, 1912); Isaac W. Heysinger, *Antietam and the Maryland and Virginia Campaigns of 1862* (1912); James H. Wilson, *Under the Old Flag* (1912); *Confederate Military History*, vol. iii., pp. 346-359; vol. iv., pp. 117-132; vol. v., pp. 151-161; vol. vi. pp. 187-194; vol. x., pt. i., pp. 237-243.

† *Official Records*, vol. xix., pt. i., p. 65.

‡ *Ibid.*, pt. ii., p. 322.

¶ *Ibid.*, pt. i., p. 322.

§ See for instance Swinton, *Army of the Potomac*, pp. 223-224; Palfrey, *The Antietam and Fredericksburg*, p. 127.

Confederate loss was only 33 killed and 252 wounded. After the engagement of the 20th A. P. Hill and Early marched from the field and joined the main body of the Confederate army which bivouaced that night on the Opequon near Martinsburg.*

This ended the Maryland campaign of September, 1862. From the beginning to the end (September 5 to 20) the Union loss, including Harper's Ferry and Maryland Heights, was 2,671 killed, 11,766 wounded and 13,542 captured or missing, an aggregate of 27,979. The Confederate loss was 1,979 killed, 9,607 wounded and 2,336 captured or missing, an aggregate of 13,922.

The latter part of September wore away in resting the exhausted Army of the Potomac.† McClellan's movements were not aggressive enough to satisfy Lincoln and the people of the North. On October 1 Lincoln visited the Army of the Potomac and had an opportunity to review the troops and go over the battle grounds of South Mountain and Antietam. This afforded McClellan an excellent opportunity to explain his delay in following up Lee and his army. Evidently Lincoln was not very much impressed by McClellan's reasoning for on his return to Washington October 6 he issued through Halleck the following order:

"The President directs that you cross the Potomac and give battle to the enemy or drive him south. Your army must move now while the roads are good. If you cross the river between the enemy and Washington and cover the latter by your operations you can be reinforced with 30,000 men. If you move up the Valley of the Shenandoah not more than 12,000 or 15,000 can be sent you."*

This order seems to have had no potent effect on McClellan and while procrastinating he was again subjected to the same humiliation which Lee had once before inflicted upon him on the peninsula—Stuart's cavalry rode entirely around the Union army.

Lee had received word of some movements of the Union army and, to ascertain their end and to disarrange McClellan's plans for crossing the Potomac, on October 8 ordered General J. E. B. Stuart with his cavalry to cross the Potomac above Williamsport, destroy bridges and railroads, and do all the damage possible. Selecting 1,800 men (600 each from his three brigades) commanded by Wade Hampton and Colonels W. H. F. Lee and W. E. Jones, Stuart crossed the Potomac on the 10th at McCoy's Ford above Williamsport, passed Cox's Kanawha division near Clear Spring, marched northward along the western side of Cumberland Valley by way of Mercersburg and reached Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, at 8 o'clock. On the 11th he destroyed the railroad depots and a large quantity of military sup-

* *Official Records*, vol. xix.; Smith, *History of the 118th Pennsylvania Volunteers*; *Confederate Military History*, vol. v., pp. 161-163.

† *Official Records*, vol. xix., pt. i., pp. 70-71.

* *Official Records*, vol. xix., pt. i., p. 72. See also Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. vi., pp. 175-176.

plies, paroled 280 sick and wounded soldiers in the hospital and seized over 500 good cavalry horses. Leaving Chambersburg, Stuart continued his ride for some time without meeting opposition. When it became known that Stuart had crossed the Potomac preparations were made to cut off his escape. Cox's Kanawha division was stationed at Clear Spring near Hagerstown; all the fords on the Potomac were carefully guarded; W. W. Averell's cavalry was ordered down from near Hancock and Pleasonton's cavalry then near Hagerstown was sent in pursuit. Learning of these preparations and skilfully avoiding Pleasonton's cavalry, Stuart pushed on through Barnesville, passed through Stoneman's division of Union troops lying between Poolesville and the mouth of the Monocacy, and sent the head of his column under Colonel Lee to secure a crossing of the Potomac at White's Ford, while he with the rear guard held Pleasonton in check. Lee had but little trouble in seizing the ford, and Stuart soon crossed the river with over 1,200 horses from the farms of Pennsylvania and a number of prisoners, some of whom were prominent citizens to be held as hostages for citizens of the Confederacy who had been arrested and imprisoned. In the entire expedition Stuart had but one man wounded and two captured.*

This daring raid stirred up afresh public impatience of delay. McClellan complained that he could not advance because he was short of horses and what he did have were broken down by fatigue. Lincoln wrote to McClellan: "Will you pardon me for asking what the horses of your army have done since the battle of Antietam that fatigues anything?"* Again he said: "Stuart's cavalry outmarched ours, having certainly done more marked service on the peninsula and everywhere since."† This resulted in a tedious correspondence between the War Department and McClellan, until, weary of the controversy, Lincoln wrote: "To be told after more than five weeks' total inaction of the army and during which period we have sent to the army every fresh horse we possibly could amounting in a whole to 7,918, that the cavalry horses were too much fatigued to move, presents a very cheerless, almost hopeless, prospect for the future. * * * If not recruited and rested then, when could they ever be?"‡ As the President's peremptory order of October 6 had produced no effect, Lincoln wrote to McClellan on the 13th saying that there was no reason why he should not be moving the same as the enemy.|| Finally on October 26 the army, 116,000 strong, began to cross the

* Allan, *Army of Northern Virginia*; McClellan, *Life of General J. E. B. Stuart*; Theodore S. Garnett, *J. E. B. Stuart* (1908).

* *Official Records*, vol. xix., pt. ii., p. 485.

† *Ibid.*, p. 490.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 496.

|| *Ibid.*, vol. xix., pt. i., pp. 13-14. See also Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. vi., pp. 181-184.

Potomac and six days later the last division was over. On the advance of the Union army the Confederates fell back, Longstreet's corps, accompanied by Lee, going to Culpeper Court House while Jackson remained in the Shenandoah Valley. By this time Lincoln had begun to think that McClellan had no real desire to beat the enemy. Finally he decided that if McClellan permitted Lee to cross the Blue Ridge and place himself between Richmond and the Union army he would remove him from command.* Hence when it was reported that Lee and Longstreet had accomplished this very movement, he sent an order to McClellan dated November 5 directing him to report for further orders at Trenton, New Jersey, and to turn the command of the army of the Potomac over to General Burnside. This ended McClellan's military career.†

On the point of taking the offensive immediately Burnside and Lincoln agreed, but somewhat to Lincoln's chagrin the new general objected to the plan of campaign which had been furnished to McClellan from Wash-


ington; nevertheless Lincoln relinquished his design on condition that Burnside move rapidly. Some delays were occasioned by lack of pontoons, but by the last week of November Burnside with his army was on the north bank of the Rappahannock River opposite Fredericksburg. The Army of the Potomac "present and equipped for duty" numbered 120,281 men with 312 guns. General Lee with Longstreet was strongly intrenched on a broken range of hills back of Fredericksburg and on December 10 had 78,513 men "present for duty" with 270 guns. The Army of the Potomac was organized into three grand divisions. The right under General Sumner consisted of the 2d corps, General Couch, the 9th corps, General Willecox, and Pleasonton's cavalry division. The centre under General Hooker consisted of the 3d corps, General Stoneman, the 5th corps, General Butterfield, and Averell's cavalry division. The left under Franklin consisted of the 1st corps, General Reynolds, the 6th corps, General Smith, and the cavalry brigade under General Bayard. General Lee's army was divided into two wings, Jackson commanding the right and Longstreet the left. Burnside concluded to cross the river at and below Fredericksburg by pontoon bridges, and by night of the 12th Sumner and Franklin had crossed and taken position. Franklin, who was to open the battle by an attack on the Confederate right, reinforced by Birney's and

* John Hay's Diary as quoted in Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. vi., p. 188.

† *Official Records*, vol. xix., pt. ii., p. 545; *McClellan's Own Story*, p. 660. A few days afterward Lincoln seems to have feared that he made a mistake in that he had not found anybody who could do the work any better than McClellan. Writing to Carl Schurz he said: "I certainly have been dissatisfied with the slowness of Buell and McClellan but before I relieved them I had great fears I should not find successors to them who would do better; and I am sorry to add that I have seen little since to relieve those fears." — *Lincoln's Complete Works*, vol. ii., p. 258.

Sickles' division of the 3d corps and Burns' of the 9th, had about 60,000 men. At 7:30 A. M. on the 13th Burnside gave him orders to seize the heights at Hamilton's Crossing. Meade's division, therefore, moved out at 9 o'clock but owing to flank attacks and lack of support it was 1:15 P. M. before the Confederates were

tion that after Franklin had attacked Lee's right Sumner could carry the line near the Telegraph and Plank roads. Feeling the importance of haste, Burnside directed Sumner to begin the movement. In the rear of the town and between it and the heights that Sumner was to carry was a broken plain traversed about mid-



driven from the Richmond Railroad. Crossing this, Meade's troops charged up a ridge and into the woods, piercing the centre of A. P. Hill's first line. But when Meade had crossed the road that ran in the rear of the crest he was attacked on the front and flank by Hill's second line and the reserves and was driven back with heavy loss. Gibbon, who had come up to support Meade's right suffered the same fate.

Sumner was retained in his position until toward noon in the expecta-

way by a canal or ditch running from right to left. Two roads cut the plain nearly at right angles with the canal—the Plank road on the right and the Telegraph road on the left. The advance was to be made on and between these two roads over ground completely covered by artillery on the heights. McLaws' division held the heights to be assaulted, Cobb's and Kershaw's brigades being placed in the sunken Telegraph road that ran at the base of the hill. On the side

of the road next to the town was a stone wall behind which Cobb's and Kershaw's men were well protected. The 2d corps led the attack. French's division moved out of the town by parallel streets and about 12 o'clock had come to within 120 yards of the stone wall when it received a deadly fire. Hancock's division followed in support. At 1 o'clock Couch ordered French and Hancock to carry Mayre's Heights. French sent in his three brigades, but they met with a bloody repulse. Samuel K. Zook's brigade of Hancock's division then sprang forward and was joined by some shattered regiments of French's division but when within 25 paces of the stone wall it met the same fate. The Irish brigade and Caldwell's followed in succession but failed to carry the position and after losing one-half their number fell back, though French and Hancock continued to hold the rise of ground near the stone wall. Meanwhile O. O. Howard had been ordered to move his division to the right so as to turn the Confederate left but since French and Hancock needed support, Howard was recalled and ordered in on the Telegraph road and two divisions of the 9th corps went in on Couch's left. All fought gallantly but no impression was made on the Confederate line. French lost 1,160 men, Hancock 2,032, Howard 900, Sturgis' division of the 9th army corps 1,000, and George W. Getty's division 290. At 2 o'clock Hooker, riding in advance of the 5th

corps, came on the ground. After an examination of the position and conference with Couch and other officers he concluded that he could make no impression upon the Confederate works. Accordingly he sent an aide to Burnside but only received an order to attack. Putting the spurs to his horse, however, he rode across the river and sought to dissuade Burnside from further attack, but the latter was obdurate and reiterated his order. Every available battery opened fire upon the Confederate position and near sunset A. A. Humphreys led his division of the 5th corps against Mayre's Heights, Sykes' division moving on his right. Twice Humphreys led his men forward and some of them got within 20 yards of the stone wall but the wall was such a sheet of flame enveloping the head and flanks of the column that in a brief time over 1,000 men were killed and wounded. On the right Sykes lost over 200, while Charles Griffin's division on the left supporting the 9th corps lost over 800. This ended the battle. Night came on with the Union army everywhere repulsed. Burnside directed preparations for a renewal of the battle on the morning of the 14th when he proposed to lead the 9th corps (his old command) in an assault where the 2d and 5th corps had failed, but he was dissuaded from the attempt. From the night of the 13th until the night of the 15th the two armies confronting each other engaged in artil-

lery fire and skirmishing, but on the night of the 15th, concealed by a violent storm of wind and rain, the Army of the Potomac recrossed the river after one of its most bloody and humiliating defeats. Its loss was 1,284 killed, 9,600 wounded, 1,769 missing, an aggregate of 12,653. The Confederate loss was 595 killed, 4,061 wounded, and 653 missing. The loss of the Confederate troops defending Mayre's Heights was less than 1,000 while in the attack the Union troops had lost over 7,300.*

Apart from the repulse and the heavy losses at Fredericksburg, there was a serious depreciation produced in the morale of the army. Necessity enforced rest, the repairing of losses, the care of the wounded and the burial of the dead, but in addition there grew up a spirit of discontent

at the barren results obtained and a disposition not only sharply to criticise the commanding general but also to distrust him and his capacity to guide and direct the army's efforts. Accordingly, Burnside determined to make another movement against the enemy. On December 26 he ordered the entire army to prepare three days' rations with the evident intention of crossing the river six or seven miles below Fredericksburg. Just as the movement was about to take place he received a telegram from the President, saying: "I have good reason for saying you must not make a general movement of the army without letting me know."* Burnside therefore suspended operations and immediately went to Washington. No determination was reached, however, and Burnside returned to the army where in spite of the opposition of his general officers he resolved to make another attempt to cross the river, writing the President to this effect and inclosing his resignation in case the movement was disapproved.† On January 8, 1863, Lincoln replied approving the project but admonishing him to be cautious and giving him to understand that the Government and country were not driving him. He said also he did not see how he could profit by changing the command of the Army of the Potomac and that, even if he could, he did not wish to do it by accepting Burnside's resigna-

* Swinton, *History of the Army of the Potomac*; Palfrey, *The Antietam and Fredericksburg*, pp. 136-190; Walker, *History of the Second Army Corps*; Powell, *History of the 5th Army Corps*; Allan, *Army of Northern Virginia*; *Official Records*, vol. xxi.; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. iii., pp. 70-147; Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. vi., p. 198 *et seq.*; Rhodes, *United States*, vol. iv., pp. 192-198; Woodbury, *Burnside and the 9th Army Corps*, p. 190 *et seq.*; George A. Bruce, *The Battle of Fredericksburg, December 13, 1862* (1912); J. L. Greene, *General William B. Franklin and the Operations of the Left Wing at the Battle of Fredericksburg, December 13, 1862* (1900); H. H. Humphreys, *Major-General A. A. Humphreys' United States Volunteers at Fredericksburg, Va., December 13, 1862 and Farmville, Va., April 7, 1865* (1896); Carswell McClellan, *General A. A. Humphreys at Malvern Hill, Va., July 1, 1862, and at Fredericksburg, Va., December 13, 1862* (1888); *Confederate Military History*, vol. iii., pp. 360-373; vol. iv., pp. 133-140; vol. v., pp. 168-179; vol. vi., pp. 195-199; vol. x., pt. i., pp. 244-248.

* *Official Records*, vol. xxi., p. 900.

† *Ibid.*, p. 944.

tion.* Thereupon Burnside resolved to move on his own responsibility, his resolution resulting in the famous "mud march" of January 21. Hooker and the other officers declared that the projected movement was absurd and the elements performed their part in making it so.† A severe storm occurred, a cold drizzling rain set in, the ground became absolutely impassable for wagons and artillery, and everything upon wheels sunk into the bottomless mud. Nevertheless Burnside persisted with desperate energy. He ordered the cavalry to dismount and made pack horses of their animals for carrying forage and light commissary stores to the front, but the rain persisted also and finally it became impossible to move the artillery, pontoons, ammunition and supply wagons. When the Union pickets arrived at the river near Banks' Ford the Confederates on the other side began to banter them, asking if they should not come over and help them build the bridges. At last Burnside was compelled to acknowledge that the expedition was a failure and the army struggled and floundered through the wilderness and mud back

to their own camp. Burnside was still stubborn and his excitement did not abate. He felt his position had become impossible if the officers under him were to remain. On January 3 he issued General Order No. 8 dismissing from the army Hooker, W. T. H. Brooks, Newton, Franklin, W. H. Smith and others.* Armed with this order and with his own letter of resignation he went to see the President and on January 24 placed before him the alternative of approving the order or accepting his resignation.† Lincoln took time for reflection but believing that Hooker possessed in a great degree the confidence of the country and the soldiers and that he had the capacity and energy to lead the army to success, he placed him in command and the next day informed Burnside of his determination. Burnside then tendered his resignation which the President refused to receive but gave him leave of absence for 30 days after which he was placed in command of the Department of the Ohio.‡

* *Official Records*, vol. xxi., pp. 998-999.

† Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. vi., pp. 219-220.

‡ Rhodes, *United States*, vol. iv., p. 202; Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. vi., pp. 220-222.

* *Official Records*, vol. xxi., p. 954.

† Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. vi., p. 217 *et seq.*

CHAPTER XVIII.

1862.

THE EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION.

Lincoln's doubts as to the reception of the proclamation — Promulgation of the edict — Lincoln's dejection at the North's response — Democratic gains in the fall elections — Curtis' pamphlet — Fessenden's resolution of indorsement — Appendix to Chapter XIV. — The Emancipation Proclamation.

Lincoln had postponed the promulgation of the Emancipation Proclamation because of the unfavorable military aspect. The battle of Antietam, however, gave him the victory he was waiting for to issue his proclamation. After laying it aside on July 22, he had not dropped the project altogether, but in various ways had endeavored to secure unbiased counsel which would aid him in deciding when the proper moment had come to emancipate the slaves. At the same time he said:

"I do not want to issue a document that the whole world will see must necessarily be inoperative, like the Pope's bull against the comet. Would my word free the slaves when I cannot even enforce the Constitution in the rebel States? Is there a single court, or magistrate, or individual that would be influenced by it there?"*

Lincoln was subjected to much pressure both in favor of and against the promulgation of such a proclamation. He talked with conservatives and radicals, listened to their arguments and reasoned with them. One of the most important to be considered was whether public opinion at the North

would sustain him in the action. He could not doubt that the radicals would support such action enthusiastically, but of more importance was the attitude of the mass of steady Republicans and war Democrats. There was a possibility also that the border slave States might be alienated, but as to this he considered inaction as serious a blunder as action. On the other hand, emancipation would aid the North in Europe. After deep thought, therefore, he believed that the proper course was to issue the proclamation and allow events to shape themselves. He believed the proclamation to be a military necessity and that the mass of people in the North would soon concur in his viewpoint. Moreover, as time passed, he thought that public sentiment was growing in favor of the edict and that only a victory of the Union army was necessary to place the people in the proper attitude to receive it. Accordingly, on September 22, after the battle of Antietam and Lee's retreat into Virginia, a Cabinet meeting was held at which the subject was again discussed. Lincoln read to the Cabinet members a draft of the proclamation

* Lincoln's *Complete Works*, vol. ii., p. 234; Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. vi., pp. 155-156.

of freedom, asking each member his opinion. All except Blair substantially approved the proclamation, and Blair's objection was on the ground of expediency, not of principle.* After the Cabinet had discussed the situation and the proclamation, Seward took the document with him to the Department of State, where the great seal was affixed. The President signed it the same day, and on the morning of September 23 it was published in full by the leading newspapers of the country.†

Lincoln's action received both applause and denunciation. Everywhere the proclamation aroused profound interest and particularly in Washington, where the President was serenaded at the executive mansion. In a speech to the serenaders the President said:

"What I did I did after a very full deliberation and under a very heavy and solemn sense of responsibility. I can only trust in God I have made no mistake. * * * It is now for the country and the world to pass judgment and, maybe, take action upon it." ‡

* See the diaries of Chase and Welles, quoted in Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. vi., p. 158 *et seq.* See also Warden, *Life of Chase*, p. 481 *et seq.*

† Richardson, *Messages and Papers*, vol. vi., pp. 96-98 Williams, *The Negro Race in America*, vol. ii., pp. 267-269. For text see App. at the end of the present chapter. For other accounts of the proclamation and the Cabinet meetings, see McClure, *Lincoln and Men of War Times*, p. 96 *et seq.*; Blaine, *Twenty Years of Congress*, vol. i., p. 439; Julian, *Political Recollections*, p. 222; Pierce, *Life of Sumner*, vol. iv., p. 66; Rhodes, *United States*, vol. iv., pp. 157-161; McPherson, *History of the Rebellion*, pp. 227-228.

‡ Lincoln's *Complete Works*, vol. ii., p. 240; Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. vi., p. 164.

Lincoln, however, detected a lack of heartiness in the response of the Northern people. In a letter to Hamlin on September 28 he writes:

"While I hope something from the proclamation, my expectations are not as sanguine as are those of some friends. The time for its effect southward has not come; but northward the effect should be instantaneous. It is six days old, and while commendation in newspapers and by distinguished individuals is all that a vain man could wish, the stocks have declined and troops come forward more slowly than ever. This, looked soberly in the face, is not very satisfactory. * * * The North responds to the proclamation sufficiently in breath; but breath alone kills no rebels." *

Lincoln was further disappointed in the outcome of the fall elections. The failure of McClellan's Richmond campaign and the inaction of the Western army had produced widespread discontent which was only partly allayed by the victory at Antietam. Taking advantage of this, the Democratic party entered upon a vigorous and fairly successful campaign. They protested against the anti-slavery legislation of Congress, and made a loud outcry that the Administration had changed the war for the Union to a war for abolition. In October and November elections occurred in the principal States, with the result that the Administration suffered reverses in New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois and Wisconsin, but was sustained by New England, Iowa, Michigan and the border slave States. The number of Democrats in the House was increased

* Lincoln's *Complete Works*, vol. ii., p. 242.



From the painting by F. B. Carpenter.

SIGNING THE EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION.

Secretary of the Treasury
SALMON P. CHASE.

Secretary of the Interior
CALEB B. SMITH.

Postmaster-General
MONTGOMERY BLAIR.

Secretary of War
EDWIN M. STANTON.

Secretary of the Navy
GIDEON WELLES.

Secretary of State
WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Attorney-General
EDWARD BATES.

from 44 to 75, and the reaction threatened for a time to deprive Lincoln of the support of the House.* Against this temporary adverse political current the bulk of the Republicans followed Lincoln loyally, accepting and defending his emancipation policy with earnestness and enthusiasm. On October 18, however, Benjamin R. Curtis, of the Supreme Court, published a pamphlet entitled *Executive Power*, in which he argued that the President had no constitutional right to issue the proclamation. Owing to Curtis's high standing this pamphlet attracted much attention but apparently exerted little enduring influence. The people had much confidence in Lincoln, for, though there was much distrust of his ability and firmness, his honesty was unquestioned. Many were impatient, too, of the law's delay, and in the exercise of these extraordinary powers gave the President their faithful and earnest sup-

port. This was seen when the Thirty-Seventh Congress met in session in December of 1862. On the 11th of that month Representative George H. Yeaman introduced resolutions declaring the Emancipation Proclamation unwarranted by the Constitution and a useless and dangerous war measure. These resolutions were promptly laid on the table, 94 voting to do this; then, a few days later (December 15), Representative S. C. Fessenden, of Maine, introduced the following resolution, which was adopted by a vote of 78 to 51:

"That the proclamation of the President of the United States, of the date of 22d September, 1862, is warranted by the Constitution, and that the policy of emancipation, as indicated in that proclamation, is well adapted to hasten the restoration of peace, was well chosen as a war measure, and is an exercise of power with proper regard for the rights of the States and the perpetuity of free government."

With the proclamation thus warmly indorsed, Lincoln could well afford to wait for the full tide of approval.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XVIII.

THE EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION.

"I, ABRAHAM LINCOLN, President of the United States of America, and Commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy thereof, do hereby proclaim and declare that hereafter, as heretofore, the war will be prosecuted for the object of practically restoring the constitutional relations between the United States and each of the states, and the people thereof, in which that relation is, or may be, suspended or disturbed.

"That it is my purpose, upon the next meeting

of Congress, to again recommend the adoption of a practical measure tendering pecuniary aid to the free acceptance or rejection of all slave states, so called, the people whereof may not then be in rebellion against the United States, and which states may then have voluntarily adopted, or thereafter may voluntarily adopt, the immediate or gradual abolishment of slavery within their respective limits; and that the effort to colonize persons of African descent, with their consent, upon this continent or elsewhere, with the previously obtained consent of the governments existing there, will be continued.

* Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. vi., p. 170; Rhodes, *United States*, vol. vi., p. 163.

"That on the first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, all persons held as slaves within any state, or any designated part of a state, the people whereof shall then be in rebellion against the United States, shall be then, thenceforward and forever, free, and the executive government of the United States, including the military and naval authority thereof, will recognize and maintain the freedom of such persons, and will do no act or acts to repress such persons, or any of them, in any efforts they may make for their actual freedom.

"That the Executive will, on the first day of January aforesaid, by proclamation, designate the states and parts of states, if any, in which the people thereof respectively shall then be in rebellion against the United States; and the fact that any state, or the people thereof, shall on that day be in good faith represented in the Congress of the United States, by members chosen thereto, at elections wherein a majority of the qualified voters of such state shall have participated, shall, in the absence of strong countervailing testimony, be deemed conclusive evidence that such state, and the people thereof, are not then in rebellion against the United States.

"That attention is hereby called to an act of Congress, entitled 'An Act to make an additional Article of War,' approved March 13th, 1862, and which act is in the words and figures following:—

"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America, in Congress assembled: That hereafter the following shall be promulgated as an additional article of war, for the government of the army of the United States, and shall be obeyed and observed as such:—*Section 1.* All officers or persons in the military or naval service of the United States are prohibited from employing any of the forces under their respective commands for the purpose of returning fugitives from service or labor who may have escaped from any persons to whom such service or labor is claimed to be due; and any officer who shall be found guilty by a court-martial of violating this article, shall be dismissed from the service. *Section 2. And be it further enacted:* That this act shall take effect from and after its passage.

"Also, to the ninth and tenth sections of an act entitled 'An Act to Suppress Insurrection, to Punish Treason and Rebellion, to Seize and Confiscate Property of Rebels, and for other purposes,' approved July 16th, 1862, and which sections are in the words and figures following:—

"Section 9. And be it further enacted: That

all slaves of persons who shall hereafter be engaged in rebellion against the government of the United States, or who shall in any way give aid or comfort thereto, escaping from such persons and taking refuge within the lines of the army; and all slaves captured from such persons, or deserted by them and coming under the control of the government of the United States; and all slaves of such persons found or being within any place occupied by rebel forces, and afterwards occupied by forces of the United States, shall be deemed captives of war, and shall be forever free of their servitude, and not again held as slaves.

"Section 10. And be it further enacted: That no slave escaping into any state, territory, or the District of Columbia, from any other state, shall be delivered up, or in any way impeded or hindered of his liberty, except for crime or some offence against the laws, unless the person claiming said fugitive shall first make oath that the person to whom the labor or service of such fugitive is alleged to be due is his lawful owner, and has not borne arms against the United States in the present rebellion, nor in any way given aid and comfort thereto; and no person engaged in the military and naval service of the United States shall, under any pretence whatever, assume to decide on the validity of the claim of any person to the service or labor of any other person, or surrender up any such person to the claimant, on pain of being dismissed from the service.

"And I do hereby enjoin upon and order all persons engaged in the military and naval service of the United States to observe, obey, and enforce, within their respective spheres of service, the act and sections above recited.

"And the Executive will in due time recommend that all citizens of the United States who shall have remained loyal thereto throughout the rebellion, shall (upon the restoration of the constitutional relations between the United States and their respective States and people, if the relation shall have been suspended or disturbed) be compensated for all losses by acts of the United States, including the loss of slaves.

"In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

"Done at the City of Washington, this twenty-second day of September, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-two, and of the Independence of the United States the eighty-seventh.

"ABRAHAM LINCOLN."

CHAPTER XIX.

1862-1863.

BRAGG'S INVASION OF KENTUCKY: PERRYVILLE AND MURFREESBORO.

The beginning of Bragg's movement — Morgan's raid — Kirby Smith's attack on Richmond — Declaration of martial law in Cincinnati — Morgan's evacuation of Cumberland Gap — The surrender of Munfordsville — The battle of Perryville — Bragg's retreat — Buell superseded by Rosecrans — The engagements at Hartsville and Parker's Cross Roads — The battle of Murfreesboro.

After the expulsion of the Confederate army from Corinth, Mississippi, on May 29, 1862, Pope was called to the East to take command of the army of Virginia and Halleck was elevated to the position of general-in-chief of the armies of the United States. Halleck's army of 137,000 men was divided and the Army of the Ohio under General D. C. Buell was ordered on June 10 to move on Chattanooga, the movement beginning next day along the line of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad. By this time the Union forces had opened up the Mississippi to Memphis and Vicksburg; and all the country north of the line of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad and the Tennessee River as far east as Bridgeport, Alabama, and following the Cumberland Mountains northward to the Ohio River had come into Union possession. Kentucky and Tennessee, save the eastern part of the latter, was held by Union troops. When the Union armies advanced on Chattanooga and Knoxville during June and July, reinforcements were rushed there by the Confederates and

General Braxton Bragg was authorized to make a counter movement into middle Tennessee and Kentucky. Many Confederates thought that the people of Kentucky would rise in their favor on the advance of the army, and at Richmond it was thought that Bragg could march through Tennessee and Kentucky to the banks of the Ohio and beyond. Bragg was then at Tupelo, Mississippi, and General E. Kirby Smith was in command of the department embracing Chattanooga and Knoxville. Having faith in the idea that the people would support the Confederate cause, they took 20,000 stand of arms for the recruits that were expected to enlist. At the same time Generals Earl Van Dorn and Sterling Price were to move from Mississippi into west Tennessee and all the forces were then to unite in Ohio. On July 21 Bragg ordered his own army from Tupelo to secure Chattanooga against Buell's advance and to prepare for the movement to the Ohio.

Before the campaign had progressed far, however, there had been considerable skirmishing in the territory through which he expected to pass. Guerilla parties along the borders of Tennessee and Kentucky made numerous raids. Early on the morning of July 13 an unexpected attack was made upon the Union brigade commanded by General T. T. Crittenden in charge of Murfreesboro by a cavalry force of about 3,000 men under General N. B. Forrest. The surprise being complete, the Union force of about 800 men was compelled to surrender, the prisoners, including General Crittenden, being taken to Chattanooga, and large quantities of ammunition and supplies fell into the hands of the Confederates. Almost simultaneously a raid into Kentucky was made by John Hunt Morgan. Having crossed into Kentucky from Knoxville with about 900 men he issued a proclamation on July 10 to the inhabitants appealing to them to "rise one and all and clear out dear Kentucky's soil of its detested invaders." He pushed forward to the centre of the State and took possession of Lebanon where he captured a large quantity of government commissary stores. Having destroyed to a considerable extent the railroad communication with Cincinnati, on July 17 he fell upon a body of about 400 Union troops at Cynthiana in Harrison County under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Landrum. Morgan soon captured this force and quickly

gained possession of the town. A body of mounted infantry was immediately gathered at Lexington and its vicinity and placed under command of General Green Clay Smith who set out at once in pursuit of Morgan and his raiders. At Paris he came up with Morgan, defeated him and captured a considerable portion of the stolen property. Morgan, however, made his escape into Tennessee.* At about the same time Henderson on the Ohio was occupied, as was Russellville on July 29. On the same day, however, an attack on Mount Sterling, east of Lexington, was repulsed with considerable loss to the Confederates.

Toward the close of August a large division of Confederate troops in Tennessee threatened an invasion of Kentucky. On August 14, 1862, General E. Kirby Smith left Knoxville, Tennessee, to unite with General Bragg in northern Kentucky. He passed through Big Creek Gap of the Cumberland Mountains and leaving General C. L. Stevenson to observe the Union forces at Cumberland Gap, penetrated Kentucky with about 6,000 men. Preceded by Colonel J. S. Scott's cavalry force of 900 men, he moved in the direction of Frankfort, threatening both Louisville and Cincinnati. General Lew Wallace hastened with a regiment from Louisville to Lexington and was placed in command of all the troops in that vicinity. Additional

* Duke, *History of Morgan's Cavalry*, p. 182 et seq.; Shaler, *Kentucky*, pp. 288-290; Cist, *The Army of the Cumberland*, p. 35 et seq.

CONFEDERATE GENERALS AND NAVAL OFFICERS.



From the original Brady negatives.

1. J. B. HOOD.
4. G. E. PICKETT.
7. D. N. INGRAM (Navy).
10. T. J. PAGE (Navy).

2. J. H. MORGAN.
5. JAMES LONGSTREET.
8. RAPHAEL SEMMES (Navy).
11. JOSIAH TATNALL (Navy).

3. WADE HAMPTON
6. E. KIRBY SMITH.
9. FRANKLIN BUCHANAN (Navy).
12. G. N. HOLLINS (Navy).

regiments came from north of the Ohio and as Wallace was about to move forward to oppose Smith he was succeeded by General William Nelson who had been ordered by General Buell to take charge of affairs in Kentucky.

On taking command Nelson organized the troops at Lexington into a division of three brigades under Generals M. D. Manson, Charles Cruft and J. S. Jackson. Learning that the Confederates were approaching, some cavalry was sent forward and several sharp engagements occurred. Kirby Smith then determined to make an immediate advance on Richmond, Kentucky, although his troops were jaded by long and laborious marches and General Heth's division of 4,000 men was still far in the rear. For the attack Smith had P. R. Cleburne's and T. J. Churchill's divisions of 6,000 men and Scott's cavalry brigade of about 850 men. The advance was ordered for August 30. About half a mile south of Rogersville, Scott's cavalry encountered Manson's brigade which in turn was attacked by Cleburne with two brigades. Manson was then reinforced by a regiment of Cruft's brigade and a battery and endeavored to turn Cleburne's right but was repulsed. Meanwhile Churchill's division came up to support Cleburne, and Manson's right was then flanked and driven back in disorder. Another of Cruft's regiments endeavored to turn the tide but was repulsed with heavy loss. Another position

was taken farther to the rear where the troops were under partial cover with artillery on the flanks but this was soon assailed by the Confederates. Cruft's brigade on the right was attacked by Churchill's division and driven back in confusion and as Cleburne now advanced in the front, Manson's entire line fell back with the Confederates in close pursuit. Manson formed another line in front of Richmond but General Nelson came on the field and selected a new line near the town and cemetery. Scarcely had the troops taken their position when they were attacked by the Confederates and compelled to give way, the demoralization being increased by the knowledge that Scott's cavalry had gained the road in the rear of Richmond. Nelson was wounded and narrowly escaped to Lexington and thence to Louisville. Manson was wounded and taken prisoner with over 4,000 of his men, while 9 guns, more than 6,000 muskets, and the entire wagon train were lost. The Union loss was 206 killed, 844 wounded and 4,303 captured or missing, while the Confederate loss was 78 killed, 372 wounded and 1 missing.* General Heth with his division of 4,000 men joined Smith after the battle and marched to Lexington where he arrived on September 2.

* Van Horne, *History of the Army of the Cumberland*, vol. i.; *Official Records*, vol. xvi.; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. iii., pp. 4-5; Shaler, *Kentucky*, pp. 290-293; Cist, *The Army of the Cumberland*, p. 51 et seq.; A. H. Noll, *General Kirby Smith* (1907).

Naturally, there was considerable excitement in Louisville and Cincinnati. Martial law was declared in Cincinnati, the liquor shops were closed, all business was suspended, the street cars ceased to run, and all men who could fight or work were ordered to assemble at their voting places for the purpose of drill or labor. Governor Todd hastened to Cincinnati and called out for military service all the loyal men of the river counties.* For a while it was doubtful what move the Confederates would make next. Having occupied Lexington, Paris, Frankfort and Cynthiana, Smith sent Heth to threaten Covington and Cincinnati. On September 10 it was thought that a battle was imminent, but finding Cincinnati too well defended to attack, and being in turn threatened with counter attack, Heth gave up the attempt and withdrew to join Smith who waited at Lexington to coöperate with General Bragg, then operating against Buell.† On September 18 Smith was in motion to join Bragg at Shelbyville but his march was suspended by the news that General George W. Morgan had evacuated Cumberland Gap.

This place had been fortified and magazines and an arsenal had been established there. When Kirby Smith defeated Nelson at Richmond, communication with the North was cut off and, moreover, General C. L. Stevenson with a division of 9,000 men was

preparing to attack the Gap in front. Hence, being short of forage and unprepared for a siege, Morgan blew up the arsenal and magazines, set fire to his store houses and on the night of September 17 started on a march of 200 miles through an almost unbroken wilderness to Greenup on the Ohio River. Accordingly, on learning of Morgan's movement, Smith marched his entire army eastward toward Mount Sterling to intercept him. In this, however, he was unsuccessful for Morgan reached his destination on October 3. Smith next marched back to the vicinity of Frankfort where he was joined in person by Bragg who informed him that Buell was moving out of Louisville.

Meanwhile Bragg had divided his army into two wings, the right commanded by General Leonidas Polk, the left by General W. J. Hardee. He crossed the Tennessee at and above Chattanooga on August 24 and his column of 30,000 men took up the march over Waldon's Ridge and the Cumberland Mountains. Turning Buell's left whose advance was at McMinnville and Altamont, Bragg threatened Nashville, whereupon Buell ordered a concentration of his army at Murfreesboro. Hearing there of Nelson's defeat at Richmond, Kentucky, Buell fell back to cover Louisville. Keeping to the east of Buell, Bragg turned northward for Louisville and the Ohio. He marched through middle Tennessee unmolested

* Rhodes, *United States*, vol. iv., pp. 175-176.

† Shaler, *Kentucky*, pp. 298-300.

and entered Kentucky on September 5 about 45 miles above Nashville, and by the 13th had reached Glasgow. It now became a race between the two for Louisville, and Bragg, having the shorter line of march, reached the city first, placing himself between Buell and the city. It was thought that he could capture Louisville and Kirby Smith suggested a combined assault,* but Bragg lingered, and instead of attacking Louisville marched from Glasgow across the country and attacked the Union garrison at Munfordsville on Green River where the Louisville and Nashville Railroad crosses. The Confederates demanded the surrender of the place but Colonel J. T. Wilder in command of the Union troops refused. Accordingly at daylight on September 15 the attack was made by the Confederates but was repulsed with considerable slaughter. The fight was renewed two days later and continued until the close of the day, when hearing that Bragg with his main force was near at hand, Colonel C. L. Dunham then in command surrendered the place with 4,000 men and 10 guns. Bragg took a strong position on the south side of Green River intending to give Buell battle, but owing to want of supplies changed his mind. Reduced to three days' rations, Bragg turned aside from the direct road north and advanced to Bardstown.

On leaving Nashville, Buell had followed Bragg's invading force closely

on its route into Kentucky and soon occupied Munfordsville. While Bragg was marching toward Frankfort Buell advanced by the main road into Louisville where he arrived on September 25, insuring the safety of the city. On reaching Louisville Buell was reinforced by over 30,000 men, chiefly raw troops, hastily gathered from Illinois, Indiana and Ohio, thus increasing the Army of the Ohio to nearly 100,000 men. The army was divided into three corps commanded by Generals A. McD. McCook, T. L. Crittenden, and C. C. Gilbert, General Thomas being second in command of the whole army. On October 1 Buell left Louisville with 58,000 men, moving in three columns against Bragg at Bardstown. General Joshua W. Sill with his own division and that of Ebenezer Dumont marched direct to Frankfort to threaten E. Kirby Smith. Believing that Sill was but the advance of Buell's main body marching for that place, Bragg ordered General Polk to move the entire army from Bardstown toward Frankfort and to strike Sill and Buell in flank, while E. Kirby Smith advancing from Frankfort met the Union column in front. But Polk disregarded Bragg's order and retired slowly by way of Perryville toward Harrodsburg where he thought that the entire Confederate army in Kentucky would be concentrated. When Bragg heard of this he, Smith and others were formally inaugurating a secession governor of Kentucky. This person was Richard

* *Official Records*, vol. xvi., pt. ii., p. 830.

Hawes, who was sworn into office on October 4. He had begun a long inaugural address when he was interrupted by the booming of distant cannon. His audience, composed chiefly of the Confederate soldiers, immediately sprang to their horses and Hawes' administration floated away in the dust of the marching column.* The approaching Federal column proved to be that under Sill. Accordingly, accompanied by the newly inaugurated governor, Smith retreated in haste toward Lexington. Dumont's division then occupied the city, and on the 8th Sill slipped away to join Buell. Smith took position near Versailles to cover Lexington and watch an advance from Frankfort. Polk with two divisions was ordered to join Smith while Hardee with his two infantry divisions and Wheeler's cavalry was left to hold Perryville and cover the depot of supplies at Camp Dick Robinson.

Meanwhile Buell's columns were moving toward Perryville. Joseph Wheeler's cavalry were driven back by Gilbert, with the centre, and on the night of the 7th went into camp about four miles from Perryville. Crittenden with the right was to have encamped at Hayesville, but finding no water he marched three miles to the west. McCook with the left, after some resistance, reached Mackville, 10 miles from Perryville, the same


distance from Harrodsburg, and 6 miles in the rear and to the left of Gilbert. Late in the afternoon Bragg at Harrodsburg learned that Hardee was being pressed by Gilbert whom the Confederates supposed to be isolated from the rest of Buell's army. Accordingly he ordered Polk to join Hardee with B. F. Cheatham's division and attack Gilbert, but Hardee and Polk urged that Bragg's and Smith's armies be united before this movement were attempted. Early on the morning of the 8th, seeing the Union advance, Polk, knowing that the greater part of Buell's army was in his front, determined to disregard Bragg's order to attack and after consulting Hardee and other officers concluded to adopt the "defensive offensive." The battle was brought on by the advance of Colonel Dan McCook's brigade at 3 A. M. on the morning of the 8th for the purpose of covering certain pools of water of which the troops, thirsty with their long march, were very much in need. McCook's brigade took position in advance of Chaplin's River and at daylight was joined by the remainder of Sheridan's division, followed by Mitchell's and a brigade of Albin Schoepf's. Sheridan moved up the road driving back the Confederate skirmishers, and nearly a mile in advance with Mitchell on his right formed in line of battle on ground overlooking a branch of Doctor's Creek. About 11 o'clock L. H. Rousseau's division, the advance of McCook's corps came up on the left

* B. F. Stevens, *Kentucky Neutrality*, p. 20; *Official Records*, vol. xvi., pt. i., p. 1087; Shaler, *Kentucky*, p. 303.

of Sheridan. W. H. Lytle's and L. A. Harris' brigades were put on the right, W. R. Terrill's brigade of Jackson's division on the left, George Webster's brigade of Jackson's division in Rousseau's rear and J. C. Starkweather's brigade of Rousseau's division with two batteries to the left and rear of Terrill's brigade. Soon the infantry and artillery on both sides were hotly engaged, the battle being fought mainly on McCook's line. Buell's army numbered about 58,000 men and was confronted by only 16,000.

About 10 o'clock General Bragg came upon the field from Harrodsburg and was much angered when informed by Polk that he had assumed the "defensive offensive." Bragg made some changes in the disposition of the troops, moving Cheatham's division from the left to the right, and then ordered Polk to open the attack, but Polk was dilatory and Bragg led the entire line forward, the left striking Sheridan and the centre and right falling furiously on McCook. Terrill's brigade on the left received a heavy blow from Cheatham's division and J. A. Wharton's cavalry, and after inflicting severe loss on Maney's brigade was routed, abandoning 7 of the 8 guns in C. C. Parson's battery. The Confederates then struck Starkweather to the rear and left of Terrill, but were repulsed with a loss of half their men by the fire of the Union batteries. Later in the action Starkweather was obliged to yield some

ground and General Terrill in a vain effort to rally his brigade was mortally wounded. The battle then rolled down the line upon the brigades of Lytle and Harris of Rousseau's division, the attack being made by part of Buckner's division. Taking advantage of an interval of 400 yards between Rousseau's right and Sheridan's left, the Confederates pressed



their attack at this point. Colonel Webster sprang to Rousseau's support and was killed, while his brigade, together with those of Lytle and Harris, were soon overpowered and forced back nearly a mile. Lytle was seriously wounded and taken a prisoner and the three brigades, terribly cut up, were about to dissolve when Colonel Michael Gooding's brigade of Mitchell's division came up from the

right, turned, and after nearly an hour of severe fighting in which he lost 499 killed and wounded, checked the Confederate advance and threw it back. Then, soon after sunset, J. B. Steedman's brigade arrived, and Lieutenant F. G. Smith's battery, supported by the 18th U. S. infantry, was pushed forward and opened with canister, but darkness put an end to the firing on both sides. On McCook's right Sheridan was attacked by part of Buckner's division and that of Anderson, but Sheridan repelled the attack and, besides, helped McCook by turning his artillery upon the flanks of the troops opposing him. Unfortunately, Gilbert, his corps commander, ordered him and Mitchell to fall back, thus uncovering McCook's right. He soon advanced, however, held his ground, though hard pressed, and as his right was severely threatened, Mitchell sent General W. P. Carlin's brigade to his assistance. Forming on his right Carlin made an impetuous attack, broke the Confederate lines, and drove them back through Perryville, capturing in the town 15 or 20 caissons and wagons loaded with ammunition, and a corps of 140 officers and men. This ended the battle on that part of the field. On the right Crittenden's corps was not engaged and had only 2 men wounded. In the battle the Union loss was 845 killed, 2,851 wounded and 515 missing, an aggregate of 4,211, while the Confederate loss was 510 killed, 2,635

wounded and 251 missing, an aggregate of 3,396.*

During the night Bragg, abandoning his dead and many wounded and 13 of the 15 guns he had captured, retreated to Harrodsburg where he was joined by E. Kirby Smith, raising his command to over 60,000 men. Buell awaited Sill's division which arrived on October 11, and the next day advanced and manœvered to turn Bragg's left. Crittenden was to advance in front and McCook and Gilbert to approach by different roads so as to cut off Bragg's escape and compel him to fight or surrender. Bragg seeming to have divined Buell's purpose fell back to Bryantsville, and on the 13th began his retreat from Kentucky by way of Cumberland Gap. Buell pursued but did not advance much further than Crab Orchard and Bragg succeeded in passing through Cumberland Gap, October 19 to 24. On the latter date (October 24) an order was issued directing Buell to turn over his command to General W. S. Rosecrans, the army now becoming known as the Army of the Cumberland.†

Rosecrans arrived at Louisville on October 27 and immediately entered

* See *Official Records*, vol. xvi., pt. i., pp. 1024-1031; Wm. Polk, *Life of Leonidas Polk*, vol. ii.; Cist, *The Army of the Cumberland*, pp. 61-77; Fry, *The Army under Buell*; Van Horne, *The Army of the Cumberland*; Pollard, *Second Year of the War; Battles and Leaders*, vol. iii., pp. 1-69; Moore, *Rebellion Record*, vol. v.; Davis, *Confederate Government*; Shaler, *Kentucky*, pp. 304-309; *Confederate Military History*, vol. viii., pp. 49-55; vol. ix., pt. i., pp. 132-146.

† *Official Records*, vol. xvi., pt. ii., p. 619.

upon the duties assigned him. He made some changes in the organization of the army which was composed of the 14th army corps. This was divided into three wings—the right wing of three divisions under General A. McD. McCook, the centre of five divisions under General George H. Thomas, and the left of three divisions under General T. L. Crittenden. On November 1 Rosecrans moved to Bowling Green, Kentucky, and on the 5th three divisions of McCook's corps marched by this route toward Nashville. Rosecrans followed McCook's advance with the remainder of the army, reached Nashville on November 10, and took up his position in front of the city. At the close of the month the railroad communication from Louisville was completed and the next few weeks were occupied in gathering supplies, organizing the troops, etc. General Bragg, after his return from Kentucky, had gone into winter quarters at Murfreesboro, a short distance to the south of Nashville, expecting that Rosecrans would follow his example. Wheeler's cavalry covered his front, its pickets within 10 miles of Nashville. A large cavalry force was sent by Bragg into west Tennessee to cut off Grant's communications and another large force under Morgan into Kentucky to break up the railroad.

On December 6, 1862, Hartsville was held by Colonel A. B. Moore, with a Union force of three regiments of

infantry, a regiment and a company of cavalry, and a section of artillery, in all about 2,100 men. Morgan had been instructed by General Bragg to operate on General Rosecrans' lines of communication in the rear of Nashville and, learning that Moore was isolated, with no supports near, resolved to capture him. While two infantry brigades of Cheatham's division and Wheeler's cavalry demonstrated on Nashville, Morgan with four regiments and a battalion of cavalry, two regiments of infantry, and a battery, set out from Baird's Mills, 25 miles south of Hartsville, on the morning of December 6, 1862, marched through Lebanon, crossed the Cumberland below Hartsville during the night, disposed his forces so as to cut off Moore's retreat on the roads leading to Gallatin and Castalian, posts occupied by other Union commands, and early in the morning of December 7 closed in on the Union camp, surprised it, attacked the troops who were being hastily drawn up to receive him and, after a stubborn fight of an hour and a half, defeated and captured the entire command. Colonel John M. Harlan, in command of a small Union brigade at Castalian Springs, nine miles away, hearing the noise of the battle, marched to Hartsville and attacked Morgan's rear-guard as it was recrossing the river, recapturing some of the wagons taken. The Union loss was 58 killed, 204 wounded, and 1,834 captured and

missing. The Confederate loss was 21 killed, 104 wounded, and 10 missing.*

On the morning of December 11, 1862, under Bragg's orders, General N. B. Forrest, with 2,500 cavalry, left Columbia, Tennessee, to operate in the western part of the State and fall upon General Grant's communications with Columbus. On the 13th he reached the Tennessee River at Clifton, about 50 miles east of Jackson, crossed on a flatboat, and on the 16th reached Lexington, where he met 700 of the 11th Illinois cavalry and two guns, under command of Colonel R. G. Ingersoll, and routed Ingersoll, capturing him and nearly one-fourth of his command. Two detachments were then sent to cut the Mobile and Ohio Railroad at points north and south of Jackson, and on the 19th Forrest, with the remainder of his command, not over 600 men, moved on the town, and was met by a force of infantry and cavalry, which disputed his advance, but which was gradually driven back until within reach of the defences of the place, when Forrest withdrew and, uniting his command, turned north on the line of the railroad. He captured Humboldt and Trenton, at the latter place taking and paroling its garrison of 700 men. Several small posts were captured and the railroad destroyed as far as the Kentucky line. On the 25th he retraced his steps toward the southeast, closely followed by General

J. C. Sullivan with 4,000 men. On December 31, at Parker's Cross Roads, Tennessee, a few miles north of Lexington, Sullivan's leading brigade of 1,500 men, under Colonel C. L. Dunham, intercepted Forrest's march, but Forrest attacked it and drove it eastward and southward from the cross-roads. The fighting lasted several hours, during which time Sullivan came up with Colonel J. W. Fuller's brigade, and at 3 P. M. struck Forrest's rear and soon defeated him, taking 400 prisoners, 6 guns, and several caissons and ammunition wagons. The Union loss was 27 killed, 140 wounded, and 70 missing. The Confederate loss in killed and wounded is not known. Forrest continued his retreat, brushed away the 6th Tennessee cavalry that had been sent to intercept him at Clifton, and on January 1 and 2, 1863, recrossed the Tennessee River, having destroyed the railroad at many points between Jackson and Columbus, also a large quantity of stores, and claiming that, with a loss of less than 400 men, he had killed, wounded, and captured nearly 2,500.*

The absence of Forrest and Morgan afforded the Union army an excellent opportunity for an attack. Accordingly on the morning of December 26 Rosecrans with 56,000 men advanced from Nashville in three columns, the

* *Official Records*, vol. xx.; Cist, *The Army of the Cumberland*, p. 82 et seq.

* *Official Records*, vol. xvii.; Greene, *The Mississippi*, p. 67 et seq.; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. iii., p. 452. See also Wyeth, *Life of Forrest* (1899); J. H. Mathes, *General Forrest* (1902).

right under McCook by the Nolensville pike, the centre under Thomas, first on McCook's right by the Franklin pike and subsequently on his left, and the left under Crittenden by the Murfreesboro turnpike. Sharp skirmishing ensued with Wheeler's cavalry and Bragg's outposts, but in spite of a stout resistance the Confederates were driven steadily back and by the night of the 26th McCook had gained possession of Nolensville and the hills in front. Thomas followed on the right leaving Rousseau's division on the right flank. Crittenden advanced to LaVergne, skirmishing heavily on his front. On December 27 McCook advanced on Triune, but on reaching this place found that Hardee had retreated and accordingly sent a division in pursuit. Crittenden began operations about 11 o'clock in the morning, driving the enemy before him and by a gallant charge upon the Confederate rear guard saved the approach over Stewart's Creek. This and another bridge cross the same creek. The Murfreesboro turnpike came into possession of the Union forces and by night of the 29th Crittenden was close up to Murfreesboro. Thomas came up on Crittenden's right, but McCook was delayed until the next day and after some severe fighting in which he lost 135 killed and wounded, took position on the right of Rosecrans' army, with his left (Sheridan's division) on the Wilkinson pike and with J. C. Davis' division on the right of Sheridan. At

first R. W. Johnson's division was in reserve, but when McCook ascertained that he was overlapped by the Confederate left, Johnson was brought up on Davis' right. Negley's division of Thomas' corps formed on the Wilkinson pike connecting with Sheridan, while Crittenden's left rested on Stone River with his right across the Nashville and Murfreesboro pike connecting with Thomas.

On the morning of December 26 General Wheeler promptly informed General Bragg of Rosecrans' movements, whereupon Hardee's corps was ordered in from Triune and Wheeler was directed to protect its flank to impede the Union advance, ready, if hard pressed, to fall back upon the main body of the Confederate army which it was expected would fight the main battle in front of Murfreesboro. The right wing of Bragg's army consisted of Hardee's corps comprising the divisions of Breckinridge and Cleburne with the brigade of John K. Jackson as a reserve. The right of this wing rested on the Lebanon pike, north of Murfreesboro, and its left on the Nashville road, Wheeler's cavalry being on the right. On Hardee's left connecting with it on Stone River was Polk's corps, consisting of the divisions of Cheatham and J. M. Withers. On the night of the 29th J. P. McCown's division of E. Kirby Smith's corps which previously had been held in reserve east of the river was ordered to cross over and extend

Polk's left so that on the night of the 30th Hardee's corps was east of Stone River and Polk's corps and McCown's division west of it. Rosecrans' army consisted of 56,000 men, of whom 43,400 became engaged, while Bragg had 51,000, of whom 37,700 were in the battle.

While Rosecrans was taking position on the 30th Wheeler made a bold cavalry raid in his rear. About midnight of the 20th with seven regiments of cavalry and part of a battery Wheeler started from Bragg's right on the Lebanon pike, crossed Stone River at Jefferson soon after daylight and attacked Starkweather's brigade but after a sharp fight was repulsed, though he captured and burned part of the brigade train. He then turned toward LaVergne which he reached by noon of the 30th, attacked and captured the immense supply train of McCook's command which he burned, captured and paroled over 700 prisoners, and pushing on to Rock Spring attacked, captured and destroyed another large train. He then marched to Nolensville where large quantities of supplies were taken and about 300 prisoners, who were paroled. After halting at this place for a short rest Wheeler resumed his march at 2 A. M. of the 31st and joined the left of the Confederate army which was then engaged. He had made a complete circuit of Rosecrans' army, had captured and paroled more than 1,000 prisoners and had destroyed more than \$1,000,000 worth of stores, besides

bringing back with him nearly 5,000 stand of small arms.

Meanwhile Bragg had determined to attack and turn Rosecrans' right at daybreak of December 31st and with that object in view, leaving Breckinridge's division to hold the right against Rosecrans' left, Hardee was ordered to march Cleburne's division from the right to the left, take command of that and of McCown's division and open the fight at daybreak by an attack upon McCook's right. The assault by Hardee was to be followed up by Polk's divisions in succession to the right, the move to be made by a constant wheel to the right on Polk's flank on the river, as a pivot, the object being to force Rosecrans back on Stone River, gain the roads in his rear and cut him off from his base of operations and supplies by the Nashville pike. On the night of the 30th Cleburne's division was sent by Hardee to the left and took position in McCown's rear. At daybreak the latter fell upon the right of R. W. Johnson's division while the Union troops were at breakfast. The outposts resolutely opposed the Confederate advance but were soon driven in and McCown, swinging to the right, overlapped Johnson's right, soon overcame the two brigades holding the first line, captured most of their artillery and swept them from the field. McCown's first movement had diverged somewhat to the left and as an opening had been made between his right and the left of Withers'


division Cleburne's division sprang forward, advanced on Davis' division and was severely engaged when Johnson's division gave way, whereupon McCown turned one of his brigades upon Davis' flank. Davis then changed front on his right to meet McCown, and made counter attacks upon Cleburne in his front, but was finally forced back with great loss, with a part of Sheridan's division on his left. Sheridan had also changed front to meet attacks upon his flank but after three successive assaults and repulses of the Confederates was obliged to fall back upon the divisions of Negley and Rousseau of Thomas' command on the left of the Wilkinson pike. Upon these and Sheridan's troops Polk's two divisions of Withers and Cheat-ham fell with great force, attacking in front, left flank and rear, and causing them to fall back in the rear of Crittenden's line. By this time the whole Union line had been driven back beyond the Wilkinson pike and Rosecrans' entire force was employed in holding the Nashville pike on which were all his trains. Accordingly all the troops were rallied on a new line covering this road and H. P. Van-Cleve's division of Crittenden's wing was brought up. The Confederates then made another attack but were repulsed, Rosecrans' right and centre being thrown at right angles to their positions of the morning, while Bragg's line was also at right angles to its former position, Rosecrans' left

and Bragg's right resting on Stone River.

It was now past noon. Bragg held a large part of the field with many prisoners, wagons, guns and ammunition, but the road to Nashville was still in Rosecrans' possession. The Confederates had made persistent efforts to crush the Union left near Stone River, but the various assaults of Polk's corps on that part of the Union line had been bloodily repulsed. Another effort was now made. At 10 o'clock in the morning Breckinridge had been ordered to send two brigades to reinforce Hardee but on hearing that Rosecrans' left was crossing the river to attack Breckinridge, Bragg countermanded this order. Later, however, he learned that his previous information was incorrect and directed Breckinridge to send two brigades to Hardee, soon afterward ordering him to leave one brigade east of Stone River and take the balance of his troops to Hardee's support. When the brigades of Daniel W. Adams and Jackson crossed Stone River, Hardee had been checked and thrown back and the two brigades were sent to Polk who was still assailing Rosecrans' left. These two brigades immediately became hotly engaged but were soon driven back with great slaughter. As they were falling back the brigades of Preston and J. B. Palmer under Breckinridge came up but they, too, were speedily repulsed. The cannonade continued until nightfall when, exhausted by a conflict which had

lasted fully 10 hours, both armies ceased fighting. While Bragg's infantry and artillery were breaking the Union lines and forcing them back, his cavalry under Wharton with part of McCown's infantry had attacked Rosecrans' right and rear, inflicting

justed, the left was drawn back though still resting on Stone River and the right and centre held more firmly the Nashville Road. General Bragg was highly elated at his success* but this was his last chance for exultation. On the morning of January 1, 1863,



losses in killed and wounded, capturing guns and wagons, and taking nearly 2,000 prisoners. Rosecrans' losses during the day had been appalling and when night came he was in some doubt whether to remain on the field, but finally decided to await another attack.* The line was read-

he began to demonstrate with infantry and artillery and again Wheeler's and Wharton's brigades of cavalry sought the Union rear. They attacked a large train near LaVergne, captured it and a piece of artillery and informed Bragg that heavy trains were

* *Official Records*, vol. xx., pt. i., p. 195.

* *Ibid*, vol. xx., pt. i., p. 662; Moore, *Rebellion Record*, vol. vi., Docs., p. 166.



From the original Brady negative.

SECTION OF THE UNION CAMP AT MURFREESBORO.

moving toward Nashville, some loaded and all the ambulances filled with wounded. Early in the morning H. P. VanCleve's division, commanded by Colonel S. Beatty and supported by Willam Grose's brigade, was thrown across the river from the left and formed line on a hill in front of Breckinridge who had resumed his position on that side of Bragg's right. On the morning of the 2d there was some shelling on Rosecrans' left, but elsewhere everything was quiet. There were indications, however, that Bragg meditated an attack on Rosecrans' left, whereupon Davis' division was ordered from the right to the left and some changes were made on that flank. From his headquarters west of the river Bragg perceived that Rosecrans had again occupied the high grounds on the east side of the river and that Polk's line could be enfiladed by artillery placed on the hill occupied by the right of VanCleve's division. As they must be dislodged or Polk must be withdrawn Breckinridge was ordered to take the hill and occupy it with his artillery. The two brigades that yet remained west of Stone River were returned to Breckinridge and he was reinforced by 2,000 of Wharton's and Pegram's cavalry and some artillery. Breckinridge formed his division in two lines of two brigades each with two batteries of artillery in rear, his whole force, exclusive of cavalry, numbering 4,500 men. At 4 o'clock the four brigades began the attack and after a severe fight broke and drove

from the hill and toward the river the two right brigades of VanCleve's division. The Confederates, flushed with success, were not content with merely following out orders, and instead of stopping at the hill pursued the Union troops, but soon paid the penalty of their rashness. Major John Mendenhall had placed 58 guns in a commanding position on the west bank of the river and as the Confederates advanced opened fire which, together with the infantry fire, drove the Confederates back in confusion. That part of VanCleve's line which had not been forced across the river then attacked the fleeing Confederates. A Union brigade at once crossed the river in pursuit and the Confederates were driven back to the position from which they had advanced, with a loss of 4 guns and over 1,700 killed and wounded of the 4,500 engaged. Night fell and Davis' and T. J. Wood's divisions were sent across and intrenched on the hill for which the two forces had been contending. A cold, heavy rain storm continued throughout the night and the next day (the 3d), fearing a rapid rise in the river Rosecrans withdrew all his troops from the eastern side of it. The day passed in comparative quiet and, under the erroneous impression that Rosecrans was receiving reinforcements, Bragg on the night of the 3d withdrew to Tullahoma, 36 miles away. On the 4th Rosecrans buried his dead and on the 5th occupied Murfreesboro. The Union loss at

Murfreesboro including the killed and wounded in the minor engagements between Nashville and Stone River was 1,730 killed, 7,802 wounded and 3,717 missing, an aggregate of 13,249, while the Confederate loss was 1,294 killed, 7,945 wounded, and about 2,200 missing, a total of 11,439.*

CHAPTER XX.

1862.

AFFAIRS IN THE SOUTHWEST.

Hindman's efforts to revive the Confederate cause in Arkansas and Missouri — Activities of guerilla bands — Schofield's orders — Organization of the militia — Assessments on Confederate sympathizers — Contests with bands under Porter, Cobb, Poindexter and others — Operations in Missouri — The battle of Prairie Grove.

In April of 1862 Missouri was in charge of General John M. Schofield who had recently been promoted to the rank of brigadier-general of volunteers. When Halleck started from St. Louis for his Corinth campaign, he left with General Schofield only the brief instruction to "take care of Missouri." This instruction was difficult to execute. After the battle of Pea Ridge in northwestern Arkansas under General Curtis, large numbers of Missourians on taking the oath of allegiance were allowed to return home and the guerilla bands were for the time virtually suppressed. After Schofield took command, however, these bands again began to be very troublesome. About the end of May of 1862, the Confederate general, T. C. Hindman, arrived at Little Rock with orders to revive the Confederate cause, but he met with little encouragement, writing: "In the existing condition of things General Beauregard could not spare me a soldier, a

gun, a pound of powder nor a single dollar of money." Accordingly he assumed the powers of a military dictator, reporting as follows:

"With the view to revive the hopes of loyal men in Missouri and to get troops from that State, I gave authority to various persons to raise companies and regiments there and to operate as guerillas. They soon became exceedingly active, and rendered important services, destroying wagon-trains and transports, tearing up railways, breaking telegraph lines, capturing towns, and thus compelling the enemy to keep there a large force that might have been employed elsewhere." †

* *Official Records*, vol. xx., pt. i., pp. 215, 674, (the numbers of the Confederate loss as given on the latter page being less than that in the text). See also Cist, *Army of the Cumberland*, pp. 87-135; Van Horne, *History of the Army of the Cumberland*, vol. i.; Ropes, *Civil War*, pt. ii.; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. iii., 600-637; Swinton, *Decisive Battles of the War*; Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. vi., pp. 282-296; Pollard, *Second Year of the War*; Alexander F. Stevenson, *The Battle of Stone's River, near Murfreesboro, Tenn., Dec. 30, 1862, to Jan. 3, 1863*; *Confederate Military History*, vol. iv., pp. 148-149; vol. v., pp. 112-119; vol. vi., pp. 110-111; vol. vii., pp. 100-114; vol. viii., pp. 57-77; vol. ix., pt. i., pp. 155-168; vol. x., pt. i., pp. 179-182; vol. xi., pt. i., pp. 165-168.

† *Official Records*, vol. xiii., p. 33.

Accordingly Schofield was forced to employ many severe retaliative measures. In his order of May 29, 1862, he said:

"The time is past when insurrection and rebellion in Missouri can cloak itself under the guise of honorable warfare. The utmost vigilance and energy are enjoined upon all the troops of the State in hunting down and destroying these robbers and assassins. When caught in arms, engaged in their unlawful warfare, they will be shot down upon the spot." *

This had little effect, however, and on June 23 he issued the following order:

"The rebels and rebel sympathizers in Missouri will be held responsible in their property, and if need be, in their persons, for the damages that may hereafter be committed by the lawless bands which they have brought into existence, subsisted, encouraged, and sustained up to the present time. These lawless bands could not exist in Missouri a single week but for the aid of influential and wealthy sympathizers, many of whom have taken the oath of allegiance to the United States—only to violate its spirit while they observe its form—so far as to escape punishment. If these people will not aid in putting down the demon they have raised among us, they must pay the damages. * * * The sum of \$5,000 for every soldier or Union citizen killed; from \$1,000 to \$5,000 for every one wounded; and the full value of all property destroyed or stolen by guerillas will be assessed and collected from the class of persons described above and residing in the vicinity of the place where the act is committed." †

This order, like the previous one, was ineffective and disturbances increased to such an extent that on July 22, 1862, another was issued by Governor Gamble to organize all the militia of the State, so that any portion of it might be called into active service whenever needed in

threatened localities.* This organization became known as the "Enrolled Missouri Militia," and more than 50,000 men were mustered, of whom 30,000 were armed. One of Schofield's problems was the status of secessionists and secession sympathizers; and as only those of proved loyalty were permitted to bear arms, it was resolved that the secession sympathizers should be made to contribute to the support of those actually enrolled. A tax of \$500,000 was levied upon the secessionists of St. Louis County "to be used in arming, clothing and subsisting the enrolled militia when in active service."

In spite of Schofield's efforts, however, the Confederate emissaries continued their work. Schofield says: "The desperate and sanguinary guerilla war which for nearly two months raged without cessation may be said to have begun about July 20, 1862, by the assembling of small bands under Porter, Poindexter and Cobb, who immediately began to rob and drive out the loyal people." † It was estimated that these guerillas numbered about 5,000 and the principal theatre of their operations was the northeastern division above the Missouri and bordering on the Mississippi. The band under Porter was pursued by the Union cavalry for 12 days and driven a distance of nearly 500 miles. On July 28 Porter and Cobb were defeated in Calloway County on the Mis-

* *Official Records*, vol. xiii., p. 402.

† *Ibid.*, p. 446.

* *Official Records*, p. 506.

† *Ibid.*, p. 12.

souri River but three days after Porter captured Newark and two companies of Union troops. On August 6, however, at the battle of Kirksville, Porter, with a loss of 180 killed and about 500 wounded, was completely routed. This broke his power. Poin-dexter's band of 1,200 men was next followed and on the 10th, while attempting to cross the Chartam River, was captured by Colonel Guitar with about 600 men. Soon afterward the band under Cobb dispersed or formed itself into small parties and continued plundering. After some time, however, these small bands were hunted down and killed, captured, or driven out of the State.

Almost simultaneously a rising occurred near the western Missouri line. On August 11 the garrison at Independence was compelled to surrender and immediately afterward the Confederate general J. T. Coffee was found to be advancing with about 1,500 cavalry. Major J. W. Foster with 800 men and 2 pieces of artillery set out from Lexington to effect a junction with Colonel Warren in command of 1,500 men from Clinton. Foster's intention was to attack Hughes and Quantrel who had gathered a large force, but upon his failure to join Warren he ventured an assault upon Coffee and Hughes alone at Lone Jack in Jackson County. The Confederates were shaping their campaign to repeat the capture of Lexington on the Missouri River, and after a severe conflict in which Foster was

defeated they began the movement to effect this coveted result. General J. G. Blunt, however, was called into Missouri with his Kansas troops and the converging Union columns drove the Confederates out of the southwestern corner of the State into Arkansas. In his report General Schofield says: "From the 1st of April to the 20th of September our troops met the enemy in more than one hundred engagements, great and small, in which our numbers varied from 40 or 50 to 1,000 or 1,200 and those of the enemy from a few men to 4,000 or 5,000."*

On September 19, 1862, Missouri, Arkansas, Kansas and the bordering Indian Territory were organized into a new department called the Department of the Missouri and placed in command of Major-General Samuel R. Curtis.† Accordingly Schofield took the field in person and gathering what troops he could at Springfield set out on a campaign toward southwest Missouri to meet the expected invasion from Arkansas. Schofield's force numbered about 11,000 in all, with 16 pieces of artillery. The military manœuvres, however, were of little significance and resolved themselves into small contests between Union and Confederate posts.

On September 30 General Salomon with 4,500 troops was defeated at Newtonia. Schofield then hurried to Sarcoxie and being joined by Blunt on October 3 advanced against the

* *Official Records*, vol. xiii., p. 14.

† *Official Records*, vol. xiii., p. 653.

Confederates at Newtonia. On the 22d Blunt came upon Cooper at Old Fort Wayne and routed him completely. With the command of Francis J. Herron, Schofield marched over the White River Mountains but found the enemy in flight. In November Schofield resigned his command. A month later the contest was resumed in northwestern Arkansas. On November 27 Blunt set out with 5,000 men and 30 pieces of artillery to attack Marmaduke's force of 8,000 men at Cane Hill. By a rapid march he came up with the enemy and opened the attack upon their position on one of the heights of the Boston Mountains, but Marmaduke retreated toward VanBuren and Blunt returned to Cane Hill. There the latter received information that Hindman, with a force of over 11,000 men, was advancing northward to enter Missouri, and immediately summoned General F. J. Herron and his two divisions, then near Springfield, Mis-

souri, to his aid. Herron reached Elkhorn, about 12 miles from Blunt's position, on the evening of December 6, at which time the Confederates lay between the two Union camps. Early on the morning of the 7th Hindman moved against Herron with his cavalry, but Herron's entire force having come up, the Confederates were driven back. Hindman then took up a strong position and awaited attack. Meanwhile Blunt hastened to Herron's aid and Hindman thus faced a force superior to his own in both numbers and equipment. The battle, known as the battle of Prairie Grove or Crawford's Prairie, lasted the greater part of the day and the Confederates were finally forced to retreat. Their loss in killed, wounded and missing was 1,317 and the Union loss 1,251. The battle was of importance chiefly as checking the further advance of the Confederates into Missouri.*

CHAPTER XXI.

1862-1863.

ACTS OF CONGRESS: FINANCES: SEWARD AND CHASE.

Lincoln's statement of financial conditions — Opposition to the government — Passage of the National banking law — Financial measures — The Cabinet crisis.

The 'Thirty-Seventh Congress began its third session on December 1, 1862. On the same day Lincoln sent in his annual message. He reviewed the relations with foreign powers, the slavery controversy and other internal affairs, and urged that the finances be

given serious consideration. He stated that the receipts into the Treasury for

* William M. Wherry, *The Battle of Prairie Grove, Arkansas*, in *Journal of the Military Service Institute*, vol. xxxiii., pp. 176-189; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. iii., pp. 448-450; *Confederate Military History*, vol. ix., pt. ii., pp. 107-111; vol. x., pt. ii., pp. 144-150.

the year ending January 30, 1862, had been \$583,885,247.06, of which more than \$525,000,000 had come from loans. The disbursements had been \$570,841,700.25, leaving a balance in the Treasury of \$13,043,546.81. Of the expenditures naturally the greatest portion had gone to the War Department (nearly \$400,000,000), while \$43,000,000 had been spent for the navy. As expenses would be enormous during the coming year, Congress was urged to provide money to meet them.*


Hardly had the message been read when the opposition began to denounce the course of the Government. Resolutions were introduced criticizing the Government for suspending the writ of *habeas corpus* and for arbitrarily arresting persons suspected of dealings with the Confederacy. Numerous Senators and Representatives were actively engaged in efforts to thwart the plans of the majority, but they accomplished little. The report of the Secretary of the Treasury was disheartening, since it stated that the public debt by the end of the year would amount to \$1,700,000,000. The Secretary urged the organization of banking associations under a general act as proposed the previous year. The central idea of the scheme was "the establishment of one sound, uniform circulation, of equal value throughout the country, upon the foundation of national credit com-

bined with private capital." Its advantages in absorbing public securities, providing a home market and giving steadiness to their value were obvious, while the measure was free from the objection of government interference, formerly alleged against the National bank. In 1862 E. G. Spaulding, of New York, and Samuel Hooper, of Massachusetts, had prepared a National bank act in accordance with the views of Secretary Chase, but Congress was so busy at that time with internal revenue bills and other important work that it was laid aside. This bill was introduced by John Sherman from the Senate Committee on Finance on February 2, 1863, with several suggested amendments. Ten days later it passed the Senate by a vote of 23 to 21 and on the 20th passed the House by a vote of 78 to 64. The act was approved by the President on February 25, 1863.*

On January 17, 1863, an issue of \$100,000,000 in United States legal tender notes was authorized for the immediate payment of the army and navy, such notes to be a part of the amount provided for in any bill that might be passed during the session. In approving this act Lincoln said:

* For text see *Appleton's Annual Encyclopedia* (1863), pp. 296-304; *United States Statutes-at-Large*, vol. xii., p. 665. This act proved so unsatisfactory in many details that during the next nine months only 134 banks were organized under it. Accordingly in June of 1864 the act was revised and the extension of the new system went on rapidly. See the note in Rhodes, *United States*, vol. iv., p. 239.

* Richardson, *Messages and Papers*, vol. vi., p. 130.



From the original Brady negative.

SALMON P. CHASE.

"I think it my duty to express my sincere regret that it has been found necessary to authorize so large an additional issue of United States notes, when this circulation and that of the suspended banks together have become already so redundant as to increase prices beyond real values, thereby augmenting the cost of living to the injury of living, and the cost of supplies to the injury of the whole country."*

Spaulding explained to the House that during the next eighteen months the Government must borrow \$1,000,000,000. The expenses of the Government were \$2,500,000 a day (including Sundays) and as the receipts from customs, taxes and other sources would not exceed \$600,000 daily the balance (\$1,900,000) must be obtained by loans of some kind.† Accordingly, by an act approved March 3, 1863, a loan of \$300,000,000 was authorized for the current fiscal year and a loan of \$600,000,000 for the next fiscal year, for which bonds were to be issued running not less than 10 nor more than 40 years, principal and interest payable in coin bearing interest at a rate not exceeding 6 per cent. per year, payable on bonds not exceeding \$100 annually and on all others semi-annually. The secretary was authorized also to issue \$400,000,000 of 6 per cent. Treasury notes to run not more than three years and to be legal tender for their face value, excluding interest, and exchangeable for and redeemable by United States notes, for which purpose alone an issue of \$150,000,000 of the latter was authorized. Further-

more, if necessary for the payment of the army, the navy, and other creditors of the Government, another issue of \$150,000,000 in United States notes including the \$100,000,000 voted in January was authorized, besides which authority was granted to issue \$50,000,000 in special currency in lieu of postage or other stamps exchangeable for United States notes in sums not less than \$3 and receivable for any dues to the United States less than \$5, except duties on imports. Authority was given also to receive deposits of gold coin and bullion and to issue certificates therefor; and to issue certificates representing the coin in the Treasury, in payment of interest, which, with the certificates of deposits issued, were not to exceed by more than 20 per cent. the amount of coin and bullion in the Treasury. A semi-annual tax of 1 per cent. was imposed on the circulation of State banks.

Meanwhile a crisis had arisen in the Cabinet. Seward and Chase had become the Cabinet representatives of the more conservative and the more radical elements of the Republican party. Seward throughout had worked without regard to his own future, being absolutely free from any ambition for higher office. Chase on the other hand, while doing everything possible to insure the success of the Treasury operations, never became convinced that the Republicans had not made a great mistake at Chicago in nominating Lincoln. He

* Lincoln's *Complete Works*, vol. ii., p. 300.

† Spaulding, *History of Legal Tender Paper Money*, p. 174.

seemed to consider the President and his colleagues his inferiors in capacity, zeal, and devotion to liberty and the general welfare. In a letter to W. M. Dickson, dated August 29, 1862, he says:

"Since the incoming of General Halleck I have known but little more of the progress of the war than any outsider—I mean so far as influencing it goes. My recommendations, before he came in, were generally disregarded and since have been seldom ventured. * * * I hope for the best. Those who reject my counsels ought to know better than I."*

Writing to John Sherman, of Ohio, on September 20, he says:

"Since Halleck has been here the conduct of the war has been abandoned to him by the President almost absolutely. We who are called members of the Cabinet but are in reality only separate heads of departments, meeting now and then for talk on whatever happens to come uppermost—not for grave consultation on matters concerning the salvation of the country—we have as little to do with it as if we were heads of factories supplying shoes or clothing. No regular and systematic reports of what is done are made, I believe, even to the President; certainly none are made to the Cabinet. Of course, we may hope [for] the best; that privilege always remains. It is painful, however, to hear complaints of remissness, delays, discords, dangers, and feel that there must be ground for such complaints, and know at the same time that one has no power to remedy the faults complained of and yet be thought to have."†

Again he said:

"Though charged with the responsibility of providing means [for] the vast expenditures of the war, I have little more voice in its conduct than a stranger to the Administration; perhaps not so considerable a voice as some who are, in law, at least, strangers to it. I should be very well satisfied with this state of things if I saw the war prosecuted with vigor and success. I am only dissatisfied with it because I cannot help thinking that if my judgment had more weight it would be so prosecuted."‡

* Schuckers, *Life of Chase*, p. 443.

† Schuckers, *Life of Chase*, pp. 379–380.

‡ Warden, *Life of Chase*, pp. 491–492.

In another letter he says:

"We have fallen on very evil days. Under the influence of a short-sighted notion that the old Union can be reconstituted, after a year's civil war of free States and slave States, just as it was, the President has hitherto refused to sanction any adequate measure for the liberation of the loyal population of the South from slavery to the rebels. Hence we are fighting rebellion with one hand, and with the other supplying its vital elements of strength. * * * It is some consolation to me that my voice, and, so far as opportunity has allowed, my example has been steadily opposed to all this. I have urged my ideas on the President and my associates till I begin to feel that they are irksome to the first and one or two, at least, of the second."*

The Secretary warmly sympathized with General Hunter after the revocation of his emancipation order in South Carolina and allowed his preference for military emancipation to carry him in one instance to the point of absolute disloyalty to the President. Writing to General Butler at New Orleans on July 31, 1862, he strove to controvert the President's views with relation to slavery in the Northern States, urging in their place his own opinion "to which I am just as sure the masses will and the politicians must come as I am sure that both politicians and masses have come to opinions expressed by me when they found few concurrents." He then gives Butler the following mischievous advice:

"Of course if some prudential consideration did not forbid, I should at once, if I were in your place, notify the slave-holders of Louisiana that henceforth they must be content to pay their laborers wages. This measure would settle it in the minds of the working population of the State that the Union general is their friend; would be apt to secure him a good deal of de-

* Warden, *Life of Chase*, pp. 453–454.

votion among them; and when he wanted faithful guides or scouts he could find them. It is true that such an order could not be enforced by military power beyond military lines; but it would enforce itself by degrees a good way beyond them, and would make the extension of military lines comparatively quite easy. It may be said that such an order would be annulled. I think not. It is plain enough to see that the annulling of Hunter's order was a mistake. It will not be repeated." *

This should be enough to show the Secretary's opinion of the President. It must not be understood that Lincoln was unaware of Chase's disposition toward him, but it was his lifelong habit to disregard slights that were personal to himself. However, an incident occurred toward the end of 1862 which he could not well overlook. In an interview with Thurlow Weed Chase had spoken of Seward rather disparagingly:

"I told him [Weed] I did not doubt Mr. Seward's fidelity to his ideas of progress, amelioration, and freedom, but that I thought he adhered too tenaciously to men who proved themselves unworthy and dangerous, such as McClellan; that he resisted too persistently decided measures; that his influence encouraged the irresolution and inaction of the President in respect to men and measures; although personally he was as decided as anybody in favor of vigorous prosecution of the war and as active as anybody in concerting plans of action against the rebels." †

At this time also Seward offended Sumner and the other radical anti-slavery members of Congress by two dispatches. On April 22, 1861, he wrote to Dayton that the "rights of the States and the condition of every human being in them will remain subject to exactly the same laws and

forms of administration whether the revolution shall succeed or whether it shall fail." On July 5, 1862, he wrote to Adams:

"It seems as if the extreme advocates of African slavery and its most vehement opponents were acting in concert together to precipitate a servile war—the former by making the most desperate attempt to overthrow the Federal Union, the latter by demanding an edict of universal emancipation as a lawful and necessary, if not, as they say, the only legitimate way to save the Union."

Finally the feeling against the Secretary of State became so great in the Senate that at a caucus called to consider the matter a vote was taken demanding Seward's withdrawal from the Cabinet. As a question of taste and expediency, however, this resolution was reconsidered and another adopted in its place requesting the President to reconstruct the Cabinet in such a way as would secure "in the present crisis of public affairs" better results in the war waged "to suppress a causeless and atrocious rebellion."* A committee was appointed by the caucus to present their formal conclusions to Lincoln, but before they had done so Senator Preston King, of New York, acquainted Seward with these proceedings and he immediately offered his resignation to the President. On the morning of December 19 the committee waited on the President and presented the resolutions. One by one the nine members of the committee attacked Seward, not for "wrong-doing, but on the ground that, in their

* Schuckers, *Life of Chase*, pp. 376-378.

† Warden, *Life of Chase*, p. 475.

* Rhodes, *United States*, vol. iv., p. 204.

opinion, he was lukewarm in the conduct of affairs and did not ardently support the anti-slavery measures of the Administration. In reporting this conference to the Cabinet afterwards Lincoln said: "While they seemed to believe in my honesty they also appeared to think that when I had in me any good purpose or intention Seward contrived to suck it out of me unperceived."* On the same evening the committee and the Cabinet members (save Seward) met the President and a frank interchange of views took place. Collamer, Fessenden, Grimes, Sumner and Trumbull attacked the Cabinet and Seward in particular, and the Cabinet members made an energetic defence. Chase was in an awkward position because he could not join the Senators in an attack upon the Administration, nor could he defend his colleagues in the presence of the Senators when he had written to all of them in derogation of the President and the Secretary of State. Accordingly he protested against the proceedings and said he would not have come to the meeting had he foreseen that he would be arraigned. Finally Lincoln asked if the Senators still thought Seward ought to be excused. Sumner, Grimes, Trumbull and Pomeroy promptly said

yes; Collamer, Howard and Fessenden declined to commit themselves; while Harris, of New York, said no.*

The news of this stormy meeting created much excitement in Washington. Though deeply distressed, the President preserved his coolness and kept his own counsel. Chase, however, saw that his position was embarrassing and untenable and, as resignation seemed the only solution of the difficulty, he tendered his resignation to the President on the 20th. Lincoln believed that if he "had yielded to that storm and dismissed Seward the thing would all have slumped over one way and we should have been left with a scanty handful of supporters." He now saw that he had the upper hand and on December 20 sent an identical note to Chase and Seward, in which he said:

"I am apprised of the circumstances which may render the course personally desirable to each of you; but after most anxious consideration my deliberate judgment is that the public interest does not admit of it [their resignations]. I therefore have to request that you will resume the duties of your departments respectively."*

The next day Seward cheerfully resumed the functions of his department, and two days later Chase reluctantly returned to his post.

* Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. vi., p. 265.

* Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. vi., p. 266; Rhodes, *United States*, vol. iv., p. 205.

† Warden, *Life of Chase*, p. 508; Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. vi., p. 268.

CHAPTER XXII.

1862-1863.

RECONSTRUCTION : COLONIZATION : EMANCIPATION.

The formation of a State government in West Virginia — Her admission into the Union — The appointment of military governors — Lincoln's views of reconstruction — His scheme of colonization — Failure of the colonization enterprise — The dispute over emancipation in Missouri — Lincoln's scheme of compensated abolishment — His justification of the Emancipation Proclamation — The employment of negroes in the armies.

At the outbreak of the war the legislature of Virginia had called a convention to be held at Richmond on February 14, 1861, to decide the question of secession. It was required also that when the delegates to the convention were elected a vote should be taken on the question whether, if the convention passed a secession ordinance, that ordinance should or should not be referred to the people for their adoption or rejection. This was done and when the secession ordinance was passed it was referred to the people on May 28, 1861. In the western part of the State, however, there was much Union sentiment, and early in May a convention of nearly 500 delegates assembled, declared the secession ordinance null and void, and recommended that, in case the ordinance were ratified by the popular vote on May 28 delegates from all the counties of Virginia be elected to meet in general convention and provide as might seem best for the welfare of the people. As we have seen, at the May convention Virginia seceded and the convention, as recommended, met at

Wheeling on June 11. At that time the convention (assuming that the various offices of the State government were vacated since the incumbents had joined the secession movement), formally organized the restored government of Virginia, made Francis H. Pierpont governor, and invoked the aid and protection of the Federal Government, which Lincoln duly promised. Those members of the legislature who had taken the oath of allegiance to the United States and the restored government of Virginia were formed into a legislature and the vacancies were filled by new elections. This legislature chose United States Senators whom Congress admitted to seats. After a recess the convention reassembled at Wheeling on August 20, 1861, and passed an ordinance providing for the formation of a new State out of a portion of the territory of Virginia, to be called the State of Kanawha. An election was to be held late in October to vote upon this proposition and also to elect delegates to another convention which should form a constitution for submission to the

people. The election took place in October according to program and resulted in a vote of 18,408 in favor of the new State and 781 against it. Accordingly the delegates elected at the same time met at Wheeling on November 26, 1861, and, during a session which lasted till February 18, 1862, drafted a constitution for the 40 counties to be incorporated in the new State which was to be given the name of West Virginia.* The constitution was submitted to the people and was adopted by a vote of 18,862 to 514. Accordingly, on May 13, 1862, the new legislature, convened by Governor Pierpont, passed an act giving the formal consent of Virginia to the creation of a new State out of her territory. As the consent of Congress was necessary, the various proceedings were laid before that body on May 29 together with the application for the formation of a new State. The application was referred to the Senate Committee on Territories, which on June 23 reported favoring admission and accepting all the provisions of the new constitution save that relating to slaves (which consisted of a simple prohibition against their being introduced into the State for permanent residence). The committee reported the bill with a condition requiring gradual emancipation beginning on July 4, 1863. The bill was passed on July 14, 1862, by a vote of 23 to 17.

* The constitution will be found in Thorpe, *Federal and State Constitutions*, vol. vii., pp. 4013-4033.

The House did not consider the bill until the following December, when it was passed on December 10 by a vote of 96 to 55. The bill was then approved by the President and became law on December 31, 1862.*

The act of Congress, however, did not admit West Virginia as a State, it being conditional to admission that a slavery clause which Congress had prescribed should be inserted in the constitution by the constitutional convention, that it be adopted and ratified by a majority of the voters of the State and, when this had been done, that the President issue a proclamation stating this fact. Accordingly, the constitutional convention reconvened on February 12, 1863. The slavery amendment was adopted almost unanimously after much debate and on March 26 the constitution was again submitted to the people and was adopted by a vote of 28,321 to 572. The result of the vote was certified to the President, who on April 20 issued the proclamation declaring that the act of admission should take effect and be enforced in 60 days from that date.† Thus, on June 20, 1863, the State of West Virginia became a legal entity, and A. J. Boreman was elected its first governor. Two Senators were

* *The South in the Building of the Nation*, vol. i., pp. 365-382. See also W. P. Willey, *An Inside View of the Formation of West Virginia*; East and Maxwell, *Formation of West Virginia*. For the opinions of the Cabinet members, see Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. vi., pp. 297-311.

† For the proclamation see Richardson, *Messages and Papers*, vol. vi., p. 167.

chosen to represent the new State in the Senate, by whose formal admission Congress gave its official, full, and final recognition to the new State.

The organization and admission of West Virginia still left in existence the restored government of Virginia. Governor Pierpont transferred the government, which they supposed was in their keeping, to Alexandria, Virginia. There he continued to administer affairs in the interest of the Federal Government, while Governor Letcher, at Richmond, continued to administer a separate government in the interest of the Confederate authority. Pierpont was recognized by the President and Congress as the loyal and legal governor, and, till the end of the war his authority was exercised over such portions of the remaining territory of the Old Dominion as came under the permanent control of the Union armies.*

By this time much Southern territory had been restored to the domain of the Federal Government. This necessarily disarranged the ordinary administration of civil affairs and involved a displacement of the old officials. The most important of the officials to be appointed were the military governors. The first of these appointments occurred in Tennessee on February 23, 1862, after Nashville had been evacuated, when Lincoln nominated, and on March 4 the Sen-

ate confirmed, Andrew Johnson as military governor of Tennessee. In his speech on assuming office Governor Johnson stated his duties as follows:

"I have been appointed in the absence of the regular and established State authorities, as military governor for the time being, to preserve the public property of the State, to give the protection of law actively enforced to her citizens, and, as speedily as may be [possible], to restore her government to the same condition as before the existing rebellion. * * * I find most, if not all, of the offices, both State and Federal, vacant, either by actual abandonment or by the action of the incumbents in attempting to subordinate their functions to a power in hostility to the fundamental law of the State, and subversive of her national allegiance. * * * I shall, therefore, as early as practicable, designate for the various positions under the State and county governments, from among my fellow citizens, persons of probity and intelligence, and bearing true allegiance to the Constitution and government of the United States, who will execute the functions of their respective offices until their places can be filled by the action of the people." *

On May 19, in conformity with this precedent, Lincoln appointed Edward Stanley military governor of North Carolina, and in June, after news had been received of the success in the Gulf, named Colonel G. F. Shepley as military governor of Louisiana. At about the same time General Curtis, after the battle of Pea Ridge, was preparing for an advance on Little Rock, Arkansas, and, as there was every prospect that he would hold it permanently, a similar commission as military governor was given to John S. Phelps, a citizen of Missouri, with the intention that he should assume

* *The South in the Building of the Nation*, vol. i., p. 384; Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. vi., p. 313.

* Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. vi., pp. 344-345.

his duties as soon as the capital was reached. The Union advance, however, was delayed more than a year and, when it finally occurred, a popular convention was convened and a provisional government appointed which rendered unnecessary the intervention of a military governor.

There was considerable doubt as to Lincoln's views regarding methods of reconstruction. In his inaugural address on March 4, 1861, Lincoln said:

"I hold that, in contemplation of universal law and of the Constitution, the union of these States is perpetual. Perpetuity is implied, if not expressed, in the fundamental law of all national governments. It is safe to assert that no government proper ever had a provision in its organic law for its own termination. * * * But if destruction of the Union by one or by a part only of the States be lawfully possible, the Union is less perfect than before the Constitution, having lost the vital element of perpetuity. It follows from these views that no State upon its own mere motion can lawfully get out of the Union; that resolves and ordinances to that effect are legally void; and that acts of violence within any State or States against the authority of the United States are insurrectionary, or revolutionary, according to circumstances. I therefore consider that in view of the Constitution and the laws the Union is unbroken, and to the extent of my ability I shall take care, as the Constitution itself expressly enjoins upon me, that the laws of the Union be faithfully executed in all the States." *

Lincoln adhered to this view throughout his Administration, and several times confirmed it in letters to various persons. A complaint was sent to him regarding the course of General Phelps in Louisiana. Writing to Cuthbert Bullitt on July 28, 1862, he said:

"The people of Louisiana who wish protection to person and property have but to reach forth their hands and take it. Let them in good faith reinaugurate the national authority and set up a State government, conforming thereto under the Constitution. They know how to do it, and can have the protection of the army while doing it. The army will be withdrawn so soon as such State government can dispense with its presence, and the people of the State can then, upon the old constitutional terms, govern themselves to their own liking."

In a private letter to Shepley Lincoln said:

"I wish elections for Congressmen to take place in Louisiana; but I wish it to be a movement of the people of the district, and not a movement of our military and quasi-military authorities there. I merely wish our authorities to give the people a chance—to protect them against secession interference. Of course the election cannot be according to strict law—by State law there is, I suppose, no election day before January; and the regular election officers will not act in many cases, if in any. These knots must be cut, the main object being to get an expression of the people. If they would fix a day and a way, for themselves, all the better; but if they stand idle, not seeming to know what to do, do you fix these things for them by proclamation." *

Accordingly, Shepley ordered the election of members of Congress in the first and second Congressional districts of the State, each of which embraced about half of the city of New Orleans with some outlying territory. All the other districts of the State were outside the Union military lines and hence no election was held. The legal forms prescribed by the State were observed; and when the election was held on December 3, 1862, B. F. Flanders was chosen in the first district and Michael Hahn in the sec-

* Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. vi., p. 347; Richardson, *Messages and Papers*, vol. vi., p. 7.

* Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. vi., p. 352.

ond district. Early in 1863 these men were admitted to seats in the House, after a full scrutiny of the methods pursued.

Lincoln had never abandoned his idea of colonization. Under the operation of the Confiscation Act, approved August 6, 1861, a considerable number of slaves had become legally free, while many more had become actually free by escape or capture. Their protection and maintenance rested to a considerable extent upon the Government; and, while the able-bodied could be put to use in the army, something must be done for the support of those incapable of military labor. Accordingly, in his message to Congress Lincoln recommended the appropriation of money and the acquisition of territory for colonization purposes. Congress appropriated \$100,000 to aid in the colonization and settlement of such free negroes in the District of Columbia or those to be freed under the emancipation act for the District as might desire to emigrate to Haiti, Liberia or such other country beyond the limits of the United States as the President should determine. By an act approved July 16, \$500,000 was appropriated to accomplish the emancipation of the slaves in the District and to colonize those made free by the probable passage of a confiscation bill.

Under the confiscation act of July 17, 1862, the President was authorized to colonize in the tropical countries any negroes who were willing to emi-

grate, if the consent of the government to which such country belonged could be obtained. Seward, therefore, on September 30, 1862, addressed a circular to England, France, Denmark and the Netherlands suggesting negotiations with this object in view, in so far as such colonization related to their dependencies. Nothing was done by those governments, but, on December 31, 1862, Bernard Kock signed a contract with the government for a compensation of \$50 per head to colonize 5,000 negroes on the island of A'Vache. Kock bound himself to furnish the colonists with comfortable houses and substantial food and to employ them for four years for money wages varying from \$4 per month for minors and women, to \$10 per month for male adults. He agreed also that the emigrants and their posterity should remain free forever, that medical attendance and medicines would be furnished and that such care for paupers should be provided "as is customary with similar inhabitants of the country in which they shall be residents." Kock then sought financial assistance in New York and Boston and broached the following scheme: With 500 emigrants on the island he agreed to set out a cotton plantation and guaranteed, within eight or nine months, a crop of 1,000 bales of cotton which, at the war price, would yield \$500,000. The outlay would be about \$70,000 and as the profits were thus 600 per cent. Kock readily obtained financial assistance.

Soon, however, it was learned that he was an irresponsible adventurer whose project had no substantial foundation, and the President not only refused to proceed but cancelled the contract. Kock, however, had the lease of the island and, as the capitalists were in an awkward situation, they pressed Kock to sign the lease over to them, whereupon, on April 6, 1863, they entered into a similar arrangement with the Secretary of the Interior, and more than 400 persons, of whom about one-third were women and children, were sent to the island. But this project also terminated disastrously. During the voyage 20 or 30 died of fever and, as no houses were ready for the emigrants when they reached the island, much sickness was brought on by exposure. There were sad mismanagement and oppression on the part of the projectors of the enterprise, and considerable idleness, extravagance and mutinous conduct on the part of the negroes. The Haitian government naturalized the negroes, but refused to give the guarantee of freedom. There were no food crops nor any cotton crops, and finally the capitalists declined longer to support the colony. Lincoln sent a special agent to investigate the affairs of the colony. He found only a small stock of provisions on the island, of which but a meagre portion was suitable for the sick. Of the negro emigrants only 378 remained alive, and of these many were seriously sick and others disabled from the effects of the stings of

poisonous insects. Accordingly, the agent assumed charge of the emigrants, furnishing them with the necessities of life and ameliorating their condition in every way possible. Finally, on March 4, 1864, as they expressed a desire to return to the United States, the negroes left the island and anchored in the Potomac River opposite Alexandria on the 20th of the same month. No further attempt at colonization was made by the President, and by an act approved July 2, 1864, the appropriations previously made by Congress for that purpose were repealed.*

In Missouri, as we have seen, the Confederates had been driven out after the battle of Prairie Grove and General Curtis had been placed in command of the Department of Missouri. Among the earliest directions to Curtis was a request to suspend the order of military assessments (issued August 28, 1862), levying \$500,000 on "secessionists and southern sympathizers" of St. Louis County, to maintain, arm, subsist and clothe the enrolled militia.† On January 5, 1863, Lincoln wrote to Curtis requesting him to confer with Governor Gamble regarding these assessments and other matters of interest to Missouri, to see if some plan of action could not be agreed upon.‡ Curtis held the interview with Gamble, and on January 23 wrote to Lincoln that there was no

* Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. vi., pp. 354-367.

† *Official Records*, vol. xiii., p. 12.

‡ *Official Records*, vol. xxii., pt. ii., pp. 17-18.

reason to fear differences of opinion between himself and Gamble:

"In regard to county assessments, he withdrew his enrolled militia publicly. I am checking them quietly. Our Union men are much opposed to restraint in their pursuit of rebels, especially in the county where our friends have been persecuted and where the assessments inure to the benefit of the widows and orphans of men killed by the rebels. There may be frauds such as you name, but I doubt it. * * * The assessments on persons for crimes committed in a neighborhood are considered a great restraint on rebels who have encouraged bands of rebels, and our friends fear they will suffer if such restraints are taken off. I am implored not to remove them. * * * As to banishments, the governor goes further than I do on that subject although we might differ as to particular cases. Most of the banishments have been made as a commutation for imprisonments determined by military commissions or local commanders, and in all instances where the community seems to think it safe I try to procure a release." *

Notwithstanding Curtis' letter, Lincoln, on January 20, issued an order through Stanton to suspend until further instructions all action upon assessments for damages, not only in St. Louis but in the whole State of Missouri.†

Meanwhile the subject of emancipation was a source of irritation and discord in Missouri. In the State Convention which met on June 2, 1862, Breckinridge introduced a bill providing that all negroes born in slavery after January 1, 1865, should be slaves until they reached the age of 25 years and no longer, unless sooner permanently removed from the State. The bill provided also for accepting the offer of Congress, recommended by

the President, of compensation to the State and through it to the owners, but was summarily laid on the table by a vote of 52 to 19. Nevertheless, on June 14, a resolution was adopted by a vote of 37 to 23, to the effect that, while the majority of the convention did not feel authorized to take action on this delicate subject, yet they desired to recognize the liberality displayed by the Federal Government.

Lincoln's preliminary Emancipation Proclamation of September 22, 1862, made the issue a prominent one in Missouri, as elsewhere. The emancipation party in Missouri gained much strength by this proclamation and at the general election of November 4, 1862, obtained a decided majority in both branches of the legislature. In his annual message to the legislature Governor Gamble recommended a modified plan of gradual emancipation although he thought that the legislature did not have constitutional power over all details of the scheme.

Accordingly, when Congress met in December of 1862, the Missouri delegates felt justified in advocating the President's plan of gradual emancipation. On December 10 Senator Henderson, and on the 11th Representative Noell, gave notice of bills to aid Missouri in compensated emancipation. Henderson recommended an appropriation of \$20,000,000, while Noell advocated only \$10,000,000. On January 6, 1863, by a vote of 73 to 46 the House passed Noell's bill which, upon being sent to the Senate, super-

* *Official Records*, vol. xxii., pt. ii., pp. 42-43.

† *Ibid*, p. 64.

seded Henderson's bill. A compromise was reached on February 7 by fixing the amount at \$15,000,000, in which form the bill passed the Senate on February 12 by a vote of 23 to 18. On being referred to the House, the amended bill was not reported until February 25. By this time the session was nearly at an end and three of the Missouri Representatives who were strongly pro-slavery, aided by some of the Democrats, succeeded by dilatory parliamentary tactics in preventing the bill reaching a vote. Later an endeavor was made to secure consideration for it by the suspension of the rules, but the necessary two-thirds vote of the House could not be obtained.* Meanwhile, in his message of December 1, 1862, Lincoln urged upon Congress the policy of compensated abolishment, recommending the adoption of a resolution and articles amending the Constitution of the United States as follows:

"Every State wherein slavery now exists which shall abolish the same therein at any time or times before the 1st day of January, A. D. 1900, shall receive compensation from the United States as follows, to wit:

"The President of the United States shall deliver to every such State bonds of the United States bearing interest at the rate of _____ per cent. per annum to an amount equal to the aggregate sum of _____ for each slave shown to have been therein by the Eighth Census of the United States, said bonds to be delivered to such State by installments or in one parcel at the completion of the abolishment, accordingly as the same shall have been gradual or at one time within such State; and interest shall begin to run upon any such bond only from the proper

time of its delivery as aforesaid. Any State having received bonds as aforesaid and afterwards reintroducing or tolerating slavery therein shall refund to the United States the bonds so received, or the value thereof, and all interest paid thereon.

"All slaves who shall have enjoyed actual freedom by the chances of the war at any time before the end of the rebellion shall be forever free; but all owners of such who shall not have been disloyal shall be compensated for them at the same rates as is provided for States adopting abolishment of slavery, but in such way that no slaves shall be twice accounted for.

"Congress may appropriate money and otherwise provide for colonizing free colored persons with their own consent at any place or places without the United States."*

No immediate action followed this appeal. No signal military victories gave to Lincoln's words the strength that was needed to compel action. Moreover, owing to distrust in him and his waning popularity among certain classes, his recommendations were not considered.†

Meanwhile the time was approaching when Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation should be carried out according to his solemn announcement. When he promulgated the proclamation on September 22, he informed the Cabinet that he had himself decided upon its issuance and only wanted advice regarding subordinate points. The Cabinet members suggested several unimportant amendments or changes in the wording,‡ which in substance were followed by Lincoln in

* Richardson, *Messages and Papers*, vol. vi., p. 136.

† Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. vi., pp. 399-401; Rhodes, *United States*, vol. iv., pp. 215-216.

‡ For which see Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. vi., p. 414 *et seq.*

* Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. vi., pp. 395-397; Rhodes, *United States*, vol. iv., pp. 216-217.

rewriting the proclamation for signature. The draft of the proclamation was completed on January 1, 1863, and was issued the same day. The text was as follows:

"Whereas, on the 22d day of September, A. D. 1862, a proclamation was issued by the President of the United States, containing, among other things, the following, to wit: That on the 1st day of January, etc., (see paragraphs three and four of the Proclamation, previously quoted).

"Now, therefore, I, ABRAHAM LINCOLN, President of the United States, by virtue of the power in me vested as Commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, in time of actual armed rebellion against the authority and government of the United States, and as a fit and necessary war-measure for suppressing said rebellion do, on this 1st day of January, A. D. 1863, and in accordance with my purpose so to do, publicly proclaimed for the full period of one hundred days from the day first above-mentioned, order and designate as the States, and parts of States, wherein the people thereof, respectively, are this day in rebellion against the United States, the following, to wit:

"Arkansas, Texas, Louisiana (except the Parishes of St. Bernard, Plaquemines, Jefferson, St. John, St. Charles, St. James, Ascension, Assumption, Terrebonne, Lafourche, St. Marie, St. Martin, and Orleans, including the City of New Orleans), Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, and Virginia (except the forty-eight counties of West Virginia, and also the counties of Berkeley, Accomac, Northampton, Elizabeth City, York, Princess Anne and Norfolk, including the cities of Norfolk and Portsmouth) and which excepted parts are, for the present, left precisely as if this Proclamation were not issued.

"And by virtue of the power and for the purpose aforesaid, I do order and declare that all persons held as slaves within said designated States and parts of States, are and henceforward shall be free; and that the Executive Government of the United States, including the military and naval authorities thereof, will recognize and maintain the freedom of said persons.

"And I do hereby enjoin upon the people so declared to be free, to abstain from all violence, unless in necessary self-defence; and I recommend to them that in all cases when allowed they labor faithfully for reasonable wages.

"And I further declare and make known that such persons of suitable condition will be received into the armed service of the United States to garrison forts, positions, stations, and other places, and to man vessels of all sorts in said service.

"And upon this act, sincerely believed to be an act of justice, warranted by the Constitution upon military necessity, I invoke the considerate judgment of mankind and the gracious favor of Almighty God." *

Undoubtedly there was nothing in the letter of the Constitution authorizing Lincoln's action, but he justifies it as follows:

"I am naturally anti-slavery. If slavery is not wrong nothing is wrong. I cannot remember when I did not so think and feel, and yet I have never understood that the Presidency conferred on me an unrestricted right to act officially upon this judgment and feeling. * * * I did understand, however, that my oath to preserve the Constitution to the best of my ability imposed upon me the duty of preserving by every indispensable means, that Government—that nation, of which that Constitution was the organic law. Was it possible to lose the nation and yet preserve the Constitution? By general law, life and limb must be protected, yet often a limb must be amputated to save a life; but a life is never wisely given to save a limb. I felt that measures otherwise unconstitutional might become lawful by becoming indispensable to the preservation of the Constitution through the preservation of the nation. Right or wrong, I assumed this ground, and now avow it. I could not feel that, to the best of my ability, I had even tried to preserve the Constitution if, to save slavery or any minor matter, I should permit the wreck of Government, country, and Constitution all together. * * * When in March and May and July, 1862, I made earnest and successive appeals to the border States to favor compensated emancipation, I believed the indispensable necessity for military emancipation and arming the blacks would come unless averted by that measure. They declined the proposition and I was, in my best judgment, driven to the alternative of either surrendering the Union, and

* Richardson, *Messages and Papers*, vol. vi., pp. 157-159; Williams, *The Negro Race in America*, vol. ii., pp. 272-273.

with it the Constitution, or of laying strong hand upon the colored element. I chose the latter."*

In a letter to James C. Conkling August 26, 1863, he replied to the charge that the proclamation was unconstitutional, saying:

"I think differently. I think the Constitution invests its commander-in-chief with the law of war in time of war. The most that can be said, if so much, is, that slaves are property. Is there, has there ever been, any question that, by the law of war, property, both of enemies and friends, may be taken when needed? And is it not needed whenever taking it helps us or hurts the enemy? Armies the world over destroy enemies' property when they cannot use it; and even destroy their own to keep it from the enemy. Civilized belligerents do all in their power to help themselves or hurt the enemy, except a few things regarded as barbarous or cruel."†

The wisdom of Lincoln's policy was manifest. Every slave in the South who desired freedom became an enemy of the Confederacy, if not a friend of the North; for he knew that, once within the lines of the Federal armies, he would become a free man, and hence was on the lookout for an opportunity of gaining freedom by escape. Before the close of the year 1863, therefore, more than 100,000 slaves entered the military service of the United States, including those engaged in all kinds of manual labor. If the Emancipation Proclamation had not been issued these negroes would undoubtedly have remained in

the South raising food to support the Confederate armies, thus aiding in prolonging the war. Practical results such as these brought to the measure the hearty support of a large majority of the North.*

In resorting to military emancipation, Lincoln did not intend to rely merely on its sentimental effect. He seems to have coupled with his policy of emancipation the expectation of making it bring to the aid of the Union armies a powerful contingent of negro soldiers. Though constrained to postpone a systematic organization of negro troops for active campaigns, he had previously expressed a willingness that, for purely defensive purposes, commanders should arm slaves entering their lines; and on August 25, 1862, General Rufus Saxton, in command at Port Royal, had been authorized to arm and equip not more than 5,000 negro volunteers to protect the plantations and settlements at Port Royal and elsewhere.† In the act of July 17, 1862, the President had been empowered to receive negroes into the United States service for the purpose of constructing intrenchments or performing camp duties or any other labor for which they might be found competent, and to issue to negroes so employed one ration each and \$10 per month, of which \$3 might be in clothing. In his preliminary proclamation of Septem-

* Letter of April 4, 1864, to A. G. Hodges quoted in Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. vi., pp. 430-431; *Lincoln's Complete Works*, vol. ii., p. 508.

† *Lincoln's Complete Works*, vol. ii., p. 397; Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. vi., p. 432.

* Rhodes, *United States*, vol. iv., pp. 214-215.

† *Official Records*, vol. xiii., p. 377; Williams, *The Negro Race in America*, vol. ii., pp. 283-284.

ber 22, 1862, Lincoln made no mention of the subject, but in the proclamation of January 1, 1863, he declared that "such persons of suitable condition will be received into the army service of the United States to garrison forts, positions, stations and other places and to command vessels of all sorts in said service."

There was much prejudice in the army itself, and particularly among the officers, against such an innovation and, moreover, the blacks themselves did not come forward freely to enlist. A regiment was formed by General David Hunter, but to fill the ranks he was compelled to resort to drafting;* hence there was much desertion and mutinous conduct, as a result of which it was formally disbanded about three months after its formation.† Thomas Wentworth Higginson was instrumental in filling the quota of a negro regiment which became known as the "First South Carolina Volunteers." Another regiment was formed in the West and became known as the "First Kansas Colored," though it was not organized as a regiment until January 13, 1863. General Butler in New Orleans had attempted to secure permission to organize, arm and control a force of negroes, but obtained little satisfaction from the Government.‡

* Regarding the formation of this regiment and the authority to do so, see the letters in Williams, *The Negro Race in America*, vol. ii., p. 278 et seq.

† T. W. Higginson, *Army Life in a Black Regiment*, pp. 272-274.

‡ For details of this, see Nicolay and Hay,

However, as 1863 advanced, many prominent men of the North, under the combined influence of patriotism and military ambition, volunteered their services to officer and organize negro regiments in the South. One of these, Daniel Ullman, was sent to Banks at New Orleans, and by the middle of August of that year had five regiments nearly completed. Banks reported also that he had 21 regiments of between 10,000 and 12,000 men nearly organized,* but it was seen that the efforts of a few popular leaders, whether white or black, were insufficient to mobilize the military strength of the black population of the country. Accordingly, even as early as April, Adjutant-General Lorenzo Thomas had been sent to the West to examine and report upon the feasibility of recruiting and using negro soldiers. From the first he was successful. The troops in the western armies received the proposition with enthusiasm, for in that section prejudice against the arming of negroes was fast dying out. At about this time, however, Grant began his Vicksburg campaign and Thomas' recruiting operations were unavoidably interrupted by general army movements. Nevertheless the work was not abandoned, but on May 22, 1863, a special bureau for the organization of colored troops was established in

Life of Lincoln, vol. vi., p. 446 et seq.; Williams, *The Negro Race in America*, vol. ii., pp. 285-287.

* Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. vi., p. 455.

the adjutant-general's office of the War Department.

The raising of negro soldiers in the free States under State authority was successful only in Massachusetts. Governor Andrew, of Massachusetts, did everything possible to make the plan a success and selected the officers of the 54th Massachusetts Volunteers with the greatest of care. Frederick Douglass assisted in recruiting this regiment which, after being completed, organized and equipped, sailed from Boston on May 28 for South Carolina.* Another regiment, the 55th Massachusetts Colored, was soon afterward organized and sailed from Boston on June 21 for North Carolina. These two were the only colored regiments organized under Free State authority. The officials of the border slave States strongly objected to arming the negroes and even Andrew Johnson deprecated the sending of recruiting officers to Tennessee. He said:

"All the negroes will quit work when they can go into camp and do nothing. * * * It is exceedingly important for this question to be handled in such a way as will do the least injury in forming a correct public judgment at this time. We hope, therefore, that the organization of negro regiments in Tennessee will be left to the general commanding this department and the military governor."†

After 1863 there was little opposition to colored troops, except in the border States. The policy had forced

its own acceptance. Finally, on February 24, 1864, Congress passed an act that all able-bodied male colored persons between the ages of 20 and 45 should be enrolled, with the further provision that loyal masters of drafted slaves should receive bounty and compensation and that the slaves should become free. Early in December of 1863 about 50,000 slaves were actually bearing arms in the Union army. In April of 1864 there were 72,000 and at the end of the war 123,000. The entire number commissioned and enlisted in the military branch during the war after the issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation was 186,017.*

Naturally the Confederates were greatly dismayed when they heard that their late slaves were to be employed against them. Measures of retaliation were strongly urged and on December 23, 1862, Jefferson Davis issued a retaliatory proclamation directed chiefly against Benjamin F. Butler. This proclamation concluded with the following order:

"That all negro slaves captured in arms be at once delivered over to the executive authority of the respective States to which they belong to be dealt with according to the laws of said States. That like orders be executed in all cases with respect to all commissioned officers of the United States, when found serving in company with said slaves in insurrection against the authorities of the different States of this Confederacy"†

* Williams, *The Negro Race in America*, vol. ii., p. 289.

† Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. vi., p. 464.

* See the tables in Williams, *The Negro Race in America*, vol. ii., pp. 299-301. See also Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. vi., p. 468.

† *Annual Cyclopædia* for 1862, p. 738; Williams, *The Negro Race in America*, vol. ii., p. 359.

While fully indorsing the proposed retaliation, the Confederate Congress preferred to keep the power of such punishment in the hands of the central military authorities. On May 1, 1863, Davis approved a joint resolution of that body which prescribed that white officers of negro Union soldiers "shall, if captured, be put to death or be otherwise punished at the discretion of the court."*

When these threats were issued by the Confederates the practice of arming negroes had not been formally authorized by the Federal Government, but after this became a settled policy and large numbers of negroes joined the Union army, the matter became one of great import to both governments. Justice required that if a negro enlisted to do a soldier's duty he must be accorded a soldier's right. Hence, in order to define his position, Lincoln on July 30, 1863, issued the following comprehensive order:

"It is the duty of every government to give protection to its citizens, of whatever class, color, or condition, and especially to those who are duly organized as soldiers in the public service. The law of nations and the usages and customs of war, as carried on by civilized powers, permit no distinction as to color in the treatment of prisoners of war as public enemies. To sell or enslave any captured person on account of his color, and for no offence against the laws of war, is a relapse into barbarism and a crime against the civilization of the age.

"The government of the United States will give the same protection to all its soldiers and if the enemy shall sell or enslave anyone because of his color, the offence shall be punished

by retaliation upon the enemy's prisoners in our possession.

"It is therefore ordered that for every soldier of the United States killed in violation of the laws of war a rebel soldier shall be executed; and for everyone enslaved by the enemy or sold into slavery a rebel soldier shall be placed at hard labor on the public works and continued at such labor until the other shall be released and receive the treatment due to a prisoner of war."*

The Confederate authorities, however, did not persist in their threats of retaliation and the necessity never arose for Lincoln to enforce his proclamation. There were, to be sure, a few instances of imprisonment of captured negroes as hostages, for which a few Confederate captives were ordered into confinement by General Halleck, but the cases were not pushed to extremity on either side. For a long time the Confederates had used negro slaves in their armies, finding them especially valuable in building fortifications, but were extremely reluctant to arm the blacks; and in his message of November 7, 1864, to the Confederate Congress, Davis said that, until the white population of the South should prove insufficient, the employment of the negro as a soldier would scarcely be deemed wise or advantageous. Nevertheless, if the Confederate government were ever confronted with the alternative of subjugation or the employment of the slave as a soldier, there was no reason to doubt what their decision would be.†

* Richardson, *Messages and Papers*, vol. vi., p. 177; Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. vi., pp. 474-475; Williams, *The Negro Race in America*, vol. ii., p. 355.

† *Annual Encyclopedia* 1864, p. 697.

* For complete text see Williams, *The Negro Race in America*, vol. ii., pp. 350-352.

The proposition was as unpalatable to the members of the Confederate Congress as it was to Davis; they thought that if, as Davis suggested, the slaves were purchased and then liberated as a reward for faithful military service, the Confederate government would subscribe to the main tenet of the abolition party in the North.* Early in 1865 Lee declared the measure of employing negro soldiers not only expedient but necessary, but even then the Confederate Congress could not wholly conquer their repugnance. Not until March 30, 1865, when the fall of Richmond

was imminent, did the Congress pass the following act:

"That if, under the previous sections of this act, the President shall not be able to raise a sufficient number of troops to prosecute the war successfully and maintain the sovereignty of the States and the independence of the Confederate States, then he is hereby authorized to call on each State, whenever he thinks it expedient, for her quota of three hundred thousand troops, in addition to those subject to military service under existing laws, or so many thereof as the President may deem necessary for the purposes herein mentioned; to be raised from such of the population, irrespective of color, in each State, as the proper authorities thereof may determine."

This, however, resulted in little or no good to the Confederate armies, and soon afterward, with Lee's surrender, the war ended.

CHAPTER XXIII.

1863.

THE ENROLMENT AND THE DRAFT.

Lincoln's early calls for volunteers — Seward's conferences — The pressing necessity for more troops — Passage of the Conscription Act — The draft riots in New York City and other places — Seymour's conduct — Confederate conscriptions.

The various steps by which the Union armies were recruited deserve some notice. When Lincoln was inaugurated the Union armies numbered about 17,000 men. On April 15, 1861, Lincoln issued his proclamation calling for 75,000 troops for 90 days.† On May 3 he issued a call for 42,034 volunteers to serve three years, unless sooner discharged. At the same time the regular army was increased

by 10 regiments and 18,000 seamen were ordered to be enlisted. The volunteers were quickly raised, but the recruits for the regular army came in so slowly that the new regiments were never fully organized until the close of the war. After the first battle of Bull Run Congress passed acts (July 22 and 25) authorizing the President to raise an army of 1,000,000 men* and under these acts a force of 637,126 men was in the service by the

* Pollard, *Life of Jefferson Davis*, pp. 453-454.

† Under this call 91,816 were furnished. Phisterer, *Statistical Record*, p. 3.

* Under these acts 700,680 men were furnished. Phisterer, *Statistical Record*, p. 4.

spring of 1862. McClellan's disastrous peninsula campaign convinced Lincoln that the plan for taking Richmond had failed and that if the end toward which he was striving were to be attained the Union armies must be very largely increased. Accordingly, Secretary Seward went to New York, Boston and Cleveland carrying with him a letter, dated June 28, 1862, in which Lincoln plainly stated the need for additional troops, and asserted his determination to maintain the contest until it terminated in success to the Union cause or he himself was dead.* After Seward had conferred in New York with influential men and had consulted by wire with the President and Secretary Stanton, it was determined to issue a circular to the Northern governors asking them to offer the President the needed reinforcements.† Accordingly, on July 2, a formal correspondence appeared in the newspapers purporting to be a voluntary request from 18 governors that the President call upon the several States for men enough to fill up all military organizations in the field and to supply whatever additional troops he deemed necessary to "speedily crush the rebellion." The President's reply was printed also and announced his decision to call into the service an additional force of

300,000 men,* which he did the same day. He anticipated that the new levy would be easily obtained† and it was evident from the first that the people would accord the Government hearty support.‡ But after McClellan's disastrous peninsula campaign the need for troops became more and more pressing, so that on August 4, 1862, a further call for 300,000 militia for nine months' service was issued and in some States a draft from the militia was ordered, the results of which were not very satisfactory.|| Early in 1863 it became evident that volunteering would not furnish the necessary number of troops and in February of 1863 a bill was introduced in the Senate for enrolling and calling out the National forces. The Democratic Senators attacked it as being unconstitutional and subversive of the liberties of the country. It was defended by Henry Wilson, of Massachusetts, and Jacob Collamer, of Vermont, and was soon passed. It came up for consideration in the House on February 23 and there too was subjected to fierce attacks by the Democrats, who charged that the President proposed to establish an irresponsible despotism and to destroy constitutional liberty; but a few unimportant amendments were

* Moore, *Rebellion Record*, vol. v., Docs., pp. 547-548; Seward, *Life of Seward*, vol. iii., chap. xiii.

† Lincoln's *Complete Works*, vol. ii., p. 218.

‡ Under this call 421,465 men were furnished. Phisterer, *Statistical Record*, p. 5.

|| Under this call only 87,588 men were furnished. Phisterer, *Statistical Record*, p. 5.

* Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. vi., p. 116.

† The correspondence between Seward and Stanton is in Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. vi., pp. 116-118.

attached to the bill which was then passed and sent to the Senate. After another debate, scarcely less passionate than the first, the House amendments were accepted, the bill was finally passed, and was approved by the President on March 3, 1863. This act, known as the Conscription Act, operated directly on the people of the country instead of through the medium of the States. The act declared that, with certain exceptions, all able-bodied male citizens of the United States and foreigners intending to become citizens, between the ages of 18 and 45 years, were subject to enrolment. A provost-marshal-general was to be appointed by the President and the States were to be divided into districts coinciding with those for the election of Congressmen, the District of Columbia and the Territories forming additional districts. For each district a provost-marshal was authorized, with whom was associated a commissioner and a surgeon. Colonel James B. Fry, an assistant adjutant-general of the army, was appointed provost-marshal-general with his office at Washington, and army officers selected for their administrative ability were appointed provost-marshals for the several States.

The enrolment began in the latter part of May and showed that there were more than 3,000,000 men liable to military duty. Before procedure actually began, one-fifth the number of men subject to the draft (between the ages of 20 and 45), was adopted

as the quota of a district and the boards in charge apportioned this quota among the towns and wards forming sub-districts so that the number of men required would be furnished. Each amenable name in the sub-district was written upon a separate piece of paper and placed in a box which was then made to revolve and a name was drawn out and registered. This process was continued until the required number of names had been obtained. The person drafted was obliged to report immediately for duty under a penalty, unless he furnished a substitute or paid \$300 computation money.*

The most serious opposition experienced during the progress of the enrolment came from Governor Seymour of New York. Seymour had been elected governor of New York upon a platform denouncing the war measures which the National Government had found necessary, and when inaugurated on January 1, 1863, he clearly intimated that his policy would be to maintain and defend the sovereignty and jurisdiction of his State. Seymour believed that the Conscription Act violated the supreme constitutional law and he constantly accused the National Administration of an unfair and partisan execution of the law. He attacked the proceedings of the provost-marshals and charged them with neglect and contumacy toward himself. The

* See *Appleton's Annual Encyclopedia* for 1863, pp. 361-371.

National Government did everything possible to appoint enrolment officers acceptable to the governor. General Fry himself came of a distinguished Democratic family and the three provost-marshal-generals appointed for New York were chosen among those "who would be likely to secure the favor and coöperation of the authorities and the people of New York."* They were instructed to give the governor's views and wishes due weight in determining the best interests of the Government and to secure the aid and hearty coöperation of the governor, State officers and people. Nevertheless "Governor Seymour gave no assistance; in fact, so far as the government officers engaged in the enrolment could learn, he gave the subject no attention."† The enrolment was carried along as rapidly as possible and upon its completion the orders for drafting in the State of New York were issued on July 1. On July 7 the draft began in Rhode Island, the next day in Massachusetts, and proceeded quietly in various districts until Saturday, July 11, when the drafts began in New York. In the 9th Congressional district, which was inhabited mainly by laborers, chiefly of foreign birth, and was a Democratic stronghold, the drafting office was at Third Avenue and 46th Street. More or less trouble was apprehended and the police were held

in readiness for any emergency. A large crowd assembled, and though over 1,200 names were drawn in the district the day passed without disturbance. Good humor prevailed and the officers in charge were convinced that there was no further danger. The names drawn on Saturday, being nearly all of mechanics and laborers, were published in the Sunday newspapers, and as they began to realize the meaning of compulsory military service for three years they became desperate, while their wives and mothers abandoned themselves to excitement and rage. Furthermore, the Democratic political leaders aroused much bitterness of feeling by representing exemption through the payment of \$300 as a privilege of the rich at the expense of the poor. Many of the poorer conscripts organized by the political leaders, meeting secretly, formed associations to resist; and on the next morning, Monday, July 13, organized bodies of men went from yard to yard and from shop to shop compelling those at work to leave and join the procession which was marching toward the corner of Third Avenue and 46th Street. At 10 o'clock the drawing was resumed and at each revolution a blindfolded man drew out a name which was read by the provost-marshal to the assembled mechanics and laborers. For some time everything proceeded quietly and a number of names had been called and recorded. Suddenly a pistol shot was fired in the street and a

* James B. Fry, *New York and the Conscription of 1863*, p. 14.

† Fry, *New York and the Conscription*, p. 18.

large paving stone came crashing through the window, landing on the reporters' table. In another moment a volley of stones flew through the window, stopping the proceedings. The crowd, kindled into fury by its own act, speedily became a howling mob. They attacked the building, broke in the door, drove out the provost-marshal and his deputies, wrecked everything inside but the wheel, beat one of the deputies into insensibility, broke up the furniture and set fire to the building. The whole block was soon in flames, but when the firemen arrived the hydrants were denied them until the conflagration was beyond control. This furious outburst completely surprised the authorities. The militia were nearly all in Pennsylvania and the few garrison regulars and marines were under different commanders who held separate authority with no deciding power. There was only a handful of troops in the harbor, and having possession of the street railways the mob for a time prevented a rapid concentration of these companies, while the police were wholly inadequate to deal with the situation. The superintendent of police approached the devastated area on a tour of inspection and, though not in uniform, was recognized, set upon, badly beaten, and barely escaped with his life. The mob increased and began wreaking vengeance on political opponents and their property. Fifty marines sent to disperse the 46th Street mob were

stopped and pelted with stones. The soldiers fired blank cartridges into the mob, but they were instantly chased by the rioters, overpowered, their muskets taken away, and many of them cruelly beaten. This changed the mob's attitude from defence to aggression. A strong squad of police appeared and received a volley of stones. They drew their clubs and revolvers and charged the crowd, but in a few minutes were compelled by overpowering numbers to retreat. Excitement and drink inflamed the mob to frenzy. The proprietor of the Bull's Head Hotel on 44th Street refused to give the mob liquor, and his hotel was burned to the ground. The residence of the mayor on Fifth Avenue was attacked and the entire block at Broadway and 29th Street, which contained the headquarters of the provost-marshal of the Eighth district, was burned, as was also the headquarters of the Fifth district. The fire engines responded to the alarms, but some of the firemen had been drafted on Saturday and sympathized with the mob, thus rendering little aid in checking the flames in the odious buildings. The wrath of the mob then turned on the negroes, since they were considered the cause of the "Black Republican war." Hotels and restaurants having colored servants were invaded in search of them and the movables smashed or stolen. A number of negroes were beaten and stoned to death, hanged to trees and lamp posts and burned as they hung.

Late in the afternoon the colored orphan asylum at Fifth Avenue and 44th Street, containing between 700 and 800 children and nurses, was broken into in spite of the efforts of the few policemen present to defend it. The few minutes' delay, however, enabled the inmates to escape, whereupon the asylum was broken into, sacked, and set afire. The armory on Second Avenue was broken open with sledge hammers and stones to secure the arms, the police who bravely defended it being driven out and the building then set afire. Next to the negroes the rioters hated abolitionists and radical Republicans. They hunted for Horace Greeley and, failing in their search, attacked the office of the *Tribune*, rushed into the counting room, seized the newspapers, gutted the office and were about to set the building on fire when a strong force of police dispersed the mob. All that day and night the city was at the mercy of the mob, for the police had been able to act only on the defensive. At midnight the sky was aflame with the glow of burning buildings, but a heavy rainfall quenched the fires and dispersed the rioters for a time. On Tuesday the malignant character of the mob seemed to have increased. Apparently they were masters of everything. They pursued, assaulted and murdered every negro man, woman and child who came within their reach and plundered stores and dwellings with impunity. The rioters, who had no leader, were armed

with pistols, guns, bludgeons, pitchforks and pieces of old scrap iron, and while making few demonstrations downtown held complete possession of the city from Union Square to Central Park. The burning of houses continued, the street cars and omnibuses ceased to run and railroad tracks were torn up. Lieutenant Wood with 150 regulars from Fort Lafayette fired a ball cartridge into a mob, killed a dozen men and broke up the gathering; but his small force was entirely powerless against the numerous large bands running amuck through the city. Colonel H. T. O'Brien, who had sprained his ankle while dispersing a mob, stepped into a drug store for assistance while his detachment passed on. He was ordered by the terrified proprietor to leave the store, and as he went out the howling mob set upon him, beat him and trampled him into unconsciousness. For several hours the savage brutes dragged his body through the streets and then, shouting and yelling, threw the helpless form in front of his own door. There a priest endeavored to read the last offices for the dying over the unfortunate colonel, but the brutal ruffians thrust the priest aside and closed the ceremonies by dancing upon the corpse.* Mayor Opdyke issued a proclamation, but to no purpose. Governor Seymour on receipt of the frightful news hastened from Long Branch to New York, and at

* Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. vii., pp. 21-22.

noon on Tuesday addressed a large crowd from the city hall steps, begging them to preserve peace and order and stating that he had sent his adjutant to Washington to confer with the authorities there to have the draft suspended. On the 14th he issued two proclamations, one mildly condemning the riot and calling on those engaged in it to retire to their homes, and the other declaring the city and county of New York under martial law. General Wool and General Sandford, commanders of the New York State National Guard, coöperated with the governor and mayor to restore order. Wool brought all the soldiers except small guards from the forts in the harbor to the city, obtained a reinforcement from the navy yard and brought a company from West Point, in all about 800 troops. All the militia at home were ordered on duty and the military were aided by the metropolitan police, who at this time numbered about 2,000 men. The rioters were repulsed in their attacks on two arsenals, and after a bloody fight in Second Avenue the police recaptured a lot of carbines stolen from a factory. The gas works, ship yards and manufactories threatened by the mob were protected and the Treasury building was guarded by two companies. In the East River a gunboat was stationed ready to open fire on Wall and Pine Streets when the proper signal should be given. Mobs were dispersed in Broadway, 7th, 8th, 9th and 10th Avenues and in the cross

streets from 27th to 32d Streets. The barricades in 29th Street were stormed and carried and a stiff fight took place in 42d Street. The military and police soon abandoned the use of blank cartridges and resorted to the bullet. A large number of the mob were killed, but this taste of blood and the sight of their own dead only increased the frenzy.

During Wednesday, July 15, the riot was still active, though greatly reduced in its capacity for mischief. In the afternoon the assistant provost-marshal, General Robert Nugent, announced that the draft had been suspended in New York City and Brooklyn.* On the same day the militia regiments which had been sent to Pennsylvania began to arrive in the city. Cannon and howitzers raked the streets and harsh measures were used to repress the mobs who still, with rash boldness, continued their depredations. On the 16th more regiments reached the city and continued the work, capturing large quantities of arms from the rioters. Isolated gangs prowled around, but they were mere criminals and soon slunk away. For several days cavalry and other troops were on duty patrolling the streets and enforcing order, but there was no further attempt at riot and the city resumed its usual peaceful course. The exact number of the killed during these fearful days is not known. The bills of mortality for the week were 450 above the average; 90

* *Official Records*, vol. xxvii., pt. ii., p. 903.

deaths from gunshot wounds were reported; and it is said that many rioters were secretly buried by their friends. Claims for property damage amounting to more than \$2,500,000 were filed and, though heavily scaled, about \$1,500,000 was paid.*

There were riotous demonstrations in other places, but none of such formidable proportions as those in New York. On the night of July 15 a draft riot broke out in Boston, which for a time threatened to be serious. At Portsmouth, New Hampshire, there was an incipient riot on the day of drafting and in Holmes County, Ohio, in June, there was a similar disturbance, but these were quickly suppressed. Leading Unionists in Philadelphia, fearing a riot, besought the

President to stop the draft, and a similar appeal was made from Chicago. By recruiting and volunteering the necessity of a draft was avoided in Illinois until the next year. Finally public peace was restored there without great loss to the rioters.*

Following the draft riots Seymour sent Samuel J. Tilden and other prominent citizens to Washington to urge the President to suspend the draft, but Lincoln refused.† Governor Seymour, however, continued an active campaign against the proceeding. On October 17 another call was made for 300,000 volunteers, and at the same time it was ordered that a draft should be made for all deficiencies existing on January 5 following, on the quotas assigned to districts by the War Department. On July 18, 1864, Lincoln made a third call for troops, whereupon Seymour promptly renewed his protests. He raised no new points, but made the same old complaints of excessive quotas and of unfair, unequal, and oppressive action. He called for a commission to investigate errors and frauds, but Stanton refused.‡ In the autumn of 1864 the voters of New York retired Seymour to private life and his successor, Governor Reuben E. Fenton,

* On the draft riots see *Official Records*, vol. xxvii., pt. ii.; Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. vii., chap. i.; Fry, *New York and the Conscription of 1863*; D. M. Barnes, *The Draft Riots in New York, July, 1863. The Metropolitan Police, their Services during Riot Week, their Honorable Record*; Greeley, *The American Conflict*, vol. ii.; *The Bloody Week. Riot, Murder, and Arson, Containing a full Account of this Wholesale Outrage on Life and Property. Accurately Prepared from Official Sources, by Eye Witnesses*, (1863); Dix, *Memoirs of J. A. Dix*, vol. ii.; Vincent Colyer, *To the Memory of the Martyrs Slain in the Riots of July, 1863*; Emerson, *Life of A. H. Gibbons*, vol. ii.; Rhodes, *United States*, vol. v., pp. 321-328; *The Volcano under the City, by a Volunteer Special*; *Three Days' Reign of Terror, or the July Riots in 1863 in New York*; *Life of Thurlow Weed*, vol. ii.; *Appleton's Annual Encyclopedia for 1863*; Seymour, *Vallandigham and the Riots of 1863*; *History and Report of the Trustees of the Riot Relief Fund* (1866); *An Act to Recognize the Brave Conduct of the Members of the Police Force of the City of New York for their Service in Suppressing the Draft Riots of July, 1863* (*New York State Senate Doc. 97*).

* See *Appleton's Annual Encyclopedia for 1863*, pp. 817-818.

† See the correspondence in Fry, *New York and the Conscription*, p. 34 et seq.; Lincoln's *Complete Works*, vol. ii., p. 382; Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. vii., chap. ii.


‡ Fry, *New York and the Conscription*, pp. 59-61.

gave hearty support to the Government.*

The Confederates also had their own troubles with enlistments. Before the attack on Fort Sumter the Confederate Congress had authorized the raising of an army of 100,000 men. Davis called into service 36,900 men and immediately after the opening of hostilities called for 32,000 more. On May 8 Davis was given almost unlimited power to accept the services of volunteers without regard to place of enlistment, and a few days later he was relieved by statute of the delays and limitations of formal calls. In December of 1861 the term of enlistment was changed from one to three years, a bounty of \$50 being given as compensation. During the winter recruiting languished, and several statutes were passed, but with little result. Accordingly on April 16, 1862, the Confederate Congress passed a Conscription Act authorizing the enrolment of white residents of the Confederate States between the ages of 18 and 35 years not legally exempt from service, and arbitrarily lengthening to three years the terms of those already enlisted. Various acts were passed so as not to hinder

the ordinary routine of civil life, one of the most difficult problems to solve being the question of overseers of plantations. On October 11, 1862, a law was passed exempting one man for every plantation of 20 negroes. From time to time this system was extended, but owners of slaves were obliged to pay \$500 a year for each exemption. One statute provided that on plantations where these exemptions were granted the exempt should pay 200 pounds of meat for every able-bodied slave on the plantation. Gradually all exemptions as of right were legislated away and the whole subject was left to the discretion of the executive, which placed him in a position not calculated to add to his popularity. In September of 1862, the age limit was extended from 18 and 35 to 18 and 45 years, and in February of 1864 all white residents between 17 and 50 were liable to military service. The laws, however, were not carried out systematically and thoroughly, and the Confederate generals constantly complained of receiving no recruits. Finally the situation became so bad that the chief of the bureau of conscription at Richmond reported that the functions of his bureau might terminate at the close of 1864.

* For Lincoln's opinion on the draft, see Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. vii., pp. 49-57.



CHAPTER XXIV.

1863.

DUPONT BEFORE CHARLESTON.

Attempt of the *Princess Royal* to run the blockade — The battle between the *Palmetto State* and *Chicora* and the Union fleet — Destruction of the privateer *Nashville* — The bombardment of Fort McAllister — The fortifications at Charleston — DuPont's attack and repulse — Capture of the Confederate ram *Atlanta*.

In the Department of the South little of any importance had been accomplished owing to the weakness of the force under the commander of this department. The coast blockade had been maintained with energy and efficiency, though many fast-sailing steamers succeeded in eluding the cordon of warships. The Confederate government protested to foreign nations against the recognition of the blockade, upon the assertion that it was ineffective. To prove this, a daring movement was undertaken by the Confederate vessels in the vicinity of Charleston. Early on the morning of January 29, 1863, an ironclad steamer, the *Princess Royal*, attempted to run the blockade into the harbor. The Union gunboat *Unadilla* gave chase, and after a couple of shots were fired at her the *Princess Royal* was run ashore and abandoned, the *Unadilla* assuming possession of her. Two days later she was taken to Port Royal and subsequently sent to Philadelphia for repairs.

Thereupon the Confederates determined to attempt the recapture of Port Royal and to attack the blockading squadron. Two of the strongest

of the Union vessels were absent, coaling at Port Royal, and only one vessel of any strength, the *Housatonic*, together with the *Ottawa* and *Unadilla* and seven other purchased vessels, remained to cope with the Confederate ironclads. At 4 o'clock on the morning of January 1, during the obscurity of a thick haze, the Confederate ram *Palmetto State* followed by the *Chicora*, steamed out of the harbor. The *Palmetto State* steered directly for the steamer *Mercedita*, which was almost immediately rendered helpless by the explosion in her boiler of a large shell fired by the ram. The *Mercedita* gave up the contest and her officers and crew having surrendered were parolled by Captain D. N. Ingraham of the *Palmetto State*. About the same time the *Chicora* attacked the *Keystone State* and was joined by the *Palmetto State* as soon as she had disabled the *Mercedita*. The *Keystone State* was making a determined resistance when a shell exploded in her fore hold and set her on fire. This was quickly subdued and she then bore down under full head of steam with the intention of ramming the nearest Confederate

vessel, but a shot having passed through her steam chests, she became virtually powerless and accomplished nothing. By this time the *Housatonic* was well under way and going in as close as the shoals permitted opened rapid fire on the rams, soon driving them back to the protection of the forts. The *Mercedita* and *Keystone State* were then sent to Port Royal for repairs.* Though no practical advantage had been gained by the Confederates, they took the ground that the blockading fleet had been dispersed and the blockade raised.†

The battle of the *Merrimac* and *Monitor* on March 9, 1862, completely revolutionized the methods of naval warfare for the entire world, and the clamor in the North for ironclad ships became so widespread and insistent that the construction of such vessels was immediately begun and vigorously pushed. Several vessels of the monitor type had been added to the squadron of Rear Admiral Samuel F. DuPont. He was anxious to test the new vessels and the opportunity soon came. In the latter part of January he sent the *Montauk* under Commander Worden to the Ogeechee River opening into the Ossabaw Sound on the Georgia coast and through which there was an approach to within

ten miles of Savannah. The Confederate blockade runner *Nashville* had taken refuge in the Ogeechee in July of 1862, and was compelled by the blockading fleet to remain there. For seven months she had been confined to the river, the defences of which had been strengthened in the meantime by various obstructions and by the erection of Fort McAllister at an advantageous bend of the stream. To destroy these works and capture the *Nashville* was the object proposed. Accordingly, on January 27, Commander Worden began the attack on the fort with the *Montauk*, *Seneca* and three other gunboats of the blockading squadron. For five hours the artillery duel was maintained chiefly between the fort and the *Montauk*, the latter being struck 13 times, though with little or no damage.* Again on February 1 Commander Worden took his boats within 1,000 yards of the fort but inflicted no damage upon it. In this second action the *Montauk* received 61 shots, her smokestack was riddled, and her flagstaff was carried away.† On the 27th Worden observed the *Nashville* in motion and apparently in trouble. In his report the next day Worden says:

"A reconnaissance immediately made proved that in moving up the river she had grounded in that part of the river known as the seven-miles' reach. Believing that I could, by approaching close to the battery, reach and destroy her with my battery, I moved up at daylight this

* *Battles and Leaders*, vol. iv., p. 28; Maclay, *History of the Navy*, vol. ii., pp. 505-508; *Confederate Military History*, vol. xii., pp. 67-71; W. H. Parker, *Recollections of a Naval Officer*.

† See the proclamation of Beauregard and Ingraham in *Official Records*, vol. xiv., p. 205.

* *Battles and Leaders*, vol. iv., p. 28.

† Maclay (*History of the Navy*, vol. ii., p. 510) says the *Montauk* was struck only 46 times in this second attack.

morning, accompanied by the blockading fleet in these waters, consisting of the *Seneca*, Lieut.-Commander Gibson; the *Wissahickon*, Lieut.-Commander Davis, and the *Dawn*, Acting-Lieut.-Commander Barnes. By moving up close to the obstructions in the river, I was enabled, although under a heavy fire from the battery, to approach the *Nashville*, still aground, within the distance of 1,200 yards. A few well-directed shells determined the range, and soon succeeded in striking her with 11-inch and 15-inch shells. The other gun boats maintained a fire from an enfiladed position upon the battery, and the *Nashville* at long range. I soon had the satisfaction of observing that the *Nashville* had caught fire, from the shells exploding in her, in several places; and in less than twenty minutes she was caught in flames forward, aft and amidships. At 9.20 A. M. a large pivot-gun, mounted abaft her foremast, exploded from the heat; at 9.40 her smoke-chimney went by the board; and at 9.55 her magazine exploded with terrific violence, shattering her in smoking ruins. Nothing remains of her. The battery kept up a continuous fire upon this vessel, but struck her but five times, doing no damage whatever. The fire upon the other gun boats was wild and did them no damage whatever. After assuring myself of the complete destruction of the *Nashville*, I, preceded by the wooden vessels, dropped down beyond the range of the enemy's guns. In so doing, a torpedo exploded under this vessel, inflicting, however, but little injury. I beg leave, therefore, to congratulate you, sir, upon this final disposition of a vessel which has so long been in the minds of the public as a troublesome pest.*

This, however, did not convince DuPont and he decided to make another attack on Fort McAllister. On March 3 Captain Percival Drayton with the *Passaic*, the *Patapsco*, and the *Nahant* made a concentrated attack upon Fort McAllister. Three mortar boats were added to the attacking force, and, taking shelter behind the bend of the stream, opened fire, followed by the *Montauk*. The firing was maintained

during the day and by the mortar boats during the night, but was interesting chiefly as a matter of target practice. The mass of metal thrown against the fort did little damage beyond disabling two of the guns. DuPont was convinced that the value of these vessels was much over-rated, for in a dispatch dated January 28, 1863, he says: "My own previous impression of these vessels expressed frequently to Assistant Secretary Fox has been confirmed, viz., that whatever degree of impenetrability they might have, there was no corresponding quality of aggression or destruction as against forts." He said later: "This experiment also convinced me of another impression firmly held and after expressed that in all such operations, to secure success, troops are necessary." The Navy Department, however, was not convinced and determined to make another and still more pretentious experiment, ordering DuPont to attack Charleston. DuPont said that while he knew the views of the department did not coincide with his own, he "determined to make the experiment and to risk and probably lose whatever of prestige pertained to a long and successful professional career, in order to meet the necessities of war and the wishes of the government."

In view of the projected naval attack and in order to increase the military forces in the Department of the South, General John G. Foster was sent with a considerable force to aid in this important undertaking. For

* See also *Battles and Leaders*, vol. iv., p. 29; Maclay, *History of the Navy*, vol. ii., p. 510; *Confederate Military History*, vol. iv., pp. 201-214.

some unexplained reason, however, he returned to North Carolina, leaving his troops to take part in the work close at hand. On March 5 Hunter issued a general order announcing the long-expected forward movement, and his force of about 7,000 men was brought to Stono Inlet to support the naval movement.

Beauregard had employed all his engineering skill to render Charleston impregnable. On February 18 he issued a proclamation urging all non-combatants to retire and appealing to "all able bodied men from the seaboard to the mountains [to] rush to arms. Be not exacting in the choice of weapons; pikes and scythes will do for exterminating your enemies; spades and shovels for protecting your firesides."* The next day the governor called out the militia, saying "The abolitionists are threatening to invade our soil with a formidable army and * * * the most effective method of defending our firesides, our wives and our children is to meet the ruthless invader at the threshold."† Beauregard claimed that Hunter's force was 40,000, while his own was 25,000, but his returns for April 7 showed an effective force of 32,217 (the aggregate present and absent being 43,449 not including 3,000 negroes at work on the fortifications‡), while Hunter's returns show only 20,000 present for duty, with an

aggregate present and absent of 27,060.*

The defences of Charleston were of the most extensive and formidable character. Beginning with the northern or eastern entrance by way of Maffitt's Channel there were three large and powerful forts on Sullivan's Island, including Fort Moultrie. In the middle of the channel on an artificial island near the entrance of the harbor and about one and a half miles west of Fort Moultrie stood Fort Sumter. On the northern end of the inner harbor were Battery Bee, Mount Pleasant on the mainland, and Castle Pinckney on an island about a mile from the city. On the southern side of the harbor were Wampler battery and Fort Johnson on James Island. Between the latter and Castle Pinckney on the "middle ground" was Fort Ripley, and on Cumming's Point, Morris Island, opposite Fort Moultrie, was Battery Gregg, a mile south of which was Fort Wagner. On Lighthouse Island also there was a fort covering the landing at that place. In these works the Confederates had mounted several hundred guns and besides had mined the channel between Fort Sumter and Sullivan's Island and in the channel between Sumter and Cumming's Point had sunk four rows of piles extending north up to Charleston.

During March the preliminary preparations for the attack were completed

* *Official Records*, vol. xiv., p. 782.

† *Ibid.*, p. 784.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 889.

* *Ibid.*, p. 434.

and early on the morning of April 6 the ironclad fleet crossed the bar at Charleston and was ranged opposite Morris Island. At 12:30 p. m. Saturday, April 7, DuPont gave the signal from his flagship, the *New Ironsides*, for the fleet to weigh anchor and move to the attack, it being planned that they were to take position a cable's length apart in the following order: *Weehawken* (Captain John Rodgers), *Passaic* (Captain Percival Drayton), *Montauk* (Captain John L. Worden), *Patapsco* (Commander Daniel Ammen), *New Ironsides*, DuPont's flagship (Commodore Thomas Turner), *Catskill* (Commander George W. Rodgers), *Nantucket* (Commander Donald M. Fairfax), *Nahant* (Captain John Downes), and the *Keokuk* (Commander Alexander C. Rhind). The *Canandaigua* and four other gunboats were formed into a reserve outside the harbor, and after Fort Sumter had been reduced they were to support the ironclads in attacking the batteries on Morris Island. The flagship *New Ironsides* was a formidable iron-covered battery mounting 16 11-inch guns and two 200-pound Parrotts. The other vessels were of the monitor class, each carrying two guns (a 15-inch and an 11-inch) to a single turret except the *Keokuk* which had two 11-inch guns. Soon after starting, a raft which had been attached to the *Weehawken* for the purpose of exploding torpedoes and clearing away obstacles became disarranged, causing an hour's delay. This difficulty being overcome, the

fleet moved forward expecting to be deluged with shot from the batteries on Morris Island, but to DuPont's surprise the Confederates allowed the fleet to pass in silence. The ironclads then entered the inner harbor and about 3 o'clock came within range of Fort Sumter and the batteries on Sullivan's Island. The action immediately began; the guns of Moultrie opened on the *Weehawken* and were followed by those of Fort Sumter and of the powerful batteries on Sullivan's and Morris' Islands. It had been planned to pass around Sumter and make the assault on the northwest face which was supposed to be its weakest spot, but Captain Rodgers commanding the *Weehawken* found almost immediately that he could not force his ship through the obstructions and a scene of great confusion followed. Rodgers attempted to turn his ship to get a better position, as the channel was narrow and tortuous and the tide strong, but the tide prevented. DuPont's flagship, the *New Ironsides*, was caught in the tideway also and refused to obey the helm, so that it twice became necessary to drop anchor in order to bring her bow in the proper direction. To add to the annoyance the *Catskill* and *Nantucket* fell foul of the *Ironsides* and it was some time before they were cleared and passed on.

In this state of affairs DuPont signalled the fleet to disregard the movements of the flagship and to act independently in the positions deemed

most available. Accordingly, shortly before 4 o'clock, the eight ironclads ranged opposite the eastern and north-eastern fronts of Sumter at distances varying from 550 to 800 yards and opened a terrific fire. Lieutenant Commander Rhind in command of the *Keokuk* pushed his vessel to within 500 yards of the fort and became a special target for its guns. The other commanders bravely strove to accomplish the reduction of the fort but it was impossible long to endure the hurricane of fire directed against them by the Confederates. The *Weehawken* was struck 53 times in 40 minutes, the *Passaic* 35 times, the *Nahant* 36 times, the *Nantucket* 51 times, the *Montauk* 14 times, the *Catskill* 20 times and the *Keokuk* 90 times, 19 of the shots piercing her near the water-line.* After more than an hour of this frightful punishment the *Keokuk* was withdrawn and anchored out of range of the enemy's guns. She was kept afloat during the night but at 7 o'clock the next morning sank off Morris Island. During the brief engagement of 40 minutes the fleet fired 151 shots, of which 34 hit the walls of the fort, while Sumter fired 810 shots and Moultrie and the other batteries 1,399, a total of 2,209, a large percentage of which struck the vessels.† As several of the other ironclads began to show signs of distress, as darkness was approaching, and as he believed that "half an hour more fighting

would have placed them all *hors de combat*," DuPont about 5 o'clock gave the signal to withdraw from action in order, as he said, to "prevent a failure from being converted into a disaster," intending to renew the attack the next morning. But the reports of the commanders convinced him that this would be disastrous and he abandoned the plan.*

After the engagement DuPont remained comparatively inactive for some time, his principal duties being to maintain a close blockade and to capture blockade runners. In June the idleness of the fleet was suddenly terminated by the news that the Confederate ironclad ram *Atlanta* had left Savannah for Warsaw Sound by way of Wilmington, fully prepared to attack the blockading squadron. The *Atlanta*, formerly the English iron steamer *Fingal*, had been altered by the Confederates into a man-of-war. Her deck, cut down to within two feet of the water-line, was surmounted by a casemate with inclined sides and flat roof, inclosing a powerful battery of two 7-inch and two 6-inch Brooke rifles. Her armor was 4 inches thick; the edges of the deck projected six feet from the side of the vessel; and the overhang was filled in and strengthened with a heavy mass of wood and iron. Knowing the great strength of the vessel and the high hopes entertained of her in the South, DuPont

* Maclay, *History of the Navy*, vol. ii., p. 513.

† *Battles and Leaders*, vol. iv., p. 12.

* *Official Records*, vol. xiv., p. 442. See also *Confederate Military History*, vol. v., pp. 193-201.

dispatched the *Weehawken*, Captain John Rodgers, and the *Nahant*, Commander John Downs, to the assistance of the *Cimerone*, Commander Drake, which was maintaining an inside blockade on Warsaw Sound. At 6 A. M. on June 17 the *Atlanta* came in sight and steered for the Federal iron-clads, expecting an easy victory. The *Atlanta* fired first at a distance of a mile and a half, the shot going over the stern of the *Weehawken* and striking the water near the *Nahant*. For 20 minutes the monitors advanced slowly and steadily until Rodgers had come within 300 yards of the Confederate ram, when he opened with his 15-inch gun. The result of the shot was appalling. It struck the sloping side of the vessel, penetrated her armor, ripped out the wooden backing, and covered the deck with splint-

ers. The second shot struck the edge of her projection and the third shot took off the top of her pilot house, wounding two of the three pilots and knocking senseless the man at the wheel. In consequence of these injuries the *Atlanta* grounded and immediately afterward surrendered, being taken with her officers and men to Port Royal.* This was the last important engagement that occurred while DuPont had command of the fleet. Admiral Foote had been designated to relieve DuPont, but he died on June 26 and Rear Admiral John A. Dahlgren was appointed in his place. Early in June General Q. A. Gillmore was delegated to relieve General Hunter in command of the South. For some time, however, no operations were undertaken.

CHAPTER XXV.

1863.

THE CHANCELLORSVILLE CAMPAIGN.

Lincoln's letter to Hooker — Reorganization of the Army — Stoneman's raid in Virginia — Positions of the two armies — The crossing of the Rappahannock and Rapidan — Defeat of the 11th corps — Jackson's death — The battle of May 3 — The attack on Marye's Heights — Losses in the campaign.

It will be remembered that, on January 26, 1863, Joseph Hooker had been placed in command of the Army of the Potomac.* When appointing him Lincoln wrote a remarkable letter, saying,

"Of course I have done this upon what appears to me to be sufficient reasons and yet I

* *Official Records*, vol. xxi., p. 1009.

think it best for you to know that there are some things in regard to which I am not quite satisfied with you. I believe you to be a brave and skillful soldier * * * [that] you do not mix politics with your profession, in which you are right; [that] you have confidence in yourself which is a valuable, if not indispensable, quality; [that] you are ambitious, which, within reason-

* Maclay, *History of the Navy*, vol. ii., pp. 513-515; Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. vii., pp. 79-81.

able bounds, does good rather than harm; but I think that during General Burnside's command of the army you have taken counsel of your ambition and thwarted him as much as you could in which you did a great wrong to the country and to a most meritorious and honorable brother officer. I have heard, in such a way as to believe it, of your recently saying that both the army and the Government needed a dictator. * * * Only those generals who gain successes can set up dictators. What I now ask of you is military success and I will risk the dictatorship. * * * I much fear that the spirit, which you have aided to infuse into the army, of criticising their commander and withholding confidence from him will now turn upon you. I shall assist you as far as I can to put it down. * * * Beware of rashness but with energy and sleepless vigilance go forward and give us victories."*

When Hooker took command of the army it had become disheartened and almost sulky from its former reverses.† Desertions were frequent—about 200 a day—and the number of absentees was enormous. He immediately set to work to correct these evils. Under his administration the army assumed wonderful vigor, General Couch writing: "I have never known men to change from a condition of the lowest depression to that of a healthy fighting state in so short a time."‡ Hooker made several changes in the army and carried into effect needful judicious reforms. A system of furloughs was instituted, the ranks were filled up by the return of absentees, the idle troops were kept busy by increasing the amount of drill and field exercise, the cavalry was consolidated and its efficiency improved,

and by the end of April the Army of the Potomac was in a state of admirable preparation for active operations.

Early in April Hooker felt that his army was in condition to take the offensive. North of the Rappahannock he had at least 130,000 men fit for service to oppose Lee's 60,000 at Fredericksburg, the Army of Northern Virginia having been weakened by the detaching of Longstreet and part of his corps.* Lee was so strongly intrenched on the south side of the river from Port Royal on the right to Banks' Ford on the left, a distance of about 25 miles, that an attack on his front was impracticable, and it became a matter of importance for Hooker to make a movement of such a kind that Lee would be compelled to come out of his fortifications and fight or fall back on Richmond. Accordingly Hooker decided to send his cavalry around Lee's left, cut the communications of the Confederates with Richmond and compel Lee to leave Fredericksburg, in which contingency he proposed to fall on Lee's flank and rear as the latter should fall back.

On April 12 he ordered General George Stoneman, commanding the cavalry corps of the Army of the Potomac and having 10,000 men and 4 batteries, to move quietly and rapidly up the left bank of the Rappahannock,

* *Official Records*, vol. xxv., pt. ii., p. 4; Lincoln's *Complete Works*, vol. ii., p. 306.

† *Battles and Leaders*, vol. iii., p. 154.

‡ *Ibid.*, vol. iii., p. 119.

* Swinton makes the Union army 125,000 infantry and artillery and 12,000 cavalry besides 400 guns, and places Lee's effective force at 55,000, though the latter's army roll shows on March 31 a force of 60,298. See Swinton, *Army of the Potomac*, p. 269.

on April 13, 1863, cross the river above the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, disperse Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry brigade at Culpeper Court House, push on to Gordonsville, and from there strike the Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad at Saxton's Junction, destroying it with all its bridges and telegraph lines, thus severing Lee's communications with Richmond. He was also directed to harass Lee's retreating troops that Hooker expected to defeat near Fredericksburg. Heavy rains delayed both Hooker's plans and Stoneman's movement, for after Stoneman had sent over one brigade at Freeman's Ford the Rappahannock rose so rapidly and so high that the brigade was recalled and re-crossed to the left bank of the river by swimming the horses. Stoneman now waited two weeks for Hooker's initiative and better weather. On April 29, under modified orders to cross the river between Kelly's and Rappahannock Fords, and to send one column in the direction of Raccoon Ford and Louisa Court House, Stoneman again crossed the river, this time at Kelly's Ford.

With picked men and horses, in light marching order, not a wagon accompanying him, Stoneman pushed forward, with three brigades of 4,300 men and a battery of six guns. He divided his force into several detachments which often came in contact with the Confederate cavalry under Lee, but these skirmishers hardly interfered with the operations of the

raiders. The result of the raid was the capture of over 500 men and 460 horses and mules and the destruction of 20 bridges and culverts, three trains of railroad cars, 122 wagons, several canal-boats, and a large amount of army supplies. The railroads had been cut in several places, but these breaks, which General Lee considered of small consequences, were soon repaired. As the chief object of the raid had been the total destruction of Lee's communications with Richmond, which was not accomplished, it was considered a failure. The Union loss was 5 killed, 21 wounded, and 163 missing. About 1,000 horses were broken down and abandoned, some being killed. There are no trustworthy records of Confederate losses in killed and wounded.*

Meanwhile the rise of the Rappahannock had caused Hooker to modify his plans. He determined to flank Lee's position and compel him to come out and fight on open ground. Lee's army consisted of the two divisions of McLaws and R. H. Anderson of Longstreet's corps with the divisions of A. P. Hill and D. H. Hill in command of R. E. Rodes, and the divisions of Isaac R. Trimble's corps commanded by R. E. Colston and Jubal A. Early. Hooker's army was divided into seven corps as follows: 1st J. F. Reynolds, 2d D. N. Couch, 3d D. E. Sickles, 5th George G. Meade,


* *Official Records*, vol. xxv.; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. iii., pp. 152-153; E. A. Duyckinck, *Life of Stoneman*, in his *National Portrait Gallery*, vol. ii.

6th John Sedgwick, 11th O. O. Howard, 12th H. W. Slocum. On April 27 the 11th and 12th corps marched for Kelly's Ford about 25 miles up the Rappahannock where they arrived on the 28th and were joined by the 5th corps. All crossed the river the next morning, the 11th and 12th corps marching for Germanna Ford on the Rapidan, 12 miles distant, while the 5th corps went to Ely's Ford on the same stream but lower down. Pleasanton's cavalry brigade accompanied the two columns. The three corps united at Chancellorsville where they were joined the same day by two divisions of the 2d corps under Couch which had crossed the Rappahannock at United States Ford, the 3d corps also being near. The cavalry was thrown out on the roads toward Fredericksburg and Spotsylvania. The whole movement had been brilliantly conceived and executed and greatly raised the spirits of the army.* Hooker had concentrated 71,000 men on Lee's left and joined them before night. Mahone's and Carnot Posey's brigades of Anderson's Confederate division had been guarding United States Ford, but when the Union troops passed Germanna Ford the two brigades fell back on the 29th to Chancellorsville where Anderson had come up with A. R. Wright's brigade. On the next morning Anderson withdrew with the three brigades to the vicinity of Tabernacle Church and began to throw up works covering the roads

converging at that point. These movements on Lee's left were covered by demonstrations on his right and front below Fredericksburg. They began as early as the 21st and on the 29th Sedgwick with the 1st, 3d and 6th corps moved to about four miles below the town, threw pontoon bridges across the river and sent troops over to hold them. On the 30th he was ordered to go down the river to make a demonstration on Lee's right, while the 3d corps marched by the north bank of the river toward Chancellorsville.

Lee had early information of Hooker's movements and was not deceived by Sedgwick's march. On the afternoon of the 29th he ordered Anderson to march with Wright's brigade to Chancellorsville and when informed that Hooker had crossed the Rapidan directed McLaws to leave Barksdale's brigade at Marye's Heights and march with three brigades to Anderson's right. Jackson was directed to leave Early's division with Barksdale's brigade — in all about 8,500 men and 30 guns — to hold the lines at Fredericksburg against Sedgwick, while he himself with three divisions went to Chancellorsville. About daylight of the 1st McLaws arrived on Anderson's right and was joined by two of Anderson's brigades from near Banks' Ford. At 3 o'clock on the morning of May 1 Jackson set out, came up to Anderson at Tabernacle Church at 8 o'clock, and at 11 o'clock ordered McLaws and Anderson to march along the two roads lead-

* *Battles and Leaders*, vol. iii., p. 157.



From the original Brady negative.

VIEW OF CHANCELLORSVILLE.

ing to Chancellorsville, his own three divisions following Anderson. From Chancellorsville to Fredericksburg were three roads. One passed Salem Church, the second led south from Chancellorsville and united with the turnpike beyond Tabernacle Church, and the third led northeastward past Banks' Ford to Fredericksburg. At 11 o'clock on May 1 Meade sent two divisions by the Banks' Ford Road and one (Sykes') along the turnpike, with orders to be at or near Banks' Ford at 2 o'clock. At the same hour, 11 o'clock, Slocum advanced on the plank road to be at Tabernacle Church at noon. Hooker did not originally intend to remain in the tangled thicket of the wilderness which was an exceedingly bad place for the movements of a large army, but planned to uncover Banks' Ford and form in battle line in the open elevated country with his right at Tabernacle Church and his left covering Banks' Ford. Sykes, supported by Hancock's division of the 2d corps, had encountered McLaws and driven him back nearly to Anderson's works; Slocum had met Jackson and was skirmishing with him; and Meade was nearly in sight of the important position of Banks' Ford when Hooker, though almost through the worst of the woods, suddenly became frightened at the unexpected advance of the enemy and, fearing his own inability to get entirely out of the tangled forest and on open ground before being beaten in detail, issued an order to his men to fall back.

His corps and division commanders were of the opinion that a vigorous attempt to hold the ground in the open country which they had gained should be made, for the troops were in fine spirits and wanted to fight, but Meade said: "If we can't hold the top of a hill we certainly cannot hold the bottom of it." Couch asked for permission to remain, but was flatly refused.† Hooker seemed to think that he had Lee just where he wanted him and that the latter must fight on ground of Hooker's choosing. Couch, however, was not satisfied with Hooker's explanation and "retired from his presence with the belief that my commanding general was a whipped man."‡

On the morning of the 2d Hooker's line extended from the Rappahannock on the left to a point on the Germanna Plank Road about two and a half miles west of Chancellorsville. The 5th corps and a division of the 2d was on the left facing east, the right in advance of the Chancellor House. The 12th corps was south of the plank road, its left about one-quarter of a mile in front of the Chancellor House and its right near Hazel Grove, a little over a mile southwest of Chancellorsville. On the right of the 12th was Birney's division of the 3d corps, and the 11th corps continued the line from Dowdall's Tavern westward beyond


* Walker, *History of the Second Army Corps*, p. 224.

† Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. vii., p. 97.

‡ *Battles and Leaders*, vol. iii., p. 163.

Talley's farm. The works held by the 12th, 3d and 11th corps faced south, those of the 12th in the form of a bow, the plank road being the string of the bow. Those of the 12th ran in a straight line just south of the road. For nearly the entire distance the line ran through a tangled forest and almost impenetrable thicket of scrub oak and shrubbery.* There was a spacious clearing around the Chancellor House where Hooker had his

of which evinced their supreme contempt for Hooker's generalship since in the presence of superior numbers they decided to divide their own forces. Jackson with 3,000 men, infantry, cavalry and artillery, was to march across Hooker's front and assail his right flank and rear, while Lee remained with McLaws' and Anderson's 18,000 men to watch Hooker's left, make a demonstration against it and guard the roads to Fredericks-



headquarters, and open ground around Dowdall's. A division of the 2d corps and two of the 3d were in reserve. Pleasonton's cavalry was near Chancellor House.

Hooker deemed his position a strong one and so evidently did Lee, who considered that a direct attack with 48,000 men upon the Union army of 71,000 behind works would entail a terrible loss of life. Accordingly on the night of May 1 Lee and Stonewall Jackson had a conference, the result

burg. Jackson entered into the plan with great enthusiasm and early on the morning of the 2d with his accustomed celerity began the march. At 4:30 in the afternoon the head of his column was on Hooker's right and rear and he began to form a line less than a mile away from the right flank of the 11th corps. Hooker had warned Howard and Slocum at 9:30 in the morning to be prepared against a flank attack of the enemy.* Jackson's

* Dabney, *Life of Jackson*, p. 668.

* *Official Records*, vol. xxv., pt. ii., p. 360. See also Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. vii., pp. 99-100. There is some controversy as to the

column had been plainly seen by the Union troops* but the movement was misunderstood. Hooker came to the conclusion that Lee was retreating and at 1 o'clock Sickles at his own request was ordered to take two divisions of the 3d corps, move out and attack. This he did, falling on Jackson's rear at Welford's Furnace, taking some prisoners. F. C. Barlow's brigade of the 11th corps was sent to Sickles and Pleasonton's cavalry soon joined him, but the forest was too dense for cavalry operations and Pleasonton withdrew two of his regiments and battery to Hazel Grove where Sickles had left some of his artillery. A. S. Williams' division of the 12th corps was sent from its works to form on Sickles' left to assault Anderson's left and roll him back on Chancellorsville. Williams was about to attack when Jackson fell on the flank of the 11th corps and he accordingly retreated to his works.

Having reached the place for which he had set out Jackson lost no time in forming his troops in battle array and at 5 o'clock gave the order to advance. The officers of the 11th corps (Union), though repeatedly informed by brigade and regimental commanders of Jackson's approach, lay quietly in position, lulled into security by the

pleasant reports that Jackson was retreating. Hence they made no adequate provision against a flank attack and most of the men were preparing supper or engaged in some diversion when the storm broke, the first warning coming from the wild rush of deer which were driven out of the woods by the Confederates. Jackson had formed his 26,000 infantry in three lines across the plank road a mile on either side of it with the artillery in the road. At 5 o'clock his lines advanced with a rush, quickly drove in the Union skirmishers, and with a wild yell struck the right brigade of Charles Devens' division, flanking it and after two or three rounds compelling it to give way. The officers and men of the 11th corps bore up bravely, but not much was to be expected of new troops taken by surprise and attacked in front and rear simultaneously.* No soldiery in the world so placed could stay such an attack. Some regiments made a heroic stand and fought brilliantly, but inside of 30 minutes Devens' division of 4,000 men was routed and the Confederates advanced upon Schurz's division, which changed front. Schurz held off the Confederates for about 20 minutes and then fell back on Adolphus Buschbeck's brigade, east of Dowdall's, where he managed to rally some of his men. Buschbeck withstood the attack for about three-quarters of an hour, but at nearly 7

time this order was received by Howard. He says that the order never reached him, but General Schurz says that it arrived at Howard's headquarters about noon or a little after, and that he read it to him. See *Battles and Leaders*, vol. iii., pp. 196, 219-220.

* *Official Records*, vol. xxv., pt. i., p. 386.

* T. A. Dodge, *The Campaign of Chancellorsville*, pp. 92-93.

o'clock, being attacked in front and flank, he fell back to Fairview where 40 guns of the 11th and 12th corps were being massed on high ground in his rear. In less than two hours Howard's corps had been driven back nearly two miles, losing about 1,500 killed and wounded and about 1,000 prisoners. As the Confederates had become tired and hungry and as the two leading divisions (those of Rodes and Colston) had become inextricably mixed, Jackson suspended further operations and ordered A. P. Hill to relieve them. Meanwhile H. G. Berry's division of the 3d corps and William Hays' of the 2d corps had been sent by Hooker to the west edge of the open field north of the road; at Berry's right were some of Schurz's regiment; and Williams, desisting from his attack on Anderson, regained part of his works and formed south of the road on Berry's right with Buschbeck in his rear, thus covering the road at a distance of a little over half a mile west of Chancellor House. On being informed of Howard's disaster Sickles fell back from Welford's Furnace to Hazel Grove and formed on Pleasonton's left, while Barlow drew up in the rear of Pleasonton and close to Williams' left and front. At the same time the two Confederate lines fell back to the open ground around Dowdall's and, in order to cut off Hooker's retreat, A. P. Hill's leading brigade pushed along the plank road beyond the in-

tersection of a road leading left to White House and United States Ford.

At about this time the Confederates met with an irreparable loss. In an endeavor to re-form his troops and eager to discover Hooker's intentions, Jackson had ridden along this road with his escort far beyond his line of battle. Skirmishing between opposing pickets in the woods began and as Jackson was riding back the mounted body was mistaken for Union cavalry and fired into, Jackson being wounded in three places, both arms being shattered. Nearly the entire escort also were killed or wounded. Jackson's wound proved mortal, resulting in his death on May 10.* At the sound of the firing in the woods the Union guns at Fairview opened furiously on the plank road, causing some confusion among the Confederate troops there. During this fire A. P. Hill was badly wounded and J. E. B. Stuart was sent forward to take command.

During the night and early morning, by making some changes in the Union line, the approaches to United States Ford were covered by Reynolds' corps and part of Meade's, while the 11th corps took position on the extreme left vacated by Meade. At 9 o'clock on the night of May 2

* Dabney, *Life of Jackson*, p. 282 et seq.; I. B. Haas, *Stonewall Jackson's Death. Wounded by his Own Men*, in *Southern Historical Society Papers*, vol. xxxii., pp. 94-98 (1904); *Battles and Leaders*, vol. iii., pp. 203-214. See also the biographies of Jackson by M. Addey, J. E. Cooke, S. N. Randolph, G. F. R. Henderson, C. Hovey, J. Anderson, D. D. White, and James H. Wood.

Hooker, unaware that Sedgwick's entire corps was at Fredericksburg, ordered him to cross from Falmouth and march up the south side of the river to Chancellorsville so as to be "in our vicinity at daylight. You will probably fall upon the rear of the forces commanded by General Lee and between us we will use him up."* Pleasonton and Sickles were ordered to fall back from Hazel Grove at dawn of the 3d, Pleasonton marched back at 4 o'clock, and Sickles was in the act of following when his rear was struck by the Confederates. At 5 o'clock on the morning of May 3 Stuart, now in command of Jackson's corps, sent his right against Sickles' rear brigade then retiring from Hazel Grove. The brigade was soon routed, four guns were captured, and Stuart swept on. At Hazel Grove the Confederates placed 30 guns in position which, sweeping the open ground of Fairview, poured an enfilading fire on the right of Geary's division of the 12th corps which was fighting Anderson. At the same time Geary's left was being pounded by McLaws' guns. The battle raged along the entire line of the 2d, 3d and 12th corps. On the right W. H. French's division of the 2d corps and three divisions of the 3d were driven in but soon regained the ground lost, though eventually Stuart's men retook the Union works. Stuart's right was then hotly engaged with Williams, while Anderson was fighting desperately with Geary of

the 12th corps; and on the left, covering the Fredericksburg road, the force attacked by McLaws' brigade was being desperately resisted by Hancock's division of the 2d corps. Stuart, however, gradually gained ground and united his right with Anderson's left near Hazel Grove. At this time the ammunition of the Union troops began to fail and at 9 o'clock, after having suffered frightful losses, French's division of the 2d corps, the entire 3d corps, and Williams' division of the 12th corps began to fall back. The Confederates then gained the west of the Chancellor Plateau and swept it fore and aft with a hot artillery fire.

It was at this time that an unfortunate accident happened to General Hooker. Shortly after 9 o'clock, while standing near his headquarters at Chancellor House, a column of the portico was struck by a cannon shot and Hooker was knocked down and stunned. This, however, had little effect on the result for, according to Lee, "by 10 A. M. we were in full possession of the field."* Couch, being second in command, was instructed by Hooker to withdraw to a position about three-quarters of a mile north of the Chancellor House and covering United States Ford. Closely pressed, the right and centre fought their way back; Geary, attacked in front, right flank and rear, followed; Hancock followed Geary; before noon the Union troops were in the new position; and here the battle of Chancellorsville

* *Official Records*, vol. xxv., pt. ii., p. 365.

* *Official Records*, vol. xxv., pt. i., p. 800.

proper ended, for before Lee had time to renew the attack he had heard of the capture of Fredericksburg and Marye's Heights and the advance of Sedgwick. Accordingly he suspended further operations against Hooker and sent McLaws' division against Sedgwick.

We have seen that Hooker had ordered Sedgwick on the night of May 2 to march upon Chancellorsville and attack Lee's rear at daylight. This was an impossible undertaking and it seems altogether unreasonable that Hooker should have expected Sedgwick to attack and defeat the force left at Fredericksburg and then march 11 miles and fall upon Lee's rear, and to do all this between midnight and daybreak.* When Sedgwick received Hooker's order he had already crossed the river at Fredericksburg and was three miles below the town. Between him and Lee lay Early with 9,000 men occupying strongly fortified positions. Sedgwick had about 23,000 men divided into three divisions commanded by Generals John Newton, W. T. H. Brooks, and A. P. Howe. Brooks was left below Fredericksburg and Newton led the advance on the town, but it was early in the morning before he reached the rear and left of Fredericksburg. When morning broke it was seen that the Confederates held Marye's Heights. Gibbon crossed the river from Falmouth, reported to Sedgwick

with his division, and under cover of a demonstration by Newton advanced on the right to turn the position, but was stopped by the canal and a concentrated fire of artillery. He found also that Hays' brigade of Early's division and Wilcox's of Anderson's division were facing him in front, whereupon he fell back. On the other flank Howe's division failed to make any impression. Hence to gain the road desired it was necessary to take Marye's Heights whence the Confederates, the previous December, had so mercilessly slaughtered Burnside's troops. Nevertheless, the attempt was made and storming columns were formed, Howe massing three on the left and Newton two. These were launched against the Confederate position but were bloodily repulsed by Barksdale's brigade. The assault was renewed, however, and at 11 o'clock, after a loss of 1,000 killed, wounded and missing, the heights were carried, 15 guns and nearly 1,000 prisoners being captured. A delay occurred in bringing up Brooks' division which was to take the advance, and it was 3 o'clock before Sedgwick marched for Chancellorsville, leaving Gibbon to hold the town and cover the bridges there. Meanwhile Wilcox had regained the road in Sedgwick's front and made a stand half a mile in advance of Salem Church, where McLaws had now come up and formed across the road. On the advance of Brooks, Wilcox fell back to the church, closely followed by

* Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. vii., pp. 105-106.



From the original Brady negatives.

1. CONFEDERATE DEAD BEHIND THE STONE WALL AT MARYE'S HEIGHTS AFTER SEDGWICK'S TROOPS HAD STORMED IT ON MAY 3, 1863.
2. CONFEDERATE CAISSON WAGONS AND HORSES DESTROYED AT FREDERICKSBURG BY A LUCKY SHOT FROM A UNION BATTERY.

the Union troops. A desperate encounter ensued, but finally Brooks was compelled to fall back with a loss of 1,500 men. Night put a stop to the contest and both armies slept on their guns.

Meanwhile Lee had decided to attack Marye's Heights and Sedgwick's rear at daylight. Accordingly Early, who had concentrated his command at Cox's on the telegraph road south of Fredericksburg and who was now joined by Barksdale, attacked Marye's Heights and captured it, leaving Barksdale on the heights to prevent an advance by Gibbon who was in the town. Early moved toward Salem Church and asked McLaws to cooperate with him. Lee, retaining only Jackson's three depleted divisions to hold Hooker in check at Chancellorsville, then took Anderson to unite with McLaws and Early, with the object of driving Sedgwick across the Rappahannock. Anderson arrived about noon of the 4th and took position between McLaws and Early, the total Confederate force aggregating about 21,000 men. Sedgwick with his 20,000 men was now hemmed in on all sides with both flanks on the river covering Banks' Ford; Newton was on the right facing McLaws on the west; Brooks was in the centre facing south and confronting Anderson, and Howe was on the left facing east and opposing Early. During the day the two armies engaged in skirmishing, but at 6 o'clock Lee ordered an attack to be made to protect the centre. Early attacked Howe but failed to

turn his left, two of his brigades being thrown into confusion by Howe's artillery. The attack on Howe's left and Brooks' left was repulsed also. The contest was continued until dark. Sedgwick then withdrew from the field to Banks' Ford and, with Hooker's approval, crossed the river during the night with his nine captured guns and about 1,400 prisoners. During the night Gibbon recrossed the river to Falmouth and on the morning of the 5th Lee was again in full possession of the south side of the river below Chancellorsville. Leaving Early to hold Fredericksburg Lee marched back with McLaws and Anderson to resume the contest with Hooker, but the river was turned into a torrent by a heavy storm and the attack was deferred until the next day. When day came, however, Hooker had recrossed the river at United States Ford and the Army of the Potomac marched to its old camp, Lee resuming his former position at Fredericksburg. The Union loss at Chancellorsville was 1,082 killed, 6,849 wounded and 4,214 missing, while during the entire campaign, including Fredericksburg, Marye's Heights and Salem Church, the loss was 1,606 killed, 9,762 wounded and 5,919 missing, a total of 17,287. The Confederate loss during the campaign was 1,649 killed, 9,106 wounded and 1,708 captured or missing, a total of 12,463.*

* Matthew F. Steele, *The Battle of Chancellorsville* (1907); John Bigelow, *The Campaign of Chancellorsville: a Strategic and Tactical Study*

CHAPTER XXVI.

1862-1863.

THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST VICKSBURG.

Price's defeat at Iuka—Van Dorn's repulse at Corinth—The engagement at Hatchie River—Pemberton's retreat from Holly Springs—Van Dorn's attack on Holly Springs—Grant begins his campaign—Sherman's repulse at Chickasaw Bayou—The capture of Fort Hindman, or Arkansas Post—Failure of Grant's canal scheme—The engagements at Yazoo Pass and Steele's Bayou—Running of the Vicksburg batteries—The capture of Port Gibson—The battle of Raymond—Johnston's defeat at Jackson—Pemberton's defeats at Champion's Hill and the Big Black—The siege and capture of Vicksburg—The siege of Jackson.

The promotion of General Halleck to the chief command of the Union armies placed Grant at the head of the Army of the West. Early in September of 1862, it became evident that the Confederates under Sterling Price were preparing to advance and break the line of communication between Grant and Buell in order that, having crossed the Tennessee, they might strike the flank of Buell's army while Bragg was marching into Kentucky. Accordingly Price seized the village of Iuka, a small town on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, 21 miles


southeast of Corinth. On September 19 Price was about to move to Rienzi on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad to form a junction with Earl Van Dorn's army, preparatory to an assault upon Corinth. Grant had been closely watching the movements of Price and Van Dorn and on learning of the occupation of Iuka determined to attack and cut off Price before the contemplated junction with Van Dorn could be effected. General Rosecrans, who was near Corinth with a force of about 9,000 men, was ordered to advance south to Rienzi and Jacinto, then westward, and, marching on the roads

(1910); Hatchkiss and Allen, *Chancellorsville*; Doubleday, *Chancellorsville and Gettysburg*; T. A. Dodge, *The Campaign of Chancellorsville*; A. C. Hamlin, *The Battle of Chancellorsville*; L. P. Bates, *The Battle of Chancellorsville*; Walker, *History of the Second Army Corps*; Swinton, *Army of the Potomac*; Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. vii., pp. 87-111; James H. Wilson, *The Campaign of Chancellorsville* (1911); *Battles and Leaders*, vol. iii., pp. 154-243; N. M. Curtis, *From Bull Run to Chancellorsville* (1906); Daniel Butterfield, *Life of Hooker* (1896); L. C. Holloway, *Life of General Howard*; Walker, *Life of Hancock*; H. B. McClellan, *Life and Campaigns of Major-General J. E. B. Stuart* (1885); Theodore S. Garnett, *J. E. B. Stuart* (1908); E. S. Welch, *Major-General John Sedgwick* (1899); W. H. Taylor, *Four Years with General Lee*; Robert Stiles, *Four Years under Marse Robert* (1904); J. W. Jones, *Personal Reminiscences of R. E.*

Lee (1876); F. H. Cox, *Lee, Virginia, and the Union in Seawane Review*, vol. ix., pp. 302-311 (1901); Helen D. Longstreet, *Lee and Longstreet at High Tide* (1904); Walter H. Taylor, *General Lee, His Campaigns in Virginia, 1861-1865* (1906); John R. Deering, *Lee and His Cause* (1907); Gamaliel Bradford, Jr., *Lee and the Confederate Government*, in *Atlantic Monthly*, vol. cvii., pp. 192-202 (1911); A. R. H. Ransom, *General Lee as I Knew Him*, in *Harper's Magazine*, vol. cxxii., pp. 327-336 (1911); *Confederate Military History*, vol. iii., pp. 375-394; vol. iv., pp. 156-168; vol. v., pp. 213-222; vol. vi., pp. 212-219; vol. vii., opp. 179-181; vol. x., pt. i., pp. 249-253; and biographies of Lee by Cooke (1887); Fitzhugh Lee (1894); W. P. Trent (1899); P. A. Bruce; H. A. White (1897); Gamaliel Bradford (1902); R. E. Lee, Jr. (1904); and T. N. Page (1908).


from Jacinto and Fulton, to attack Iuka from the south. At the same time General E. O. C. Ord with 6,500 men was to move along the Memphis and Charleston Railroad to Burnsville and thence by roads north of the railroad to an attack on the north and west of Iuka. Grant accompanied Ord who reached Burnsville on the 18th and encamped within six miles of Iuka, which he proposed to assault early in the morning; but Grant, learning that Rosecrans, having been delayed by a storm, would not be up in time to make an attack the next day, instructed Ord not to take any action until he heard Rosecrans' guns south of Iuka. With the two divisions of Charles S. Hamilton and David S. Stanley, Rosecrans moved from Jacinto at 5 o'clock on the morning of the 19th and after a march of 18 miles his advance division (Hamilton's) struck Henry Little's division of Price's command at 4 P. M. about two miles south of Iuka, Dabney H. Maury's division of Price's army remaining to the north of Iuka to confront Ord. Before Hamilton could complete his lines Little attacked with 4,000 men, and after a severe fight drove Hamilton back about 600 yards with a loss of nine guns. On being reinforced by three regiments of Stanley's division, however, Hamilton rallied and regained part of his lost ground, when darkness ended the battle. Price prepared to renew activities in the morning, but convinced by his generals that the sit-

uation was critical with Rosecrans in his front and Ord in his rear, he retreated southward by the Fulton Road which Rosecrans had failed to close as had been intended. Ord had not heard the sounds of the battle of the 19th, since a strong wind was blowing from the north, but during the night learned of the engagement of the 20th and pushed on to Iuka only to find



that the town was deserted and that Price had escaped. Price retreated southward and reached Baldwyn on September 23, while Rosecrans and Ord returned to Corinth. In the battle of Iuka the Union troops lost 144 killed, 598 wounded and 40 missing, while Price reported a loss of only 86 killed and 408 wounded.*

* *Official Records*, vol. xvii.; Greene, *The Mississippi*, pp. 20-42; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. ii., pp. 726-736; *Confederate Military History*, vol. vii., pp. 83-87.



From the original Brady negatives.

1. CONFEDERATE WORKS AT CORINTH NEAR DUNN'S HOUSE.

2. VIEW OF VICKSBURG.

federates had been repulsed and were in full retreat which Lovell could do no more than attempt to cover.

Van Dorn then fell back and bivouaced for the night at Chewalla. Early in the morning of the 5th he continued his retreat on Pocahontas, but when his advance had crossed the Hatchie River, at Davis' Bridge, he was met by General S. A. Hurlbut's division, which had been sent by Grant from Bolivar, Tennessee, to Pocahontas to intercept and stop him. Van Dorn's advance was driven back across the bridge, his main body came up, and General Ord, who had arrived on the field from Jackson, took command of Hurlbut's division and attacked Van Dorn vigorously. A severe engagement ensued, in which Ord was wounded, and Hurlbut resumed command of the Union troops. Van Dorn, now closely followed from Corinth by Rosecrans, who was 12 miles away, held his position before Hurlbut the greater part of the day and, cut off from his route through Pocahontas, continued his retreat to Ripley and thence to Holly Springs. Rosecrans followed as far as Ripley, when Grant ordered him to return to Corinth and Hurlbut to Bolivar. The Union loss at Hatchie River was 539 killed and wounded and the Confederate loss 127 killed and wounded, 420 prisoners and 4 guns. In the Corinth campaign the Union loss was 355 killed, 1,841 wounded and 324 missing. Rosecrans reported that he buried 1,423 Confederate dead, but the Confederate re-

ports indicate their loss as 505 killed, 2,150 wounded and 2,183 missing, an aggregate of 4,838. Deducting the loss at Davis' Bridge the Confederate loss at Corinth must have been 2,528 killed and wounded and 1,763 missing.*

Toward the end of October Grant began to turn his thoughts to the capture of Vicksburg. On October 26 he suggested in a letter to General Halleck the destruction of all the railroads about Corinth and an advance southward from Grand Junction along the east bank of the Yazoo River. In pursuance of this plan he gathered in from Bolivar and Corinth a force of about 30,000 men who arrived in the vicinity of Grand Junction on November 4. Just as Grant was about to start southward he received a dispatch from Halleck promising reinforcements. This prospect induced Grant to delay his principal movement, but on November 8 he sent General James B. McPherson with 10,000 infantry and 1,500 cavalry southward. McPherson advanced from Grand Junction and pushed the Confederates under General J. C. Pemberton, who had now superseded Van Dorn in supreme command, to Holly Springs. The main body of Grant's army then moved forward, occupied Holly Springs on the 13th and made it a

* *Official Records*, vol. xvii.; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. ii., pp. 737-760; Grant, *Personal Memoirs*; Sherman, *Memoirs*; Greene, *The Mississippi*, pp. 42-53; Pollard, *Second Year of the War*, p. 164 *et seq.*; Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. vii., pp. 116-118; *Confederate Military History*, vol. vii., pp. 87-95; vol. ix., pt. ii., pp. 89-92.

depot of supplies guarded by Colonel R. C. Murphy with two regiments of Wisconsin infantry and a regiment of Illinois cavalry. Another advance was then made, whereupon Pemberton fell back to Grenada, while Grant halted south of Oxford until he could repair the railroads in his rear. On reaching Holly Springs Grant had concerted with Sherman a plan of operations against Vicksburg. Grant was to move directly south on the line of the railroad and attack Vicksburg from the rear while Sherman, accompanied by a gunboat fleet, was to move a force from Memphis, descend the Mississippi and then attack in front. After Grant had halted south of Oxford he proceeded to repair the railroads in his rear, and while so engaged learned that General John A. McClernand had been given command of an independent expedition to start from Memphis and open the Mississippi, for which McClernand had already organized and sent some regiments to Memphis.* Believing McClernand unfit for the project, Grant determined to forestal him, and so on December 8 sent Sherman to Memphis to take command of the expedition. Such energy and zeal were put into the work that a week after Sherman reached Memphis 67 boats had arrived at that place and the embarkation was begun on the morning of the 9th. Just as Grant was about to advance from Oxford on Grenada a force of Confed-

erate cavalry under Forrest broke up his line of communications in west Tennessee and on the morning of December 20 Van Dorn at the head of 3,500 cavalry dashed into Holly Springs and attacked Murphy. The latter made only a feeble resistance and surrendered his infantry, but the cavalry cut its way out and escaped with a loss of 77 men. Van Dorn took about 1,500 prisoners, destroyed stores to the value of \$1,500,000, and left the town in the evening. This disaster, in conjunction with Forrest's raid, compelled Grant to abandon his movement on Vicksburg and to fall back to Grand Junction, thus leaving Pemberton at liberty to concentrate his forces at Vicksburg against Sherman.*

The latter was informed of Grant's failure, but the information did not reach him in time and the day Holly Springs was captured he was on his way down the river with four divisions of 30,000 men accompanied by the gunboat fleet under D. D. Porter. On the 22d the expedition rendezvoused at Friar's Point on the Mississippi ready to move up the Yazoo River in the rear of Vicksburg. Sherman's divisions were commanded by Generals Frederick Steele, George W. Morgan, M. L. Smith and A. J. Smith. The transports, preceded by the gunboats, entered the Yazoo River on December 25th, and on the 26th and

* Regarding this see Greene, *The Mississippi*, p. 55 *et seq.*

* Greene, *The Mississippi*, p. 61 *et seq.*; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. iii., pp. 451, 475; *Official Records*, vol. xvii.

27th the troops were landed on the south bank confronting the bluffs overlooking the swamps through which ran Chickasaw Bayou. Meanwhile on the 21st Pemberton had learned of the Union advance for the purpose of attacking Vicksburg, which at that time was held by General Martin L. Smith with the brigade of General Stephen D. Lee. Accordingly John C. Vaughn's brigade was ordered to Vicksburg and was soon followed by the brigades of John Gregg and S. M. Barton. Upon reaching Vicksburg, December 26, Pemberton established the brigades of Vaughn, Gregg, Barton and Lee on a line from Vicksburg on the left to Haynes' Bluff on the right on high ground overlooking Chickasaw Bayou and the Yazoo River, Lee holding Walnut Hills from Vicksburg to Snyder's Mills on the right, a distance of 10 miles. Lee strengthened his position by batteries and rifle-pits on the slope of the bluff which rose to an elevation of about 200 feet above the bayou. Between Lee's position and Sherman's landing place was bottom land almost wholly covered by dense woods and intersected with bayous and low swampy ground. There were only three roads through this region and these were obstructed by earthworks and felled timber. On the morning of the 27th Sherman advanced along these roads with Steele on the left and Morgan and the two Smiths (M. L. and A. J.) in order on Steele's right. On the 27th and 28th there was considerable skirmishing,

but though the Confederates contested every inch of the road they were slowly driven in and at night of the 28th the Union troops lay parallel to Chickasaw or Walnut Hills Bluff or about 600 yards from its foot. The main assault on the bluff was to be made by Morgan supported by Steele, while A. J. Smith with one of his own brigades and a division of M. L. Smith was to cross a lake about a mile below Morgan and there to make an attack so as to create a diversion in favor of Morgan. On the extreme right the rest of A. J. Smith's division was to demonstrate on the road to Vicksburg. John F. DeCourcy's brigade of Morgan's division and the two brigades of F. P. Blair, Jr., and J. M. Thayer of Steele's division were formed for the assault. At 12 o'clock the attack was made but through some misunderstanding Thayer's brigade with the exception of the 4th Iowa diverged too far to the right. Nevertheless DeCourcy, Blair and the 4th Iowa of Thayer's brigade, in all about 6,000 men, after floundering through the deep mire and tangled marsh under a terrific artillery fire, finally secured a lodgment on the tableland at the foot of the bluff. Owing to the nature of the ground brigade and regiment formations were broken up, but the troops pushed on up the bluff and finally reached different points of Lee's works. Here they were met on both flanks by such a withering fire from the rifle-pits and so severe a cross fire of shell and canister from

the batteries that they were compelled to fall back to the point of starting, leaving about 1,500 killed, wounded and captured, while Lee lost only 115. Meanwhile on the right, where A. J. Smith was to demonstrate, the 6th Missouri had established themselves at the foot of the hill, but the Confederate fire from above was so hot that they were unable to advance farther. The Union troops sought shelter by digging with hands and bayonets into the ground where they remained until night covered their withdrawal. Sherman intended to renew the attack the next morning but after a personal examination concluded that his army would be too badly crippled by an assault and therefore decided to attack Haynes' Bluff higher up the Yazoo. Preparations were made to begin the assault at 4 o'clock on the morning of January 1 but Porter who was to co-operate in the attack found the fog so dense on the river that he could not move his boats and accordingly the action was deferred and finally abandoned. The next day the troops were reëmbarked on their transports and sailed for Milliken's Bend. In the assault of Chickasaw Bluff and in the skirmishing preceding it, the Union loss was 1,213 killed and wounded and 563 missing, while the Confederate loss was only 177 killed and wounded and 10 missing.*

* *Official Records*, vol. xvii.; Greene, *The Mississippi*, pp. 72-81; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. iii., pp. 462-471; Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*,

On January 4, 1863, General McClelland superseded Sherman in command. Before his arrival Sherman and Porter had arranged to make an attack on Fort Hindman at Arkansas Post about 50 miles from the mouth of the Arkansas River. This fort was in regular square bastioned form with casemates and was surrounded by a wide deep ditch; and a line of rifle-pits it mounted 18 guns and was garrisoned by about 5,000 men under General T. J. Churchill. The admirable situation of this fort at the bend of the river made it one of great importance since it effectually controlled the passage of the Arkansas, protected Little Rock, the capital of the State, and sheltered Arkansas Post and the surrounding fertile country. Accordingly, after McClelland's arrival, the fleet, consisting of three ironclads and six gunboats, entered White River and from it passed through a cut-off to the Arkansas on January 9. On the 10th the ironclads began the attack at a distance of about 400 yards and, gradually moving up, the entire fleet shelled the Confederates out of the rifle-pits and back into the fort. About noon the next day

vol. vii., pp. 131-135; Stephen D. Lee, *The Campaign of Generals Grant and Sherman against Vicksburg in December, 1862 and January 1 and 2, 1863, known as the Chickasaw Bayou Campaign*, in *Mississippi Historical Society Publications*, vol. iv., pp. 15-36 (1901); S. M. Bowman, *Sherman and His Campaigns* (1865); Johnson, *Life of Sherman* (1891); M. F. Force, *Life of Sherman* (1899); *Confederate Military History*, vol. vi., pp. 109-110; vol. vii., pp. 101-106; vol. viii., pp. 78-80.

a joint attack was begun by the land and naval forces. The navy opened a furious fire upon the fort, while McClernand's artillery joined in the fire from the land side. Churchill's guns being silenced, McClernand ordered a general assault and after a severe contest the fort was carried with a loss to the Union army of 134 killed, 898 wounded and 29 missing. The loss to the fleet was 6 killed and 25 wounded. The Confederate loss was 60 killed, about 80 wounded and 4,791 captured. The next day McClernand received peremptory orders from Grant to return to Milliken's Bend with his entire force and accordingly the prisoners were sent to St. Louis, the fort was dismantled and blown up, and the fleet and troops went down the river to Napoleon which was reached on January 18.*

On December 18 Grant had received orders from Washington to divide his command into four army corps with McClernand in command of one of them and to be assigned to that part of the army which was to operate down the Mississippi. This considerably interfered with Grant's plans, as he had placed Sherman in command of the river expedition; hence, after falling back to Grand Junction, he decided to go down the Mississippi,

unite a portion of his forces with those under McClernand, and assume command of the whole.* Accordingly the army was divided into four corps—the 13th under McClernand, the 15th under Sherman, the 16th under Hurlbut and the 17th under McPherson. Hurlbut's corps was left in charge of the line of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad and as rapidly as possible McPherson's was brought down the river and joined those of McClernand and Sherman at Milliken's Bend. On assuming command in person on January 30, 1863, Grant planned a new campaign to get below Vicksburg and operate from the south. McClernand's and Sherman's commands were moved from the mouth of the Arkansas to Young's Point to cut a canal across the peninsula by the aid of which it was hoped to get below Vicksburg and land on the east bank of the Mississippi. Work on the projected canal was pushed, but on February 4 Grant questioned its success and began to look for other routes by which the army could reach a high ground either north or south of Vicksburg. Two projects were considered. One involved cutting a way from the Mississippi into Lake Providence from a point 70 miles above Vicksburg. This lake, a former bed of the river, was connected by Bayou Baxter with Bayou Macon, a navigable stream which led to the Tensas,

* *Official Records*, vol. xxii.; Mahan, *The Gulf and Inland Waters*; Maclay, *History of the Navy*, vol. ii., pp. 424-425; Greene, *The Mississippi*, p. 83 *et seq.*; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. iii., pp. 451-454; Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. vii., pp. 137-140; *Confederate Military History*, vol. x., pt. ii., pp. 154-160.

* For Grant's relations to McClernand see Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. vii., p. 141 *et seq.*

thence into the Washita and finally into the Red River. It was hoped that the army could be transported to the lower Mississippi to coöperate with Banks who was then in front of Port Hudson. When the levee at Lake Providence was cut the water from the river flowed in rapidly and the six miles of the lake beyond were soon available, but for miles Bayou Baxter was choked with fallen trees and a growth of timber. McPherson's entire corps attempted to open this channel and those below it, but in March this project was abandoned.*

A few miles below Helena on the east side of the river was Yazoo Pass which for some years had been closed by a strong levee. By reopening this route it was believed that the Yazoo bluffs north of Vicksburg might be reached. Accordingly on February 4 the levee was cut by the engineers under Lieutenant-Colonel Wilson (later Major-General James H. Wilson), a way was cleared to Coldwater, and on the 24th the pass was opened to navigation. With 4,500 men Brigadier-General Samuel Ross was ordered into the pass upon light transports, and then, preceded by gunboats, penetrated to the Tallahatchie and thence to the Yallahusha where after an advance of 225 miles the expedition was stopped on March 10 by Fort Pemberton. As the fort could not be attacked, owing to its situation, attempts were made to flood it, but these were unsuccessful and the expedition

withdrew. On the way back a reinforcement under General I. F. Quinby was met, whereupon the expedition returned to Fort Pemberton to make another attempt to reduce it. Quinby, however, soon became satisfied that the fort could not be reached and the expedition again withdrew. Meanwhile the Confederates had gathered a strong land force under General W. W. Loring and this soon became aggressive. In order to relieve Ross Sherman with five gunboats went in haste through Steele's Bayou to Black Bayou and thence to Deer Creek. This opened into Rolling Fort by which he could enter the Big Sunflower and by this stream reach the Yazoo. Sherman energetically pushed forward his troops and was barely in time to save the gunboats which had been attacked in Deer Creek. These several attempts to cut through the bayous were finally abandoned and the army reassembled at Milliken's Bend and Young's Point.*

Having failed to flank the position on the right, Grant once more turned his attention to getting south of Vicksburg by a series of bayous running from Milliken's Bend past Richmond to New Carthage, and on March 29 directed McClernand to move the 13th corps toward Richmond and New Carthage with a view to making his way to the banks of the Mississippi below Vicksburg and the batteries at

* Greene, *The Mississippi*, p. 93 et seq.

* Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. vii., p. 146 et seq.; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. iii.; Greene, *The Mississippi*, p. 98 et seq.

Warrenton and Grand Gulf. Meanwhile Admiral Porter was preparing for the perilous enterprise of running past the batteries of Vicksburg and Warrenton. Early on February 2 Colonel Charles R. Ellet in command of the wooden steam ram *Queen of the West* started on the perilous journey but was struck only a few times. Proceeding down the river the *Queen* captured three Confederate steamers and a number of prisoners and on February 10 set out on an expedition for much the same purpose, passing the Warrenton batteries and reaching the Red River the following evening. During several days' active work Ellet was quite successful in capturing Confederate boats, but at last was compelled to abandon the *Queen*. Meeting the *Indianola* near Natchez which had run the batteries on the night of February 13, Ellet again attempted to ascend the Red River for the purpose of destroying the Confederate batteries at Gordon's Landing. Having advanced about three miles he discovered the Confederate steamer *W. H. Webb* coming toward him, but as soon as the latter sighted the *Indianola* she turned and fled. The attempt to ascend the Red River was then abandoned and Ellet made his way up the Mississippi to a station below Vicksburg after having passed the batteries at Grand Gulf, Warrenton and other places without injury. On March 14 Farragut with his flagship, the *Hartford*, and the *Albatross* had passed the batteries at Port Hudson,

but as these two vessels were not strong enough to maintain the blockade of the Red River, Farragut sent a message overland on the west side of the Mississippi asking aid from the fleet above. Accordingly on March 25 General Ellet sent two rams, the *Lancaster* and the *Switzerland*, to run the batteries at Vicksburg. The *Lancaster* was destroyed but the *Switzerland*, though badly injured, got by them without being sunk. This assured Grant that he could take his fleet past the batteries at any time, and on April 16 announced his readiness for the movement. Porter with the eight gunboats (the *Benton*, *Lafayette*, *Price*, *Louisville*, *Carondelet*, *Pittsburgh*, *Tuscumbia* and *Mound City*), and three transports (the *Forest Queen*, *Henry Clay*, and *Silver Wave*) laden with supplies and a number of barges filled with coal swung into the stream and floated down the river. The fleet was not discovered until fairly abreast of the town. A little before 11 o'clock the Confederate batteries opened fire and were answered by broadsides of grape and shrapnel from the ironclads. Porter steamed boldly under the bluffs which were blazing with a terrific cannonade from the Confederate batteries, while the transports, gliding as near as possible to the Louisiana shore, sought to escape under cover of the smoke and tumult into the darkness beyond the town. But the *Forest Queen* was disabled by a shot, the *Henry Clay* was set on fire by the

explosion of a shell and burned, while the *Silver Wave* escaped without injury. On reaching Warrenton the gunboats poured in their broadsides and so continuous and terrible was their fire that the Confederates scarcely attempted a response. The *Forest Queen* was taken in tow by one of the gunboats and the fleet, with the exception of the loss of the *Henry Clay* and with only one man killed and a few wounded, passed the dreaded ordeal in safety. Porter's success was so gratifying that on the night of April 22 six transports protected by cotton bales and loaded with supplies and having 12 coal barges in tow ran the batteries; five of the transports though more or less disabled, got through while one was sunk, and some of the barges were lost. By the 27th McClernand's corps had advanced to Hard Times on the Mississippi below Vicksburg and two divisions of McPherson's corps headed by General John A. Logan followed, so that on the 29th everything was ready for the movement upon Grand Gulf.*

At 7 A. M. on April 29 Porter with seven gunboats carrying 81 guns left his anchorage at Hard Times and steamed down the river followed by transports and flat boats carrying 10,000 men of McClernand's corps. Porter opened his guns upon the batteries at Grand Gulf about 8 o'clock and though 2,500 shot were thrown against them by 1:30 in the afternoon the Confederate guns had not been

silenced, whereupon Porter withdrew with a loss of 19 killed and 56 wounded.* Convinced that he could not take the batteries Grant determined to move still further down the river and flank Grand Gulf. McClernand landed his men at Hard Times and marched across a point beside Grand Gulf and three miles down the river while Porter with his fleet of gunboats and transports dropped down to the same point. Grant had learned of a good landing place on the east bank of the river and early on the morning of the 30th transports and gunboats began ferrying the troops across to Bruinsburg, 10 miles below Grand Gulf and 32 miles in a straight line below Vicksburg. By noon McClernand's four divisions of 18,000 men had been landed and at 4 o'clock in the afternoon they pushed out into the country; the enemy's pickets were encountered, but as the day was too far gone to commence a battle both sides rested on their arms during the night. The Confederate force consisted of Thomas Green's brigade which had marched from Grand Gulf on the afternoon of the 30th and had been joined by E. D. Tracy's brigade from Vicksburg.

The Confederate line lay about three miles west of Port Gibson across two roads converging on the town and uniting just outside of it. Green was

* Greene, *The Mississippi*, p. 112 et seq.

* *Ibid*, pp. 123-124. On Porter's operations see also J. E. Homans, *Our Three Admirals* (1899); J. R. Soley, *Admiral Porter* (1903); D. D. Porter, *The Naval History of the Civil War* (1866).

across the southern road and Tracy across the northern one, the roads running on two ridges separated by a deep ravine filled by a dense growth of cane and underbrush. At 5 o'clock the division of Peter J. Osterhaus was placed on the northern road to attack Tracy, and the divisions of E. A. Carr, A. P. Hovey and A. J. Smith went along the southern road to attack Green. At 5 on the morning of May 1 the battle was opened by the advance of Osterhaus, but the movement was checked and repulsed by Tracy with much loss. The divisions of Carr and Hovey assaulted the ridge held by Green's brigade and after a hard fight carried it, capturing two guns and over 300 prisoners, Green then falling back toward Port Gibson. General J. S. Bowen, commanding the Confederate forces at Grand Gulf, arrived on the field with General W. E. Baldwin's brigade at about 9 o'clock and formed line in Green's rear. Carr and Hovey continued to press Green, whereupon the latter was withdrawn and sent to assist Tracy while Baldwin undertook to oppose Carr and Hovey. A severe contest ensued lasting nearly two hours during which Bowen, with two regiments of Colonel F. M. Cockrell's brigade which had arrived about noon, made a very determined effort to turn McClernand's right, but the attempt was defeated and Cockrell's men joined Baldwin. Meanwhile Logan's division of McPherson's corps had come up and with the division under Osterhaus attacked

and gradually forced back the brigades of Tracy and Green. On the right McClernand's troops again attacked Baldwin and just at sunset the entire Confederate force retreated. Of the 23,000 Union troops engaged there were 131 killed, 719 wounded and 25 missing. Of the 6,000 Confederates engaged there were 68 killed, 380 wounded and 384 missing.*

While Grant was crossing the river at Bruinsburg, Sherman, whose corps had been left at Young's Point, went up the Yazoo River with a division accompanied by some of Porter's gunboats and made a strong demonstration at Snyder's Bluff on the Yazoo 12 miles above Vicksburg. On May 3 Grant rode into Grand Gulf. He had resolved to get below Vicksburg, unite with Banks against Port Hudson, make New Orleans a base and with that base and Grand Gulf as a starting point move the combined forces against Vicksburg. Upon reaching Grand Gulf, however, Grant received a letter from Banks stating that he could not be at Port Hudson for ten days and then with only 15,000 men. Accordingly, as time was worth more than reinforcements, Grant determined to push into the interior of the enemy's country.

After their defeat at Port Gibson the Confederates retreated across Big Black River at Hankinson's Ferry

* *Official Records*, vol. xxiv.; Greene, *The Mississippi*, p 126 et seq.; Grant, *Personal Memoirs*, vol. ii.; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. iii., pp. 486, 497, 500.

leaving a force behind to protect the crossing. On the morning of the 3d this force was attacked by Crocker's division of McPherson's corps, whereupon the Confederates slowly retired. Later in the day, however, Logan's division came upon their flank and they hastily crossed the river. McPherson's corps was then moved forward to Hankinson's Ferry and McClernand's to Willow Springs where they remained until the 7th when Sherman's corps, having crossed the Mississippi, the advance was resumed, the main body of the army moving along the Big Black toward Edwards' Station midway between Vicksburg and Jackson, while McPherson on the right was sent toward Jackson, the capital of the State, 45 miles east of Vicksburg. On the night of the 11th McPherson bivouaced five miles northeast of Utica on the road to Raymond, and early on the morning of the 12th pushed rapidly on toward Raymond, 18 miles from Jackson, hoping to capture there a large quantity of commissary stores; but before 9 o'clock Logan's division which was in advance came upon a strong body of Confederates, whereupon the division was deployed and continued its advance for two hours when, coming to a small stream crossing the road about two miles from Raymond, General Gregg's brigade of about 3,000 men with two batteries was sent beyond the stream in a position to enfilade the road and the bridge across the stream. Logan immediately threw out skirmishers

and a severe engagement ensued which lasted two hours when, Logan's division having been reinforced with a portion of Crocker's division, Gregg abandoned the field and retreated toward Jackson, being joined on the way by Walker's brigade. In the battle of Raymond the Union loss was 66 killed, 329 wounded and 37 missing. Gregg reported a loss of 73 killed, 229 wounded and 204 missing.*

Having provided for the safety of his rear and left from the direction of Vicksburg, Grant sent a corps of McPherson's and Sherman's and part of McClernand's to capture Jackson. On the 13th McPherson moved from Raymond to Clinton and then turned east toward Jackson. On the same day Sherman moved through Raymond to Mississippi Springs and on that night arranged with McPherson that both columns should arrive at Jackson at about the same hour the next day. McClernand sent one division to Clinton to support McPherson. Meanwhile on May 9 the Confederate government had directed General Johnston to proceed at once to the Mississippi with 3,000 troops and take command of the forces there.† On learning of this Grant decided to follow the enemy and not to stop until

* *Official Records*, vol. xxiv., pt. i., p. 50; Grant, *Personal Memoirs*, vol. ii.; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. iii., pp. 478, 486, 503, 519, 604; Greene, *The Mississippi*, pp. 140-143; *Confederate Military History*, vol. vii., pt. ii., pp. 137-139; vol. viii., pp. 80-83.

† Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. vii., p. 178 *et seq*

Vicksburg was in his possession.* Johnston, however, did not arrive at Jackson until the night of May 13, after the battle of Raymond. Upon his arrival Johnston learned of the Union approach and ordered Gregg's division to take position on the Raymond road and W. H. T. Walker's brigade on the Clinton road, their object being to delay the Union advance as long as possible so that the public property might be removed from the city. The combined strength of Gregg and Walker was about 6,000 men. At 9 o'clock on the 14th McPherson advanced on the Clinton road, struck Walker's pickets and drove them back to the main body, about two and a half miles west of Jackson. At 11 A. M. Crocker's division charged and soon compelled Walker's men to retreat, abandoning 7 guns. After pursuing the Confederates for about a mile Crocker's men became disorganized and while they were re-forming Walker escaped to the Canton road. Crocker's loss was 265 killed and wounded. On the Raymond road Sherman had struck Gregg and by a flank movement had compelled him to abandon his line and 10 guns with a loss of 200 prisoners and 81 killed and wounded, while Sherman's loss was only 32. Johnston retreated northward on the Canton road and between 3 and 4 o'clock in the afternoon McPherson and Sherman entered Jackson. The Union loss was 42 killed and 251 wounded. The Confederates

stated their loss at less than 400, but Sherman estimated it at 485 killed, wounded and missing.*

Learning from an intercepted dispatch sent by Johnston to Pemberton on the 13th that Pemberton had been advised to march with all his available force to Clinton† and attack Grant's rear while Johnston operated on his front or flank, Grant, leaving Sherman with two divisions at Jackson to destroy all public property, tear up the railroads and burn bridges, factories, arsenals, etc., turned the rest of his army from Clinton, Raymond and Auburn on Bolton and Edwards' Station on the Vicksburg and Jackson Railroad. With the three divisions of C. L. Stevenson, J. S. Bowen, and W. W. Loring, Pemberton was near the Big Black River on May 14 when he received Johnston's dispatch. Disregarding it, he decided to move on Grant's rear in the direction of Raymond and on the 15th advanced for that purpose, Loring's division halting that night on the Raymond road at Elliston's, eight miles east of Edwards' Station, the other divisions being farther north on roads coming into the Raymond road. The next morning Pemberton resumed the march but almost immediately received a dispatch from Johnston that he had been defeated at Jackson and advising Pemberton to move on Clin-


* Johnston, *Narrative of Military Operations*; Sherman, *Memoirs*, vol. i.; *Official Records*, vol. xxiv.; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. iii., p. 480 et seq.; Greene, *The Mississippi*, pp. 143-148.

† *Official Records*, vol. xxiv., pt. i., p. 263.

* *Official Records*, vol. xxiv., pt. i., p. 33.

ton. Pemberton concluded to make the movement and turned back his trains to Edwards' Station to get the road leading to Brownsville on the north. Scarcely had he done so when the divisions of Osterhaus and A. J. Smith of Grant's army appeared on the Raymond road and attacked the Confederate skirmishers. Accordingly Pemberton formed a battle line

west of Raymond on the road to Edwards' Station. On the 16th Grant at Clinton learned that Pemberton intended to attack him, whereupon he ordered McPherson with the divisions of Logan and Crocker to close up rapidly on Hovey and the four divisions under McClelland on the Raymond and Middle roads to move forward cautiously and establish com-



with Loring on the right covering Raymond road, Bowen in the centre and Stevenson on the left on the northern point of a narrow road known as Champion's Hill covering the Clinton road and the intersection of the cross-road. Altogether Pemberton had about 17,500 men, while Grant had 32,000 men formed in seven divisions as follows — Hovey's at Bolton on the Clinton road, Logan's and Crocker's on the same road a few miles in Hovey's rear, Osterhaus' on a cross-road half way from Raymond to Bolton, Carr's a short distance in his rear, and Blair's and A. J. Smith's

munications with each other; he himself then hastened by the Clinton road to the front. About 8 o'clock A. J. Smith's division advancing along the Raymond road attacked and drove in Loring's skirmishers, and Osterhaus on the middle road engaged those in front. At 2 P. M. McClelland received an order from Grant to advance, whereupon the divisions of Smith and Osterhaus began the attack. But meanwhile the battle was being fought out and decided on the right of Champion's Hill. Advancing along the Clinton road Hovey began skirmishing with Stevenson about 10 o'clock

and was preparing for a general assault when ordered by Grant to wait for news from McClernand. At 11 o'clock Logan came up, and as nothing had been heard from McClernand the line was formed for a general attack with Hovey south of the Clinton road and Logan on his right. At about noon Hovey's troops climbed Champion's Hill and advanced, driving back Stevenson's right and capturing 11 guns. Soon after this Logan, who had worked around on Stevenson's left on the north side of the hill attacked and drove back Stevenson's left and captured 7 guns. Being compelled to take ground to the left in order to meet Logan's flank movement and cover the road to Baker's Creek and Edwards' Station, Stevenson induced Pemberton to draw Bowen to the left and close the interval between the two divisions while Loring should compel an engagement with Bowen. At 2 o'clock Bowen closed in on Stevenson's two leading brigades (Green's and F. M. Cockrell's) and attacked Hovey furiously driving him back down the hill and recapturing 9 guns. Finally, however, two brigades of Crocker's division came to Hovey's support and checked the Confederates. The Union artillery then poured such an effective enflading fire upon Stevenson's line that it was much demoralized, whereupon Hovey and Crocker again charged up the hill and drove back Stevenson and Bowen. Accordingly, seeing his left entirely broken, Pemberton at

3 o'clock ordered a general retreat, at the same time ordering Loring to cover. Meanwhile Loring, leaving General Lloyd Tilghman's brigade on the Raymond road to oppose Smith and Blair, had closed up on Bowen with two brigades, and when the retreat began was forming his men beyond the Raymond road when he was attacked by Osterhaus and compelled to fall back to the Raymond road. At the same time A. J. Smith attacked Tilghman's force and killed Tilghman. Loring then reunited his command and retreated along the Raymond road, but when he came to the ford of Baker's Creek found it in possession of the Union troops and realizing that he had been cut off from Pemberton's army moved off to the south, abandoned his artillery, and on the 19th joined General Johnston who meanwhile had reoccupied Jackson. The Union loss was 410 killed, 1,844 wounded, and 187 missing. The Confederate loss was 380 killed, 1,018 wounded, and 2,441 missing.*


After his defeat General Pemberton withdrew his army across Big Black River and was pursued by Grant on the 17th. Pemberton tried to hold the bridge head on the east side of the stream, but the Confederates had lost heart and were filled with consterna-

* *Official Records*, vol. xxiv.; Greene, *The Mississippi*, pp. 149-160; Grant, *Personal Memoirs; Battles and Leaders*, vol. iii., p. 508 *et seq.*; Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. vii., pp. 183-192; *Confederate Military History*, vol. vi., pp. 220-222; vol. vii., pp. 141-148; vol. ix., pt. ii., pp. 117-120.

tion at the swift movements and impetuous onsets of Grant. The Confederates were posted in the river bottom on the east bank with a long line of rifle-pits which were defended by the bayous. They presented a somewhat formidable front as the Union army approached, but Grant found

enabling most of his troops on the east side to get over, whereupon he ordered all of his command to withdraw within the intrenched lines of Vicksburg. The fortified position at Snyder's Bluff on the Yazoo was abandoned and the garrison brought into the city while the outpost at Warrenton on the south was also drawn in.

Around the exterior line of defence, which was about eight miles in length, were 102 pieces of field artillery and about 19,000 effective men. On the river front were 40 heavy guns with about 700 men. On the 18th Pemberton received a dispatch from Johnston advising him to evacuate Vicksburg and march to the northeast.* After a council of war, however, Pemberton decided to make the attempt to hold Vicksburg. On the same day Grant closed in, established his base on the Yazoo River above Vicksburg, while Sherman on the right reoccupied Haynes' and Snyder's Bluffs. On Sherman's left McPherson held ground on both sides of the Jackson road while McClernand's division was stationed on the south of McPherson and extended toward Warrenton. From the demoralization of the Confederates Grant hoped that he might carry their works by storm, and at 2 P. M. of the 19th ordered a general assault. Sherman advanced on the right and after hard fighting gained the ditch of the works near the Graveyard road, but could advance no far-



that under cover of the river bank the rifle-pits could be flanked. This was done and an attack was made, the Confederates hastily retreating. Pemberton fell back across the bridge after losing 18 guns and 1,750 prisoners.* His troops on the west bank of the river covered the disorderly retreat,


* Greene, *The Mississippi*, pp. 161-164; *Confederate Military History*, vol. ix, pt. ii., pp. 120-121.

* *Official Records*, vol. xxiv., pt. i., p. 272.

ther and was repulsed with a loss of 942 killed and wounded.*

Notwithstanding the experience of the 19th, Grant determined to make another assault. Accordingly on May 21 orders were issued for a general assault on the whole line to commence at 10 A. M. on the 22d. Early on the morning of the 22d a furious cannonade was opened on the Confederate lines, in which Porter's fleet joined, and at 10 o'clock Grant's 40,000 men threw themselves against the 20,000 Confederates covered by intrenchments. The Union troops met a terrific hail of musketry and grape and canister from the field guns. In some places Sherman and McPherson reached the ditch of the Confederate works and planted their colors on the parapet, but in general the assault was repulsed and the troops fell back under shelter. On the left McClernand carried a part of the Confederate line but was soon driven out. About noon McClernand reported that he had partial possession of two forts and that the Stars and Stripes were floating over them.† He

said that if he were supported on the right complete success would be assured. Accordingly Grant ordered McPherson and Sherman to renew the assault but the new attack only served



to increase the casualties of the Union army without any appreciable advantage in position. The firing continued until dark when the Union troops were withdrawn after having sustained a loss of 502 killed, 2,550 wounded and 147 missing. The Con-

* Greene, *The Mississippi*, pp. 165-170.

† *Official Records*, vol. xxiv., pt. i., p. 172.

federate loss was not over 500. This action of McClernand led to a bitter controversy after the battle, in which McClernand took action to insinuate that Grant had not properly supported him. As this reflected also on Sherman and McPherson, Grant immediately removed McClernand from command of the 13th corps and placed it under E. O. C. Ord.*

This assault convinced Grant that the position of the Confederates was so strong that the city could be taken only by a regular siege.† The investing line was about 15 miles long extending from Haynes' Bluff to Vicksburg, thence to Warrenton on the south. Artillery was put in commanding places and rifle-pits and covered ways constructed to connect the entire command by the shortest route. In no place were the opposing lines more than 600 yards apart and as the work was pushed forward rapidly the distance was greatly reduced. Whenever an advance position was secured and covered from the fire of the enemy the batteries were again moved forward.

The situation in Vicksburg was truly pitiable. The town was filled with wounded from the battles preceding the siege, and the effective soldiers were exceedingly gloomy at the steady, systematic work of the investing army. The bursting of the shells

and the whizzing and clattering sound of the shrapnel struck terror to the women and children and they finally began to build caves which soon served them as dwelling places. There was lack of the proper kind of food and as the siege progressed the inhabitants faced starvation. Soon after the siege began the meat rations were reduced one-half, and when the supply of meat and bacon was exhausted the flesh of horses and mules was eaten. Corn meal began to run low and gradually, worn out by incessant work and emaciated from lack of nourishment, the soldiers began to talk of mutiny.* Of this Grant received an inkling from the reports of deserters and the conversations of pickets during temporary truces. Accordingly, he steadily and grimly closed about the beleaguered city and prepared for a final assault. By June 25 a sap had been run to the Confederate parapet and a mine was exploded just north of the Jackson road. A lodgment inside the works was effected by two Union regiments, but they were driven out the next day. On July 1 another mine was exploded but no attempt was made to take advantage of it. Three other mines were set off at other

* Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. vii., pp. 286-288. See also Sherman, *Memoirs*, vol. i., p. 327 *et seq.*; Badeau, *Military History of U. S. Grant*, vol. i., p. 364.

† *Official Records*, vol. xxiv., pt. iii., p. 337.

* *Official Records*, vol. xxiv., pt. iii., p. 982. See also Rhodes, *United States*, vol. iv., pp. 313-316. Pollard denounces this as untrue: "The statement that the garrison of Vicksburg was surrendered on account of an inexorable distress, in which the soldiers had to feed on mules, with the occasional luxury of rats, is either to be taken as a designing falsehood or as the crudities of that foolish newspaper romance so common in the war. In neither case does it merit refutation," etc.—*Third Year of the War*, p. 68.

points which resulted in the killing and wounding of a number of men, but no practical advantage was gained. The lines now were very close and the casualties on each side were from 10 to 100 a day. By June 30 Grant had received reinforcements raising his army to 71,000 men, besides which he had in position 248 guns of which 220 were field-pieces and 28 heavy naval guns. A large part of the army was placed under Sherman's command and sent to check the advance of Johnston's army from Jackson. By July 1 Grant's approaches were close to the Confederate works and at many points were within from 5 to 100 yards of the enemy. Accordingly orders were given to prepare for a general assault on the 6th. By this time, however, Pemberton was convinced that he could not repel another assault. Accordingly, on July 3, white flags were displayed on the Confederate works and a note was sent to Grant proposing an armistice to arrange terms of capitulation. After a conference Grant wrote a letter to Pemberton offering such terms, which after a little delay were accepted. At 10 A. M. on July 4 the Confederate troops marched out, each division in front of its works, stacked arms, laid their colors upon them, and then returned toward the town where they were subsequently paroled. The prisoners surrendered numbered 29,391, besides which 172 pieces of artillery, 60,000 muskets and a large amount of ammunition were captured. Grant's

entire loss during the campaign was 1,243 killed, 7,095 wounded and 535 missing, while the Confederate loss including the prisoners must have aggregated 40,000 killed, wounded and captured.*

Meanwhile, on June 29, Johnston had marched west to operate in the rear of Grant. He was about to move on the morning of July 5 to the south of the Vicksburg and Jackson Railroad when he heard that Vicksburg

* *Official Records*, vols. xxiv., xxv., xxvii.; Greene, *The Mississippi*, pp. 174-208; Grant, *Personal Memoirs*; Sherman, *Personal Memoirs*, vol. i.; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. iii., pp. 482-570; Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. vii., pp. 282-310; Johnston's *Narrative*; Badeau, *Military History of Grant*, vol. i.; Swinton, *Decisive Battles*; Mahan, *Gulf and Inland Waters*; Davis, *Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government*; Pollard, *Third Year of the War*; William R. Livermore, *The Vicksburg Campaign* (1942); Frederick D. Grant, *With Grant at Vicksburg*, in *The Outlook*, vol. lix., pp. 533-543 (1898); Stephen D. Lee, *The Campaign of Vicksburg*, in *Mississippi Historical Society Publications*, vol. iii., pp. 21-53, and *The Siege of Vicksburg* in *ibid.*, vol. iii., pp. 55-71 (1900); John S. Kountz, *Record of the Organizations Engaged in the Campaign, Siege and Defense of Vicksburg* (1901); W. T. Rigby, *Historic Vicksburg* (1904); James H. Wilson, *Under the Old Flag* (1912); S. M. Bowman, *Sherman and His Campaigns* (1865); biographies of Sherman by Johnson (1891) and Force (1899); Brockett, *Our Great Captains* (1865); biographies of Grant by J. S. C. Abbott (1868), A. W. Alexander (1887), Coppée (1869), W. A. Crafts (1868), C. A. Dana and J. H. Wilson (1868), Hamlin Garland (1898), P. C. Headley (1866), Edward Howland (1868), Phelps (1868); J. K. Larke, *Grant and His Campaigns* (1864); H. Coppée, *Grant and His Campaigns* (1866); Horace Porter, *Campaigning with Grant*; Dawson, *Life of John A. Logan* (1887); B. T. Johnson, *Memoir of Joseph E. Johnston* (1891); R. M. Hughes, *General Johnston* (1893); *Confederate Military History*, vol. vii., pt. ii., pp. 149-160; vol. ix., pt. ii., pp. 122-129; vol. x., pt. i., pp. 121-125; vol. xi., pt. i., pp. 170-174.

had fallen, whereupon he retreated to Jackson and occupied a line of works covering the town with both flanks on Pearl River. Sherman had been held in readiness to move back and drive the Confederates from the State. When Vicksburg fell he moved across the Big Black at three different points with his own corps and those of Generals Ord and Parke and by July 11 was close up to Johnston's works and shelling the city with nearly 100 guns. The 13th corps under Ord was on the right, the 15th corps under Sherman in the centre and the 7th corps under Parke on the left. On the 12th the artillery fire was increased and Lauman's division of Ord's corps moving in dense woods and coming too close

to the Confederate works, was struck in flank and driven back in disorder, losing over 500 men in killed, wounded and captured. The siege continued until the morning of the 17th when Johnston after evacuating Jackson retreated to Brandon and then to Morton where he arrived on the 20th. Johnston was pursued as far as Brandon by Steele's division. Sherman remained at Jackson for five days destroying much property of every description and then returned to Vicksburg. The Union loss in the siege was 129 killed, 762 wounded and 231 missing or captured, while the Confederate loss was 71 killed, 504 wounded and 764 missing or captured.*

CHAPTER XXVII.

1863.

THE SIEGE OF PORT HUDSON.

Halleck's instructions to Banks — The occupation of Baton Rouge — Union defeats at Galveston — Operations at Bayou Têche — Farragut's passage of the batteries — Weitzel's operations — Cooke's capture of Butte-la-Rose — The investment and capture of Port Hudson.

The great work of freeing the Mississippi was not complete when Vicksburg was captured. Port Hudson, a small village in Louisiana on the east bank of the Mississippi, 135 miles above New Orleans, had been occupied by the Confederates under General Breckinridge after their defeat at Baton Rouge on August 5, 1862. The place was on a sharp bend of the river on bold bluffs rising 75 to 90 feet above it, which for three miles along

the river were strengthened by fortifications and armed with heavy guns. In December of 1862 General Butler had been succeeded by General N. P. Banks who was ordered to clear the Mississippi River and to occupy the Red River country as a protection for Louisiana and Arkansas and as a base

* *Official Records*, vol. xxiv.; *Sherman's Memoirs*, vol. i.; *Johnston's Narrative*; *Grant's Memoirs*, vol. i., *Battles and Leaders*, vol. iii.; *Confederate Military History*, vol. vii., pt. ii., pp. 162-163.

for future operations against Texas. He was also authorized to assume control of any military forces from the upper Mississippi which might come within his command and to exercise supreme authority as far up the river as he ascended. When the instructions were issued authority had been given to General McClernand to organize an expedition on the upper Mississippi to reduce Vicksburg and the Government at Washington intended that Banks should ascend the river from New Orleans, join McClernand at Vicksburg and assume command of operations at that place. On his arrival at New Orleans Banks was surprised to learn that the Confederates held Port Hudson armed with 21 heavy guns and garrisoned by between 12,000 and 16,000 men. Nothing was heard from McClernand or Grant and on the 18th General Cuvier Grover with a division of 18,000 men and some artillery was sent to take possession of Baton Rouge, 25 miles south of Port Hudson; this was accomplished without opposition and was the first step in the reduction of Port Hudson.

The next movement was not so judicious. At the earnest entreaties of General Andrew J. Hamilton, the military governor of Texas, Banks sent a small detachment to take possession of Galveston on the Texan coast. On December 24, 260 men of the 42d Massachusetts were landed and encamped on the city wharf. At daybreak of January 1, 1863, General Magruder,

the Confederate commander in that department, made a combined naval and land attack on the Union fleet in the bay and the troops in the city. The *Westfield* was blown up and destroyed by her officers to prevent capture; the *Harriet Lane* was boarded, and surrendered after her captain and executive officer had been killed. The land force was attacked by a largely superior force and surrendered after a stout resistance, in which it had 20 men killed and wounded. Magruder reported his loss as 26 killed and 117 wounded. The other United States vessels then abandoned the blockade, but Farragut quickly restored it, soon after which, on January 11, a strange vessel was seen outside and the *Hatteras* was sent to overhaul her. She proved to be the noted *Alabama*, and after a short and hot fight she sunk the *Hatteras*, saving her crew. Ten days later the Union gunboats *Velocity* and *Morning Light*, blockading Sabine Pass, were attacked by Confederate steamers, driven out to sea, and captured, with guns, prisoners, and a large amount of stores.*

The next attempt of a military kind was in the region of the Bayou Têche west of the Mississippi where the Confederates, with the aid of a gunboat named the *Cotton*, were committing depredations. On January 11 General

* *Official Records*, vol. xv.; Mahan, *The Gulf and Inland Waters*; Maclay, *History of the Navy*, vol. ii., pp. 563-565; Lossing, *Field Book of the Civil War*, vol. ii.; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. iii., pp. 571, 586, vol. iv., p. 605; *Confederate Military History*, vol. xi., pt. i., pp. 80-96.

Godfrey Weitzel crossed to Brashear City and embarked his men for the ascent of the Atchafalaya, the cavalry and artillery proceeding by land. Having taken refuge in the Bayou Têche, the *Cotton* was attacked by a gunboat supported by Weitzel's troops. Finally the *Cotton* was set on fire to prevent her capture, whereupon the Union gunboats were withdrawn and the troops fell back to their encampment at Thibodeaux.

After providing for the security of New Orleans Banks organized his available forces into four divisions under command of General C. C. Augur, Thomas W. Sherman, W. H. Emory and Grover. At this time news arrived that two of Colonel Ellet's rams, after running the batteries at Vicksburg, had been captured. Admiral Farragut then determined to run past the batteries at Port Hudson, to recapture or destroy the rams, and thus to control the river as far up as Vicksburg and cut off supplies from the Red River country. At the same time the land forces under Banks were to threaten Port Hudson from the rear. On March 14, 1863, Banks moved from Baton Rouge with 17,000 men to the rear of Port Hudson. That night Farragut with nine vessels carrying 116 guns started to run the batteries. Leading the way at the head of the fleet with the flagship *Hartford*, accompanied by the gunboat *Albatross* made fast to her port side, Farragut started at 9:30 o'clock. Most of the fleet, under the heavy fire brought

to bear on them, failed to pass the batteries and put back. The *Mississippi* succeeded in getting by the lower batteries but then ran aground, and being under the fire of three heavy batteries was burned by her commander, the crew escaping down the river in the small boats. The *Hartford* and *Albatross*, however, passed the batteries unscathed and communicated with Porter's fleet above Vicksburg. Farragut's loss was 113 killed and wounded.*

The navy now had control of the mouth of the Red River, and Banks, reverting to the execution of his turning movement by the Atchafalaya, recrossed the Mississippi and turned his attention to that part of Louisiana west of New Orleans and bordering on the Têche River where the Confederates were in considerable force under General R. Taylor. Since Weitzel's expedition in January, several new fortifications had been erected by the Confederates who had concentrated their forces at several stations on the Têche River with the evident intention of threatening New Orleans. Accordingly Banks advanced with his force to Berwick where he arrived on April 11 and commenced a series of operations which swept the Confederates from their strongholds throughout the central region from the Gulf to the Red River. On April 12 to 13 there were engagements between the Confederates and the divisions under

* Maclay, *History of the Navy*, vol. ii., pp. 432-434; Greene, *The Mississippi*, pp. 214-218.

Emory and Weitzel in the vicinity of Pattersonville at the mouth of the Têche, but on the night of the 13th, after having suffered severely, the Confederates abandoned their position. Meanwhile Grover with the force under his command ascended Grand Lake from Brashear City and effected a landing at Irish Bend in the rear of the Confederates. He then marched toward Franklin and on April 14 routed the Confederates after their retreat from the batteries below. Banks advanced with his force to New Iberia and took possession of and destroyed an extensive salt works in the vicinity. He then pushed vigorously forward and on April 17 Grover came upon the Confederates strongly intrenched with a battery of six pieces at Bayou Vermillion, but after destroying the bridge over the bayou the enemy beat a hasty retreat. The Union troops quickly followed and continued the pursuit until Opelousas was reached and occupied on the 20th. General William Dwight then pushed forward through Washington toward Alexandria. Meanwhile on April 20 Lieutenant A. P. Cooke of the navy with a gunboat and four companies of artillery attacked Butte-a-la-Rose and thus was secured what Banks called the key to the Atchafalaya. Following up these advantages Banks, on May 8, occupied Alexandria driving the Confederates northwestward toward Shreveport. Banks then moved down the Red River and on May 21 landed on the opposite bank

of the Mississippi at Bayou Sara, a few miles above Port Hudson. On the 23d a junction was effected with the advance of Generals Augur and T. W. Sherman, who had brought up their forces from Baton Rouge. Thus the Union line now occupied the Bayou Sara road at a distance of five miles from Port Hudson.*


On May 26 the investment of Port Hudson was complete with about 14,000 men. General Frank Gardner who commanded at Port Hudson had been ordered by General Joseph E. Johnston on May 19 to evacuate the place with his 7,000 troops, but the order came too late. Under the impression that the Confederate force was smaller than it actually was, Banks, on the morning of the 27th, ordered an assault. On the land side of Port Hudson the Confederate fortifications consisted of a series of strong works connected by rifle-pits (containing about 30 field-guns) with their flanks resting on the river above and below the place. The investing line was about 7 miles in length with Weitzel's brigade and the divisions of Dwight and Grover on the right, Augur's division in the centre and part of Thomas W. Sherman's division on the left. The assault was to take place simultaneously along the entire line. After a heavy fire of artillery, Weitzel on the right, commanding his own and Dwight's troops, moved forward at 10 o'clock and was severely engaged

* *Battles and Leaders*, vol. iii., p. 586 et seq.; Greene, *The Mississippi*, pp. 219-220.

until late in the afternoon, by which time he had gained a little ground. On Weitzel's left Grover gained and held a commanding position within 200 yards of the Confederate works.

withdrawn at night. The only advantages gained were the advance positions held by Weitzel and Grover. In the assault the Union loss was 293 killed, 1,545 wounded and 157 miss-

ing; the Confederate loss was about 235 killed and wounded. Realizing the impossibility of capturing the place by storm save at an enormous loss, Banks determined to begin regular siege operations. Siege guns were planted and much skirmishing was engaged in, during which the Union lines gained a little ground. On June 10 heavy artillery fire was indulged in and at 3 o'clock on the morning of the 11th the Union troops made an attack to get within assaulting distance of the works. Some of the troops advanced within the abatis but were repulsed with considerable loss.



In the centre and on the left Augur and Sherman did not begin their advance until 2 o'clock in the afternoon; they were met with so severe a fire of cannon and musketry that they were unable to cross the parapet and were

Meanwhile Banks had reorganized his command. Sherman had been severely wounded and was succeeded by Dwight, and Grover was placed in command of the right wing consisting of his own and H. E. Paine's divi-

sions of Weitzel's brigade, the line being formed from right to left as follows: Weitzel, Grover, Paine, Augur and Dwight. As the line of investment was well advanced Banks at daylight of June 14 made a second general assault from his left and right. On the left Dwight attempted to gain entrance to the works by passing a ravine, while Grover and Weitzel made the main attack on the right. In this, however, the Union troops were unsuccessful and were bloodily repulsed with a loss of 203 killed, 1,401 wounded and 188 missing, while the Confederates lost only 22 killed and 25 wounded. The only advantage gained was a few yards' nearer approach to the works on the right, and on the left an eminence commanding a strong part of them and which later enabled Banks to secure the bluff

within 10 yards of the Confederate works. Siege operations were then continued and on the right saps were run to the very line of the Confederate works. On the left a mine was prepared to contain 30 barrels of powder, and a storming column of 1,000 volunteers was organized, but during the night of July 6 Gardner having learned that Vicksburg had surrendered requested a cessation of hostilities with a view to surrender. On the 8th terms of capitulation were arranged and Gardner surrendered the fort with 6,340 officers and men, 51 guns, 7,500 muskets, large quantities of ammunition, and 2 river steamers. During the siege the Union loss was 708 killed, 3,336 wounded, and 319 missing, an aggregate of 4,363. Incomplete Confederate returns show a loss of 176 killed and 447 wounded.*

CHAPTER XXVIII.

1863.

THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN.

Lee's determination to invade the North — Hooker's movements — The engagements at Fleetwood and Brandy Station — The second battle of Winchester — Cavalry engagements at Aldie, Middleburg and Upperville — Early's capture of Chambersburg — Consternation in the North — Hooker's removal — The battle of Gettysburg — Lee's retreat — The engagement at Manassas Gap.

After the battle of Chancellorsville, May 1-3, 1863, the opposing armies resumed their positions on the Rappahannock, Lee on the south side at Fredericksburg and Hooker on the north side. Lee employed his time for several weeks in reorganizing his army and dividing it into three corps

commanded by Longstreet, Ewell and A. P. Hill. Besides, there was Stuart's

* Greene, *The Mississippi*, chap. vii.; Grant, *Personal Memoirs*, vol. i.; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. iii., pp. 586-599; Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. vii., pp. 311-327; Frank M. Flinn, *Campaigning with Banks in Louisiana* (1887); *Confederate Military History*, vol. x., pt. i., pp. 110-120.

cavalry force of 12,000 men, so that on June 1 Lee had an army of about 76,000 men with 190 guns. Elated by his victories at Chancellorsville and Fredericksburg, and believing that nothing was to be gained by remaining inactive,* he decided, with Davis' approval, on an invasion of Pennsylvania, the particular object being to relieve Virginia of the presence of a hostile army. Lee was constantly informed of the situation at the North and, realizing the weariness of the Northern people at the duration of the contest and the growing strength of the Democrats due to the Confederate successes at Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, he wrote to Davis that no honorable means of dividing and weakening the Northerners should be neglected. The Confederate government should give "all the encouragement we can consistently with the view to the rising peace party of the North. Nor do I think we should, in this connection, make nice distinctions between those who declare for peace unconditionally and those who advocate it as a means of restoring the Union, however much we may prefer the former."† Nevertheless, Lee trusted more to the moral effect of a great victory than he did to internal quarrels among the enemy.

Accordingly on June 3 he began his campaign for the invasion of Pennsylvania by sending Longstreet and Ewell to Culpeper Court House where

the cavalry under Stuart was also concentrated. A. P. Hill remained at Fredericksburg to watch and detain Hooker. Hooker's army at this time was composed of seven corps, the 1st commanded by Reynolds, the 2d by Hancock, the 3d by Sickles, the 5th by Meade, the 6th by Sedgwick, the 11th by Howard and the 12th by Slocum, aggregating 82,000 infantry and artillery present and fit for duty, with 410 guns, to which were added Pleasonton's cavalry force of about 12,000 men. With this force Hooker believed that he should attack the rear of the enemy. Before Lee had actually begun his movement Hooker had suspected Lee's project, and to ascertain definitely if any actual movement were in progress, bridged the river in his front and on June 6 threw the 6th corps over it at Franklin's Crossing. From Falmouth Heights he saw that this movement created considerable excitement in the Confederate camp and that the enemy gathered from all quarters in great force in front of Sedgwick; hence he concluded that no movement was under way at that moment. Nevertheless at this very time Lee's troops were on the march.

Although Hooker was not aware of the large force of Confederate infantry which had already arrived at Culpeper Court House, he ordered Pleasonton who was at Catlett's Station to cross the Rappahannock at Beverly and Kelly's Fords, attack Stuart and ascertain Lee's intentions.

* *Official Records*, vol. xxvii., pt. iii., p. 868.

† *Ibid.*, vol. xxvii., pt. iii., p. 881.

Pleasanton had the cavalry divisions of John Buford and David M. Gregg, and Hooker sent him two picked provisional infantry brigades of 3,000 men under Generals Adelbert Ames and David A. Russell, making an effective force of 10,900 men, to oppose which Stuart had five brigades of 10,200 men. At daylight on June 9, 1863, Buford, with his cavalry and one brigade of infantry, crossed at Beverly Ford and encountered one of Stuart's brigades under command of General Sam Jones. A severe contest ensued in which the 8th New York cavalry under Colonel B. F. Davis was routed and its commander killed. The 8th Illinois cavalry then charged and drove Jones back two miles where he joined Stuart and the two brigades of Wade Hampton and W. H. F. Lee. Meanwhile, with his cavalry division and an infantry brigade, Gregg crossed at Kelly's Ford and, pushing back B. H. Robertson's brigade, approached Fleetwood Hill (a few hundred yards north of Brandy Station) from the east, while Buford was moving on Brandy Station from the northwest. A hard hand-to-hand struggle took place at both points with varying success. Buford maintained his position near Brandy Station, but at Fleetwood Hill Gregg was compelled to withdraw with a loss of three guns. Satisfied that a great part of Lee's army was at Culpeper preparing to move on Washington, Pleasanton recrossed the Rappahannock with about 100 prisoners. The Union loss in this

engagement was 484 killed and wounded, and 382 missing. The Confederate loss was 301 killed and wounded, and 184 missing.*

At the beginning of his preparations for the Northern campaign Lee turned his attention to the clearing of the Shenandoah Valley, which offered a safe line of operations and was held by Union troops not sufficient in numbers to present a serious obstacle. At this time Winchester was held by General R. H. Milroy with the two brigades of General W. L. Elliott and Colonel Ely, numbering about 7,000 men, with a brigade of 1,800 men under Colonel A. T. McReynolds in observation at Berryville. General B. F. Kelley with 10,000 men was at Harper's Ferry and a detachment of 1,200 men and a battery under Colonel B. F. Smith were at Martinsburg. There were outposts at Romney and also toward Strasburg and Front Royal, watching the Confederate cavalry and infantry under General Albert G. Jenkins in the upper valley. On June 7 Lee began his operations by ordering General John D. Imboden, then near Monterey, to make a demonstration with his cavalry brigade at Romney by way of the south branch of the Potomac in order to cover the movement against Winchester and prevent the Union troops at that place from being reinforced by Kelley's

* *Official Records*, vol. xxvii.; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. iii., pp. 148, 172, 261-263; Doubleday, *Chancellorsville and Gettysburg*, pp. 81-84; *Confederate Military History*, vol. iv., p. 168 et seq.

troops on the line of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. At the same time Jenkins with his brigade of cavalry was ordered to march down the valley and concentrate at Strasburg or Front Royal to coöperate with Ewell's infantry corps. Both Imboden and Jenkins were in position by the 10th, on which day Ewell's corps set out from Brandy Station for Winchester by way of Gaines' Cross Roads, Chester Gap and Front Royal. On the evening of the 12th Ewell arrived at Cedarville and on the next day detached Jenkins' cavalry brigade and Rodes' infantry division to move on Berryville and capture McReynolds' brigade. The latter, however, having been warned by Milroy, had made good his retirement by a roundabout way to Winchester where he joined Milroy on the night of the 13th. Avoiding Winchester, Rodes and Jenkins pushed on to Martinsburg, and on the 14th drove Smith and his battery from the place, capturing five guns of the battery that was retiring on the Williamsport road. Smith and his infantry escaped by crossing the Potomac at Shepherds-town Ford and moving to Maryland Heights. Meanwhile Ewell marched direct on Winchester, Early's division advancing by Newton and the valley pike, while Edward Johnson's division moved against the town by the direct road from Front Royal. After driving in Milroy's outposts, the two divisions were in position before Winchester on the evening of the 13th.


The main works at Winchester

were on a ridge north of the town and consisted of two forts known as the "Main" fort and the "Star" fort, mounting 4 20-pound Parrotts and 2 24-pound howitzers. Surrounding these were smaller works connected by rifle-pits. On reaching Winchester McReynolds had been assigned to the "Star" fort, immediately north of the main works. For some days Milroy had felt the pressure from Confederate cavalry and had no idea of Lee's strength until a prisoner captured on the evening of the 13th informed him that he was confronted by Ewell's corps and that Longstreet was near. Realizing that an ordinary retreat was impracticable, he resolved to defend himself and, if not relieved, to force his way through the weakest part of the enemy's lines.

On the night of the 13th Early was ordered by Ewell to attack the works on the north and west of the town the next morning, while Johnson was to make a diversion by demonstrating against the east and southeast. Johnson made his attack between the Millwood and Berryville roads held by Colonel Ely's brigade but was repulsed by the 8th and 87th Pennsylvania regiments. After some sharp fighting Johnson gained part of the town but the Union artillery shelled him out of it and he made no further effort to hold it. West of the ridge on which the main forts were thrown up, and about 1,300 yards distant, was another parallel ridge called Flint Ridge, where an isolated earthwork

had been constructed to command the Pughtown and Romney roads. This was held by the 110th Ohio, a company of the 116th and a battery under Lieutenant Wallace F. Randolph, the whole force being under command of

ing Round Mountain, south of the Pughtown road and putting 20 guns in position without being perceived, opened an unexpected fire on Keifer's work and soon silenced Randolph's battery; whereupon Hays' brigade



Colonel J. W. Keifer. Leaving Gordon's brigade south of the town to engage Milroy's attention, Early moved with the remainder of his division to the left and west, then north, crossed the Romney road and about 5 o'clock in the afternoon after gain-

made a quick dash and after a stubborn conflict carried the work and captured 6 guns. Having lost 40 men Kiefer retired under cover of the fire from the guns of the main works. Then followed an artillery duel which was maintained until 8 P. M., during

which Milroy withdrew his detachment into the main works. Night ended the contest.

Milroy was now in a critical position, his ammunition being nearly exhausted and his men having but one day's rations. At 9 o'clock on the night of the 14th, at a conference of the brigade commanders, it was decided to abandon all the artillery and wagons and to force a way through the Confederate lines that night. Accordingly, spiking all the guns, throwing the ammunition into the cisterns, and abandoning his sick and wounded, Milroy at 1 o'clock on the morning of the 15th, avoiding the town, moved silently through a ravine about a mile and struck the Martinsburg Pike following it quite cautiously for about three miles. At 3:30 A. M. Elliott's brigade, which was in advance, came upon the Confederate skirmishers and ascertained that Johnson, with the main body of the Confederates, was east of and near the road, the Confederates having anticipated and intercepted the retreat. When Elliott ascertained the situation he sent forward his three leading regiments to push back the Confederates and clear the way for the rest of the column to pass on toward Martinsburg. Johnson's right was forced back and his artillery silenced, but the left of his line repulsed all the Union attacks. The main road being blocked Milroy determined to try another and directed the troops to fall back a short distance and turn to the right.

Part of them did so but the greater number turned to the left and took the road to Bath. Late in the afternoon a part of the command accompanied by Milroy reached Harper's Ferry by way of Smithfield, while those who took the Bath road (2,700 in all) crossed the Potomac at Hancock and rallied at Bloody Run. The greater part of Ely's and McReynolds' brigades was captured. Johnson claims to have taken 2,300 men, 175 horses and 11 colors, while by the capture of Winchester and the defeat of Milroy the Confederates secured 28 guns, 300 loaded wagons, many horses and about 4,000 prisoners. Altogether the Union loss was 95 killed, 348 wounded and 4,000 captured or missing, while the Confederates lost only 47 killed, 219 wounded and 3 missing.*

After the seizure of Winchester and Martinsburg, Rodes' division on the 15th crossed the Potomac at Williamsport, and Jenkins' cavalry brigade was sent in advance to Chambersburg. On the 19th Hagerstown was occupied. Johnson's division crossed the Potomac and marched to Sharpsburg and Early's division moved to Shepherdstown to threaten Harper's Ferry, the garrison of which was withdrawn on the 17th to Maryland Heights. Thus the valley was cleared of Union troops. In these positions Ewell waited until the 21st for the other two corps to close up, when he

* *Official Records*, vol. xxvii.; Doubleday, *Chancellorsville and Gettysburg*, pp. 88-94; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. iii pp. 263-265.

marched to Chambersburg. Longstreet moved from Culpeper on the 15th and advancing along the east side of the Blue Ridge occupied Ashby's and Snicker's Gaps.

On June 16 Stuart, with three brigades of his cavalry division, went north from the Rappahannock to screen the movement of the Confederate army toward the Potomac. Stuart's orders were to keep along the eastern base of the Blue Ridge, occupy the passes of Bull Run Mountain, and cover the front of Longstreet's corps. On the 17th Fitzhugh Lee's brigade, under Colonel T. T. Munford, was sent from Piedmont, by way of Middleburg, to Aldie, to hold the gap in the mountain as a screen to Longstreet's movements, while W. H. F. Lee's brigade reconnoitered toward Thoroughfare Gap. General Pleasonton was near Manassas Junction and scouting in the direction of Bull Run Mountain, and at 2:30 P. M. of the 17th Kilpatrick's brigade of cavalry ran into Munford's pickets, driving them back to Aldie, where, west of the village, he found Munford strongly posted on a hill covering the road to Snicker's Gap. A severe engagement ensued, lasting until dark, when Munford withdrew toward Middleburg under orders from Stuart who had been attacked. The Union loss was 50 killed, 131 wounded, and 124 missing. Munford's loss was 119 killed, wounded, and missing.

While Kilpatrick was engaged at Aldie Colonel A. N. Duffié, with the

1st Rhode Island cavalry, 300 strong, having passed through Hopewell Gap, reached Middleburg about 4 P. M., drove in Stuart's pickets and occupied the town, Stuart narrowly escaping to Rector's Cross Roads, and sending orders to Munford to withdraw from Aldie, the other two brigades to move upon Middleburg, and all to concentrate against Duffié. Robertson's brigade arrived at 7 P. M. and attacked Duffié, who was finally driven from town with severe loss and compelled to retreat by the road upon which he had come until he had crossed Little River, where he halted, and where during the night he was entirely surrounded by W. H. F. Lee's brigade. Duffié endeavored to cut his way out, but was met by heavy fire and a great part of his command captured, Duffié escaping with a few men and making his way back to Hopewell Gap and Centreville. His total loss, killed, wounded, and prisoners, was over 200.

On the 18th Stuart took position outside of Middleburg with Robertson's brigade. Munford was on the left at Union, and Jones' brigade was ordered up as a reserve. Pleasonton moved forward with all his available force, and occupied Middleburg and Philmont on the road to Snicker's Gap. On the 19th Gregg, with two brigades of his own division and one of Buford's, advanced and steadily drove Stuart in the direction of Upperville, losing 99 in killed, wounded, and missing. During the day Hooker

advanced and occupied Aldie Gap with infantry. On the 20th Stuart concentrated his five brigades about three miles west of Middleburg, Pleasonton remaining at Middleburg. On the morning of the 21st, however, he moved out of Middleburg, Buford's division by the road through Union to turn Stuart's left, Gregg's division, supported by Vincent's infantry brigade, going on the main road to Upperville. Buford encountered W. H. F. Lee's and Jones' brigades and drove them back, and Gregg met Hampton's and Robertson's brigades, driving them steadily to Goose Creek, where they remained several hours, when they again fell back to effect a junction at Upperville with Jones and W. H. F. Lee, who were retreating before Buford. As Pleasonton neared Upperville the fight increased in severity, and Stuart was driven through the town to Ashby's Gap. The Union loss during the day was 12 killed, 130 wounded, and 67 missing. On the 22d Pleasonton fell back to Middleburg and Aldie. The Union loss June 17-21 was 883 killed, wounded, and missing; the Confederate loss was 65 killed, 279 wounded, and 166 missing, an aggregate of 510.*

On the 24th Longstreet moved by way of Berryville, crossed the Potomac at Williamsport on the 25th and 26th and marched to Hagerstown, thence on the 27th to Chambersburg.

* *Official Records*, vol. xxvii.; Doubleday, *Chancellorsville and Gettysburg*, pp. 99-104; McClellan, *Life of Stuart*.

A. P. Hill remained at Fredericksburg until the 14th when, Hooker having fallen back, he moved down the Shenandoah Valley, crossed the Potomac at Shepherdstown and joined Longstreet at Chambersburg. Stuart was left to guard the passes of the Blue Ridge and to watch Hooker, being instructed to harass the latter as much as possible if an attempt were made to cross the Potomac. At the formal surrender of Chambersburg Early laid it under contribution, receiving 1,000 hats, 1,200 pairs of shoes, 1,000 socks, nearly \$30,000 in money and three days' rations of all kinds.*

By the middle of June Lee's movements warned the North of the approaching invasion.† Ewell's march spread the wildest terror and consternation among the rural population on his route. As early as June 15 President Lincoln, foreseeing the invasion, had called upon the States of Pennsylvania, Ohio, Maryland and West Virginia to furnish 100,000 militia for the service of the United States to serve for six months. The Secretary of War asked also for aid from the governors of 13 of the other States. The response was prompt, especially

* Rhodes, *United States*, vol. iv., p. 272.

† "So hopeful were the leaders of the rebellion in the success of this their project that they did not deem it necessary to keep their intentions a secret. Many weeks before their attempted invasion their newspapers freely referred to it as an event that would surely happen, and boasted loudly of the manner in which they would fatten on the spoils they would take from the rich farmers and well filled storehouses of the North." Jacobs, *Notes on the Rebel Invasion*, p. 6.

after word was received that Lee's troops were on Pennsylvania soil. The country was wild with rumors. Men, women and children fled before the enemy, and the bridge over the Susquehanna, the communication of the Cumberland Valley with Harrisburg, was thronged with wagons laden with household goods and furniture. On June 26 Governor Curtin, of Pennsylvania, issued a proclamation calling for 60,000 men to defend the State.* Harrisburg was supposed to be in great danger and a large body of troops was stationed there by General Couch for the defence of the city. Finally the people became so panic-stricken that strong pressure was brought to bear on the President to place McClellan again in command of the Army of the Potomac or at all events of the militia for the defence of Pennsylvania.† While awaiting Lincoln's action, however, word came that there had been a change in commanders of the Army of the Potomac.

Starting from the Rappahannock on the 13th Hooker moved cautiously back toward the Potomac to cover Washington. On the 25th, 26th and 27th he crossed this river at Edward's Ferry near Leesburg and on the 28th grouped his army about Frederick with Slocum's corps on the left near Harper's Ferry. He desired to send Slocum's corps and the 10,000 men comprising the garri-

son at Maryland Heights, which commanded Harper's Ferry, against Lee's rear to cut his line of communications. He saw no reason why Maryland Heights should be held,* but Halleck did not approve its abandonment "except in case of absolute necessity."† Hooker contended that he was unable with the means at his disposal to cover Harper's Ferry and Washington and at the same time to fight an enemy in his front superior to himself; hence he must request to be relieved of his command. Halleck referred this matter to the President who immediately sent an order relieving Hooker and appointing George Gordon Meade, commander of the 5th corps, in his place. This appointment was satisfactory to the officers of the army and they gave Meade hearty support. At the same time Halleck granted Meade's request to utilize the garrison at Maryland Heights and Meade ordered the abandonment of the place and the transfer of the garrison to Fredericksburg and Washington.

Meade's resolution was prompt. On the morning of the 29th, under the impression that all of Lee's army was along the Susquehanna, Meade marched by three divergent roads in that direction and on the night of the 30th his forces were distributed as follows: Buford with two brigades of cavalry was in advance of Gettysburg; Reynolds' 1st corps was on

* *Official Records*, vol. xxvii., pt. iii., p. 347.

† See Rhodes, *United States*, vol. iv., pp. 277-278.

* *Official Records*, vol. xxvii., pt. i., p. 58.

† *Ibid*, p. 59.

Marsh Creek, 5 miles southwest of Gettysburg; Sickles' 3d corps was at Taneytown, 13 miles south of Gettysburg; and Howard's 11th corps was at Emmitsburg. These three corps, constituting the left wing of the army, were under command of General Reynolds. Hancock's 2d corps was at Uniontown; Sykes' corps was at Union Mills; Sedgwick's 6th corps was at Manchester, and Slocum's 12th corps at Littlestown. Gregg's cavalry division was at Westminster, and Kilpatrick's division, after a fight with Stuart's cavalry at Hanover, bivouaced near that place.

The first mistake in Lee's campaign arose from the absence of Stuart's cavalry. Unable to get information of Hooker's movements and to retain him on the east side of the mountains after he had entered Maryland, Lee had instructed Ewell on the 24th to send a division across the South Mountain to threaten Baltimore. Early's division which was detailed for the purpose went as far east as York, the other two divisions of the corps marching from Chambersburg to Carlisle. The cavalry of Jenkins and White were in advance at Wrightsville and above, on the Susquehanna, threatening to cross and take Harrisburg. Lee now made preparations to advance upon Harrisburg, but on the night of June 28 a scout brought him word that the Union army had crossed the Potomac and was moving northward, its head of column already being at South Moun-

tain. Not daring to allow the interception of his communications with Virginia, Lee resolved to prevent the progress of the Union army by concentrating his own on the east side of the mountains. Accordingly he ordered Ewell back from his projected attack upon Harrisburg and directed him and Longstreet and Hill to march to Gettysburg on the south side of the South Mountain range. On the night of the 30th Rodes' division of Ewell's corps was at Heidlersburg, eight miles northeast of Gettysburg and near him were Early's and Johnson's divisions. Longstreet was still at Chambersburg and Hill was at Fayetteville and Cashtown, eight miles from Gettysburg.

When Buford arrived at Gettysburg with his cavalry he had passed through the town and pushed out reconnaissances west and north to ascertain the movements of Lee's army. Throwing out pickets along the Chambersburg road he went into camp just beyond the western limits of the town. At 5 o'clock on the morning of July 1 Heth's division, the advance of Hill's corps, moved from Cashtown and at about 9 o'clock came in sight of Buford's skirmishers, whereupon Buford fired his first gun as a signal for his skirmishers to open fire and the battle of Gettysburg began. Heth slowly drove Buford back, but Reynolds came up with Wadsworth's division and a desperate encounter ensued. Reynolds did not live to see the outcome of the battle, for before noon he received a bullet in his brain

and died instantly. After Reynold's death matters went badly with the Union troops who continued the contest under the command of Doubleday. Two other divisions of the corps came up at 11 o'clock, followed at 12:45 by Howard's corps, one division of which was placed in reserve at Cemetery Hill while the other two formed on Doubleday's right along Seminary Ridge. Meanwhile Hill had arrived with the remainder of his corps and at 2:30 Ewell arrived with Early's and Rodes' and immediately formed on Hill's left. Hill then assaulted Doubleday from the west while Ewell moved against Howard from the north. Both these attacks were repulsed, but finally after desperate fighting and great losses on both sides Early struck Howard in flank, causing him to give way and the entire Union line was driven back through the town to Cemetery Hill which Howard had chosen as a rallying point for the 2d corps and upon which he had placed one of his own divisions. Probably the chief reason for the defeat, at least an important one, was that there was no directing mind.* All was confusion, and disaster seemed to be the portion of the Union troops when Hancock arrived on the field.

When Meade heard that Lee's advance had reached Gettysburg and that Reynolds had been killed he was at Taneytown, 14 miles away, preparing to take up a defensive line along


Pipe Creek. He immediately ordered Hancock to ride forward and take supreme command. Hancock arrived at Gettysburg as the Union troops were retreating through the town. Noting the advantages of Cemetery Hill as a place for a defensive battle he determined to hold it and so notified Meade, sending one of Doubleday's small brigades to hold Culp's Hill on the right and making an ostentatious display of Buford's cavalry on the extreme left. This show of force together with the enormous loss of the Confederates (over 7,000) caused Lee to defer operations. At dark two divisions of Sickles's corps came up and about the same time Slocum's corps arrived on the field, whereupon, being the ranking officer, Slocum assumed command while Hancock rode back to report to Meade that Gettysburg was the proper place to fight a battle. The corps of Hill and Ewell on the Confederate side were all up by night and Longstreet had bivouaced four miles in the rear of Hill.

Lee's greatest mistake was in not taking Cemetery Hill. Probably if the Confederates had been prompt they might have carried the height, and Lee sent a suggestion to Ewell to assault the hill if he thought such a movement was practicable, but warning him against bringing on a general engagement until the arrival of the rest of his force. Ewell awaited the arrival of General Edward Johnson so that all the latter part of the after-

* See Buford's dispatch in *Official Records*, vol. xxvii., pt. i., p. 925.

noon was left to Howard and Hancock and after them to Slocum to prepare for the coming conflict unmolested.* General Meade arrived on the battlefield at 1 o'clock on the

corps were up by noon, the latter having 34 miles to march from Manchester and not arriving until the middle of the afternoon. The position on which Meade disposed his army was



morning of July 2 tired looking, hollow-eyed, and worn out from want of sleep.† All the troops except the 6th

* *Official Records*, vol. xxvii., pt. ii., p. 318. See also Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. vii., pp. 238-246.

† Doubleday, *Chancellorsville and Gettysburg*, p. 156; Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. vii., p. 246.

in the shape of a fish hook. As finally posted, the 12th corps under Slocum had the extreme right on Culp's Hill facing east; Wadsworth's division was on its left looking north; and to Wadsworth's left was Howard with the 11th corps on Cemetery Hill, its right facing northeast but its centre

and left northwest, with Robinson's division of the 1st corps on its left. Doubleday's division was in reserve. The 2d corps under Hancock was on Robinson's left facing west, while the 3d corps, under Sickles, was on Hancock's left with the 5th, later in the day, on the extreme left. The 6th corps under Sedgwick was in the rear of Round Top, on the left, as a reserve. Dissatisfied with the position of the 3d corps, Sickles moved to the front about three-quarters of a mile, but he would have been recalled by Meade had there been time. About a mile distant from the Union lines Lee's army swept in a wide curve from Benner's Hill on the east of Gettysburg to the high ground in front of Round Top. The main part of the army was on Seminary Ridge, Longstreet on the right and Hill on the left. Ewell's corps on the extreme left held the town and was at right angles to Hill and Longstreet. Pickett's division of Longstreet's corps had not yet come up.

Some skirmishing occurred in the morning but the main battle took place in the afternoon. At 4 o'clock Longstreet attacked Sickles with great fury and, although reinforced by Caldwell's division of the 2d corps and Barnes' and Ayres' divisions of the 5th, after great fighting and heavy losses the 3d corps and its supports were driven back beyond the main line. Longstreet followed but was checked by a charge of Crawford's division of the 5th corps and the firm

and solid appearance of the 6th corps. On Longstreet's right Hood's division attempted to seize Round Top, but Vincent's and Weed's brigades of the 5th corps repulsed the attack in which both Vincent and Weed were killed and Hood was wounded. During the latter part of Longstreet's engagement with Sickles, two of Hill's brigades assailed Hancock's line and broke it, but were soon driven back. At about the same time Hays' and Hoke's brigades of Early's division attacked Howard on Cemetery Hill but the latter, with the aid of two regiments and Carroll's brigade of Hancock's corps, drove the Confederates back. On the extreme left, Wadsworth's division of the 1st corps and Green's small brigade of the 12th corps stationed at Culp's Hill were assaulted by Johnson's division of Ewell's corps. Though continuing the fight until late at night, Johnson's right was repulsed. Meanwhile his left, unopposed, had entered the strong works thrown up by the 12th corps and was perilously near the almost unguarded reserve artillery and ammunition train of the Army of the Potomac. During the night the 12th corps returned to its former position, but, finding it occupied, waited until daylight before attempting to retake it. Meanwhile Johnson was reinforced by three brigades so as to enable him to hold his ground. The result of the second day's fighting was told by Lee: "We attempted to dislodge the enemy and although we gained

some ground we were unable to get possession of his position.”* The assaults of the Confederates had been disjointed, which undoubtedly accounts for their poor success. According to Meade: “The enemy * * * after one of the severest contests of the war was repulsed at all points. We have suffered considerably in killed and wounded.”†

The feeling in the Union camp was one of gloom. The 1st and 11th corps had been nearly annihilated on the first day and on the second day the 5th and part of the 2d had been shattered, while the 3d was “not in good condition to fight.”‡ Moreover, 20,000 men had been lost. Nevertheless, on the night of the 2d, at a council of war, the generals decided to fight it out where they were. Meade had no intention of taking the offensive and contented himself with improving the natural defences of his position by means of earthworks. The previous successes of the Confederates determined Lee to continue the battle on the 3d. The battle began early in the morning by a struggle of the 12th to regain their works. At 4 A. M. the corps artillery of five batteries opened fire on Johnson at a range of 600 to 800 yards. In the midst of this furious fire Johnson attacked the left of the 12th corps and the right of Wadsworth’s division. The combat ex-


tended to the right, was taken up by Williams’ division and continued for over six hours, at the end of which time Johnson was driven back. At 10:25 he made a determined assault on the right of Geary’s division, but as the latter had been reinforced by Shaler’s brigade, Johnson was again repulsed and driven beyond Rock Creek with a loss of nearly 2,000 men. At 11 o’clock the battle ceased on the Union right leaving the line of the 12th corps fully reestablished.

Meanwhile Lee was preparing for an attack upon the left centre of Meade’s army. Pickett’s division had now arrived and Longstreet was directed to form a column of assault composed of Pickett’s division, Pettigrew’s division, and two brigades of Pender’s division under Trimble of Hill’s corps, in all about 14,000 men. To prevent Meade from reinforcing the threatened point Stuart’s cavalry was ordered to go around Meade’s right and attack his rear. On Seminary Ridge were 135 guns which at 1 o’clock in the afternoon opened fire to crush out all opposition at the threatened point. The 85 Union guns responded and for two hours a most terrific and appalling cannonade continued, though it did little damage. The Union soldiers lay under the protection of stone walls and earthworks and the Confederate projectiles passed over their heads. All the Union soldiers believed that this cannonade was merely preliminary to an infantry charge and they braced them-

* *Official Records*, vol. xxvii., pt. ii., p. 298.

† *Ibid.*, vol. xxvii., pt. i., p. 72.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 74; Doubleday, *Chancellorsville and Gettysburg*, p. 185; Walker, *Life of Hancock*, p. 130.



Upper photo taken from the *Photographic History of the Civil War*. Copyright by the Patriot Publishing Company. Lower photo from the original Brady negative.

1. ONE OF THE CONFEDERATE SHARPSHOOTERS POSTED IN THE "DEVIL'S DEN" AT GETTYSBURG.
2. DEAD ON THE BATTLEFIELD OF GETTYSBURG, GATHERED FOR BURIAL FROM THE WHEATFIELD.

selves for the attack. Finding his ammunition running low General Hunt, chief of the Union artillery, ordered his guns to cease firing. The Confederates thought that they had silenced the Union batteries and accordingly prepared for the charge.

Longstreet had no sympathy with Lee's plan of battle and argued that the assault could not succeed. Nevertheless Lee persisted, whereupon Longstreet took Pickett to the crest of Seminary Ridge and indicated the work to be performed. E. P. Alexander of the artillery was directed to note the effect of his fire and when a favorable moment came was to give Pickett the order to charge. When the fire of the Union guns ceased, therefore, and as he could observe no sign of life through his glasses during the next five minutes, Longstreet allowed Pickett to make the charge, although he said: "I don't want to make this attack. I would stop it now but that General Lee ordered it and expects it to go on. I don't see how it can succeed."* As he spoke the great column of attack moved forward over the crest of Seminary Ridge and down the slope. Pickett's division was on the right and Pettigrew's on the left, the former being supported by the brigades of Wilcox and Perry and the latter by the two brigades of Trimble. The Confederates had 1,400 yards of open ground to traverse before they reached the Union lines. As soon as the Confed-

erate column started the Union artillery opened fire with shot and shell and tore great gaps in the line. Steadily and coolly they advanced and after they had started the Confederate artillery reopened over their heads in an effort to draw the deadly fire directed at them; but nothing could disconcert the Union guns, which continued to mow down Pickett's men. Half way across there was the shelter of a ravine. There the Confederates stopped for a moment to breathe but again began the advance. As they approached nearer the Union line a terrific storm of canister did its deadly work. The slaughter was terrible. The left was staggered, but Pickett with what remained of his division pressed on, closely followed by the other division. As the Confederates approached the Union line held by Gibbon's and Hays' divisions of Hancock's corps, a flame of musketry burst forth before which nothing could stand. Pickett halted at musket range and delivered a volley, but his men began to retreat. In the last assault Armistead commanding one of Pickett's brigades pressed forward, broke the Union line, and with less than 100 men crossed the Union works, seized a cannon and planted the Confederate battle flag on Seminary Ridge. A hand-to-hand encounter ensued and the Confederates held their position only for a moment. Armistead was killed and his small party was killed or captured. Garnett and Kemper, Pickett's other brigadiers,

* *Battles and Leaders*, vol. iii., p. 365.

fell, and, surrounded by swarms of Union troops on all sides, his command enveloped and broken up, and having lost 5,000 men, Pickett gave the word to retreat. Wilcox's and Perry's brigades which should have supported Pickett's right were not prompt in starting, became separated from it, and, attacking the right of the 1st corps, were driven back, losing many prisoners. In their charge the Confederates had struck the 2d corps under Hancock, who had shown the same reckless courage as Armistead. He was struck by a ball and fell from his horse, but raising himself on his elbow ordered a flank attack, and not until the battle was over did he resign himself to the surgeon. Shortly afterward he sent the following dispatch to Meade:

"I have never seen a more formidable attack and if the 6th and 5th corps have pressed up the enemy will be destroyed. The enemy must be short of ammunition as I was shot with a 10-penny nail. I did not leave the field until the victory was entirely secured and the enemy no longer in sight. I am badly wounded, though I trust not seriously. I had to break the line to attack the enemy in flank on my right where the enemy was most persistent after the front attack was repelled. Not a rebel was in sight upright when I left." *

Meanwhile on the Union right Gregg's cavalry division, aided by Custer's brigade, defeated Stuart after a severe fight and thwarted his attempt on Meade's right and rear. On the left Kilpatrick with two cavalry brigades recklessly charged the Confederate infantry in dense woods and

behind stone fences west of Round Top, in which assault General Farnsworth, commanding one of the brigades, was killed.

Longstreet expected a counter attack and made ready for it. Entirely alone Lee rode up to encourage and rally his broken and defeated troops. His face showed not the slightest sign of disappointment, care or annoyance, even though he had suffered a disastrous defeat. It is clear that Longstreet did not give his commander the hearty coöperation demanded, but on the other hand Lee should not have attempted to attack the strongly intrenched Union troops with only 14,000 men. Undoubtedly one commander has as much of the stigma for the defeat to bear as the other, and General Lee is quoted as saying: "All this has been my fault. It is I that have lost this fight and you must help me out of it in the best way you can." *

At Gettysburg July 4 passed in joyful but saddened tranquility, but the exuberance of the North knew no bounds for on that day Lincoln announced to the country not only the prospect of Lee's total defeat but also

* *Official Records*, vol. xxvii., pt. i., p. 366.

* Rhodes, *United States*, vol. iv., p. 291. Rhodes compares the emotions of Napoleon and Lee after disaster as follows: Lee wrote to Pickett on July 9, "No one grieves more than I do at the loss suffered by your noble division in the recent conflict, or honor it more for its bravery and gallantry." (*Official Records*, vol. xxvii., pt. iii., p. 987.) Napoleon after his disastrous Russian campaign was not surprised at the loss of 300,000 men and asked: "What are the lives of a million to a man like me?"

the surrender of Vicksburg to General Grant. On the morning of July 4 Lee withdrew from his advanced position, put his trains in motion for the rear, and, under cover of the night and a heavy rain, began his retreat.* Followed and harassed by the Union cavalry, Lee reached Williamsport on the 7th. At the same time Halleck telegraphed to Meade urging him to push forward and attack Lee before he could cross the Potomac,† although later he requested Meade to use his own judgment and said that he thought it best for him to postpone a general battle.‡ On reaching Williamsport Lee found the Potomac badly swollen. "A series of storms * * * has placed the river beyond fording stage, and the present storm will keep it so for at least a week. I shall therefore have to accept battle if the enemy offers it, whether I wish it or not. * * * I hope your Excellency will understand that I am not in the least discouraged or that my faith * * * in the fortitude of this army is at all shaken." He stated that the condition of the army was good and its confidence unimpaired.|| On July 12, after he had taken up his strong position on the Potomac, he wrote Davis: "But for the power the enemy possesses of accumulating troops I should be willing to await his attack excepting that in

our restricted limits the means of obtaining subsistence are becoming precarious. The river has now fallen to four feet, and a bridge, which is being constructed, I hope will be passable by tomorrow."** By July 11 Meade, following a circuitous route through Frederick, had come within striking distance of Lee. He had determined to make an attack on the 13th, but not wishing to tempt a disaster called a council of war. Five out of the seven corps commanders opposed the projected attack and accordingly Meade devoted July 13 to examining Lee's position, strength and defensive works. The next day he advanced to make an attack if the conditions justified it but ascertained that during the night Lee had recrossed the Potomac. Lee's rear guard under General Pettigrew, however, was attacked by Kilpatrick and during the fight Pettigrew was mortally wounded and many prisoners were taken. From first to last the Union forces on the field of Gettysburg numbered about 88,000 effective men, while the Confederates numbered only 73,000. As finally reported the Union loss was 3,072 killed, 14,497 wounded and 5,434 missing, an aggregate of 23,003. The Confederate loss was 2,592 killed, 12,709 wounded and 5,150 missing, an aggregate of 20,451.†

* *Ibid.*, p. 301.

† On the battle of Gettysburg see Longstreet, *From Manassas to Appomattox*; Doubleday, *Chancellorsville and Gettysburg* and *Gettysburg Made Plain* (1888); Walker, *History of the Second Army Corps*; Bates, *The Battle of Gettysburg*; Swinton, *Army of the Potomac*, and

* *Official Records*, vol. xxvii., pt. i., p. 79.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 83-85.

‡ *Ibid.*, pp. 88-89.

|| *Ibid.*, vol. xxvii., pt. ii., p. 299.

After Gettysburg Lee recrossed the Potomac and marched to Winchester and Bunker Hill. When Meade crossed the Potomac south of Harper's Ferry Longstreet's corps moved

Decisive Battles; Powell, *History of the 5th Army Corps; Battles and Leaders*, vol. iii., pp. 244-440; Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. vii., chap. ix.; Comte de Paris, *Battle of Gettysburg*; Davis, *Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government*, vol. ii.; George G. Meade, *Did General Meade Desire to Retreat at the Battle of Gettysburg?* (1883); John S. Mosby, *Mosby's War Reminiscences and Stuart's Cavalry Campaigns* (1887), and *Stuart's Cavalry in the Gettysburg Campaign* (1908); Samuel Toombs, *New Jersey Troops in the Gettysburg Campaign* (1888); S. C. Pickett, *Pickett and His Men* (1899); Helen D. Longstreet, *Lee and Longstreet at High Tide; Gettysburg in the Light of the Official Records* (1904); John W. De Peyster, *The Decisive Conflicts of the Civil War*; Cecil Battine, *The Crisis of the Confederacy. A History of Gettysburg and the Wilderness* (1905); R. K. Beecham, *Gettysburg the Pivotal Battle of the Civil War* (1911); *The Battle of Gettysburg*, by "Niles" (1912); J. W. De Peyster, *A. A. Humphreys* (1884); A. R. Hancock, *Reminiscences of W. S. Hancock* (1887); F. E. Goodrich, *Life of W. S. Hancock* (1886); F. A. Walker, *Life of General Hancock* (1894); Bache, *Life of Meade* (1897); I. R. Pennypacker, *Life of Meade* (1901); B. R. Meade, *Life of Meade*; H. H. Humphreys, *Critical Examination of Pennypacker's Life of Meade* (1901); H. B. McClellan, *Life and Campaigns of Major-General J. E. B. Stuart* (1885); Theodore S. Garnett, *J. E. B. Stuart* (1908); Daniel Butterfield, *Life of Joseph Hooker* (1896); Walter H. Taylor, *Lee and His Campaigns* (1906); John R. Deering, *Lee and His Cause* (1907); F. T. Hill, *On the Trail of Grant and Lee* (1911); W. H. Taylor, *Four Years with General Lee*; Robert Stiles, *Four Years under Marse Robert* (1904); biographies and memoirs of Lee by J. W. Jones (1876), J. E. Cooke (1887), Fitzhugh Lee (1894), W. P. Trent (1899), P. A. Bruce, H. A. White (1897), Gamaliel Bradford (1902), R. E. Lee, Jr. (1904), and T. N. Page (1908); *Confederate Military History*, vol. iii., pp. 395-422; vol. iv., pp. 171-194; vol. v., pp. 257-276; vol. vi., pp. 223-235; vol. viii., pp. 199-202; vol. x., pt. i., pp. 254-264; vol. xi., pt. i., pp. 215-220, and pt. ii., pp. 150-156.

up the valley, crossed the Blue Ridge at Chester Gap and advanced to Culpeper Court House where he arrived on the 24th. A. P. Hill's corps followed by the same route and Ewell's, after pursuing Kelley's Union troops west to Martinsburg, found Chester Gap and Manassas Gap held by Meade. After crossing the Potomac at Harper's Ferry and Berlin on the 17th and 18th, General Meade moved up the Loudoun Valley along the eastern side of the Blue Ridge, and on the 21st Merritt's brigade of Buford's cavalry division, pushing well up into Manassas Gap, skirmished with the 17th Virginia infantry and took 20 prisoners from whom it was ascertained that Lee was moving up the valley with the evident intention of passing to the east of the Blue Ridge. Accordingly Meade sent the 2d, 3d and 5th corps to Manassas Gap, directing General French in command of the 3d corps then guarding Ashby's Gap to hasten to Buford's support. Before dark of the 22d French reached Piedmont, and Birney's division was pushed forward to Buford's aid, followed by the remainder of the corps, at daylight of the 23d entering the gap and relieving Merritt's cavalry, which then moved up to Chester Gap. Meanwhile, at dawn of the 23d, Hood's division of Longstreet's corps had marched from Front Royal and, taking the place of the 17th Virginia, was deployed in the Gap where it was relieved during the morning by Wright's brigade of about 600 men

of R. H. Anderson's division under orders to hold the Gap until Ewell came up from Winchester. Wright's brigade was deployed on the west end of the Gap, and Rodes' division with two batteries of artillery advancing to its support drew up about 600 yards in rear and sent 250 sharpshooters to take position on its left. These dispositions were completed about 2 P. M. Meanwhile Birney's division had advanced steadily from Wapping Heights beyond which was Wright's line. About 4 P. M. Spinola's Excelsior brigade and two regiments of Ward's charged past Wapping Heights, attacked Wright's men and

drove them back upon Rodes, who stood firm. About dark the artillery checked the Union advance. Rodes lost 15 killed and wounded, while Wright lost 19 killed, 83 wounded and 66 missing and French lost 21 killed and 84 wounded. During the night Ewell fell back to Front Royal and the next morning was followed by the Union army, but as all of Lee's troops had passed he marched swiftly through Chester and Thornston Gaps and took position on the south side of the Rappahannock.* Thus the lower valley was reoccupied by Union troops and remained in their possession at the opening of the campaign of 1864.

CHAPTER XXIX.

1863.

DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION AND THE ELECTIONS OF 1863.

Depression and disaffection in the North — Vallandigham's speech — Complaints at the suspension of the writ of *habeas corpus* — Congress authorizes the President to suspend the writ — The arrest, trial and banishment of Vallandigham — Lincoln's justification — The Democratic denunciation of Lincoln — Vallandigham's defeat for the Ohio governorship — Burnside's suppression of the *New York World* and the *Chicago Times* — The various attempts at peace-making — The elections of 1863 — The suspension of the writ of *habeas corpus*.

After the campaigns of Perryville and Stone River there was considerable dejection in the North and news of the failure of the expedition against Vicksburg had still further depressed public spirits. Everywhere were confusion and doubt. The nation seemed to be without a head and faith and confidence in the Government appears to have given way completely. Writing to Colfax, Joseph Medill says:

"The public discontent waxes greater daily. Failure of the army, weight of taxes, deprecia-

tion of money, want of cotton — which affects every family — increasing national debt, deaths in the army, no prospect of success, the continued closure of the Mississippi, exorbitant charges of transportation companies for carrying the farmers' products eastward — all combine to produce the existing state of despondency and desperation. By a common instinct everybody feels that the war is drawing toward a disastrous and disgraceful termination. Money cannot be supplied much longer to a beaten, demoralized, homesick army. Sometimes I think nothing is left now but 'to fight for a boundary.'"[†]

* *Official Records*, vol. xvii.; Humphreys, *From Gettysburg to the Rapidan*.

† Hollister, *Life of Colfax*, p. 203.

Sumner said that he did not despair, "but I fear that our army is everywhere in a bad way. I see no central inspiration or command; no concentration, no combination which promises a Jena."* To make matters worse there were strange and sadly ominous signs of disaffection at the North. Governor Morton, of Indiana, telegraphed Stanton on January 3, 1863: "I am advised that it is contemplated when the legislature meets in this State to pass a joint resolution acknowledging the Southern Confederacy, and urging the States of the Northwest to dissolve all constitutional relations with the New England States. The same thing is on foot in Illinois."† Even in Congress there was much intemperate denunciation of the Government. On January 14, 1863, Clement L. Vallandigham made a fiery speech boasting of his opposition to abolitionism or the political development of the anti-slavery sentiment of the North and West. Among other things he said:

"On the 14th of April I believed that coercion would bring on war, and war disunion. More than that, I believed, what you all in your hearts believe to-day, that the South could never be conquered—never. And not that only, but I was satisfied * * * that the secret but real purpose of the war was to abolish slavery in the States, * * * and with it * * * the change of our present democratical form of government into an imperial despotism. * * * I did not support the war; and to-day I bless God that not the smell of so much as one drop of its blood is

upon my garments. * * * Our Southern brethren were to be whipped back into love and fellowship at the point of the bayonet. Oh, monstrous delusion! * * * Sir, history will record that, after nearly six thousand years of folly and wickedness in every form and administration of government, theocratic, democratic, monarchic, oligarchic, despotic and mixed, it was reserved to American statesmanship, in the nineteenth century of the Christian era, to try the grand experiment, on a scale the most costly and gigantic in its proportions of creating love by force and developing fraternal affection by war; and history will record, too, on the same page the odious, disastrous, and most bloody failure of the experiment. * * * You have not conquered the South. You never will. * * * The war for the Union is, in your hands, a most bloody and costly failure. The President confessed it on the 22d of September. * * * War for the Union was abandoned; war for the negro openly begun, and with stronger battalions than before. With what success? Let the dead at Fredericksburg and Vicksburg answer. And now, Sir, can this war continue? Whence the money to carry it on? Where the men? Can you borrow? From whom? Can you tax more? Will the people bear it? * * * Will men enlist now at any price? Ah Sir, it is easier to die at home. I beg pardon; but I trust I am not 'discouraging enlistments.' If I am, then first arrest Lincoln, Stanton and Halleck, and some of your other generals; and I will retract; yes I will recant. But can you draft again? Ask New England, New York. Ask Massachusetts. * * * Ask not Ohio—the Northwest. She thought you were in earnest, and gave you all, all—more than you demanded. Sir, in blood she has atoned for her credulity and now there is mourning in every house and distress and sadness in every heart. Shall she give you any more? But ought this war to continue? I answer, no—not a day, not an hour. What then? Shall we separate? Again, I answer, no, no, no! What then? * * * Stop fighting. Make an armistice. * * * If to-day we secure peace and begin the work of disunion we shall yet escape; if not, I see nothing before us but universal, political and social revolution, anarchy and bloodshed, compared with which the reign of terror in France was a merciful visitation."*

* Pierce, *Life of Sumner*, vol. iv., p. 114.

† *Official Records*, vol. xx., pt. ii., p. 297. See also p. 294.

* *Congressional Globe*, Appendix, pp. 53, 54, 55, 59, 60.

Undoubtedly there was much cause for complaint. In assuming the right to suspend the writ of *habeas corpus* and applying the suspension to States outside the sphere of hostile operations, Lincoln went beyond the Constitution, though in his defence it was said that this was done under the pressure of necessity.* The number of arrests of political persons must be counted by thousands. These infractions of the Constitution greatly concerned the Republicans and were the subject of earnest debates.† Moved by the criticism not only among the Democrats but among the Republicans, Congress passed an act which became law March 3, authorizing the President during the war and whenever in his judgment the public safety required it to suspend the privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus* in any case throughout the United States or any part thereof. The Secretary of State and the Secretary of War were directed to furnish lists of political prisoners confined within their jurisdiction to the judges of the United States circuit and district courts. After they had taken the oath of allegiance to the National Government those prisoners not indicted by the grand jury at the regular session were to be discharged by the judge. If the lists

were not furnished within 20 days from the time of the arrest and if no indictment were found, relief was provided for any citizen who suffered from the arbitrary action of the authorities.

The most celebrated of arbitrary arrests during the war was that of Vallandigham. In January of 1863 Burnside had been relieved of the command of the Army of the Potomac, and late in March had been placed over the Department of the Ohio, having his headquarters at Cincinnati. Besides having to contend with the border ruffians and guerillas, Burnside came in contact with considerable disaffection and lukewarmness toward the Government. The "copperheads" of Ohio, Indiana and Illinois were exerting every effort to annoy and hinder the Government in its efforts to subdue the Confederates. Believing this opposition to amount to positive aid and comfort to the enemy Burnside on April 13 issued General Order No. 38, in which he said:

"The commanding general publishes for the information of all concerned that hereafter all persons found within our lines, who commit acts for the benefit of the enemies of our country, will be tried as spies or traitors, and, if convicted, will suffer death. * * * The habit of declaring sympathy for the enemy will not be allowed in this department. Persons committing such offences will be at once arrested with a view to being tried as above stated, or sent beyond our lines into the lines of their friends. It must be distinctly understood that treason expressed or implied will not be tolerated in this department; all officers and soldiers are strictly charged with the execution of this order."*

* For a very hostile view of Lincoln's act in this and other respects, see Harris, *The Political Conflict in America*, chaps. xiv.-xviii.

† Regarding these arbitrary arrests see Rhodes, *United States*, vol. iv., pp. 227-234; Harris, *The Political Conflict in America*, p. 276 et seq.

* *Official Records*, vol. xxiii., pt. ii., p. 237.

At this time Vallandigham was a candidate for the Democratic nomination for governor and was continually making speeches of an irritating nature. General Order 38 furnished him an excellent excuse for assailing the Government and at various Democratic meetings throughout the State he availed himself of this opportunity. On May 1 a Democratic mass meeting was to be held at Mount Vernon, Knox County, Ohio. Vallandigham was the chief speaker and aroused much enthusiasm. He said that the government intended to establish a despotism and there was no intention to effect a restoration of the Union; that the war was for the liberation of the blacks and the enslavement of the whites; that General Order 38 was "a base usurpation of arbitrary authority"; and that "the sooner the people inform the minions of usurped power that they will not submit to such restrictions upon their liberties the better." He referred to the President as "King Lincoln" and advised the people to rally at the ballot box to hurl the tyrant from his throne. Two of Burnside's captains in citizen's clothes attended the meeting to take notes. Though their report to Burnside was of little value as historical evidence, Burnside was convinced that Vallandigham had violated General Order 38. Accordingly on his own initiative he sent a detachment to Dayton to arrest Vallandigham. Early on the morning of May 5 the detachment broke into Vallandig-

ham's house, arrested him, and took him to Cincinnati where he was consigned to the military prison and kept in close confinement. On May 6 he was brought for trial before a military commission convened by General Burnside. Vallandigham made no individual objection to the court but denied its jurisdiction. He refused to plead but his protest was disregarded and the trial went on. The two witnesses for the prosecution gave their evidence and in Vallandigham's behalf S. S. Cox, one of the speakers at the Mount Vernon meeting, declared that while Vallandigham's speech was couched in strong language it was in no respect treasonable. There were no arguments, but Vallandigham entered a protest against the proceeding and on May 11 his attorney, George E. Pugh, applied to Judge Leavitt of the United States Circuit Court at Cincinnati for a writ of *habeas corpus*, which was refused. On May 16 the commission rendered its verdict by declaring Vallandigham guilty of the charge of "publicly expressing in violation of General Order No. 38 * * * sympathy for those in arms against the Government of the United States, declaring disloyal sentiments and opinions, with the object and purpose of weakening the power of the government in its efforts to suppress an unlawful rebellion."* The commission therefore sentenced him to close confinement during the

* *Appleton's Annual Encyclopedia* for 1863, p. 484.

continuance of the war. Burnside approved the sentence and designated Fort Warren in Boston harbor as the place of confinement. Lincoln, however, commuted the sentence to banishment and directed that he be sent beyond the Union military lines to the Southern Confederacy. Accordingly Vollandigham was sent to Tennessee and, on May 25, was escorted by a small cavalry force to the Confederate lines, in Murfreesboro. No further legal steps were taken in the case, save an application by Vollandigham's counsel for a writ of *certiorari* to bring up the proceedings of the commission before the United States Supreme Court, but this motion was denied.*

The arrest, trial and sentence of Vollandigham took Lincoln by surprise. Probably had he been consulted before proceedings were instituted he would not have permitted them.† However, finding himself in the presence of an accomplished fact, he sent a *quasi* approval of it through the Secretary of War,‡ and in a letter

to Burnside, May 29, 1863, said: "All the Cabinet regretted the necessity of arresting, for instance, Vollandigham, some perhaps doubting there was a real necessity for it; but, being done, all were for seeing you through with it."* Accordingly Lincoln assumed the responsibility of the arrest, and in another letter to Erastus Corning made the strongest possible argument in favor of his action:

"I was slow to adopt the strong measures which by degrees I have been forced to regard as being within the exceptions of the Constitution and as indispensable to the public safety. * * * I think the time not unlikely to come when I shall be blamed for having made too few arrests rather than too many. * * * Must I shoot a simple minded soldier boy who deserts, while I must not touch a hair of a wily agitator who induces him to desert? This is none the less injurious when effected by getting a father, or brother, or friend into a public meeting and then working upon his feelings till he is persuaded to write the soldier boy that he is fighting in a bad cause for a wicked administration and contemptible government, too weak to arrest and punish him if he shall desert." †

The arrest and sentence of Vollandigham produced a profound sensation throughout the country. There was general rejoicing in the South, for it was thought that the North would be split upon the issue. In the North the feeling was equally intense. Many Republicans, particularly in the West, approved of the affair and believed that the sentence was not severe enough, but a large part of the Republican press of the East and the solid

* For details see J. L. Vollandigham, *Life of Clement L. Vollandigham* (1872); *Trial of C. L. Vollandigham by a Military Commission* (Cincinnati 1863); Rhodes, *United States*, vol. iv., p. 245 *et seq.*; Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. vii., p. 328 *et seq.*; *Clement L. Vollandigham, Copperhead*, in *Putnam's Monthly*, vol. ii., pp. 590-599 (1907).

† In a letter to Erastus Corning he says: "In my own discretion I do not know whether I would have ordered the arrest of Mr. Vollandigham. * * * It gave me pain when I learned that he had been arrested (that is, I was pained that there should have seemed to be a necessity for arresting him)."—*Complete Works*, vol. ii., p. 351.

‡ *Official Records*, vol. xxiii., pt. ii., p. 316.

* *Lincoln's Complete Works*, vol. ii., p. 342; Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. vii., p. 338.

† *Lincoln's Complete Works*, vol. ii., p. 347 *et seq.* See also Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. vii., p. 343 *et seq.*

Democratic press condemned the arrest and the tribunal before which Vallandigham had been arraigned.

The Vallandigham episode was undoubtedly unfortunate. The Democratic papers were bitter in condemnation of the Administration and many public meetings were held to stigmatize the outrage. On June 11 the Democrats of Ohio met in convention at Columbus, and passed a series of resolutions affirming their devotion to the Union, protesting against the alleged wrong done Vallandigham as a violation of the Constitution and a direct insult offered to the sovereignty of the people of Ohio; and asserting that the Democrats of Ohio were fully competent to decide whether Vallandigham was fit to be nominated for governor and that the attempt to deprive them of this right by his arrest and banishment was an unmerited imputation upon their independence and loyalty. They therefore requested the President to restore Vallandigham to his home in Ohio and severely reprimanded Lincoln for his suspension of the writ of *habeas corpus*, charging him with overriding the guaranteed rights of individuals.*

Lincoln's reply† was regarded as an evasion of the questions involved and the Democrats thereupon decided

that the case must be laid before the people of Ohio in the form of a nomination of Vallandigham for governor. The Union party, meeting at Columbus, nominated John Brough, a war Democrat, and adopted a platform which favored a more vigorous prosecution of the war and pledged hearty support to the President.

Meanwhile Vallandigham, having no desire to stay in the South, sailed to Bermuda and after a short stay there took passage for Halifax, Nova Scotia, where he arrived on July 5. From the Canadian side he issued an address to the people of Ohio in which he thanked the Democrats for the nomination, indorsed their platform, and spoke of himself as a martyr who, under the protection of the British flag, exercised "the privileges and rights which usurpers insolently deny me at home."** At first the hearty response to his nomination seemed to indicate his election, but when the ballots were counted he was found to be defeated by the unprecedented majority of 101,000 votes.† In view of his defeat, therefore, he thought it prudent to remain during the winter beyond the jurisdiction of the United States. In June of 1864, however, he returned to the United States and was allowed to remain without hindrance. He indulged in a series of speeches more violent than those which had caused his arrest, defied the Govern-

* Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. vii., pp. 350-352.

† For which see Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. vii., pp. 352-353. See also Raymond, *Life of Lincoln*, pp. 386-398; *Appleton's Annual Cyclopædia* for 1863, pp. 799-807; Duyckinck, *Late Civil War*, vol. iii., pp. 270-273.

* Moore, *Rebellion Record*, vol. vii., Docs., pp. 438-439.

† Rhodes, *United States*, vol. iv., pp. 412-415.

ment and the army and made various threats.* He was not molested, however, and in August took a prominent part in the National Democratic convention at Chicago which nominated McClellan.

Burnside was not satisfied at having stirred up a single hornet's nest. The President's approval of Vallandigham's arrest evidently stirred him to further acts of folly. On June 1 he issued an order prohibiting the circulation within the limits of his jurisdiction of certain newspapers which in his judgment were quite as active in doing mischief and quite as necessary to be restrained as popular speakers like Vallandigham and others.† Prominent among these was the *New York World*, whose articles and opinions it was alleged tended "to cast reproach upon the government and weaken its efforts to suppress the rebellion, by creating distrust in its war policy and its circulation in war time being calculated to exert a pernicious and treasonable influence." At the same time also the publication of the *Chicago Times* was ordered to be suppressed "on account of the repeated expressions of disloyal and incendiary sentiments." Accordingly on June 3 the office of the *Chicago Times* was entered by two companies of infantry who stopped the press, destroyed the newspapers which had been printed, placed a

guard over the establishment and during the remainder of the night patrolled the entire block. At a meeting of citizens the next day the President was requested to rescind Burnside's order and in the evening an immense gathering of citizens in Court House Square, Chicago, resolved that freedom of speech and of the press must not be infringed and that the military power must remain subordinate to the civil authority. Accordingly on the next day, June 4, Lincoln rescinded that part of Burnside's order which suppressed the *Times* and later the general revoked his order concerning the *World*. Stanton directed also that no more arrests of civilians be made and that no more newspapers be suppressed without first consulting the War Department.*

Contemporaneous with the Ohio elections, others were held throughout the Northern States. The field of politics had been greatly affected by the reverses sustained by the Union arms during the summer and autumn of 1862. The President's proclamation of September 22, 1862, had its influence also in exasperating and consolidating the opposition. In the autumn of 1862 the Democrats carried New York, electing Horatio Seymour governor by 10,000 majority, and New Jersey also went Democratic. There were heavy losses of Congressmen in Pennsylvania, Ohio and Indiana, and in the President's own State of Illi-

* McPherson, *History of the Rebellion*, p. 176.

† *Official Records*, vol. xxiii., pt. ii., pp. 381-382; Woodbury, *Burnside and the Ninth Army Corps*, pp. 265-277.

* Rhodes, *United States*, vol. iv., pp. 253-254.

nois nine of his opponents were elected and only four of his friends. Lincoln himself was assailed and criticised by every faction. The conservatives reproached him for having yielded to the radicals, while the latter denounced him for being under the influence of the conservatives. One side clamored for peace, and the other side demanded a more vigorous prosecution of the war.

Several ineffective movements for peace had been made on both sides. Henry S. Foote, of Tennessee, introduced a resolution in the Confederate Congress to the effect that the Confederate victories justified the Southern government in dispatching commissioners to Washington to propose terms of peace.* Hines Holt, of Georgia, offered a substitute that, whenever the National Government manifested a like anxiety, the President of the Confederate States should appoint commissioners to treat upon the subject. Both resolutions were laid on the table by large majorities. In the National legislature Senator Garrett Davis offered a resolution recommending a convention to be held at Louisville, Kentucky, to consider a peace movement, and in the House Vallandigham (late in 1862) had also offered resolutions for peace, but nothing was done at that time. One of the most persistent of the peace advocates was Fernando Wood, of New York.† Duff Green,

of Virginia, wrote to Lincoln requesting an interview to discuss methods for an early termination of the war. Receiving no encouragement at Washington he asked the same permission from Richmond, but his request met a similar fate. About the middle of June of 1863, Alexander H. Stephens, Vice-President of the Confederacy, wrote to Davis proposing that he go to Washington ostensibly to negotiate regarding an exchange of prisoners but actually to present a peace proposal to the authorities at Washington.* Davis and the Confederate cabinet thought that this mission could be better accomplished after Lee made his movement into Pennsylvania, and that Lincoln would be more likely to receive a peace commissioner if Lee's army actually threatened Washington than if it was lying quietly south of the Rappahannock. Accordingly Stephens went to Fortress Monroe and on July 4, just as Lee's invasion had ended in disaster, he sent to Admiral Lee in Hampton Roads a note stating that he bore a communication from Davis to Lincoln and desired to proceed directly to Washington in his own steamer, the *Torpedo*. Lee telegraphed to Lincoln and received an order not to permit Stephens to proceed to Washington unless he made known the subjects which he wished to discuss. If they were military his communication could be received through the regular channel and nothing else would be entertained by the

* McPherson, *History of the Rebellion*, p. 303.

† For his activities in this direction see Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. vii., p. 366 *et seq.*

* Stephens, *War between the States*, vol. ii., pp. 557-560.

President when offered in terms assuming the independence of the so-called Confederate States.*

The Democrats naturally took up the peace issue and played upon it in the campaign of 1863, but the ballots proved its futility. In the spring election in New Hampshire the Republicans gained the victory. In Pennsylvania the friends of Governor Curtin relied on the war spirit to carry their candidate through and he was re-elected by a good majority in spite of the fact that McClellan, much to the disappointment of Curtin, identified himself with the Democratic party by writing a public letter in support of its candidate. In Indiana and Iowa the Union party was successful. In New York a great popular reaction set in, due principally to Seymour's conduct during the draft riots, and the majority in favor of the Administration candidates for State offices, except governor, was about 30,000, the legislature also passing into the hands of the Unionists. In Maryland four Unionists out of five were elected to Congress and an Emancipation State ticket was carried by 20,000 majority. Massachusetts re-elected Andrew for governor by 41,000. All the Northern States but New Jersey, Kentucky and Delaware voted with the Union party.

Meanwhile there had been much discussion respecting the President's power to suspend the privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus*. Attorney-Gen-

eral Bates, in a long review of the matter on July 5, 1861, as well as many other prominent lawyers, sustained the President in the exercise of this power. However, constant attempts were made in Congress to define the limits of the executive prerogative in this direction, these efforts not being confined strictly to Democrats. Even so staunch a Republican as Lyman Trumbull introduced a resolution in Congress on December 12, 1861, calling on the Secretary of State for information regarding the arrest and imprisonment of persons in the loyal States, and as to the law under which such action had been taken. This resolution was referred to the Judiciary Committee, which was equivalent to its rejection. Several other resolutions of a similar nature were introduced, but all of these were buried in committee. On February 14, 1862, however, the President issued an order through the War Department referring to the critical circumstances of the country and the measures which he had felt it his duty to employ. He then stated that a favorable change of public opinion had occurred and that he was anxious to favor a return to the normal course of the Administration so far as regard for the public welfare would allow. Accordingly he directed that all political prisoners or state prisoners held under military custody be released on subscribing to an oath that they would not render aid or comfort to the enemies of the United States. The Sec-

* Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. vii., p. 373.

retary of War was authorized to except any persons detained as spies or others whose release might be deemed incompatible with the public safety.* The President announced also that extraordinary arrests were thenceforth to be made under the direction of the military force alone, and on February 27 issued another order appointing General Dix and Edwards Pierrepont of New York commissioners to examine the cases of state prisoners restrained under military duress, and to determine whether, in view of the public safety and the existing war, they should be discharged, remain in military custody, or be admitted to the civil tribunals for trial.† Once again, in the autumn of 1862, on account of the necessity of enforcing the draft, the President ordered that during the current insurrection all rebels and insurgents, their advisers and abettors within the United States, and all persons discouraging the enlistment of volunteers, resisting military drafts, or guilty of disloyal practices should be subject to martial law and liable to trial and punishment by military commission; and the writ of *habeas corpus* was suspended in respect to all persons arrested or imprisoned by the military authorities or by the sentence of court-martial. This action was not only harshly

criticised, but denounced as tryanny in the worst form. Accordingly, on November 22, the War Department issued an order directing the discharge from military restraint of all persons who had been arrested for discouraging enlistments, opposing the draft, or otherwise aiding or comforting the enemy in States where the draft had been made or the quota of volunteers and militia had been furnished.

When Congress met in December of 1862 this subject occupied a large share of its attention. On December 8 Thaddeus Stevens introduced a bill to indemnify the President and other persons for suspending the privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus*, and acts done in pursuance thereof. This bill provided also that the President, during the existence of the war, might suspend the writ of *habeas corpus* at discretion. The bill passed the House the same day by a vote of 90 to 45. Thereupon 36 members of the House endeavored to have entered on the journal an elaborate protest against the bill as a deliberate and dangerous violation of the Constitution, but on the motion of Stevens this protest was tabled by a vote of 75 to 41. The bill then went to the Senate where it was amended and passed on January 27, 1863, by a vote of 33 to 7. The House refused to concur in the amendments and a committee of conference was appointed. Their compromise was accepted in both chambers, and the bill

* Richardson, *Messages and Papers*, vol. vi., pp. 102-104.

† *Ibid*, vol. vi., p. 109. See also Dix, *Memoirs of John A. Dix*, vol. ii., p. 43.

was signed by the President on March 3, 1863.*

During the summer following the passage of this act, the enrolment and draft were going on, but the work was greatly impeded by constant resort to legal expedients by drafted men and their friends, and by the opposition of the politicians. Accordingly, on September 15, deeming that the public safety required it, Lincoln issued a proclamation suspending the writ throughout the United States, where

persons were held under the command of the Government, either as prisoners of war, spies, or aiders or abettors of the enemy, or as soldiers or deserters, or for resisting the draft, or for any other overt act against the military or naval service.* The President took the greatest care to eliminate abuse of this power by the officers acting under its direction, but, though he used every precaution to avoid offense, his acts did not escape denunciation.

CHAPTER XXX.

1863.

OPERATIONS AGAINST FORTS WAGNER AND SUMTER.


The commencement of operations on Morris Island — Failure of the first assault on Fort Wagner — Disastrous result of the second assault — The bombardment of Fort Sumter — The abandonment of Fort Wagner — Repulse of the Union attack on Fort Sumter — Suspension of operations.

The attack by the fleet under Du Pont on the works in Charleston harbor in April of 1863 having been unsuccessful, it was deemed advisable, as preliminary to further offensive movements, to effect a lodgment at Morris Island where batteries might be erected for a new assault on Fort Sumter. On the death of Admiral Foote Admiral J. A. Dahlgren was appointed to the command of the south Atlantic fleet and General Q. A. Gillmore was placed in charge of the military operations. Fort Wagner was a work constructed by the Confeder-

ates near the north end of Morris Island, a low strip of sandy beach about three and a half miles in length on the south side of Charleston harbor. It was 2,600 yards directly south of Fort Sumter and was constructed to control that portion of the island upon which effective breaching batteries against Fort Sumter could be established. On the northern end of the island was Fort Gregg and the southern end was held by a small force of infantry and artillery. Gillmore resolved to make his attack from Folly Island directly south of Morris. This island was occupied by a brigade un-

* McPherson, *History of the Rebellion*, pp. 183-187; Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. viii., pp. 34-36.

* Richardson, *Messages and Papers*, vol. vi., pp. 170-171; Nicolay and Hay, vol. viii., pp. 37-38.



der General Israel Vogdes who had fortified the southern end controlling the waters of Stono harbor and the approaches to James Island. At both ends of the island was a heavy growth of underbrush and taking advantage of this Vogdes, under Gillmore's direction, secretly placed 47 siege and field guns in position.

Alfred H. Terry's division of 4,000 men and George C. Strong's brigade of 2,500 were concentrated on Folly Island, and on the afternoon of July 8 Terry was sent up the Stono to make a demonstration against James Island, while Strong was ordered to make a descent upon Morris Island at daybreak of the 9th. Terry's feint completely deceived Beauregard who paid little attention to the movements on the beach. Strong's troops effected a landing at daybreak and attacked the Confederates in front, while Dahlgren with his ironclads swept the narrow island with his guns. The Confederate batteries of 11 guns were carried and by 9 A. M. three-fourths of the island had been abandoned to Gillmore. According to Gillmore's report the Union troops now held all the island except one mile on the north end which included Fort Wagner and a battery on Cummings' Point mounting 14 or 15 heavy guns.* On the morning of the 11th an attempt was made to carry the fort by assault, which failed with a loss to the Union troops of 172 killed and wounded and 119 taken prisoners, while the Confederate loss was only

12 killed and wounded. After consultation with Dahlgren Gillmore determined to establish counter batteries against the fort, hoping thereby with the aid of the ironclads to dismount its guns and either drive the Confederates from it or open the way to a successful assault.

Soon after midday of the 18th the ironclads and the 41 light guns and siege mortars opened a furious fire on the fort until nearly all its guns were silenced and the defenders had been driven into the bombproofs. Late in the afternoon, after 900 shot and shell had been discharged, a storming party was formed consisting of General G. C. Strong's brigade of six small regiments supported by Colonel H. S. Putnam's brigade of four regiments. In advance was the 54th Massachusetts Colored led by Colonel Robert Gould Shaw. The movement of the troops was observed by the Confederates in Sumter and fire was at once opened upon them. Under this fire Strong's brigade moved along the beach for about three-quarters of a mile and were then directed to lie down. Just before dark the order was given for both brigades to advance, General Strong's leading and Colonel Putnam's within supporting distance. The troops rushed forward until within 200 yards of the work when a terrific hail of grape, canister and hand grenades was hurled against them, forcing them back with severe loss. Other troops followed but gained no advantage. Three com-

* *Official Records*, vol. xxviii., pt. i., p. 8.



From the original Brady negatives.

1. THE INTERIOR OF FORT WAGNER NEAR CHARLESTON.
2. HIBERNIAN HALL, CHARLESTON, S. C., WHERE THE CONVENTION MET AFTER THE DESTRUCTION OF SECESSION HALL.

panies of a New Hampshire regiment led by Strong in person gained the ditch and wading through the water found shelter against the embankment, but this availed little since the second brigade, which should have been ready to support them, was far in the rear. Hence Strong was compelled to order a retreat and finally, finding that support did not come, to abandon the attack. Soon afterward the other brigade came up and rushing impetuously up the glacis several regiments succeeded in crossing the ditch, scaling the parapet and descending into the fort. Here a hand-to-hand conflict ensued in which Shaw was killed and Strong mortally wounded, but in time the attack was repulsed. About midnight the order was given to retire and the troops fell back to the rifle-pits outside their own works. In this second assault the Union loss was 1,128 killed and wounded and 384 missing. The Confederate loss was 56 killed and 133 wounded.*

Having inflicted comparatively small damage on the enemy and having lost 1,500 men by his assaults, Gillmore determined to press the siege by gradual approaches. While completing these works Gillmore turned his attention to Fort Sumter. By August 16 a sufficient number of breaching guns were in position and

on the 17th the bombardment was begun in earnest. For seven days the storm of metal rained upon the fort and on the 24th Gillmore reported its practical demolition. From 18 guns he had thrown 5,009 projectiles weighing 552,683 pounds, of which 4,147 struck the fort. Nothing but a few unserviceable pieces remained on their carriages in the fort which according to Gillmore was reduced "to the condition of a mere infantry outpost."* Before daylight of August 23, five monitors approached to within 800 yards of the fort and opened fire which was kept up until 6 A. M. The Confederate officers then held a council of war and a proposition was offered to abandon the fort, but as a matter of sentiment it was resolved to hold it.

Meanwhile regular approaches were being made against Fort Wagner. Thousands of heavy shells had been thrown into it and by August 26 the trenches were within 250 yards of it, the intervening space being a flat ridge of sand scarcely 25 yards wide and for a great part planted with torpedoes. In the midst of these hidden perils the sappers continued their work and were soon within 100 yards of the fort. Gillmore then resolved upon a vigorous movement. All his light mortars were brought to the front, his breaching batteries were trained on the fort and the navy was called in to aid in the bombardment. At daylight on September 5 the entire

* Gillmore, *Engineer and Artillery Operations against Charleston*, p. 41 et seq.; Rhodes, *United States*, vol. iv., p. 322; Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. vii., pp. 429-431; Williams, *The Negro Race in America*, vol. ii., pp. 328-335; A. P. Rockwell, *The Operations against Charleston* (1912); *Confederate Military History*, vol. iv., pp. 200-204; vol. v., pp. 230-232, 235-249.

* Gillmore, *Engineer and Artillery Operations*, p. 62.

armament opened fire and for 42 hours the soldiers were regaled with a spectacle of unequalled magnificence. During this time 17 siege guns discharged 1,411 shells at the work, of which 1,247 struck it. On the night of the 6th the sappers pushed past the south face of the fort, masking its guns, and removed the pikes planted at the foot of the counter scarp of the seafront. As the way was now open, Gillmore ordered an assault for the morning of the 7th, but when morning came it was found that the garrison of Wagner, together with that of Gregg, had evacuated the island, leaving the 25 guns of the two works in Union possession. The Union loss at Morris Island July 10 to September 7 was 381 killed, 1,372 wounded and 565 missing; the Confederate loss was 157 killed, 674 wounded and 238 missing.

Meanwhile on August 30 Gillmore had resumed fire on Fort Sumter, dismounting the remaining barbette guns and leaving only one casemate gun serviceable. On September 2 six monitors made an attack but no reply was made, since not a single gun was in working order. Early on the morning of September 7, after Fort Wagner had been abandoned, Dahlgren demanded the surrender of Fort Sumter, which was refused. On the night of September 8 an attempt was made by a detachment of 400 men from the fleet under Commander F. H. Stevens to carry the fort by assault. On approaching the fort a terrific musketry fire was thrown upon them

and simultaneously, at a signal from the fort, all the Confederate batteries on James and Sullivan's Islands, with one of their gunboats, opened fire. The attack was repulsed and all the troops who landed were either killed or taken prisoners, the loss being reported as 4 killed, 19 wounded and 102 captured. After this the army busied itself for several weeks reconstructing the forts on Morris Island and firing at intervals upon Charleston and Fort Sumter.* That part of Charleston within reach of the Union shells was greatly injured and almost entirely abandoned by its inhabitants. On October 26 Gillmore again opened fire with his heavy guns from Forts Wagner and Gregg, aided by the cross fire of the 150-pound rifles of the fleet. This completed the ruin of the fort but all aggressive operations against Charleston were ended for the season, although a desultory fire was kept up against Sumter during November and December to prevent the remounting of guns. The casualties in the fort from August 12 to December 11, 1863, were 43 killed and 165 wounded, while during the period from August 12 to December 31, 19,808 shot and shell had fallen against or into it. Though the fort was now a ruin it did not come into possession of the Union forces until 1865, when on February 17, because of the approach of Sherman, the fort was abandoned.†

* *Official Records*, vol. xxviii., pt. i., p. 30.

† *Battles and Leaders*, vol. iv., pp. 52-75; *Confederate Military History*, vol. v., pp. 223-234, 249-256, 291-298.

CHAPTER XXXI.

1863.

CHATTANOOGA, CHICKAMAUGA AND KNOXVILLE.

Rosecrans' inactivity at Murfreesboro — Wheeler's attack on Fort Donelson — Engagements at Thompson's Station and Vaught's Hill — Streight's raid from Tuscumbia — Morgan's raid in Kentucky, Indiana and Ohio — Rosecrans' march to Tullahoma — Evacuation of Chattanooga by Bragg — Operations at McLemore's Cove — The battle of Chickamauga — The siege of Chattanooga — Arrival of Grant and Sherman — The dispatch of Longstreet to Knoxville — The battles of Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge — Bragg's retreat — The engagement at Ringgold Gap — Burnside's march to Knoxville — The capture of Cumberland Gap — The engagement at Rogersville — The battle of Campbell's Station — The siege of Knoxville — Longstreet's repulse at Fort Sanders — His retreat on Sherman's arrival.

When General Bragg, after the battle of Stone River or Murfreesboro, fell back from Murfreesboro, he planned to hold the line of Elk River but was directed to hold that of Duck River, north of which he disposed his forces. His infantry front extended from Wartrace on the right to Shelbyville on the left with cavalry on the right at McMinnville and on the left at Columbia and Spring Hill. On the left Polk's corps held Shelbyville, which was strongly fortified, and a strong detachment was thrown forward about 10 miles to Guy's Gap. The greater part of Hardee's corps held Hoover's, Liberty, and Bell Buckle Gaps and the rest of it was at Tullahoma, 36 miles south of Murfreesboro, which was fortified and held as a depot of supplies.

Early in January of 1863 the troops of the Army of the Cumberland under General Rosecrans were organized into three army corps—the 14th under General George H. Thomas, the 20th under A. McD. McCook, and the

21st under T. L. Crittenden. There was a reserve corps under General Gordon Granger and a cavalry corps under General D. S. Stanley. After the battle of Murfreesboro Rosecrans remained inactive for nearly six months, though the President and Halleck urged him to make an early movement, not only for the redemption of Tennessee from Confederate control but also to assist the campaigns of Grant at Vicksburg and of Hooker in Virginia by withdrawing troops from their fronts or at least by preventing the sending of reinforcements to the Confederates; but Rosecrans remained inactive, complaining of the lack of supplies, of forage, of revolving rifles for his mounted troops, of his deficiency in cavalry, etc. While bickering with the Government regarding the situation and condition of his forces, Rosecrans had not been entirely inactive. The late winter and spring were occupied not only in completing fortifications and intrenchments and in disciplining the army

but also by a series of raids which, however, though expensive and destructive on both sides, led to no adequate result. The Confederates were equally active.

On February 3 an attack was made on Fort Donelson by the Confederates under Wheeler and Forrest with about 4,000 men and 8 pieces of artillery. Colonel A. C. Harding was in command of the fort with about 500 available men of his own regiment, a company of cavalry and Floyd's battery and artillery. In the afternoon the Confederates bombarded the fort and made several feints at storming the works. Twice Forrest sent a flag of truce demanding surrender but Harding resolutely refused. At 8 o'clock in the evening three sides of the work had been invested and the Confederates were pressing to the final attack when a number of gunboats under Captain Fitch, conveying transports from below, opportunely arrived and opened fire on the assailants. The fire of the gunboats quickly drove off the enemy with a loss in killed and wounded of 550 and 150 captured. Colonel Harding's loss was 16 killed and 60 wounded, and 50 captured.*

Late in February of 1863 General Earl Van Dorn, with over 6,000 men, crossed the Tennessee River at Florence and marched northward to Co-

lumbia, on Duck River, threatening Franklin, about 28 miles west of Murfreesboro. On March 4 General Rosecrans sent a reconnoitering column from Franklin under command of Colonel John Coburn. It consisted of his brigade—33d and 85th Indiana, 19th Michigan, and 22d Wisconsin—the 124th Ohio, 600 cavalry under Colonel T. J. Jordan and C. C. Aleshire's Ohio battery of six guns; in all 2,837 officers and men. Coburn was instructed to advance the first day to Spring Hill, where he was to halt for the night of the 4th and next day divide his force, sending part of it to Rally Hill, on the left, to meet a coöperating cavalry column from Murfreesboro, and the other part toward Columbia, each to return to Spring Hill at night, unless the detachment at Rally Hill should be joined by the cavalry expected from Murfreesboro. Colonel Jordan, with the cavalry and battery, led the advance and, when three miles out of Franklin, met General W. H. Jackson's cavalry division of two brigades and King's battery moving north. Both parties formed for battle, Aleshire opened with his guns, King's guns replied, the skirmishers became engaged, and after a brisk engagement of an hour Jackson withdrew toward Spring Hill, and Coburn went into camp four miles south of Franklin.

Van Dorn had started from Columbia that morning with the five brigades of Generals N. B. Forrest, W.

* Cist, *The Army of the Cumberland*, pp. 140-141; Joseph Wheeler, *Campaigns of Wheeler and His Cavalry* (1899); J. W. DuBose, *Gen. Joseph Wheeler and the Army of Tennessee* (1912).

T. Martin, G. B. Cosby, F. C. Armstrong, and Colonel J. W. Whitfield, 6,000 men and 12 guns, and when Jackson with the two brigades of Armstrong and Whitfield fell back after the engagement, Van Dorn formed line at Thompson's Station, nine miles south of Franklin, and awaited Coburn's advance. Jackson's division was posted on a range of hills crossing the Franklin Pike, with King's battery on the extreme left, while Forrest's brigade, with a battery, was on Jackson's right. On the morning of the 5th Coburn advanced cautiously and on nearing Thompson's Station Jordan charged with his cavalry, drove a small Confederate force from the station, and seized a range of hills near it. Coburn followed with the infantry to near the station, when, on entering a pass, with hills on either side, he was arrested by shells from the Confederate artillery on his right and left, enfilading his line. It was necessary to dislodge King's battery on his right and the 33d and 85th Indiana advanced down the hill, when suddenly the Confederate guns ceased firing and from behind a stone wall Whitfield's brigade, reinforced by a regiment of Armstrong's, opened a fire that drove the two regiments back up the hill. Whitfield followed, and, when nearing the summit, was charged and driven back but made a stand behind the depot of Thompson's Station and, with the assistance of two of King's guns, compelled Coburn's men to fall back beyond the hill. At

about the same time Coburn was informed that about 1,000 cavalry had just been discovered on the left, and he resolved to retreat. Meanwhile Armstrong and Whitfield had been ordered to assault Coburn's left and Forrest to reach his rear. Armstrong, Whitfield and part of Forrest charged, and after a fierce struggle for the crest of the hill were again driven from it with great loss. Again the Confederates charged; Coburn was forced back; Forrest, with two regiments, gaining his rear, charged him; and after a few volleys at close quarters Coburn surrendered. His loss, as officially reported, was 48 killed, 247 wounded, and 1,151 captured or missing. Van Dorn's loss was 56 killed, 289 wounded, and 12 missing. Meanwhile other columns had pushed out from Murfreesboro and driven other bodies of Confederate cavalry across Duck River, and General Gordon Granger, commanding the reserve corps of Rosecrans' army, upon hearing of Coburn's defeat, strengthened Franklin and concentrated a column at that place to move upon Van Dorn at Spring Hill and Thompson's Station. Granger moved on the 9th, attacked and drove Armstrong's cavalry brigade from Thompson's Station and advanced to Spring Hill, Van Dorn having fallen back during the day to recross Duck River at Columbia. On the next day Granger's cavalry pushed Armstrong across Rutherford's Creek near Columbia and Van Dorn's main body re-

crossed Duck River. Pursuit was suspended and on the 11th the various commands engaged in the general reconnoissance returned to their former positions.*

On March 18, 1863, Colonel A. S. Hall, with a brigade of Union infantry of 1,300 men and two guns, was sent from Murfreesboro to look after General John H. Morgan, who was raiding the country to the northeast. Beyond Statesville Hall ran into the Confederate skirmishers, and learning also that Morgan, with a large force, was preparing to attack him, Hall fell back to Vaught's Hill. He was closely followed by Morgan with about 2,500 men and a battery of artillery, who made an attack at 11:30 A. M. on the 20th, before Hall had fairly taken position. Morgan's larger numbers permitted him to attack both Hall's flanks and rear, but he could gain no further advantage, and after an engagement of nearly four hours, in which he was several times repulsed, he finally withdrew, with a loss of 30 killed and 150 wounded. The Union loss was 6 killed, 42 wounded, and 8 missing.† Finally on April 1 Morgan was driven from his stronghold at Snow Hill by General D. S. Stanley.‡

On March 25 Forrest made a raid

on the Nashville and Columbia Railroad, burning the bridge and capturing Colonel Bloodgood's command of about 400 men at Brentwood. Colonel G. C. Smith arriving opportunely with about 600 cavalry attacked Forrest in the rear and recovered a large portion of the property captured at Brentwood, pursuing the Confederates to Little Harpeth where they were reinforced. On April 10 Van Dorn attacked Franklin, but was repulsed by General Granger with a loss of 19 killed, 35 wounded and 48 prisoners. At about the same time General J. J. Reynolds made a raid on the Manchester and McMinnville Railroad destroying the depot, rolling-stock supplies and other property, and capturing 180 prisoners.*

The most important of the cavalry movements set on foot by the Union general was that organized for the purpose of cutting the communications of General Bragg's army then at Tullahoma, the objective point being a railroad south of Dalton in southwestern Georgia. Colonel A. D. Streight, of the 51st Indiana, was placed in command of a brigade of 1,700 men consisting of the 51st and 73d Indiana, the 80th Illinois, the 3d Ohio, and two companies of Tennessee cavalry. Streight left Nashville on April 11, landed at Palmyra, marched to Fort Henry, and finally reached Eastport on April 20 where he met General G. M. Dodge who, with 7,000

* *Official Records*, vol. xxiii.; Van Horne, *History of the Army of the Cumberland*, vol. 1.; Wyeth, *Life of Gen. N. B. Forrest*; Cist, *Army of the Cumberland*, pp. 141-143.

† *Official Records*, vol. xxiii.; Cist, *Army of the Cumberland*, pp. 143-144.

‡ Cist, pp. 144-145.

* Cist, p. 147.

cavalry and infantry, had marched by way of Corinth and Iuka. Following Dodge he steadily pushed back P. D. Roddey's cavalry. Streight arrived at Tuscumbia on April 24 and being supplied by Dodge with some animals and rations set out again on April 26 with only 300 of his men on foot. Cutting loose from Dodge he scoured the country for more horses and mules, late on the 28th arriving at Moulton. At midnight he resumed the march eastward to Day's Gap, about 35 miles away, which he reached on the night of April 29, and the next day was attacked by Forrest with 1,200 men and 8 guns. Streight formed an ambush into which Forrest rode and was repulsed with a loss of two of his guns. This enabled Streight to make good his escape with the loss of only a few captured. He continued his march with comparatively little interruption until 9 o'clock on May 2 when Forrest attacked his rear guard at the crossing of Black Creek near Gadsden. Streight burned the bridge, which checked Forrest for some time, and, 15 miles beyond Gadsden, halted to procure forage for his animals. Having crossed the creek Forrest again attacked and was again repulsed. Streight continued his march toward Rome and when near Cedar Bluffs, Alabama, was again overtaken and attacked by Forrest. Forrest sent a flag of truce demanding the surrender of the whole command. Streight finally yielded and on May 3 surrendered his entire force of

1,365 men. Prior to surrender he had lost 145 men in killed, wounded and captured. The captains were sent to Richmond and confined in Libby Prison, from which in February of 1864 Streight escaped by burrowing under the foundation walls.*

Two months later General Bragg's cavalry made a similar movement into the Northern States with precisely the same result. About the middle of June of 1863 General Bragg ordered General John Hunt Morgan with 2,000 picked mounted infantry and four guns to move from Tennessee into Kentucky, break up Rosecrans' railroad communications, capture Louisville, destroy the public works and return to Tennessee as quickly as possible. Morgan, however, decided to exceed his orders and to create consternation in the North by making a raid north of the Ohio. On June 27 he set out with 2,460 men and 4 guns from Sparta, Tennessee, and by a rapid march entered Kentucky, crossed the Cumberland at Burkesville, and then proceeded to Green River at Tebb's Bend where he found his progress arrested by 300 men of the 25th Michigan under Colonel O. H. Moore. Moore declined to surrender, and after a hard fight, in which he lost 6 killed and 23 wounded, repulsed Morgan with a loss of 36

* *Official Records*, vol. xxiii.; Cist, *The Army of the Cumberland*, pp. 145-147; Wyeth, *Life of General N. B. Forrest; Battles and Leaders*, vol. iv., p. 414; J. H. Mathes, *General Forrest* (1902); *Confederate Military History*, vol. vi., pp. 209-211.

killed and 46 wounded. Morgan then crossed above Newmarket, on the 5th defeated and captured the garrison of 400 men under Colonel Hanson at Lebanon, and having sacked and set fire to the town proceeded to Springfield on his way to the Ohio. On July 6 at Bardstown Morgan captured 20 men of the 4th United States cavalry, at Shepherdsville on Salt River, captured a train containing 20 soldiers and on July 7 after passing through Lawrenceville reached Brandenburg on the Ohio. At this time two steamboats opportunely came down the river and were seized by Morgan who began to cross his command on the morning of the 8th. His passage was disputed by a gun and by militia with a field-piece on the Indiana shore, but by the morning of the 9th the entire force was in Indiana.

The Union troops in the vicinity immediately set out in pursuit. Colonel Wolford with his brigade from Jamestown joined E. H. Hobson and J. M. Shackelford at Springfield and arrived at Brandenburg just after Morgan had crossed. Hobson was in command and with 2,500 mounted infantry and cavalry and four guns crossed the river in pursuit and for 17 days hung upon Morgan's heels. General H. M. Judah's division was sent up the river in boats to intercept Morgan on his retreat. Hobson immediately crossed the river at Brandenburg, landing his force on the Indiana side early on the morning of the 10th. Nevertheless for two weeks

Morgan, by his boldness and skill, managed to keep ahead of his pursuers. After crossing the Ohio Morgan rode north through Corydon, overpowered the militia there, pushed on to Salem where he captured nearly 400 militia, then marched through Lexington and Paris to Vernon near which place on the 11th he encountered 1,200 militia under Colonel Love. Under cover of darkness he withdrew from Love's front and pressing on through Dupont and Sumansville crossed the Indiana line on the 13th to Harrison, Ohio. He then concentrated his command preparatory to making his way across the Ohio into Kentucky, detaching parties to burn bridges, ravage in every direction, seize upon all the horses within reach, and confuse the pursuit. Under cover of a feint on Hamilton he marched by night a few miles north of Cincinnati and then, turning toward Berlin, where the Government had a large number of animals, found himself confronted by a small body of militia under Colonel Runkel. He lost much time in threatening an attack on Runkel, but finally withdrew closely followed by Runkel, and after dark of the 18th reached the banks of the Ohio a short distance above Pomeroy near Buffington Bar and Blennerhasset's Island by which route he had intended to escape. The pursuers were not far behind and were closing in on him from every direction. On the west Hobson was hanging on his rear; General Judah was marching

up from the southwest; regiments were coming down the river from Parkersburg and gunboats were patrolling the river and watching the fords. Early on the morning of the 19th a desperate attempt was made by Morgan to cross the river, but the movement was checked by the gunboats. He was attacked in rear by the head of Hobson's column, in flank by Judah's cavalry, and in front by two gunboats. A severe engagement followed which cost Morgan 120 killed and wounded and about 700 officers and men captured, among them being Dick Morgan and Basil W. Duke. General Morgan himself, however, was not at this time captured but, with the remainder of his force, escaped up the river where he attempted to cross to Belleville by swimming his horses. A portion of Johnson's regiment, about 300 in number, managed to swim the river and get away, but a gunboat stopped the remainder of the column, whereupon Morgan with his 800 men returned to the Ohio shore and retreated inland. Though he had lost all his artillery and trains, he pressed northeast through Washington and Athens, marching 35 miles a day and burning bridges behind him. General Shackelford with 500 men had started in pursuit and harassed his rear. For several days and nights they followed Morgan and on July 26 the advance captured 250 men near Salineville and later in the day Morgan himself and 364 officers and men were intercepted

near New Lisbon and Beaver Creek and compelled to surrender. The Union loss in the campaign of July 2 to 26 was 19 killed, 47 wounded and 8 missing.* According to Pollard, Morgan destroyed 34 important bridges and not less than \$10,000,000 worth of steamboats, railroads, public stores, depots, etc.†

After his capture Morgan was taken for safe keeping to Columbus and placed in the Ohio penitentiary, but on November 28 with six others he managed to escape and was received by the Confederates with great enthusiasm. He led one more raid into Kentucky. In June of the next year he was decisively defeated by General S. G. Burbridge. On September 4, 1864, at the outset of another raid, he was surprised in Greenville, Tennessee, and was killed while attempting to escape.‡

Meanwhile Rosecrans was pushing his preparations for an active campaign and at last on June 24 the camps at Murfreesboro were broken up and the army began its march

* *Official Records*, vol. xxiii.; Duke, *History of Morgan's Cavalry*; Senour, *Morgan and his Captors*; Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. viii., pp. 52-58; S. R. Ford, *Raids and Romance of Morgan and His Men* (1864); M. E. Farley, *General Morgan's Great Raid* (1893); E. A. M., *The Truth of the Raid of the Confederate General John Morgan and Command through Portions of the States of Kentucky, Indiana and Ohio, etc.* (1894); *Celebration of the Surrender of General John H. Morgan*, in *Ohio Archaeological and Historical Quarterly*, vol. xx., pp. 368-377 (1911); *Battles and Leaders*, vol. iii., pp. 634-635; *Confederate Military History*, vol. ix., pt. i., pp. 172-173.

† *Third Year of the War*, p. 104.

‡ Duke, *History of Morgan's Cavalry*, p. 528.

with McCook on the right, Thomas in the centre and Crittenden on the left, the object being to drive Bragg from middle Tennessee. Being informed that Bragg was strongly intrenched at Shelbyville and Tullahoma, Rosecrans determined to render these intrenchments useless by turning Bragg's right and attacking the bridge across Elk River in his rear, thus compelling him to retreat or engage in battle on open ground. Rosecrans had about 50,000 infantry, 6,800 cavalry and 3,000 artillery, while Bragg had 30,000 infantry, 14,000 cavalry and 2,250 artillery. The campaign was opened when Mitchell's cavalry moved from Triune and drove Wheeler's cavalry back upon the infantry with sharp skirmishing at Eagleville, Rover and Unionville. By successive steps Liberty, Hoover's, and Guy's gaps were secured. On the 26th Thomas pushed the Confederates back to within five miles of Manchester; Crittenden followed Thomas; McCook remained at Liberty Gap, and Granger at Christiana. By this time so much ground toward Manchester had been gained by Thomas that it was practicable to concentrate the whole army there to force Bragg to abandon his position. Accordingly on the morning of the 17th Thomas seized Manchester and at midnight had concentrated his entire corps at that place, 12 miles from Tullahoma. McCook withdrew from Liberty Gap and marched through Hoover's Gap, following Thomas.

This movement convinced Bragg that he could not hold the long line to Shelbyville; hence early on the morning of the 27th he withdrew Polk from that place to Tullahoma, Wheeler with his cavalry being left to cover his rear. Stanley's cavalry and Granger's corps advanced from Christiana, drove Wheeler from Guy's Gap and pursued him inside the intrenchments four miles north to Shelbyville, where Wheeler made a stand with Martin's division to cover Polk's wagon train then on the road from Shelbyville to Tullahoma. R. H. Minty's cavalry brigade drove Wheeler into Shelbyville, whereupon the latter crossed the Duck River and was about to burn the bridge when he received information that Forrest was approaching with two brigades from Franklin to join him. Accordingly he recrossed to the northern side of the river with Martin's 500 men and two guns, but scarcely had he taken position when the Union cavalry came, charged, overrode Wheeler and his 500 men, took the guns and covered the entrance to the bridge. Wheeler ordered a charge, cut through a part of the thin Union line, pushed down the steep river bank and swam across. Wheeler, Martin and some of the men escaped, about 50 were killed or drowned, and many were taken prisoners. Meanwhile, when near Shelbyville, Forrest had turned back, crossed the river and marched to Tullahoma.

Having now forced Bragg from his first line on the right and from Shelbyville on the left, Rosecrans endeavored to drive him from Tullahoma back beyond the Tennessee. Early on the morning of June 28 Colonel J. T. Wilder with his brigade of mounted infantry burned Elk River bridge and broke the railroad south of Decherd in the rear of Tullahoma. The next day he broke up the Tracy City Railroad and then, dividing his forces, advanced toward Anderson and Tantallon on the railroad to Chattanooga. At both places superior forces prevented attack and he therefore marched both divisions to Manchester on the 30th. Meanwhile the corps of Thomas, McCook and Crittenden had closed up and with Stanley's cavalry had gone to Manchester. Thus when Bragg found his communications with Chattanooga so seriously threatened he concluded to withdraw and on the night of June 30 abandoned Tullahoma and fell back beyond Elk River. On July 1 Thomas occupied Tullahoma and was ordered to set out in pursuit of Bragg but as the latter held the crossings of Elk River the pursuit was discontinued. Bragg maintained his retreat over the Cumberland Mountains and crossed the Tennessee River to Chattanooga, leaving middle Tennessee again in Union possession. During the campaign the Union loss was 84 killed, 473 wounded and 13 missing. The Confederate loss is not known, but Rosecrans reported that he had

captured 1,634 prisoners and 11 guns.*

Rosecrans was elated at his success in driving Bragg out of middle Tennessee and thought that Bragg was in full retreat southward. Eager to strike at the Confederate army he ordered his troops to pursue but because of the topography of the country was compelled to separate his corps and divisions. Bragg, however, had no idea of retreating, but on the contrary turned on the enemy. The failure of Bragg's excellent combinations, however, increased the difficulty of interposing his army between the Union army and Chattanooga and, in the end, made it impossible.

Lookout Mountain bounds McLeMORE's Cove on the west. Following its eastern base from Chattanooga southward, it is 24 miles to Stevens' Gap, over which Thomas' 14th corps, which constituted the centre of Rosecrans' army, crossed Lookout Mountain from the west into the Cove. Eight miles beyond is Dougherty's Gap, from which point Pigeon Mountain, running northeastwardly, forms the eastern boundary of the Cove. The triangular area thus inclosed is from 5 to .8 miles wide, the mouth opening toward Chattanooga, and contains between 80 and 100 square miles. Rosecrans' centre and right were ascending Lookout Mountain before Bragg became aware of the

* *Official Records*, vol. xxiii.; Van Horne, *History of the Army of the Cumberland*, vol. i.; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. iii., pp. 635-637; Cist, *The Army of the Cumberland*, pp. 154-171.

movement. He then evacuated Chattanooga, conducted his army by way of Rossville and Lee and Gordon's Mill and established it at Lafayette, 26 miles south and behind Pigeon Mountain. From this position of his army there were four gaps through which roads led into McLemore's Cove. Opposite Lafayette was Dug Gap, to the south of which was Blue Bird and to the north Cattlett's and Wrothen's. Dug Gap was directly opposite Stevens' Gap. The Chickamauga Creek rises near Dougherty Gap and runs southward through the Cove.

Having accomplished his purpose north of the Tennessee, Crittenden withdrew his corps through Sequatchie Valley to the river, crossed both that and the Sand Mountains and entered Lookout Valley near the north point of Lookout Mountain. On September 9 a reconnoitering party discovered that Bragg had evacuated the city whereupon, leaving a brigade in the city and passing around the point of the mountain, Crittenden proceeded at once by way of Rossville Gap to the vicinity of Lee and Gordon's Mill, there to operate on the left of Thomas who had descended Lookout at Stevens' Gap. The right of the army, the 20th corps under McCook with Stanley's cavalry corps, crossed Lookout at Valley Head, 42 miles south of Chattanooga, and descended south of Dougherty's Gap. Thus the left of the army under Crittenden was at Lee and Gordon's Mill, the centre corps was at Stevens' Gap, 15 miles

distant, and the right corps about 25 miles beyond that point, with the cavalry still further south.

General Bragg was aware of the situation of the Union army and the isolation of the south corps. Moreover, the situation of the separated Union corps was rendered still more precarious by reports received from General Sheridan on the extreme right that Bragg was retreating toward Rome, which led Rosecrans to order a pursuit. General Thomas urged a concentration of the army, but was overruled. Bragg from his position behind Pigeon Mountain was in a most favorable position for first striking Thomas and then turning upon either of the wings before it could obtain support. Had Bragg's orders been executed promptly and vigorously, the situation of the Union troops would have been critical.

On the night of the 9th Negley's division, forming the Union advance from Stevens' Gap along the road leading through Dug Gap to Lafayette, encountered the enemy, and late at night it was ascertained that a strong force was concentrating there. In developing his plan Bragg had sent Hindman's division from the Lafayette side of the mountain and had ordered D. H. Hill to send Cleburne to coöperate. Hill, however, reported that Cleburne was sick and that the movement was impracticable anyway.* Early the next morning Buckner on the extreme right was ordered

* Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. viii., pp. 76-78.

to advance into the Cove to support Hindman. Hindman, however, consumed invaluable time in arguing for a change of plan, but Bragg refused to consider it. Cleburne, who in the prospect of a fight had recovered his health, removed the obstructions from Dug Gap and at daylight was ready for the march. Bragg joined Cleburne at his camp and the two waited in intense anxiety for Hindman to open his guns, when they expected to move on the flank and rear. Walker's reserve corps was ordered forward to join Cleburne in the attack and thus Bragg had seven divisions coöperating in the movement against Thomas. Hindman, however, did not attack until the afternoon of the 10th. At that time Baird's division had arrived from Stevens' Gap to support Negley and by brilliant movements in retreat, with some sharp skirmishing by T. R. Stanley's and Starkweather's brigades, the two divisions with their trains were withdrawn in perfect order to Bailey's Cross Roads, a strong strategic position in front of Stevens' Gap, where Brannan's division, which had completed the crossing of Look-out, was within easy supporting distance. Thus Bragg's attempt to cross the Union centre was a failure, for which he held Hill and Hindman responsible.

Nevertheless Bragg still hoped to destroy Crittenden's column. He moved Polk's and W. H. T. Walker's corps in the direction of Lee and Gordon's Mill. Bragg knew that Crittenden's corps was divided with one of

its three divisions near Ringgold, and on the afternoon of the 12th he ordered Polk to attack Crittenden's corps immediately. The latter, however, was led to believe that a general attack on his column was about to be made and instead of carrying out Bragg's orders sent a dispatch to him stating that he had taken a strong position for defence and requesting that the whole of Buckner's corps be sent him as a reinforcement. Bragg hurried to the front to join Polk on the morning of September 13 but found no enemy before him, for the delay had enabled Crittenden to unite his forces, cross the Chickamauga and take a strong position on the bluffs overlooking that stream at Lee and Gordon's Mill. Thus Bragg's attempt to crush the Union left failed, for which Polk was held responsible.

Meanwhile McCook was still far on the right, entirely out of position. Finding that coöperation with Thomas from the Broomtown Valley was impossible, he retired his trains to the summit of the mountain behind him and at midnight of the 12th was ordered to join Thomas at Stevens' Gap. Rosecrans had now discovered that Bragg, instead of retreating, was concentrated for battle, and that Johnston from Mississippi and Longstreet from Virginia were hurrying to join him. In his report Rosecrans says: "It then became a matter of life and death to effect the concentration of the army."* The flanks of the army

* *Official Records*, vol. xxx., pt. i., p. 54.

were 40 miles apart by the nearest practicable roads. McCook's return to the main body was one of vital importance. Concluding that he could not move along the eastern base of Lookout, McCook determined to join the centre by a roundabout way through Valley Head. On the night of the 13th he ascended the mountain, moving by way of Henderson's Gap, and four days later effected his junction with Thomas by Winston's Gap. On September 17 his advance went into camp at Pond Spring, seven miles from the slope of Missionary Ridge where Rosecrans' headquarters were situated, and 15 miles from Chattanooga.

Bragg's third plan for which orders were issued on September 18 was the Murfreesboro scheme reversed. Longstreet with two divisions of the army of Northern Virginia had arrived and he therefore determined to move by the right flank instead of the left to take position on the road from Lafayette to Chattanooga, attack the Union left, drive it down the eastern slope of Lookout Mountain and destroy it. By Bragg's original order Bushrod R. Johnson was to cross the Chickamauga at Reed's bridge, then turning to the left sweep up the stream toward Lee and Gordon's Mill, Walker crossing at Alexander's bridge to unite in the movement. Buckner was to cross at Thetford's Ford to press the enemy up the creek in front of Polk. Polk was to attack at Lee and Gordon's Mill, while Hill was to cover

the Confederate left flank against a Union advance from McLeMORE's Cove. Thus Bragg's plan was to drive Crittenden back on Thomas in the centre and both Crittenden and Thomas back on McCook on the right



and thus interposing between the Union army and Chattanooga push it back into the mountains and regain that most important city.

This movement, which was to have taken place at daybreak of the 18th, was retarded by many delays, and not until the afternoon of the 18th did Johnson, in command of five brigades

including Hood's division of Longstreet's corps, force a passage at Reed's bridge where was a troop of Minty's cavalry. Walker's corps, after failing at Alexander's bridge which was defended by Wilder's brigade of mounted cavalry, was compelled to cross at a ford below. During the night about two-thirds of Bragg's army crossed the Chickamauga and early on the morning of the 19th formed in line of battle directly on Crittenden's left flank. This delay made Bragg's purpose evident to Rosecrans, who accordingly improved his time by shifting the position of his army. Hence Bragg's plan of battle was destroyed by a night advance of Rosecrans' centre and right whereby he passed several miles beyond Bragg's position and threw his lines across the Lafayette Road and eastward to the Chickamauga, thereby gaining a position between Bragg and Chattanooga. The head of Thomas' corps which struck Forrest's cavalry at Jay's Mill was Brannan's division. The fighting soon became desperate and at close quarters, and so continued until 1 o'clock when Forrest and his supports were repulsed. Soon both armies were advancing rapidly toward the scene of fighting. The battle raged from noon until sunset with alternating advance and repulse for each side, the field finally remaining in the possession of the Union forces. At nightfall Cleburne's division fell with great force upon the lines of John-

son's and Baird's divisions which were well in advance of the centre, compelling them to withdraw. At the close of the day's fight the Union army held the Lafayette road between Bragg and Chattanooga, thus defeating Bragg's plan of battle for the day.* The Confederate line extended from Jay's Mill to Hall's Ford, while the Union line had been brought back nearer to the Lafayette road which was the axis and the objective of the battle. The Confederate line extended far beyond the Union left, overlapping the left by four brigades of cavalry, two fighting dismounted, and two brigades of infantry and the right by two brigades of infantry. Counting Longstreet's second and third lines and Law's and Kershaw's divisions at the centre, the Confederates had 15 brigades in reserve, while the Union army had 5. Counting by divisions from left to right the Union line was formed as follows: Baird, Johnson, Palmer and Reynolds east of the Lafayette road; Brannan, Negley, Davis, Sheridan and Wilder's mounted brigade west of it, with Wood and Van Cleve in reserve. From right to left the Confederate line was formed thus: Pegram and Armstrong, of Forrest's cavalry, Breckinridge, Cleburne, Stewart, Bushrod R. Johnson, Hindman, Preston, with Walker, Liddell, Cheatham, Law and Kershaw in reserve.

* Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. viii., pp. 84-90. Regarding Cleburne's attack see the versions in *Official Records*, vol. xxx., pt. i., p. 250, and pt. ii., p. 32.

Bragg had intended to begin the battle at daybreak of the 20th. Polk was to assault at early dawn and the attack was to be taken up in rapid succession to the left of the Confederate line. Dawn came, however, and the sun had risen far; yet there was no sign of a movement by Polk. The latter had immediately issued his orders to Hill, Cheatham, and Walker, the first being ordered to attack at daylight, while Cheatham was to make a simultaneous attack on Hill's left, Walker's corps being held in reserve. Hill's orders, however, did not reach him until sunrise, which accounts for his failure to attack at the time appointed. It was 9:30 before Hill reported his corps ready, and after the order to advance was given, further delay was caused by the fact that during the night Longstreet had pushed A. P. Stewart's division in front of Cheatham, making it impossible for the latter to move forward.* Finally, however, Breckinridge's division was thrown against Baird's brigade, but the attack was repulsed. The other two brigades swung around and fell on the Union rear, but were driven back after sharp fighting. Cleburne and Stewart assaulted in succession and were both repulsed. At 11 o'clock Negley, in the rear of Brotherton House, had been replaced by Thomas J. Wood from the reserve and sent to the left. Brannan, on the left of Wood, had also been ordered to the

left, but as the Confederates were going toward his front he did not move. Supposing that he had gone further Wood was directed to close on Reynolds', the next division to Brannan's left, and this movement was promptly undertaken. This left a wide gap in the Union forces.

Just as this change was occurring, Longstreet with three divisions, Bushrod Johnson in the front line, Law in the second, and Kershaw in the third, were moving toward Wood's position. Therefore the divisions of Davis and Sheridan to the right of the gap were rushed forward but failed to close the line, and being sharply attacked in front and on both flanks by the troops under Johnson and Hindman were driven from the field in great confusion. At this moment Rosecrans was in the rear of Davis' right waiting to see McCook's corps close to the left. He went to the extreme right to bring Sheridan forward, but met the retreating troops and was compelled to accompany them. McCook was swept away; Crittenden, unable to check the rout, was following Negley who, having been put in charge of a great quantity of artillery, had started for Rossville taking his guns with him; and even Sheridan, unable to hold his division together, was moving to the rear. Brannan's division, the first on the left of the break, swung back nearly at right angles and took position at Snodgrass Hill, a quarter of a mile in the rear of which also rallied other portions of the Union army that

* Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. viii., pp 90-92.


had been scattered or broken. At noon Forrest's cavalry opposite Cloud's had crossed the Lafayette road and captured the field hospitals of the Union left wing. Fearing that the whole army was vanquished Rosecrans, carried away in the crowd of fugitives, rode to Chattanooga for the purpose of taking measures to defend the city. At 5 o'clock in the afternoon he telegraphed Halleck that the army had met with a serious disaster and had been overwhelmed by the enemy.* Charles A. Dana telegraphed also: "Chickamauga is as fatal a name in our history as Bull Run."† In this they were partially mistaken, however, for the Confederates still had to reckon with George H. Thomas.

The four divisions of Baird, Johnson, Palmer and Reynolds maintained their lines around the Kelly field. At 1 o'clock General Thomas had formed parts of Brannan's, Wood's and Negley's divisions from various fragments on Snodgrass Hill. Negley had left at noon with two regiments of infantry and 40 guns, so that Thomas found himself with only one battery. At 4:30 the hill was assaulted by five brigades, that of Fulton overlapping Brannan's right and gaining the valley in his rear. At this juncture Gordon Granger arrived from McAfee's Church with the brigades of Whitaker and Mitchell and Steedman's division and, promptly attacking, drove

the Confederate force back over a ridge which it had just crossed, and extended Thomas' line a half mile along the crest. Almost simultaneously VanDerveer's brigade arrived after a successful charge on Breckinridge in the Kelly field and strengthened Brannan's line. Longstreet's assault continued with little intermission until sundown. Finally 11 Confederate brigades were participating in the attack on Snodgrass. For its defence Thomas at the last had five full brigades and about one-half of two others. After 1 o'clock there was little fighting on the Kelly field line, although Bragg had ordered a general attack for 3 o'clock which, however, was not delivered until sundown. At 3 o'clock Longstreet sent back to Bragg for reinforcements from the right wing, but was informed that this wing had been so badly defeated that it could be of no service to him. Longstreet began his attack at 4:30 and continued it until 6 o'clock. The Confederates gained a salient of the Union line and held it for a hour at an enormous loss, but were finally dislodged from their position by General Charles H. Grosvenor's regiment. It is a question whether Thomas might have held his position permanently, but he was not free to choose his course of action. At 3:45 General James A. Garfield, Rosecrans' chief of staff, borne away from the battlefield with the tide, had obtained permission from Rosecrans to turn back. He made his way to the scene of ac-

* *Official Records*, vol. xxx., pt. i., p. 142.

† *Ibid.*, pt. i., pp. 192-193.



From the original Brady negatives.

1. THE CHICKAMAUGA BATTLEFIELD.
2. LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN FROM THE SOUTH.
3. POST IN THE RACCOON MOUNTAINS, WHITESIDE, NEAR CHATTANOOGA.
4. VIEW FROM THE WHITESIDE FOURTH BRIDGE, NEAR CHATTANOOGA. THIS IS A TYPICAL PASSAGE THROUGH THE MOUNTAINS OVER WHICH THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND HAD TO MAKE ITS WAY IN THE CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN.

tempted to move on VanDerveer's position. Davis' division which had been cut off at noon reached a point near General Thomas' right at sundown. Sheridan, who had continued to Rossville, marched toward the field from that point, reaching Cloud's an hour after sundown. Both of these companies acting as supports for the flanks while the troops were being withdrawn, Thomas retired the army without molestation through McFarland's Gap to Rossville and during the night placed it in a strong position in the gap at Rossville along the adjacent crests of Missionary Ridge, and crossed the valley to Look-out Mountain, thus being firmly established between Bragg and Chattanooga. Throughout the next day he held this line, but at night withdrew toward Chattanooga.*

The numbers engaged in the battle

* Jacob D. Cox, *The Chickamauga Crisis*, in *Scribner's Magazine*, vol. xxviii., pp. 326-339; Archibald Gracie, *The Truth about Chickamauga* (1911); Cist, *The Army of the Cumberland*, pp. 173-229; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. iii., pp. 638-671; J. W. DuBose, *General Joseph Wheeler and the Army of Tennessee* (1912); Wheeler, *Campaigns of Wheeler and His Cavalry* (1899); Wyeth, *Life of N. B. Forrest* (1899); Mathes, *General Forrest* (1902); Longstreet, *From Manassas to Appomattox* (1896); W. M. Polk, *Leonidas Polk, Bishop and General* (1893); Sheridan's *Memoirs*; Burr and Hinton, *Little Phil and His Troopers* (1888); H. E. Davies, *General Sheridan* (1895); biographies of Thomas by Henry Coppée, Van Horne, Richard W. Johnson, John W. DePeyster and Donn Piatt, and of James A. Garfield by J. M. Bundy, R. H. Conwell, Riddle, and George F. Hoar; *Confederate Military History*, vol. iv., pp. 204-208; vol. v., pp. 277-290; vol. vi., pp. 241-263; vol. vii., pp. 170-174; vol. viii., pp. 90-112; vol. ix., pt. i., pp. 174-181; vol. x., pt. i., pp. 183-188; vol. xi., pt. i., pp. 174-179.

of Chickamauga are variously estimated. According to Dawes, the Confederate army was 71,551, while Longstreet states the Confederate force at 59,242. The Union force is given as 59,965,* while Longstreet states it to have been 60,867.† Rosecrans certainly crossed the Tennessee with an effective force of a little more than 60,000. As two brigades and an additional regiment were detached, a maximum figure before his force at the opening of the battle would be 55,000. It is still more difficult to approximate Bragg's force. A week after the battle he reported 38,846 effectives and his loss to have been 18,000, which would make his force in action 56,846. Writing to President Davis September 14, 1863, General Lee states that his force five days before the battle was 76,219. Hence it would seem that even considering that some of Longstreet's troops did not reach the scene of action, Bragg must have had nearly 70,000 troops. The losses on both sides were frightful, the Union loss being reported as 1,656 killed, 9,749 wounded and 4,774 captured or missing, a total of 16,179, while the Confederate loss was reported as 2,389 killed, 13,412 wounded and 2,003 captured or missing, a total of 17,804.‡

At the close of the battle of Chickamauga the Union army occupied Chat-

* *Battles and Leaders*, vol. iii., p. 673.

† *From Manassas to Appomattox*, p. 458.

‡ *Battles and Leaders*, vol. iii., pp. 673, 675. See also Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. viii., pp. 106-107.

tanooga on the night of the 21st and the morning of the 22d and immediately began to fortify it. In retiring to Chattanooga Rosecrans did not consider it practicable or expedient to retain control of Lookout Mountain which covered his line of supplies from Bridgeport, so withdrew his forces from the passes of that mountain. This point was immediately occupied by the troops under Bragg who also sent a cavalry force across the Tennessee above Chattanooga which destroyed a large wagon train in the Sequatchie Valley, capturing McMinnville and other points on the railroad. Thus the Confederates almost entirely cut off Rosecrans' army from its supplies. Bragg's left rested on the Tennessee River and Lookout Mountain below the city; his centre extended across the plain to the foot of Missionary Ridge; his right was then established at the foot of the ridge and reaching toward the Tennessee River above. Fortunately, however, the line of railroad was well defended by the Union troops. Attacks by the Confederates were repulsed by Colonel McCook at Anderson's Cross Roads on October 2, by Mitchell at Shelbyville on the 6th, and by Crook at Farmington on the 8th. For nearly a month the siege of Chattanooga continued, Bragg sealing the front and both flanks of the place against any communication, thereby expecting a speedy evacuation of Chattanooga because of lack of food and forage. The operations of the Confederate cav-

alry kept Rosecrans continually distressed. On October 12 he telegraphed to Lincoln his fear of starvation, but Lincoln told him to hold on, as Sherman and Hooker were advancing to support him.* This message, instead of cheering Rosecrans, seemingly depressed him to such an extent as to paralyze his power of initiating further plans looking toward his own relief in the interval.

On October 17 Grant was directed to go to Louisville for orders. It was the Government's intention to name him for the chief command and to leave to his discretion the question of retaining Rosecrans at the head of the Army of the Cumberland or of promoting Thomas to his place. Stanton hurried west to consult with Grant and the two decided to create a military division of the Mississippi out of the Departments of the Ohio, the Cumberland and the Tennessee — in fact, all the territory from the Alleghanies to the Mississippi north of the limits of Banks' domain, and over this new department Grant was placed in control. He then decided to relieve Rosecrans without delay and the next day telegraphed to Thomas to assume command and to hold Chattanooga at all hazards. Grant then proceeded as rapidly as possible from Louisville, arriving at Chattanooga on the night of October 23. His energy and enterprise revived the spirits of the officers and rank, and the opera-

* Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. viii., p. 116.

tions gained an immense impetus from his arrival; moreover, his farsighted wisdom in placing Thomas in command was soon abundantly justified.

On arriving at Chattanooga Grant found that plans had already been made to open a short route for supplies from Bridgeport and that the preliminary steps had already been taken. After consultation with the chief engineer, General William F. Smith, Rosecrans and Smith had planned to seize Brown's Ferry on the Tennessee at the northern base of Moccasin Point, while Hooker, crossing at Bridgeport, was to take possession of Lookout Valley. Should this be successful the Union army would have the advantage of river transportation from Bridgeport to Kelly's Ferry, from which point there was a good wagon road to Brown's Ferry and thence to Chattanooga. Thomas had already ordered Hooker to concentrate at Bridgeport and Smith had prepared the pontoons necessary for bridging the river at Brown's Ferry. The morning after his arrival Grant made a reconnoissance in company with Thomas and Smith, satisfied himself of the feasibility of the undertaking, and urged its prompt execution. Accordingly, on the night of October 26, 1,800 men under General Hazen were embarked at Chattanooga in 60 pontoons in which they floated down the Tennessee with the current around the sharp bend of the river below Lookout Mountain, unobserved

by three miles of pickets, until they reached Brown's Ferry, six miles up the river from Chattanooga. Landing at two points they seized the pickets and obtained possession of the spurs near the river. The remainder of the force under Smith, which had marched by the north bank, was ferried over before daylight, strengthening the party under Hazen. By 10 o'clock in the morning the pontoon bridge, 900 feet long, was completed; the points occupied were well intrenched; the artillery was put in position so as to command the main road from Chattanooga Valley to Lookout Valley; and the Confederates between Lookout and Shell Mound, finding themselves in a critical position, hastily retreated behind the creek. On October 26 Hooker crossed the Tennessee and occupied Lookout Valley, Geary with six regiments of his division holding the advance at Wauhatchie Station while Palmer, following in Hooker's rear, formed a strong moving base for that general's operations. Chagrined at the success of the expedition under Smith, Jenkins' (Hood's) division and six regiments of Longstreet's corps, supported by Law's division, attacked Geary on the night of the 28th and the morning of the 29th in a desperate effort to cut off and capture Geary. Schurz's division coming to Geary's support, Longstreet's troops, after three hours of fighting, withdrew to the east side of Lookout, and the Wauhatchie or Lookout Valley remained

thereafter in Union control. The Union loss in these operations from the 27th to the 29th was reported as 76 killed, 339 wounded and 22 missing. After these movements abundant supplies were able to reach Chattanooga by the river and by short wagon haul from Brown's Ferry.*

At this time Bragg executed a most injudicious movement. The Confederate corps commanders had made no secret of their lack of confidence in Bragg and on October 9 Jefferson Davis paid a visit to the army in an attempt to patch up the quarrels, but failed in this undertaking. Accordingly, to remove one element of discord, he suggested that Longstreet's corps be detached to capture or destroy Burnside's army at Knoxville.† Longstreet, however, did not start immediately upon Davis' visit, but after Longstreet's defeat in the night battle of Wauhatchie, Bragg, convinced that his grip on the army at Chattanooga was loosening, determined to send an expedition against Burnside. Accordingly on November 3, 1863, Longstreet was ordered to march and the next day took his departure from Tyner's Station. When Grant learned that Longstreet had gone he determined to attack the Confederates and on November 7 directed Thomas to make a demonstration on the enemy's right wing on the northern extremity of Missionary Ridge for the purpose

of drawing Longstreet back. Thomas, however, was convinced that such a movement would result in a terrible defeat, and he and Smith persuaded Grant that it was impracticable to take the offensive until Sherman's arrival.*


Sherman was coming along as fast as possible. He had been engaged in opening the line of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad eastward toward Huntsville with the design of effecting a communication with Chattanooga. He was employed on this task working resolutely in the face of the enemy eastwardly from Corinth through Iuka; but when Grant took command Sherman was ordered east.† Accordingly, Sherman abandoned his work on the railroad, crossed the Tennessee at Eastport, moved by the north bank to Stevenson and on the night of the 15th rode into Chattanooga, his army being close behind him. Grant had already matured his plan of battle, and at the earliest moment after Sherman's arrival put it into execution. At the opening of the battle Bragg's lines lay as has already been described. Hooker with Geary's division and Cruft's from the 4th corps of the Army of the Cumberland occupied Lookout Valley; the Army of the Cumberland and the 11th corps were in lines about Chattanooga; and Sherman having crossed at Brown's Ferry

* Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. viii., pp. 122-127.

† Pollard, *The Lost Cause*, p. 456; Grant, *Personal Memoirs*, vol. ii., p. 85.

* *Official Records*, vol. xxxi., pt. ii., p. 29; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. iii., p. 716; Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. viii., pp. 129-130.

† *Official Records*, vol. xxxi., pt. i., p. 17, pt. ii., p. 571; Sherman, *Memoirs*, vol. i., p. 357.




From the original Brady negatives.

1. VIEW OF CHATTANOOGA, LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN IN THE DISTANCE.

2. VIEW OF KNOXVILLE.

with three divisions was concealed behind the hills above Chattanooga and on the opposite side of the river. Grant's whole force on the firing line was about 60,000, while the Confederates numbered less than 40,000, though the positions they occupied gave them great advantage. Grant planned that

right; then, sweeping south together, they were to clear the ridge and the valley. At the same time Grant sent to Burnside a note explaining his purpose and urging him to occupy Longstreet at various points and to draw him farther and farther away from Bragg, only taking care to hold Knox-



Hooker should hold Lookout Valley against Bragg's left. Sherman was to cross the Tennessee opposite the north end of Missionary Ridge and carry it to the railroad tunnel about half a mile south of its northern end. Being astride of this ridge Sherman was then to move south, while Thomas with the Army of the Cumberland was to connect its left with Sherman's

ville at all hazards. If besieged there by Longstreet, Grant expected ere long to afford him relief by beating and dispersing Bragg's army, which would compel Longstreet to retreat into Virginia. As the engagement progressed, however, the Sherman-Thomas coöperative movement was changed by unexpected developments.*

* *Official Records*, vol. xxxi., pt. ii., p. 33.

All his arrangements having been made, Grant at noon of November 23 directed Thomas to ascertain if the Confederates still occupied their lines and camps between the city and Missionary Ridge. Accordingly, Thomas paraded five divisions in full view of the Confederate positions on the summit of the ridge, 500 feet above the Union troops. As was afterward ascertained, this movement was supposed to be a review and drill. Wood's division was in the centre, Schurz's and Steinwehr's divisions of the 11th corps were on the left, and Sheridan's and Baird's on the right. Suddenly at 1:30 o'clock the centre advanced rapidly, opened briskly on the Confederate pickets, drove them into their rifle-pits, and by 3 o'clock after a sharp contest had captured Orchard Knob, forced the abandonment of the entire line of the Confederates through the centre of the plain, reversed the works at and near the Knob and held them. This was the first day's battle.*

Meanwhile Sherman's troops had marched from Bridgeport by way of Whiteside, crossed the river at Brown's Ferry, moved up the north bank keeping concealed from the enemy, and reached a point not far from the mouth of the North Chickamauga. More than 100 pontoon bridges were carried overland so as to insure the passage of the river.

The site selected for the bridge was just below the South Chickamauga which afforded advantages for posting the artillery. Sherman's force arrived on November 23 and at 2 o'clock on the morning of the 24th three of his four divisions marched to the North Chickamauga. There the pontoon boats were filled with soldiers, floated down the creek to the river, and thence to the opposite shore. By daylight of the 24th, 8,000 of his troops had been ferried across and were in line fronting Missionary Ridge, two miles from it and opposite its northern extremity, which point was not occupied by the Confederates until 2:30 in the afternoon. By noon of that day two bridges had been completed to furnish a route for the remainder of the army, which crossed and gained and held "the whole of the northern extremity of Missionary Ridge to near the railroad tunnel."† At 2:30 P. M. Cleburne's division arrived at the north point of the ridge and intrenched.

General Thomas, having obtained Grant's permission to make a demonstration against the Confederate position at Lookout, Hooker made ready to move at an early hour on the 24th. The Confederates held the top of the mountain, which was a narrow plateau 1,700 feet above the valley protected by perpendicular palisades varying from 75 to 250 feet high. From the

* *Official Records*, vol. xxxi., pt. ii., p. 32; Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. viii., pp. 133-138.

† *Official Records*, vol. xxxi., pt. ii., p. 33. See also Sherman's report in *ibid*, vol. xxxi., pt. ii., p. 573.

foot of these walls of rock the mountain sloped westward to Hooker's position in Lookout Valley, and eastward to the plain south of Chattanooga, while its north slope descended to the Tennessee River opposite Moccasin Point. It was approximately a mile and a half from the foot of the palisades to the valley, and it was on these slopes that the battle took place. On the morning of the 24th Brown's and Pettus' brigades of Stevenson's Confederate division, with a battery of four Napoleons, occupied the summit, while Walthall's brigade of Cheatham's division held the western slope and Moore's brigade of the same division lay on the northern slope. Hooker's forces consisted of three brigades of Geary's division of the 12th corps, two brigades of Cruft's division of the 4th corps, and two brigades of Osterhaus' division of Sherman's army, the latter division having been prevented from following Sherman over the river by the breaking of the pontoon bridge at Brown's Ferry. Hooker's aggregate strength was a little over 9,000. Walthall's brigade, which sustained almost the entire attack until the western and northern slope had been carried, did not number more than 1,700, while 250 men of Moore's brigade were on picket duty and nearly all of them were captured early in the engagement.

At 8 o'clock in the morning the head of Hooker's column crossed Lookout Creek at Light's Mill near

Wauhatchie, and under cover of a dense fog which hung over the mountain marched directly up the western slope until the head of the line reached the base of the palisades. The line was then faced toward the north point of the mountain about two miles distant. After advancing about a mile and a half with Geary's brigades (Cobham's, Ireland's and Candy's) in advance and Whitaker's of Cruft's division in reserve, the troops struck the left flank of Walthall's line, carried it, and drove the Confederates around the north point of the mountain and across its northern slope. As Geary's attack opened, Grose of Cruft's division and Wood and Williamson of Osterhaus' successively joined the left of the lines, and with a swinging movement advanced on the slopes of the mountain. Until the northern slope had been carried to the Craven House, Walthall had no assistance, but as he was being pushed back from this place Moore advanced, though with little effect, as he was immediately repulsed. At 1 o'clock Pettus arrived and relieved Walthall after he had withdrawn about 400 yards from the Craven House, thus enabling Walthall to reform, procure ammunition and take his place on the line again. This position was held until 3 o'clock in the morning when, the troops and supplies from the top having been withdrawn and safely started across the plain for Missionary Ridge, this final line was also retired and the

mountain abandoned. The troops on the summit, because of the fog, could do little damage to the Union lines. Hooker was materially assisted by batteries on the elevated points in Lookout Valley and those across the river at Moccasin Point which swept the northern slope. The next morning the Union forces occupied the summit. Hooker's loss at Lookout and the next day at Missionary Ridge amounted to 81 killed and 390 wounded while the Confederate loss was 21 killed and 177 wounded besides 1,053 missing or made prisoners.

The capture of Lookout Mountain decided Bragg to withdraw his entire army from the plain to the crest of Missionary Ridge though heavy picket forces were left in the intrenchments at the base of the ridge. Accordingly, during the night of the 24th and early in the morning of the 25th Bragg concentrated his army at Missionary Ridge and in the earthworks at its base. His new line extended from Rossville to the north end of the ridge, a distance of eight miles, the divisions from Rossville northward being Stewart's, Breckinridge's (Bates'), Hindman's (Patton Anderson's), Cheatham's, Walker's, Stevenson's and Cleburne's.

The morning broke clear and cold, the fog had passed away, and soon after the sun had risen preparations were made for beginning operations. Shortly after 7 A. M. the battle began with an assault of Sherman upon the north end of the ridge held by Cle-

burne, Sherman's force consisting of his own divisions of Morgan L. Smith, Hugh Ewing and John E. Smith, with the divisions of Jeff C. Davis from the Army of the Cumberland and Schurz and Steinwehr of the 11th corps. The four brigades of Corse, Matthies, Raum and Giles A. Smith reached the crest at different times but none was able to hold his place, though Corse and Smith kept their grip stubbornly until evening, when all were driven from the slopes. The Union troops fought persistently and courageously, but Cleburne, at first alone and later supported by Stevenson's division and a part of Walker's, repelled all assaults. The last one, about 3:30 P. M., was especially serious.

Grant and his principal officers were waiting at Orchard Knob for news of such decisive success from Sherman as to justify the coöperating movement on the part of Thomas, and also for tidings that Hooker had descended from the slope of Lookout and had attacked the left flank of the enemy at Rossville. On observing Sherman's repulse and concluding that Hooker had already made his way to Rossville, Grant ordered Thomas to advance his four divisions at the centre against the earthworks at the foot of the ridge as a diversion in Sherman's favor, hoping thereby to cause the Confederates to withdraw part of their forces from Sherman's front. From left to right Thomas' divisions were those of Baird, Wood,

Sheridan and Johnson. The line was two and a half miles long, faced the ridge at distances from three-quarters of a mile to a mile from it, and as formed for the assault consisted of 11 brigades and 89 regiments, the formation being such as to present the appearance of being four lines deep. Opposed to this column were 13 brigades and 16 batteries. At a signal of six cannon shots from Orchard Knob the four divisions rushed for the earthworks at the foot of the ridge. The cannonading of nearly 100 guns from the crest was terrific and the line was soon under rifle-fire from the works at the base, but the entire line of rifle-pits was captured with comparative ease. The attacking of these earthworks was all that the troops had been ordered to do, but when they perceived the Confederates swarming out of the rifle-pits and fleeing before them they were seized with an irresistible impulse to mount the heights despite the storm of shot and shell which rained down upon them. Accordingly, re-forming in the earthworks, Baird's division on the left and Johnson's on the right began the storming of the ridge without further orders. The long lines of the storming party moved up the slopes with few checks; color after color was planted on the summits and in an hour three miles of the crest had been carried and 37 guns and about 2,000 prisoners had been captured.

Just as the orders were given for this assault at the centre Hooker, who

at 1 o'clock had descended Lookout and started to attack the south end of the ridge in Rossville Gap, reached that position. He at once sent Osterhaus' division through the Gap and turned it north along the east side of Missionary Ridge. Cruft's division assaulted and carried the south end of the ridge in the Gap, while Geary moved along the western base of the ridge and finally ascended to the crest, reaching it soon after the right of Thomas' assault had occupied it. Meanwhile, after Baird's division had reached the crest, it turned northward and became hotly engaged with Walthall's brigade assisted by those of Jackson and Moore of Cheatham's division, but darkness ended the fighting. Walthall's stand across the ridge had made it possible for Cleburne's, Stevenson's, Walker's and Cheatham's divisions to withdraw in order and unmolested. The centre and left retreated in general confusion, Bate's division, however, soon rallying for a stout resistance as rear guard.*

So great a success could not be achieved without serious loss. Including the three days' battles and the pursuit of Bragg, Grant's losses were

* Davis says: "It is believed that if the troops who yielded to the assault had fought with the valor which they had displayed on previous occasions, and which was manifested at this battle on the other parts of the line, the enemy would have been repulsed with very great slaughter, and our country would have escaped the misfortune, and the army the mortification, of the first defeat that has resulted from misconduct by the troops." — Pollard, *Third Year of the War*, p. 158.

752 killed, 4,713 wounded and 350 captured or missing, a total of 5,815.* Bragg's loss was 361 killed, 2,180 wounded and 4,146 captured or missing, a total of 6,687.† Grant, however, reported the capture of 6,142 prisoners, 239 of whom were commissioned officers. Bragg also admits a large loss of prisoners and stragglers and of 40 guns.‡

Bragg retreated to Dalton in the vicinity of Ringgold Gap. To intercept the retreat Thomas on the morning of November 26 ordered Hooker to push on to Graysville and directed Palmer, commanding the 15th corps, to report to Hooker and coöperate in the movement. On reaching Pea Vine Creek Palmer was ordered to

move directly on Graysville, while Hooker with the divisions of Osterhaus, Geary and Cruft moved on Ringgold to strike the Confederate line of retreat six miles farther south. At 9 o'clock in the evening the rear guard of the Confederates was struck by Palmer and three guns and some prisoners were captured. Palmer then pushed on to Graysville where he captured another gun and some more prisoners and bivouaced for the night. Hooker advanced to within six miles of Ringgold and late in the night snatched a short slumber near Palmer's right. Early on the morning of the 27th Hooker renewed the pursuit to Ringgold, Osterhaus' division in advance capturing many prisoners. Early on the morning of the 27th Cleburne was directed by Bragg to hold Ringgold Gap in Taylor's Ridge near the town until the trains and rear of the retreating troops could get beyond pursuit. Cleburne disposed his four brigades of about 4,200 men on the ridge on each side of the Gap as a support. In about half an hour Hooker came up and Wood's brigade of Osterhaus' division was ordered to make an assault. Cleburne then assumed the offensive and attacked Wood's main line but was repulsed. Meanwhile Williamson's brigade had effected a lodgment on a spur of Taylor's Ridge half a mile to the left of the Gap but the Confederates were so strongly posted that no headway could be made and Creighton's brigade of Geary's divi-

* *Battles and Leaders*, vol. iii., pp. 711, 729. Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. viii., p. 155, gives the loss as 753 killed, 4,722 wounded and 349 captured or missing, a total of 5,824.

† *Battles and Leaders*, vol. iii., p. 730; Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. viii., p. 155.

‡ *Official Records*, vol. xxxi., pt. ii., p. 36. On the battle of Chattanooga see *Official Records*, vol. xxx., and xxxi., pts. i. and ii.; Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. viii., chap. v.; Grant's *Personal Memoirs*, vol. ii.; Sherman's *Memoirs*, vol. i.; Cist, *The Army of the Cumberland*, pp. 230-262; Sheridan's *Memoirs*, vol. i.; Dodge, *A Bird's Eye View of the Civil War*; Van Horne, *History of the Army of the Cumberland*; Longstreet, *From Manassas to Appomattox*; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. iii., pp. 679-730; James H. Wilson, *Under the Old Flag* (1912); Butterfield, *Life of Hooker*; Halloway, *Life of Howard*; biographies of Thomas by Piatt, DePeyster, R. W. Johnson, Van Horne, and Coppée; of Sheridan by Davies; of W. F. Smith by James H. Wilson; of Grant by J. S. C. Abbott, A. W. Alexander, Badeau, Coppée, Crafts, Dana, Garland, Headley, Howland, Phelps, Larke, Porter, W. C. Church; and of Sherman by Bowman, Johnson and Force; *Confederate Military History*, vol. vi., pp. 268-271; vol. vii., pp. 176-178; vol. viii., pp. 113-123.

sion was ordered to ascend the ridge still further to the right. Having anticipated this movement Cleburne still further extended his right and repulsed Creighton's brigade, which in falling back carried part of Williamson's brigade with it. While Creighton was preparing to make another assault he was killed and operations in that part of the field were suspended. Meanwhile sharp work was going on in the Gap and on the line on either side of it without any material advantage to Hooker. Between 12 and 1 o'clock Hooker's artillery opened a furious fire upon Cleburne's position but Cleburne had already decamped, leaving only a few skirmishers in the Gap. Grant arrived on the field early in the afternoon and ordered the pursuit to be discontinued. Later in the day Grose's brigade went forward but encountering the Confederate cavalry supported by infantry returned to Ringgold. The Union loss in this attack was 65 killed and 377 wounded and the Confederate loss was 20 killed, 190 wounded and 11 missing.*

Meanwhile Burnside had been proceeding slowly eastward. On assuming command of the Department of the West Burnside requested reinforcements and two divisions of the 9th corps then in camp at Newport

News were sent to him. With the aid of these he was able to do something toward checking Pegram's movements in Kentucky, but his force was too meagre completely to repress the enemy. As we have seen, a movement into east Tennessee had been arranged in which Burnside, Rosecrans and Thomas were to coöperate, by the terms of which Burnside proceeded to Lexington on June 2 to take the field; but a dispatch from Washington received that day required him to send reinforcements to Grant at Vicksburg, an order which deprived him of about 8,000 men of the 9th corps. Nevertheless, on August 16, the same day that Rosecrans crossed the Cumberland Mountains, Burnside left Camp Nelson in Kentucky and started for Lexington. His plan was to make his way by unfrequented roads and take the Confederates by surprise. Having arranged his force, about 18,000 in number, to march in three columns, the first set out by way of Loudon under Burnside, the second, consisting of the 23d army corps under General Hartsuff, by way of Somerset, and the third under General J. White by way of Jamestown, Kentucky.* On September 1 the Union advance under Colonel Foster entered Knoxville, followed two days later by General Burnside himself. There a large amount of public property

* *Official Records*, vol. xxxi.; Van Horne, *History of the Army of the Cumberland*, vol. i.; *Confederate Military History*, vol. vi., pp. 272-276. The Confederate army was first rallied at Dalton where it remained until the opening of the Atlanta campaign in the spring of 1864.

* On the importance of the Confederates holding east Tennessee see Woodbury, *Burnside and the 9th Army Corps*, p. 303; Pollard, *Second Year of the War*, p. 204.

claimed by the Confederate authorities fell into Union hands, including 2,000,000 pounds of salt, large quantities of wheat, locomotives, cars, etc.

Just before leaving Kentucky Burnside ordered Colonel DeCourcy with a brigade of infantry to march upon Cumberland Gap by a direct route through Loudon and Barboursville. On September 4, learning that General John W. Frazer with a brigade of 2,300 men occupied a strong position in the Gap, Burnside ordered General Shackelford with a cavalry brigade to approach it from the north and cooperate with Colonel DeCourcy. Shackelford reached the south end of the Gap on the 7th and communicated with DeCourcy who had arrived on the north side and both sent a summons of surrender to Frazer who promptly refused. Meanwhile Burnside had set out on the 7th with another body of infantry and cavalry, arriving within four miles of the Gap on the 9th after a forced march of 60 miles. Being thus outnumbered, Frazer decided to surrender which he did on the morning of the 9th, more than 2,000 men with 12 guns and a large supply of ammunition being turned over. Cumberland Gap remained in Union possession until the close of the war.

The main body of Burnside's army was then ordered to move as rapidly as possible toward Chattanooga to connect with Rosecrans.* Being in poor health Burnside wished to resign

but Lincoln replied that such a course could not be permitted until things were a little more settled in east Tennessee.* Accordingly he at once put his troops in motion to occupy the different points necessary to guard his line of advance, the Holston River, and to hold the gaps of the North Carolina mountains. In spite of the urgency of the authorities at Washington, however, Burnside made no especial haste to relieve Rosecrans. Though he cheerfully acquiesced in the orders to proceed at once to Rosecrans' assistance, he took his own time about it, his cavalry scouring the country in every direction and skirmishing as far as Blountsville in the extreme northeastern corner of the State. After Grant assumed charge of the movements at Chattanooga Burnside was being continually urged to exert every energy toward securing a victory, but before he could do anything Bragg, as we have seen, had detached Longstreet for an expedition against him.

Longstreet received his orders on November 3 and took with him the divisions of McLaws and Hood, two artillery battalions and Wheeler's cavalry. He was directed to move as fast as possible with the design of capturing or destroying Burnside. At the same time Major-General W. E. Jones was urged to press Burnside in east Tennessee.† Longstreet, how-

* *Ibid*, p. 55.

† Badeau, *Military History of Grant*, vol. i., p. 678.

* *Official Records*, vol. xxx., pt. iii., pp. 617-638.

ever, moved very slowly and while he was on his way Jones, on the opposite side of Knoxville, made a spirited dash with 2,500 cavalry upon one of Burnside's outposts at Rogersville, capturing the force stationed there, consisting of the 7th Ohio cavalry, the 2d Tennessee mounted infantry and a battery of four guns, all under Colonel Israel Garrard. The Union loss was about 20 killed and wounded, and 650 men, four guns, two colors, 1,000 horses and mules, together with 40 wagons and ambulances. The Confederate loss, as reported, was 10 killed and wounded.

Longstreet advanced by way of Loudon and Lenoir and on November 14 crossed the Tennessee near the former place. Burnside then sent a dispatch to Grant proposing that he retire gradually in front of Longstreet so as to draw the latter farther and farther away from Chattanooga, thinking that thereby he could better assist Grant in his campaign against Bragg. Accordingly on November 14 Grant telegraphed him to hold Longstreet in check, then to skirmish and fall back. The next day Grant ordered Burnside to hold on to Knoxville and that portion of the valley depending upon it.* Burnside followed out these orders to the letter. He concluded to leave one brigade at Kingston and retire the rest of his command to Knoxville about 30 miles distant where he had prepared to make a stand behind defensive works.

On the 14th he skirmished sharply with Longstreet's advance and on the 15th gradually falling back concentrated Hartranft's and Ferrero's divisions of the 9th corps and White's division of the 23d corps at Lenoir. He had about 5,000 men. Longstreet followed and attacked during the night, but was repulsed. Before day-break of the 16th Hartranft with his division and some cavalry was sent to secure Campbell's Station at the intersection of the roads coming from the south. Burnside followed with the other two divisions, artillery and trains, closely pursued by Longstreet with Hood's division commanded by General Micah Jenkins, with whose advance the Union rear guard had several sharp encounters. McLaws' division of Longstreet's corps took a more direct road to the left, the two roads intersecting about a mile to the south of Campbell's Station, 15 miles south of Knoxville. Hartranft reached this point in advance of McLaws and, turning west on the Kingston road, deployed his division in such a manner as to confront McLaws and at the same time cover the Lenoir road along which the trains were moving in advance of the infantry. He had just swung into position when McLaws made his attack but Hartranft held on until Burnside with the trains and the remainder of the troops had passed and the troops taken position when he fell back and formed on the left of White's division, a half mile beyond the junction of the two roads.

* *Ibid*, vol. i., pp. 474-475.

Ferrero's division was on White's right and the artillery so placed as to sweep the road and the open country in front. McLaws formed his troops on the plain but Burnside's artillery opened so viciously on him that a direct attack with infantry was deemed impracticable, whereupon he opened with artillery. Longstreet then ordered attacks on both flanks of Burnside's line which were repelled, but because of his superiority in numbers Longstreet was able to move around the flanks, thus compelling Burnside to fall back to a ridge nearly a mile to the rear. This he did under a heavy fire and closely pressed on all sides. At 4 o'clock Hood's division attacked Burnside's left but was repulsed; McLaws attacked the right and was thrown back, too; whereupon Longstreet prepared for a general assault along the entire line; but before the preparations were complete darkness came on and the movement was postponed. After dark Burnside resumed his march, his advance reaching Knoxville at daybreak on the morning of November 17. During the day Longstreet warily followed and the siege of Knoxville began. In the action at Campbell's Station and in the skirmishes preceding, the Union loss was 303 killed and wounded and 135 missing. The Confederate loss is not definitely known.*

Knoxville was now invested by


Longstreet, though the investment was never made complete, the line of approaches extending only half the circuit of the town above the northern, western and southern sides. The town had been thoroughly fortified, the line of defence extending from Holston River on the left, a double line of works fronting west, a strong work called Fort Sanders on the northwest salient and a line from that point across the railroad and again to the right as far as the river. The south side of the Holston was defended also by detached works connected with the town by a pontoon bridge. On the night of November 16, communication with Cumberland Gap was cut and by the night of the 18th the siege was well established. Burnside, however, still continued to hold partial communication with the country outside, and although, before the siege was ended, rations had become very short and forage so scarce that superfluous animals were killed and thrown into the river to get rid of them, the garrison was never driven to extremities.

Longstreet and his men seemed to be confident of quickly starving out Burnside and compelling a surrender, but in consequence of Grant's success at Chattanooga, Longstreet's position became exceedingly critical and as he was loath to leave Knoxville in possession of the Union troops he resolved to make a final effort to carry the works by assault. Accordingly on the night of the 28th he advanced

* *Official Records*, vol. xxxv.; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. iii., pp. 732-734; Woodbury, *Burnside and the 9th Army Corps*.

his sharpshooters to within rifle range of the Union defences and prepared a heavy column to attack Fort Sanders. Early on the morning of the 29th the assaulting party of three brigades approached to within 100 yards of the fort unharmed. Meanwhile the

momentarily confused, but the heavy mass behind them pushed resolutely forward and some gained the ditch and the parapet. The Union guns, which up to this time had remained silent, then opened on the Confederate troops with triple charges of



Union officers had captured some Confederate pickets and learned of Longstreet's intentions. Accordingly they placed an abatis and entanglements of wire in front of the fort. At dawn of the 29th Longstreet began a furious artillery fire and about half an hour later the Confederate column charged on the bastion. On reaching the abatis the Confederates became

canister. The infantry also started shooting down the defenceless Confederates in the ditch. Hour after hour the attack and the stubborn resistance were maintained until the ditch was piled with the dead and the dying, but finally the Confederate troops were compelled to withdraw. In this assault Longstreet lost 1,000 killed, wounded and prisoners, while

Burnside lost only 13 killed and wounded. Immediately after the repulse Longstreet received a dispatch from Davis announcing the disaster at Chattanooga and as his position was becoming increasingly perilous by the advance of Sherman who, after Bragg's defeat, had been sent to Burnside's relief, he determined to get into communication with Bragg. As Sherman's advance, however, prevented a junction with Bragg Longstreet issued orders to recall his trains and on the night of December 4 passed around the north side of Knoxville and took up his line of march to the Holston. On the same day Sherman's advance guard reached Knoxville. Grant's orders were imperative that Long-

street should be followed and accordingly the 9th corps under General Parke set out in pursuit on December 7. Feeling that his work was done Burnside at his own request was relieved from further duty and on December 11 formally transferred the command to General J. G. Foster. The force under Parke was quite insufficient to cope with Longstreet who moved to the south side of the Holston where during the winter he continued to annoy and harass the Union troops in Tennessee. In the spring he joined Lee for the campaign of 1864. Sherman, having left Granger and his men at Knoxville, returned with the rest of his command to Chattanooga, and thus the important campaign was ended.*

CHAPTER XXXII.

1863.

INTERNAL AFFAIRS: ACTS OF CONGRESS.

Conspiracies at the North — The Indiana trials — Governor Morton and the Indiana legislature — The *Chesapeake* affair — Beall's project on Lake Erie — His arrest, trial and execution — The St. Albans raid — The attempt to capture Camp Douglas — The plot to burn New York — Lincoln's message to Congress — Stanton's report — Financial conditions — Resolutions adopted by Congress — Revision of the tariff — Passage of internal revenue and income tax measures — Factional disputes in Missouri.

The opposition to the Administration in the North could not content itself merely with an open show of resistance, but soon took to secret measures to avoid the restraints of justice and the sharp measures of the military administration. Secret associations were formed throughout the country to embarrass the Govern-

ment, to communicate information to the Confederates, and, in many cases, to inflict serious damage on the lives and property of Unionists. The or-

* Woodbury, *Burnside and the 9th Army Corps*, pp. 327-351; Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. viii., pp. 158-188; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. iii., pp. 731-752; *Confederate Military History*, vol. vi., pp. 264-267; vol. vii., pp. 174-176; vol. viii., pp. 123-124.

ganizations took various names, such as "Knights of the Golden Circle," "Order of American Knights," "Order of the Star," "Sons of Liberty," etc. It is impossible to ascertain the exact number of adherents, but several boasted of a membership of one million. These societies operated chiefly in Illinois and Indiana and their members were quite numerous in Ohio, Kentucky and Missouri. One of their chief objects seems to have been to arouse discontent in the army and to encourage desertion. Members of the order enlisted in the army with the express purpose of inciting soldiers to desert, and money and citizens' clothing were furnished for this purpose. Squads of soldiers sent to arrest deserters were frequently attacked in rural districts. The Government took little notice of these societies further than to secure the admission to membership of loyal men who kept the Government constantly informed of all general plans and purposes.

The organization and schemes of the orders were completely exposed in the autumn of 1864. A prominent lawyer of Indiana was indicted for treasonable practices and made a clean breast of the whole affair. A northwestern conspiracy was to be formed or, if that failed, the members were to join the Southern army. The Indiana government was to be seized and Governor Morton held as a hostage; a general uprising was then to have taken place on August 16, 1864, in

conjunction with a Confederate raid from Cumberland Gap, the chief object being the liberation of Confederate prisoners in Illinois, Ohio and Indiana. The appointed time came, but the Confederates did not, and the plans of the conspirators proved abortive.*

Governor Morton was greatly disquieted by the work of the conspirators in his State and feared that the legislature might pass a joint resolution to acknowledge the Southern Confederacy, but though they gave the governor every possible cause for worryment no such overt step of treason was attempted. Measures were introduced, however, to transfer the military power of the State from the government to the Democratic State officers. The Republicans defeated these measures by leaving the legislative chambers and preventing a quorum. As a result, no appropriation bills were passed, and Governor Morton was forced to appeal to the people of the State for funds to carry on the government. To his appeals, individuals, banks and private corporations made hearty response. Furthermore, Morton was made a disbursing officer of \$250,000, a part of the fund set aside by Congress for the purchase of munitions of war to be used in States already in rebellion or "in which rebellion is, or may be, threatened."

* Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. viii., pp. 7-8. See also Benn Pitman, *Treason Trials at Indianapolis*.

In the summer of 1864 Lincoln sent one of his secretaries, John Hay, to St. Louis, to secure from Rosecrans the story of a discovery he thought he had made anent the purpose and organization of the Order of American Knights and the Knights of the Golden Circle. There was little new in Rosecrans' story. He stated that Vallandigham was the supreme commander of the Northern wing of the society, and the Confederate general, Price, of the Southern wing. They claimed to have 25,000 members in Missouri, 140,000 in Illinois, 100,000 in Indiana, 80,000 in Ohio and 70,000 in Kentucky, and were gradually extending through the Western States. Vallandigham was expected soon to return, at which time the leaders of the society proposed to inaugurate the revolution. This story did not disturb Lincoln because he did not believe there were so many thousands of Democrats in the North who were actually disloyal to the Government; they might oppose his Administration, but they would never go to the extent of attempting to subvert the Government.

Most of the attempts against the peace of the free States were made by Southern emissaries or sympathizers. The case of the *Chesapeake* was one of the most noteworthy of these incidents. In the latter part of 1863 two Canadians, named J. C. Braine and H. A. Parr, determined to engage in a privateering enterprise on their own account. Braine had been re-

leased from Fort Henry upon the claim presented by the British minister that he was a British subject. Parr was a Canadian who had resided several years in Tennessee. Their only connection with the Confederate States was a commission in the Confederate navy. They and a dozen men, all British subjects, purchased arms and ammunition in New York and took passage on the merchant steamer *Chesapeake*, which sailed from New York on Saturday afternoon, December 6, with 24 passengers bound for Portland, Maine. On Sunday evening, after all the officers and crew except those on duty had retired, the pirates, heavily armed, overpowered those on deck and after a short struggle, in which they killed one and wounded two of the officers, succeeded in capturing the vessel. On December 9 the *Chesapeake* reached the Bay of Fundy and was there delivered into the hands of a man calling himself Captain Parker, who afterward proved to be an Englishman named Vernon Locke. The vessel was then sent to Sambro Harbor, Nova Scotia, to be prepared for her voyage to the Confederate States. While there, however, the United States gunboat *Ella and Annie* entered the harbor, recaptured the prize, and proceeded to take her back to American waters. On the way her commander met a superior officer of the United States navy, who ordered him to restore the *Chesapeake* to the jurisdiction of Great Britain. Accord-

ingly the *Chesapeake* was carried into Halifax and transferred to the British authorities for adjudication. The pirates who had been captured in the *Chesapeake* were surrendered also. When the case was taken to court the vessel was restored to her rightful owners. The Federal Government apologized for making the capture in British waters and thus the question was settled.*

The principal agent of the Confederates in Canada was Jacob Thompson, Secretary of State under Buchanan. Thompson had been captured by Grant in the ridiculous attempt to play the spy under a flag of truce, but was released and then went to Canada, whence he began to annoy the governmental officials along the border between New York and Maine. He planned to capture the war steamer *Michigan* on Lake Erie, and with her to liberate the Confederate prisoners on Johnson's Island in Sandusky Bay. The prisoners were then to destroy Buffalo, Cleveland and other large cities, and having done this were to march through Ohio toward Virginia. A man named Charles H. Cole informed himself thoroughly of the approaches to the harbors, depositories of coal, and the movements of the *Michigan*. September 19, 1864, was the day fixed for

the attempt, Cole having been invited to dine with the officers of the *Michigan* on that day. The more difficult part of the enterprise was assigned to a Virginian named John Y. Beall, who was to capture the ship. The commander of the *Michigan* was warned of the plot, arrested Cole, and prepared to give Beall a warm reception. On September 19, ignorant of the miscarriage of the plans, Beall, with 25 followers, sailed from Sandwich on the steamer *Philo Parsons*, with drawn pistols took possession of the boat and, after landing the passengers at Middle Bass Island, proceeded to attack the *Michigan*. On approaching that boat Beall missed the signals which Cole had agreed to give and, moreover, the men refused to risk the adventure; therefore he returned to the river and the crew scattered through Canada.*

Three months later (December 16, 1864) Beall was arrested in New York State near the suspension bridge over the Niagara River, after an unsuccessful endeavor to throw a passenger train from the West off the track, in order to rob the express company. He had made a similar attempt between Dunkirk and Buffalo. Therefore, for these undertakings and for his seizure of the *Parsons* and the *Island Queen*, he was tried by a military commission convened at Fort Lafayette and at New York City and

* Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. viii., pp. 14-16. On the subject of prizes, etc., see the various cases cited in *Appleton's Annual Cyclo-pædia* for 1863, pp. 765-769. See also Whiting, *War Powers under the Constitution of the United States*, pp. 141-156.

* Rhodes, *United States*, vol. v., pp. 330-332; Nicolay and Hay, vol. viii., pp. 18-19; *Official Records*, vol. xliii., pt. ii., p. 225 *et seq.*

found guilty of acting as a spy and of carrying on a guerilla warfare against the United States, for which acts he was condemned to be hanged. In defence of the episode on Lake Erie he produced a manifesto from Jefferson Davis, maintaining that the enterprise for the capture of the *Michigan* "was a belligerent expedition ordered and undertaken under the authority of the Confederate States," the government of which assumed the responsibility "of answering for the acts of any of its officers engaged in it." Major-General Dix, however, contended that "no such assumption can sanction an act not warranted by the laws of civilized warfare." Lincoln was earnestly importuned to revoke the death sentence, but, though he suggested that a reprieve of a few days be allowed Beall to prepare himself for death, declined to interfere with his execution. On February 24, 1865, therefore, Beall was hanged at Governor's Island.*

On June 16, 1864, Lieutenant Bennett H. Young was instructed by the Confederate Secretary of War to organize a small company for special service.† He informed Clement C. Clay that he proposed to burn and rob some of the New England towns, whereupon Clay gave Young a check for \$400 for his expenses, approving this as justifiable retaliation.‡ Ac-

cordingly, on October 19, 1864, Young and a party of 20 or 30 Confederate soldiers, well armed, but not in Confederate uniform nor carrying the Confederate flag, entered St. Albans, Vermont (about 15 miles from the Canadian border), robbed the banks of about \$250,000, killed several of the inhabitants and attempted to burn the village. They then seized a number of horses and rode rapidly away, the whole affair consuming less than an hour. When the inhabitants had recovered from their surprise, a company of mounted citizens was organized and started in pursuit, overtaking the robbers after entrance into Canada, where they and the Canadian police arrested Young and 12 others. The prisoners were turned over to the Canadian authorities and lodged in jail, but were soon discharged and their ill-gotten spoils restored to them. The British government, however, directed a re-trial, the prisoners were re-arrested, and the judge who had released them was re-proved by the Canadian parliament and suspended from office. When the case was tried before Justice Smith, of Montreal, the prisoners were again discharged on the ground that Young bore a commission from the Confederate Secretary of War and that his enterprise had been authorized by C. C. Clay. The Canadian government was not satisfied with this de-

* Rhodes, *United States*, vol. v., pp. 332-333; Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. viii., pp. 19-21.

† *Official Records*, ser. iv., vol. iii., p. 491.

‡ Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. viii., p.

26; *Official Records*, vol. xliii., pt. ii., p. 915; Sowles, *History of the St. Albans Raid*, p. 22; L. N. Benjamin, *The St. Albans Raid*, pp. 213, 294.

cision and immediately caused the prisoners to be re-arrested. They were taken to Toronto for trial, but the proceedings dragged along until the end of the war, when interest in the prosecution of the offenders was lost and none was ever punished. Wishing to maintain amicable relations with the United States, however, the Canadian government restored \$70,000 of the money stolen by the raiders.*

Meanwhile the Confederates in Canada had not abandoned hope of rescuing the prisoners at Camp Douglas at Chicago. Plans for taking the camp with its 10,000 prisoners were matured, and the night of election day (November 8, 1864) was selected for the undertaking. Colonel Benjamin J. Sweet, commanding the camp at Fort Douglas, was informed of the plot and on the night of November 6-7 arrested the leaders, including St. Leger Grenfell, an English soldier, Colonel Vincent Marmaduke, three other Confederates, and two prominent Sons of Liberty. Later seven others were arrested and a quantity of arms and ammunition were seized.† In January of 1865 seven of the prisoners were tried by military commission, but two were acquitted, one escaped, one committed suicide in prison, one was sentenced to three years' imprisonment, another to five years', and Grenfell was condemned

to death. President Johnson, however, commuted Grenfell's sentence to life imprisonment at Dry Tortugas, Florida, whence he escaped in 1868.*

Meanwhile Thompson had been busy with other schemes, the most daring of which was the attempt to burn New York. A party of eight men was detailed for this service, and the night of election day (November 8, 1864) was selected for the attempt, but as the inflammable materials were not ready the work was postponed. Seventeen days later, on the night of November 25, the Astor House, the St. Nicholas, the Metropolitan, the Fifth Avenue, Lovejoy's, Tammany, and several other hotels, and Barnum's Museum were set on fire by the use of phosphorus and turpentine, but fortunately the fires were soon extinguished. One of the incendiaries, named R. C. Kennedy, who had set fire to Barnum's Museum and three of the hotels, escaped to Canada, but was captured, tried, and hanged on March 25, 1865.† Before his execution he confessed the whole plot.‡

On December 7, 1863, the Thirty-Eighth Congress began its first session under circumstances different from those existing at the same time the previous year, when, because of successive military defeats, all was gloom. Nevertheless, the House was

* Rhodes, *United States*, vol. v., pp. 337-339; Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. viii., pp. 21-22.

† *Official Records*, ser. ii., vol. viii., p. 414.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 428. For Dix's view of the "atrocities" see p. 415.

* Rhodes, *United States*, vol. v., pp. 333-337.

† *Official Records*, vol. xxxix., pt. 3, pp. 696, 739; vol. xlv., pt. i., pp. 1079-1082.

not so friendly, politically, to the Administration as to the preceding one and, in this respect, the Government was no better off than it had been the previous year. This Congress had been chosen during the Democratic reaction in the autumn of 1862 and it was to Lincoln's advantage that under statutory rule the new members should not take office until December of 1863. In the House there were 102 Republicans and unconditional Unionists, 75 Democrats, and 9 Border State men.* The Senate was controlled by the Administration party, there being 36 Republicans and unconditional Unionists, 9 Democrats, and 5 conditional Unionists.

The President's message of December 8 was comparatively short, considering the events of the preceding 12 months. He first reviewed relations with foreign powers, spoke of the condition of the Territories, gave a summary of the financial operations, and then rehearsed other matters connected with the internal affairs of the country. Very little was said about the operations of army or navy during the year but he contrasted conditions in 1863 with those of the preceding year and entered upon a consideration of his emancipation policy.†

The reports of the secretaries of

the several departments, which accompanied the President's message, exhibited a remarkably extensive development of the resources of the country in meeting and providing for the exigencies of the war. In his annual report Secretary Stanton said that the Conscription Act had been enforced in 12 States, levying 50,000 soldiers, and that \$10,000,000 had been raised by the \$300 exemption for procuring substitutes. The indications were that the force required would be raised by volunteering without draft, but he added that the drafted men who had gone into the ranks had acquitted themselves well and made good soldiers. He stated that over 2,000 siege and sea coast artillery had been issued since the outbreak of the war, the number of field artillery had increased from 231 to 2,481, infantry firearms from 437,433 to 1,550,576, and other arms and material in proportion. At the beginning of the war, the Secretary said, "we were compelled to rely upon foreign countries for the supply of nearly all of our arms and munitions. Now all these things are manufactured at home, and we are independent of foreign countries, not only for the manufactures, but also for the materials of which they are composed."

Congress soon took action with a view to filling the armies for the campaigns of 1864. By an act approved February 24, 1864, the President was authorized, whenever he deemed it

* Rhodes, *United States*, vol. iv., p. 419, following the classification in the *Tribune Almanac*.

† For the text of the message, see Richardson, *Messages and Papers*, vol. vi., pp. 179-191. For a short summary see Rhodes, *United States*, vol. iv., pp. 419-422.

necessary, to call for such a number of men for the military service as the public exigencies required, and provision was made also for a draft in any division where the quota secured was not filled by volunteers.

The report of the Secretary of the Treasury gave general satisfaction, for during the last fiscal year the operations of that department had been attended by a greater measure of success than had been anticipated. The debt on July 1, 1863, was \$1,098,793,181, and it was estimated that on July 1, 1864, it would amount to \$1,686,956,641. During the preceding year the receipts were \$901,125,674.86, of which the chief items were:

Customs	\$69,059,642.40
Internal revenue	37,640,787.95
Direct taxes	1,485,103.16
Lands	167,617.17
Miscellaneous	3,046,615.35
Loans	776,682,361.57

Disbursements had been as follows:

Civil service	\$23,253,922.08
Pensions and Indians	4,216,520.79
Interest on debt	24,729,846.51
War Department	599,298,600.83
Navy Department	63,211,105.27
Payment of funded and temporary debt	181,086,635.17

Total \$895,796,630.65

Thus a balance of more than \$5,000,000 was left in the Treasury. The Secretary, while submitting estimates requiring large loans, and because he thought it would not be difficult to negotiate them, urged Congress to increase the revenue. He recommended that internal taxes to the amount of \$150,000,000 yearly be imposed, and spoke of the impossibility of an eco-

nomical and vigorous prosecution of the war. He congratulated himself that the public credit was much improved. The first loans had been negotiated at 7.30 per cent., the next at 7 per cent., the next at 6 per cent., and other large sums at 5 and 4 per cent. The average rate of interest on the whole debt in July 1, 1862 was 4.36 per cent., on January 1, 1863, 4.02 per cent., on July 1, 1863, 3.77 per cent., and on October 1, 1863, 3.95 per cent.

After organizing, Congress referred various matters to the several committees and entered upon its work. Public attention was diverted to the military and naval operations, and during the early part of the session nothing occurred of special interest or importance. Various resolutions were introduced, some strongly condemnatory to the policy and course of the Government, others of a negative mixed character, and others again highly approving the President's measures. The opponents of the Administration were anxious not to "subjugate" any of the Southern States, nor to interfere with any of their domestic institutions, but to allow them, just as soon as they had laid down their arms, to assume their former position in the Union. A number of resolutions expressing these views were introduced, but were generally disposed of by being laid on the table or rejected entirely. On the other hand, strongly worded resolutions were proposed and adopted by

large majorities in support of the Government and its policies. One of the strongest of these was introduced by Baldwin, of Massachusetts, on January 7, 1864:

"Whereas, the organized treason having its headquarters at Richmond, exists in defiant violation to the national Constitution, and has no claim to be treated otherwise than as an outlaw; and whereas, this Richmond combination of conspirators and traitors can have no rightful authority over the people of any portion of the national Union, and no warrant for assuming control of the political destiny of the people of any state or section of this Union, and no apology but that of conspiracy and treason for any assumption of authority whatever; therefore,

"Resolved. That any proposition to negotiate with the rebel leaders at Richmond (sometimes called 'the authorities at Richmond') for a restoration of loyalty and order in those portions of the Republic which have been disorganized by the Rebellion, is, in effect, a proposition to recognize the ringleaders of the rebellion as entitled to represent and bind the loyal citizens of the United States whom they oppress, and to give countenance and support to the pretensions of conspiracy and treason; and, therefore, every such proposition should be rejected without hesitation or delay."

This resolution was adopted by a vote of 88 to 24.

One of the most important acts of the session (which lasted until July 4, 1864), was that increasing the tariff rates. In spite of the great augmentation of duties by the act of 1862, still further advance of the rates became necessary in 1864. The new tariff was arranged with the double purpose of obtaining more revenue to meet the interest on the public debt, and reserving to manufacturers the protection which, had no such readjustment been made, the excise laws would have taken from them. Though the ses-

sion began on December 7, 1863, the Committee of Ways and Means did not report a new tariff bill until May 27, 1864. Hence as a temporary expedient two joint resolutions were passed increasing the rates of duties on imports 50 per cent., to take effect on April 29 and to continue until July 1. Another temporary measure was that passed March 8, imposing a tax of 60 cents per gallon on spirits, thus augmenting this excise threefold. After the Committee of Ways and Means had reported on May 27, only brief consideration was given to the new tariff bill. Debate began in the House on June 2, and the bill was passed on June 4, then being sent to the Senate, whose Committee on Finance reported it on June 14. It was taken under consideration on June 16 and was passed the next day, being approved on the 30th. The object of the measure was so well understood and the majority of the dominant party was so large, that the debates were uninteresting, and such opposition as was encountered came from men who had not the slightest hope of preventing the passage of the bill.* The tariff act curtailed the free list still further and scarcely anything was left exempt from duty, save, perhaps, some of the crudest of raw materials used by manufacturers. To each grade of unrefined sugar a half cent per pound was added, and the

* Taussig, *Tariff History*, pp. 168-169: Stanwood, *American Tariff Controversies*, vol. ii., pp. 128-129.

duty on refined sugar was fixed at 5 cents a pound. Among other duties levied, were 35 cents a pound on unmanufactured tobacco, \$2.50 per gallon on brandy, 18 cents per hundred-weight for salt in bulk, 100 per cent. *ad valorem* on opium and 35 cents per gallon on beer. On wool the duty ranged from 3 to 10 cents per pound, and on manufactures of wool the system of compound duties and higher rates, introduced in the act of 1862, was greatly extended, the duty on several important classes of goods being 24 cents a pound, and 40 per cent. *ad valorem*. As a matter of fact, everything was taxed that could be made to carry a tax, and anyone who could discover a new object of taxation, or who advocated an increase of duty upon an article already taxed, was considered a public benefactor.*

At the same time as the tariff bill was passed, an internal revenue act was enacted, heavily taxing everything in sight. Every ton of pig iron produced was charged \$2, every ton of railroad iron \$3, every pound of sugar 2 cents, and every hundred-weight of salt 6 cents, the general tax on all manufactures produced being 5 per cent. This tax was repeated on almost every article in the different stages of production. Raw cotton paid 2 cents a pound, and when the same cotton was made into clothing, it again paid 5 per cent., so that Wells estimated that on every finished

product the Government collected between 8 and 15 per cent.* The tax on spirits was made \$1.50 per gallon from July 1, 1864, to February 1, 1865, after which date it was about \$2. Moreover, an income tax was imposed, incomes of over \$600 and less than \$5,000 paying 5 per cent.; between \$5,000 and \$10,000, 7½ per cent.; and over \$10,000, 10 per cent.† Taxes on the gross receipts on express, insurance, railroad, steamboat and telegraph companies were levied, or were increased where already in existence. The license system was extended to almost every conceivable branch of trade. By a third act, approved June 30, the Secretary of the Treasury was authorized to borrow \$400,000,000, for which he should issue 6 per cent. bonds, or, in lieu of one-half that amount, he might sell \$200,000,000 of interest-bearing legal tender Treasury notes. This act limited the total amount of non-interest-bearing legal tender notes (popularly known as "greenbacks") to \$400,000,000, and such an additional sum not to exceed \$50,000,000, as might be temporarily required to redeem a temporary loan.

Meanwhile the Missouri radicals and conservatives had been quarreling among themselves and endeavoring to drag Lincoln into the dispute. Finally matters came to such a pass that the President decided to

* Stanwood, *Tariff Controversies*, vol. ii., pp. 129-130.

* Taussig, *Tariff History*, p. 164.

† Rhodes, *United States*, vol. iv., p. 428. See also vol. v., pp. 263-274.

make a change in the military administration of the department and, on May 13, 1863, appointed Schofield to relieve General Curtis.* One of Schofield's first and most difficult tasks was connected with the question of emancipation in Missouri. On April 15, 1863, Governor Gamble had issued a proclamation calling upon the old Missouri convention to meet on June 15 to consider this question. When the convention met Governor Gamble announced his resignation, to take effect on the last day of the session, but the convention peremptorily refused to accept it, and requested him to continue in office until November 1, 1864, or until his successor were elected and qualified. On assuming office, Schofield ascertained that the action of the Missouri State convention on the question of emancipation would depend very largely upon the attitude of the National Government and he therefore asked Lincoln whether he was authorized, either directly or indirectly, to pledge the Governmental support and protection to the slave property during the short time that slavery might be permitted to exist.† To this Lincoln replied on June 22 that "if the period were a comparatively short one and the act should prevent persons from being sold during that period into more lasting slavery, the whole would be easier." But he did not wish to pledge the government "to support

even temporary slavery, beyond what could be fairly claimed under the Constitution." He much desired also that the military forces of the United States in Missouri should not be used to subvert the temporarily reserved legal rights in slaves during the progress of emancipation.* But the conservative members of the convention frittered away an opportunity to confer a lasting benefit on the State, and the ordinance of emancipation, which was passed on July 1, 1863, by a vote of 51 to 30, merely provided that slavery should cease in Missouri after 1870 and prohibited sales to non-residents after that date, provided all slaves so emancipated should remain in servitude—those over 40 years of age, during their lifetime; those under twelve years of age until they became 23; and all others until July 4, 1876.

The convention adjourned on July 1, 1863 and immediately a popular movement of protest was made by the radicals of St. Louis. September 1 delegates from four-fifths of the counties of Missouri met at Jefferson City in a radical emancipation convention, the political action being greatly accelerated by the guerilla warfare then prevailing. Though Union troops patrolled the entire region, a daring leader named William C. Quantrell assembled a band of about 300 well-mounted followers on the border line of Missouri, and ascertaining that the city of Lawrence, Kansas, was undefended, crossed the

* *Official Records*, vol. xxii., pt. ii., p. 277.

† *Ibid*, p. 330.

* *Ibid*, pp. 331-332.

Missouri line below Leavenworth and, by a rapid march, entered the city on the morning of August 21. The stores, banks, dwellings, hotels and churches of the town were robbed and then set on fire, 185 being burned to the ground. Between 150 and 200 inhabitants were murdered in cold blood. This work consumed only three or four hours, when the perpetrators mounted their horses and departed.* Senator James H. Lane was in Lawrence at the time and, escaping massacre, hastily collected a small mounted force and started in pursuit of Quantrell and his men. By cutting off stragglers and laggards, many were killed, but the remainder got away safely with their plunder.

In the midst of this excitement the radical Union emancipation convention met at Jefferson City. The resolutions adopted indorsed Lincoln's policy, but complained of Schofield's administration and asked the President to remove him. The resignations of Governor Gamble and Lieutenant-Governor Hill were demanded and a resolution adopted calling for the appointment of a committee to organize and arm the loyal men for the protection of their homes. A large committee was appointed to visit Lincoln and lay their grievances before him. This committee reached the executive mansion on September 30 and held a long interview with the President.

He took up their points of complaint in detail, told them he could not act on vague impressions, that he knew nothing derogatory to Schofield and was at a loss to see why Schofield should be held responsible for the execution of one of his [Lincoln's] orders. He said that he had no intention of becoming a tyrant, and that he had no right to act the tyrant to mere political opponents. The real termination of the incident came on October 5, 1863, when Lincoln wrote a letter to the committee giving a picture of the confusion and terror incident to the war, examining with great patience the specified complaints presented by the committee, and then stating that, no matter whether the radicals and conservatives agreed among themselves or with him, he should do what seemed to him his duty; the commander in Missouri was responsible to him and not to the radicals or conservatives.*

On September 20 Schofield sent to Washington copies of several newspapers containing inflammatory articles, with a report stating that the revolutionary faction which had been striving to overthrow the State government and change the policy of the National Government had at length succeeded so far as to produce open mutiny in one of the militia regiments and serious disaffection in others. Accordingly, on September

* Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. viii., pp. 211-212; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. iv., p. 375; *Official Records*, vol. xxii., pt. i., p. 583 *et seq.*

* For details of the interview and text of the letter, see Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. viii., pp. 214-223.

17, he had issued an order to enforce martial law against persons encouraging mutiny, or inciting insurrection by printing or publishing false statements, and that he would punish newspapers who violated the order.* On September 26 Lincoln sent Schofield his written approval of the order, and on October 1 suggested the spirit and manner in which he wished the order to be carried out.† On the same day (October 1) Gamble wrote to Lincoln requesting that Schofield be directed to maintain the integrity of the State government by all the force under his

control, and on October 19 received the reply that Schofield was empowered to repress all violence which might be offered to the State government.* These measures served to check the factional excitements and, moreover, Schofield exercised great forbearance in enforcing his order and in general administration. The elections of November 3, 1863, passed without disturbance of any kind,† and as the Radicals gained a slight apparent victory, adverse criticisms of Schofield's administration were discontinued.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

1863-1864.

THE LINE OF THE RAPIDAN: THE MINE RUN CAMPAIGN.

Meade's failure to intercept Lee — The latter's northward movement — Engagements at Brandy Station, Jefferson, and Bristoe Station — Affairs at Kelly's Ford and Rappahannock Station — The Mine Run Campaign — Wistar's attack on Richmond — The expedition to Richmond under Kilpatrick and Dahlgren.

As we have seen, after the battle of Gettysburg Lee retreated and was followed by Meade. The Confederates had been driven out of Manassas Gap and Front Royal and taken position on the south side of the Rappahannock. During August and September the Army of the Potomac rested and General Lee retired behind the Rapidan for the same purpose, neither army being ready to attack the other. Longstreet's corps was detached from Lee and sent to aid Bragg in his oper-

ations against Rosecrans in Tennessee. This seemed to Lincoln to present a favorable opportunity for striking Lee, and on September 15 he wrote to Halleck that in his opinion Meade should move against Lee at once in order to forecast his contemplated plans.‡ Meade, however, did not think that he could bring on a battle save under great disadvantage to himself and was reluctant to run the risks involved without the posi-

* *Official Records*, vol. xxii., pt. ii., pp. 546-547.

† See Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. viii., pp. 225-226.

* For the entire letter see Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. viii., pp. 227-228.

† *Official Records*, vol. xxii., pt. ii., p. 698.

‡ *Official Records*, vol. xxix., pt. ii., p. 187.



Taken from the *Photographic History of the Civil War*. Copyright by the Patriot Publishing Company.
CAMP OF THE CHIEF ENGINEER'S HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, AT BRANDY STATION, VA.

tive sanction of the Government.* While Meade and the authorities at Washington were carrying on correspondence regarding a forward movement Rosecrans and Bragg had fought their battle at Chickamauga and Rosecrans had retreated to Chattanooga. He called upon the War Department for reinforcements and Stanton, growing impatient at Meade's inactivity, proposed to send 30,000 troops from the Army of the Potomac. Lincoln was unwilling to weaken Meade so much, but the other Secretaries supported Stanton and it was decided to telegraph Meade in the morning. The 11th and 12th corps, about 13,000 men, were sent westward under Hooker; but even with this reduction of his command Meade had about 68,000 men, and knowing himself to be superior in numbers, he resolved to cross the Rapidan and attack Lee. The latter, however, had anticipated this movement, and having learned of the departure of the 11th and 12th corps determined to manœuvre Meade into a position where he could attack him under circumstances favorable to himself.† Accordingly, he determined to flank Meade's position, seize the Orange and Alexandria Railroad north of the Rappahannock, and intercept his retreat upon Washington. Informed of the movement, Meade, on October 11, withdrew his army to the north side of the Rappahannock, his rear guard of cavalry having a sharp engagement with the

Confederate cavalry at Brandy Station. Believing that the Confederate army was moving upon Culpeper, Meade turned about and on the 12th threw three infantry corps and a cavalry division south of the Rappahannock, with instructions to strike Lee if at Culpeper. When they reached Brandy Station the Confederate army was nowhere in the neighborhood. At this time General Gregg's division of Union cavalry was guarding the upper fords of the Rappahannock and Hazel rivers; on the morning of the 12th Gregg's brigade crossed the Rappahannock near Sulphur Springs; and his pickets at Jeffersonton being driven in, he marched for that place, found it in possession of the enemy, drove them from the town, and occupied it. That morning Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry division, leading the Confederate advance from near Madison Court House, crossed Hazel River at Starks' Ford and pressed on toward the Rappahannock. The 11th Virginia cavalry drove Gregg's skirmishers into Jeffersonton and attacked the two regiments in the town, but was driven out after losing several men. The 7th and 12th Virginia were then sent to the left and right, encircling the town, a combined attack was made, and Gregg was utterly routed and driven across the Rappahannock with a loss of about 400 men, most of them captured. The Confederate loss was about 40 killed and wounded.*

Lee then ordered his whole force to

* *Official Records*, vol. xxix., pt. ii., p. 202.

† *Ibid*, pt. i., p. 410.

* *Ibid*, vol. xxix.; Walker, *History of the Second Army Corps*.

move in two columns upon Bristoe Station, but before they arrived Meade's entire army had passed there on the road to Centreville with the exception of the 2d corps constituting the rear guard. A. P. Hill's corps reached Bristoe Station just as Warren arrived, and as the rear of the 5th corps was marching away to the north of Broad Run attacked the Federal rear guard but was checked by the Federal troops under General Alexander S. Webb. Having repulsed the Confederates Warren then crossed the stream unmolested and joined Meade at Centreville. Lee was much disappointed at the outcome of this engagement,* and on the 18th turned toward the line of the Rappahannock, leaving his cavalry to skirmish for a few days longer with the Federal cavalry.

While waiting for Lee to attack, Meade received word from Halleck that the President desired him to move against Lee.† Accordingly Meade resumed the offensive on October 19 and in several encounters pressed Lee back to the Rappahannock, the latter crossing to the south side of the river and disposing his army on both sides of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, Ewell on the right, A. P. Hill on the left and cavalry on both flanks. A part of Ewell's corps was left on the north side of the river

at Rappahannock Station in an entrenched position covering the pontoon bridge, the railroad bridge having been destroyed. The position was first held by General Hays' brigade and four guns, to which was subsequently added General Hoke's brigade under Colonel A. C. Godwin, the whole force numbering about 2,500 men. Lee had destroyed the railroad from Bristoe Station to the Rappahannock but Meade rapidly repaired and rebuilt the broken road, by November 2 completing it as far as Warrenton Junction. Supplies were rapidly brought forward and on the morning of November 7 Meade advanced to cross the Rappahannock. The Union army moved in two columns, General French, commanding the right wing, moving upon Kelly's Ford, five miles below Rappahannock Station, while General Sedgwick with the 5th and 6th corps moved along the line of the railroad, forming line about midday within one and a half miles of Rappahannock Station with the right of the 5th corps and the left of the 6th corps on the railroad. The Confederate position was then reconnoitered and a plan of attack formulated. The Confederate works consisted of two redoubts connected by a chain of rifle-pits and a further line of rifle-pits ran from the left redoubt to the river and some distance along it. The 5th corps was to gain the river bank on the left, while the 6th was to cross on the right so as to establish a battery of artillery on a


* Cooke, *Life of Lee*, p. 355. See also *Battles and Leaders*, vol. iv., pp. 81, 84; *Confederate Military History*, vol. iv., pp. 211-214.

† Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. viii., p. 242.

range of high ground in front of the works and drive the Confederates from them. Both corps did their work well. The artillery was put into position but at dusk no impression had been made, the Confederate guns had not been silenced nor had the infantry been driven from the work. General Russell, temporarily in command of Wright's division of the 6th corps, was then ordered to make an assault. Artillery fire was kept up; Russell led parts of Ellmaker's and Upton's brigades (2,117 men) and under a heavy musketry and canister fire captured the works, 1,303 officers and men, 4 guns, 1,225 stand of arms and 7 battle flags. Hays himself surrendered but afterward with nearly 100 of his own men and about 130 of Hoke's escaped under cover of darkness. The Union loss was 413 killed and wounded and 6 missing, while Lee's loss was 6 killed, 39 wounded and 1,629 captured or missing. Meanwhile French with two corps had forced a passage at Kelly's Ford, five miles below. The advance of the 3d corps crossed with a loss of 36 killed and wounded, the Confederate loss being 64 killed and wounded and 295 captured. Accordingly Lee abandoned his design of attacking French and fell back during the night to Mountain Run. Meade crossed the remainder of his army over the Rappahannock on the 8th and concentrated his army of 70,000 men in the vicinity of Brandy Station, while Lee with 50,000 men withdrew beyond the Rap-

idan with an intrenched line, the left of which covered some of the forts of the river, the right being perpendicular to it and extending to Bartlett's Mill on Mine Run.*

A fortnight passed away in comparative inactivity. On November 26 Meade began his Mine Run campaign by sending the 1st, 5th and 2d corps to



cross the Rapidan at Culpeper and Germanna Ford, and the 3d and 6th corps to cross at Jacob's Mill. After crossing, all five corps were to converge upon the old turnpike and plank road near Robertson's Tavern, both

* *Official Records*, vol. xxxvi.; Humphreys, *From Gettysburg to the Rapidan; Battles and Leaders*, vol. iv., pp. 81, 85-88; Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. viii., pp. 242-245; *Confederate Military History*, vol. iv., p. 215 et seq.

leading to Orange Court House, and turn Lee's right. At 10 A. M. of the 27th the 2d corps reached Robertson's Tavern where it found itself confronted by a considerable portion of Ewell's corps which Lee had hurried there. Accordingly orders were issued that the 2d corps should remain on the defensive until the 3d and 6th corps came up on the right. On discovering Meade's movement Lee had ordered Early in command of Ewell's corps to move to the right, and it was a part of this command which confronted the 2d corps at Robertson's Tavern. Johnson's division was moving in the same direction when it struck the 3d corps at Payne's Farm and a battle ensued which so delayed Meade's campaign that it resulted in failure. In this engagement the loss was 125 killed, 747 wounded and 71 missing, while the total Confederate loss was 545. During the day the 2d corps advanced some distance beyond Robertson's Tavern and at night was reinforced by the 1st corps. The 5th corps, which had supported Gregg's cavalry division in an engagement at Parker's Store on the Orange plank road, was brought over to support the 2d and the next morning the 3d and 6th corps came up on the right of the 2d. On the 28th Meade advanced to the attack but on driving in the Confederate pickets ascertained that Ewell's corps had fallen back. Meade set out in pursuit and after a march of two miles found Ewell in position on the west side of Mine Run with

A. P. Hill on Ewell's right covering the Orange plank road. It was after dark when the 24th with part of the 3d fronted this position. Meade then sent Warren with the 2d corps and a division of the 6th to attack and turn Lee's right flank. The 29th was spent in reconnoitering and demonstrations while waiting for Warren's movement. Early on the morning of the 29th Warren started from Robertson's Tavern, drove in A. P. Hill's skirmishers and late in the day reported to Meade that Hill's position could be carried by attack. Sedgwick, too, thought that there were some weak points on Lee's left and accordingly Meade ordered an attack for the morning of the 30th, the right and centre to open at 8 o'clock with artillery, while Warren was to make a simultaneous assault followed at 9 o'clock by Sedgwick with an assault upon Lee's left with five divisions of the 5th and 6th corps. Two divisions of the 3d corps were added to Warren's force, thus increasing his command to six divisions of 26,000 men. At 8 o'clock the batteries on the right and centre opened a furious fire, the skirmishers of the 1st and 3d corps had crossed Mine Run and driven in the Confederate skirmishers, and Sedgwick was just beginning his assault when a dispatch was received from Warren stating that an attack would result in disaster. Meade rode over to Warren, concurred in Warren's view, and countermanded the forward movement. It was now out

of the question to send Sedgwick alone against the right and the armies remained confronting each other all that day. Meade tried to arrange for an attack later in the day but found it impracticable. The positions of the two armies remained practically unchanged the next day, but on December 1, acknowledging his campaign to have been a failure, Meade withdrew to his former position beyond the Rapidan. During the Mine Run campaign from November 26 to December 2 the Union loss was 173 killed, 1,099 wounded and 381 missing. The Confederate loss was 110 killed, 570 wounded and 65 missing.*

After Mine Run the army went into winter quarters and the next few months were spent in monotonous camp life, the only relief being foraging excursions, the most important of which was a cavalry expedition through Virginia under command of General Kilpatrick. On the morning of February 6, 1864, General I. J. Wistar with 2,200 cavalry and 4,000 infantry left Williamsburg to make a dash on Richmond and release the Union prisoners there. The cavalry advance arrived at Bottom's Bridge on the Chickahominy about 13 miles

from Richmond at daylight of February 7 and found the Confederates in force under General Eppa Hunton and reinforcements coming up by railroad from Richmond. The cavalry charged one of the fords and was repulsed by canister fire with some loss, which compelled Wistar to desist from further effort and return to Williamsburg. To cover this movement and divert Lee's attention from it, the cavalry and two corps of the Army of the Potomac made a demonstration on the 6th upon Lee's army at Morton's Ford, the demonstration continuing on the 7th with considerable loss. It was then determined to make another dash on Richmond for the purpose of distributing Lincoln's amnesty proclamation and liberating the Union prisoners in the city and at Belle Isle. The expedition was to be under command of General Kilpatrick, who on the night of February 4, 1864, with 4,000 men and a battery of artillery marched from Stevensburg, crossed the Rapidan at Ely's Ford and moved swiftly to Spotsylvania Court House. At this place on the 29th Colonel Ulric Dahlgren, son of the admiral, with 500 men was detached from the column to cross James River and enter Richmond from the south. Kilpatrick continued his course to a point five miles from Richmond which was reached on the morning of March 1. Believing that only a small force of infantry occupied the intrenchments, Kilpatrick attacked and drove in the pickets but then found himself confronted by

* *Official Records*, vol. xxix.; Pennypacker, *Life of General Meade*; Bache, *Life of Meade*; B. R. Meade, *Life of Meade*; the biographies of Lee previously mentioned; Humphreys, *From Gettysburg to the Rapidan*; Powell, *History of the 5th Army Corps*; Walker, *History of the Second Army Corps*; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. iv., p. 88 et seq.; Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. viii., pp. 245-251; *Confederate Military History*, vol. iii., pp. 427-428.

500 men and six guns. Accordingly he withdrew to Atlee Station, north of the Chickahominy, and went into camp there, but was attacked during the night by the cavalry of Wade Hampton and Bradley T. Johnson. The camp of one of the brigades was captured and Kilpatrick, retreating, was followed down the peninsula and the next day was joined by about 300 of Dahlgren's men near Tunstall's Station. On the night of March 2 he reached Williamsburg.

Meanwhile Dahlgren had moved from Spotsylvania Court House across the Virginia Central Railroad to James River near Goochland Court House where he expected to cross the river, release the prisoners at Belle Isle and, after entering Richmond from the south, to unite with Kilpatrick on the morning of March 1. He was unable to find a ford, however, and marched by the north bank of the

river, approached Richmond late in the afternoon and found himself confronted by a body of cavalry and infantry with which he skirmished until night, and then withdrew. In the darkness his column became broken, Dahlgren with less than 100 men going in one direction, while Mitchell of the 2d New York cavalry who had been assigned to command the rear guard went in another direction. About 300 of Dahlgren's men under Mitchell joined Kilpatrick at Tunstall's Station, but Dahlgren crossed the Pamunkey at Hanover town and the Mattaponi at Aylett's Ford, and about midnight of March 2 fell into an ambush and was killed. Many others were killed and wounded and the balance were captured. Of the 500 men who set out with Dahlgren 61 were killed and wounded and 138 captured. Kilpatrick's loss, including Dahlgren's, was about 350.*

CHAPTER XXXIV.

1863-1864.

OLUSTEE: THE RED RIVER AND THE SOUTH.

Gillmore's expedition to Florida — Seymour's defeat at Olustee — Franklin's defeat at Sabine Pass — The engagement at Stirling's Plantation on Bayou Fardoche — Beginning of the Red River campaign — The Union defeats at Marks' Mills and Jenkins' Ferry — The actions at Sabine Cross Roads, Pleasant Grove and Pleasant Hill — Banks' retreat to Alexandria — The saving of Porter's fleet by Bailey — The engagement at Yellow Bayou and Banks' retreat from Alexandria — Forrest's raid in Tennessee — The Fort Pillow massacre — The battles at Brice's Cross Roads or Guntown and Tupelo or Harrisburg.

Early in the winter of 1863-1864 General Gillmore, commanding the Department of the South, determined to send an expedition to Florida to cut off the Confederate supplies, to procure an outlet for cotton, lumber

and other productions of the country, and to collect recruits for the army

* *Official Records*, vol. xxxiii.; Humphreys, *From Gettysburg to the Rapidan*; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. iv., pp. 95-96. On Dahlgren's attempt see *Southern Historical Papers*, vol. iii., pp. 219-221 and vol. xiii., pp. 516-559.

from among the negroes. He planned also to bring Florida back into the Union in accordance with the President's proclamation of December 8, 1863, which plan in time came to be regarded by the opponents of the Administration as the sole purpose of the expedition.* At the same time Lincoln sent Major John Hay from Washington to Fernandina and other points in Florida to extend to the citizens of that State an opportunity to sign the oath of allegiance and enrol themselves as loyal citizens.

The expedition to Florida was under the immediate command of General Truman Seymour. On February 5, 1864, General Gillmore ordered Seymour to embark about 6,000 men in transports at Hilton Head and sail for Jacksonville, Florida. The transports were accompanied by five gunboats under command of Admiral Dahlgren. Seymour arrived at Jacksonville on the 7th, dispersed a small guard and occupied the place. On the afternoon of the 8th Colonel Guy V. Henry with cavalry and mounted infantry moved out about eight miles and late in the evening surprised about 350 cavalry under Lieutenant Colonel McCormick at Camp Finegan. He then marched for Baldwin, almost 20 miles from Jacksonville, where he arrived early on the morning of the 9th and captured another gun together with a considerable quantity of cotton. Gillmore himself arrived

at Baldwin on February 9 and after a full understanding with Seymour, as he thought, returned to Jacksonville, from which place he telegraphed to Seymour on the 11th not to risk a repulse in advancing on Lake City but to hold Sanderson's unless there were reasons for falling back. He reiterated his orders to concentrate at Baldwin and then went back to Hilton Head. On the 18th, however, he received a letter from Seymour announcing his intention of moving to the Suwannee River without supplies and asking for a demonstration of the army and another in the Savannah River to assist his movement. Amazed at Seymour's letter Gillmore peremptorily ordered him to restrict himself to holding Baldwin and the south fork of the St. Mary's River and occupying Palatka and Magnolia. Gillmore's letter, however, arrived too late.

On the 10th a portion of Henry's force was sent forward to Sanderson's where a quantity of commissary stores were found in flames, the enemy having retired to Lake City. Henry then advanced to that place, where on the 11th he had a skirmish with the Confederates and under Seymour's order fell back to Barber's at the south fork of the St. Mary's, Seymour concentrating there his entire command. On the 20th the troops started from Barber's with the intention of marching on Lake City, and then, if successful, of destroying the railroad communication between east

* *Official Records*, vol. xxviii., pt. ii., pp. 129, 134.

and west Florida on the Suwannee River. Seymour had the mounted brigade of Colonel Henry, the three infantry brigades of Colonels J. R. Hawley, W. B. Barton and James Montgomery and three batteries of artillery, in all about 5,500 men and 16 guns. When Seymour landed at Jacksonville, General Joseph Finegan, the Confederate commander in east Florida, had an insignificant force to oppose him, but by the 13th had collected at Lake City about 4,600 infantry, 600 cavalry and three batteries of 12 guns. Colonel C. Smith commanded the cavalry, General A. H. Colquitt and Colonel G. P. Harrison the two infantry brigades. Thirteen miles east of Lake City Finegan threw up defensive works a short distance east of Olustee Station, crossing the railroad with his left near Ocean Pond and his right near a bay or jungle. Colonel Henry struck Smith's pickets about 3 P. M. Two companies of the 7th Connecticut of Hawley's brigade were deployed as skirmishers and drove the Confederate pickets back upon their supports, which at once opened fire. Elder's battery was then pushed forward for similar action. The rest of the 7th Connecticut was deployed and developed the Confederate position and Henry's cavalry was disposed on the flanks. Seymour massed his artillery in the centre and sent the 7th New Hampshire to turn the Confederate left but, meeting a heavy and deadly fire, the

regiment broke in disorder and was rallied only with the greatest difficulty, taking part in the action at a later hour. The 8th United States colored infantry became hotly engaged at the left and after half its men had fallen the remainder retreated in disorder. Colquitt's men then advanced and delivered an effective fire upon the artillery; Barton's and Montgomery's brigades were also brought up and gradually drove the Confederate line back. Meanwhile Finegan had sent every possible reinforcement to Colquitt so that on both sides the entire forces except the cavalry were desperately engaged. The struggle continued until dusk when Seymour withdrew, abandoning his dead and wounded and five guns. He was pursued about two miles that day and fell back to Sanderson's and thence to St. Mary's and Jacksonville. The Union loss was 203 killed, 1,152 wounded and 506 missing. The Confederate loss was 93 killed, 847 wounded and 6 missing.* This misadventure temporarily put an end to the attempt to occupy Florida. Jacksonville was held by the Union troops and various minor raids were made from that point, but no important military operations took place and the proposed reconstruction of the State government was abandoned. Gillmore was soon afterward sent to take

* *Official Records*, vol. xxxv.; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. iv., pp. 76-80; William E. Furness, *The Battle of Olustee, Florida, February 20, 1864* (1912); *Confederate Military History*, vol. vi., pp. 283-285; vol. xi., pt. ii., pp. 56-81.

part in the Virginia campaign then opening and Seymour went north where he later took part in the battle of the Wilderness.*

In the summer of 1863 the situation in Mexico was so threatening that Seward thought it of the utmost importance that the United States authority be reestablished at some point in Texas. General Banks was anxious to capture Mobile but was instructed to hoist the flag at some point in Texas with the least possible delay.† Therefore he fitted out an expedition to make a lodgment in Texas at Sabine City, on Sabine Pass, the outlet from Sabine Lake into the Gulf of Mexico and the terminus of a railroad penetrating Texas and making connection with Houston, the capital of the State.

General W. B. Franklin was put in charge of the advance of the expedition consisting of 5,000 men, with instructions to land a few miles below Sabine Pass, move upon the Confederate works commanding it, and, if practicable, to seize Beaumont on the railroad to Houston. Four light-draught gunboats in command of Lieutenant Crocker formed part of the expedition, which sailed from New Orleans on September 4, 1863. Franklin disregarded his instructions to land 10 or 12 miles below Sabine Pass and on Crocker's representation that he could silence the Confederate works

in the Pass he and Crocker arranged for the gunboats to make a direct attack upon the works, dislodge the garrison, seize or drive away the two Confederate gunboats and then land the troops. From the army 150 sharpshooters were distributed in four gunboats. The expedition arrived at the Pass on the 7th and at 6 A. M. the next morning the *Clifton* stood in the bay and opened on the fort, but evoked no return fire. At 3:30 in the afternoon the *Sachem*, followed by the *Arizona*, advanced up the eastern channel to draw the fire of the fort while the *Clifton*, followed by the *Granite City*, moved up the western channel, but still no reply was made to the gunboats until they were abreast of the fort when the Confederates opened fire with eight guns. The fire was immediately returned but the *Clifton* and *Sachem* were struck in their boilers and thus rendered useless, their officers and crews together with 90 sharpshooters who were aboard being captured by the Confederates. Franklin made no serious attempt to land his troops but immediately returned to New Orleans, having lost two gunboats with their 15 heavy guns, nearly 50 killed and wounded and over 200 prisoners, among them Lieutenant Crocker. Not a Confederate was hurt.*

Almost simultaneously another expedition was sent out. On Septem-

* For Greeley's opinion of the battle at Olustee see his *American Conflict*, vol. ii., p. 532.

† *Official Records*, vol. xxvi., pt. i., p. 672.

* *Official Records*, vol. xxvi.; Pollard, *Third Year of the War*, p. 165; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. iii., p. 571, and vol. iv., p. 345.

ber 5, 1863, General Herron's division of the 13th corps of General Banks' army embarked on transports at Carrollton, Louisiana, and sailed up the Mississippi to disperse a Confederate force under General Richard Taylor which was then on the west side below the mouth of the Red River, seriously endangering the navigation of the river. The expedition arrived at Morgan's Bend on the 7th and during the next few days skirmished with the enemy near the Atchafalaya. On the 12th the cavalry was again sent to the front to feel the enemy and the 19th Iowa, the 26th Indiana and two guns were dispatched seven miles to the vicinity of Atchafalaya Bayou to picket the country and support the cavalry—all being under command of Lieutenant Colonel J. B. Leake of the 20th Iowa. After a skirmish with the Confederates Leake fell back to Stirling's Plantation on Bayou Fordoche, about six miles from Morganza, from which point small parties were sent out daily to skirmish with the Confederates. On the night of the 18th General Thomas Green with a brigade of Confederate cavalry, a brigade of mounted infantry and a battery crossed the Atchafalaya and by different routes reached the rear and flanks of Leake's command. By noon of the 19th Green fell upon Leake's unsuspecting command, drove his cavalry from the field and engaged in a desperate fight with the infantry. Attacked on all sides, however, the latter were soon overpowered and

captured with two guns. The Union loss was 16 killed, 45 wounded, including Leake, and 454 missing or captured. The Confederate loss was 26 killed and 85 wounded.*

These expeditions having failed, Banks determined to occupy the country at the mouths of the Rio Grande. He organized a small force under command of General N. J. T. Dana which, accompanied by three naval vessels, sailed from New Orleans on October 26, 1863, and on November 2 landed at Brazos de Santiago. The next day a small force of Confederates was driven away, on the 6th the Union troops occupied Brownsville, next moved northward along the coast in the direction of Galveston, on the 8th reached Point Isabelle and then were transported to Mustang Island between Corpus Christi Bay and the Gulf. The Confederate works guarding Aransas Pass were carried by the troops under General T. E. G. Ransom and the whole force, now under command of General C. C. Washburn, moved upon Pass Cavallo commanding the entrance to Matagorda Bay which was defended by a strong fortification called Fort Esperanza. The investment of this work was begun but on November 30, before it was complete the Confederates evacuated it. Thus a large portion of Texas came under the Union flag but the strong Confederate works at Galveston and the mouth of the Brazos still confronted Banks and he thought

* *Official Records*, vol. xxvi.

that to attack them successfully it would be necessary to march inland and make an approach from the rear.

Not wishing to undertake this without authority he requested permission from Washington but Halleck did not favor the expedition, suggesting instead that a movement be made on the Red River. Accordingly Banks acquiesced in Halleck's plan and intrusted the arrangements of the expedition to General W. B. Franklin. Franklin was to move from the Têche on March 5, was to reach Alexandria on the 17th and coöperate with a strong fleet under Admiral Porter. Porter arrived at the mouth of the Red River on March 7 with a fleet of 15 ironclads and 4 light steamers and there was joined a few days later by transports from Vicksburg carrying four divisions of Sherman's army under General A. J. Smith and the marine brigade of Colonel Ellet.

A part of the plan of the campaign was that General Steele with an army of 15,000 men should move from Little Rock, Arkansas, southward to coöperate with Banks' expedition, the objective point being Shreveport. On March 23, 1864, Steele started from Little Rock with 8,000 men and on the 21st General Thayer with 5,000 men left Fort Smith to join Steele at Arkadelphia, and Colonel Powell Clayton with a small cavalry force marched from Pine Bluff in the direction of Camden which was Steele's first objective. Steele reached Arkadelphia on the 28th, met Thayer near Elkins'

Ferry on the Little Missouri and after several sharp skirmishes with the Confederates under Price flanked that officer out of Camden on April 15 and occupied it. Here he learned that Banks had been defeated on Red River and was retreating. Moreover, E. Kirby Smith, who had been opposing Banks, had marched with 8,000 men and 14 guns to effect a junction with Price to crush Steele. The latter was too strongly intrenched at Camden to be attacked but the Confederates nearly surrounded him and cut off and captured his forage trains.

On April 23 a train of 240 wagons escorted by 1,200 infantry, 400 cavalry and 5 guns, all under command of Lieutenant Colonel F. M. Drake of the 77th Ohio infantry, started for Pine Bluff to procure supplies for Steele's army, but when at Marks' Mills on the Camden and Pine Bluff road, about eight miles distant from Saline River, was attacked on the front and rear by 3,000 cavalry, mounted infantry and two batteries under General Fagan. After a hard fight of more than three hours, during which Drake was severely wounded and lost 250 in killed and wounded, the entire train together with the guns and the greater part of the cavalry and infantry were captured, only about 300 escaping. Incomplete Confederate returns show a loss of 41 killed, 108 wounded and 144 missing.*

* *Official Records*, vol. xxxiv.; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. iv., p. 373; *Confederate Military History*, vol. ix., pt. ii., pp. 164-165; vol. x., pt. ii., pp. 253-261.

When Steele learned of this disaster he immediately abandoned the idea of joining Banks and decided to fall back to the Arkansas River. On the 29th he reached Jenkins' Ferry on the Saline River. The river was much swollen and only a part of Steele's army had succeeded in crossing when Smith and Price launched their attack against Steele's rear brigade under command of General S. A. Rice. This brigade yielded some ground, but being rallied and supported by a part of Engelmann's brigade that had not yet crossed the river, it briskly engaged in a sanguinary fight lasting the greater part of the day. Three Confederate charges were repulsed and, the Union line advancing, the Confederates fell back without trying to renew the fight. Steele then crossed the river without further molestation and moved leisurely to Little Rock which he reached on May 2, Thayer's division being sent back to Fort Smith. The Union loss at Jenkins' Ferry was 63 killed, 413 wounded and 45 missing, while the Confederates lost 86 killed, 356 wounded and 1 missing.*

Meanwhile Banks had begun his movement. General Smith's forces advanced, attacked, and on March 14, in conjunction with the navy, captured Fort DeRussy on the Red River together with 283 prisoners,

10 guns and many small arms, the Confederate covering force of 3,500 men under General Walker, after burning two steamboats and a considerable quantity of cotton, retreating up the river. On the 19th Franklin reached Alexandria and was joined by Banks on the 24th but the entire column did not close up until the 26th. Meanwhile General Mower with three brigades of Smith's division and a cavalry brigade of the 19th corps marched from Alexandria on the 21st for Henderson Hill, 25 miles to the west surprised the 2d Louisiana cavalry and with slight loss captured 250 men, about the same number of horses and 4 guns. Near Alexandria the fleet came to a series of rapids and the water was so low that the ironclads could not run up them; but after a week's hard labor the lighter ones were carried over. The transports which could not pass then returned to Vicksburg and with them 3,000 men under Colonel Ellet. The withdrawal of the transports made it necessary to establish a base at Alexandria and the use of a wagon train to carry supplies, and it was also necessary to leave a guard of nearly 4,000 under General Grover to protect the place. General Franklin with the main column advanced on the road running west of and parallel to the river to Natchitoches about 80 miles above Alexandria; this he reached on April 3 to be joined there by A. J. Smith's column which, accompanied

* *Official Records*, vol. xxxiv.; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. iv., p. 374 et seq.; *Confederate Military History*, vol. ix., pt. ii., pp. 165-168; vol. x., pt. ii., pp. 264-269.

by Porter's fleet, had come to Grand Ecore, four miles from Natchitoches.

At this time Banks' army consisted of two divisions of the 13th corps under General T. E. G. Ransom, five brigades of the 16th corps under General A. J. Smith, three brigades of the 19th corps under General W. H. Emory, Colonel Dickey's brigade of colored troops under General Franklin, General A. L. Lee's four brigades of cavalry and mounted infantry and Captain Closson's small artillery reserve, the whole force numbering on March 31, 25,735 officers and men with about 65 guns. Lee's cavalry force of 4,500 men had pushed out westward about 12 miles and on April 2 struck the Confederate cavalry, drove it back 8 miles and then waited for the general movement. On the morning of the 6th the onset began with Lee's cavalry in advance followed by two small divisions of the 13th corps under Ransom, by a division of the 19th corps under Emory and by Dickey's brigade of colored troops. The next day A. J. Smith followed with Mower's division of the 16th corps. A division of the 17th corps, 1,730 strong, under General T. Kilby Smith, remained with the transports he having instructions to take them to Loggy Bayou opposite Springfield about midway between Natchitoches and Shreveport, 100 miles by the river above Grand Ecore where he was to halt and communicate with the army at Sabine Cross Roads, 54 miles from Grand Ecore. Porter, Smith and the

transports with six gunboats carrying 17 guns started on the 7th.

Lee had been instructed to attack the enemy wherever found but not to bring on a general engagement. On the 7th he struck a brigade under General Green and drove it beyond Pleasant Hill and at Wilson's Farm came upon a strong force under Green. Lee attacked and after a hard engagement of two hours forced Green to St. Patrice's Bayou, 8 miles from Pleasant Hill. Lee then bivouaced for the night and sent back for infantry support. At daybreak of the 8th, having been reinforced by a brigade of infantry under Colonel Landram, Lee moved forward, drove the Confederates from St. Patrice's Bayou and gradually pushed them back of Sabine Cross Roads where he found himself in front of General Richard Taylor's army of 10,000 men who were concealed in a dense woods beyond Sabine Cross Roads. Taylor knew that Banks' column was stretched out on a single road for more than 20 miles and thought himself safe in attacking the head of it. Lee threw out a strong skirmish line and waited for Banks' main body to come up. At noon Ransom arrived with a brigade and formed his line as well as circumstances would allow. Soon afterwards Banks and his staff reached the field and sent back repeated orders to Franklin to hurry forward. After heavy and continuous skirmishing lasting until 4:30 p. m., Taylor threw his entire force against the Union line.

Mouton's division and two brigades of dismounted cavalry impetuously charged the Union right (Mouton being killed at the first onset) while Walker's division and a brigade on its right attacked the Union centre and left. For nearly an hour 4,500 Union troops resisted the Confederate onslaught but were gradually forced back with heavy loss to the woods in the rear of the open space on the cross roads. Meanwhile Franklin had come up with Cameron's division of the 13th corps and a new line was formed but was immediately broken by heavy attacks on both flanks and front. Soon a panic set in; the cavalry train of 156 wagons was captured; Ransom's 10 guns together with 1,000 of his men were taken; Franklin and Ransom were wounded; and in spite of Banks' efforts the whole Union army fled in disorder to Pleasant Grove, three miles from the field of battle. Here the 19th corps under Emory had formed line on the edge of a wood, but this had been scarcely drawn up when the panic stricken fugitives came rushing back through it to the rear. The Confederates were close on their heels, immediately assaulted Emory's line and were met with a severe fire that checked them. For an hour and a half the Confederates made repeated attempts to turn Emory's right but were repulsed with great loss. This action is known as the battle of Pleasant Grove. The Union loss at Sabine Cross Roads and Pleasant Grove was 1,050 killed and

wounded and nearly 1,800 missing, while the Confederate loss was only 1,500 killed and wounded.*

Banks had been limited as to time in carrying out the object of his campaign, and as the time was fast expiring he concluded to abandon the expedition. He therefore gave the order to fall back on Pleasant Hill which was done early on the morning of April 9. On the night of the 8th A. J. Smith with part of his command had halted at Pleasant Hill and with less than 13,000 men Banks formed a double line—the first, consisting of the 19th corps, along a thickly wooded slope half a mile west of Pleasant Hill; the second, consisting of A. J. Smith's command and the artillery, on a plateau in the rear. The trains, preceded by Lee's cavalry and Dickey's colored brigade and followed by remnants of Ransom's division, were put on the road to Grand Ecore. Reinforced during the night by the divisions of Generals T. J. Churchill and M. M. Parsons, General Taylor had followed Banks very cautiously and at noon his advance struck the Union outposts. Later the artillery was brought up and opened fire, and a demonstration was made on the Union right. About 5 o'clock Taylor began the attack by sending three divisions against the Union left flank driving it back to the cover of the second line. There the Confederates

* *Battles and Leaders*, vol. iv., pp. 352-355, 371.

were repulsed with great loss. Meanwhile the Union right, though hard pressed, had stood firmly until, the left being driven back, it was in danger of being surrounded and therefore gave ground. The Confederates then pressed on to an attack on A. J. Smith who held the second line in reserve, but Smith's and part of Emory's men charged the Confederates and drove them back. All the reserves were then thrown into action and the Confederates were routed, driven from the field and pursued until dark. Banks' loss at Pleasant Hill was 150 killed, 844 wounded and 375 missing. Taylor's loss was about 1,000 killed and wounded and nearly 500 missing.*

During the night the retreat was resumed and Grand Ecore was reached on the 11th. After the close of the battle of Pleasant Hill, E. Kirby Smith joined Taylor and determined to move against General Steele in Arkansas, the result of which campaign we have already seen. Taylor withdrew his infantry to Mansfield on the 10th and 11th, leaving the cavalry under Green and the infantry division of 2,000 men under C. J. Polignac to harass Banks. Upon his arrival at Grand Ecore, Banks intrenched, threw a pontoon bridge across the river, sent part of his force to the other side, and waited for the fleet to come down. Porter with

the gunboats and T. Kilby Smith with the transports started down the river and on the 15th, after repulsing an attack on the 12th at Blair's Landing by Green, arrived at Grand Ecore, then making their way as fast as possible to Alexandria. On the 22d Banks started from Grand Ecore for Alexandria and on the morning of the 23d, while marching along Cane River, a branch of the Red, was attacked at Monett's Ferry by General Bee with four brigades of 2,000 men and 4 batteries. At the same time the Confederate cavalry under General Wharton and the infantry under Polignac were harassing Banks' rear. About three miles above the ferry General Birge with his own brigade and Cameron's division of the 13th corps, in all about 5,000 men, crossed Cane River and by a difficult flank march of several miles succeeded in occupying it which rendered Monett's Bluff untenable. The Confederates then retreated and left open the road to Alexandria. On the 24th Banks resumed his march and without very serious opposition entered Alexandria on the 25th. During this march of 400 miles Banks had fought several battles and had lost 289 killed, 1,541 wounded and 2,150 missing, an aggregate of 3,980.*

On April 28 Banks received through General David Hunter an order from Grant to close the campaign against

* *Battles and Leaders*, vol. iv., pp. 355-356, 372; *Confederate Military History*, vol. ix., pt. ii., pp. 159-160; vol. x., chap. xiv.; vol. xi., pt. i., pp. 201-208.

* *Official Records*, vol. xxxiv.; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. iv., pp. 341-374; Taylor, *Destruction and Reconstruction*; Pollard, *Third Year of the War*, p. 252.

Shreveport without delay and to return A. J. Smith's troops to General Sherman for operations east of the Mississippi. Hunter returned to Grant with a letter from Banks containing the information that Porter's fleet was above the Alexandria rapids in a critical situation. The vessels needed seven feet of water to float them and as the river was very low they seemed to be doomed. Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph Bailey of the 4th Wisconsin infantry, however, suggested a plan for their release and work was begun on April 30, nearly the entire army at different times being detailed to the duty. Between 2,000 and 3,000 lumbermen from Maine and the Northwest cut down trees; others set to work collecting stones, brick, etc., and in a week a dam had been constructed across the river 758 feet in width and raising the water from five to six feet deep on the rapids. The water having risen, three gunboats and another vessel ran down the rapids on the afternoon of May 8 and lay-to just above the dam. The tremendous pressure of the pent-up waters caused two of the barges which had been sunken in the centre to break loose, early on the morning of the 9th. Four vessels were immediately rushed through the opening but by this time the water had fallen so low that no more could make the passage, six gunboats and two tugs remaining above the rapids. The damage to the dam was partially repaired and wing dams were con-

structed on the upper falls. These were completed by the 11th by which time the water had risen to six and a half feet. The heavier vessels were lightened and on the 12th all of them had run down the falls and through the dam into deeper water.*

The fleet having passed below the falls and the rising of the river insuring a safe passage of all the bars below, the gunboats and transports on the morning of May 13 started and in the afternoon Banks marched out of Alexandria for Simsport. From the start Banks' front, flanks and rear were harassed by cavalry and artillery and on the 16th a severe engagement occurred near Mansura in which the Confederates were driven from the position they had taken across the road to Simsport, which place Banks' advance reached on the evening of the 17th. It was then found that the pontoon bridge was too short to span the Atchafalaya and Bailey again improvised a crossing. The transports were ranged side by side with the planking of the pontoons laid across their bows making a level road of about 700 yards over which the main body of the army with its trains and artillery began passing on the 19th. While this operation was taking place, A. J. Smith's command was drawn up in line at Yellow Bayou covering the rear of the army and the cross-

* Duyekineck, *Late Civil War*, vol. iii., pp. 322-325; Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. viii., pp. 298-301; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. iv., pp. 364-366.

ing of the Atchafalaya. On the afternoon of the 18th the Confederate cavalry under Wharton and the infantry under Polignac attacked and drove in Smith's skirmishers, but General Mower who was in immediate command of the Union line made a counter charge with two brigades of infantry and one of cavalry and the Confederate attack was repulsed. In endeavoring to follow up his success Mower was checked by a heavy artillery fire and withdrew to a thicket where he formed a new line and brought up artillery. The Confederates renewed the attack but were repulsed with some loss. The thicket then took fire and as this formed an impassable barrier between the two contestants Mower withdrew, leaving his dead and wounded on the field. The Union loss was 38 killed, 226 wounded and 3 missing. The Confederate loss was 452 killed, wounded and missing, of whom 180 were taken prisoners. By the 20th the army had all crossed the Atchafalaya. Banks yielded the command to General Canby who had been ordered to relieve him; the navy and transports passed into the Mississippi; and the Red River campaign, one of the most humiliating of the war, had ended. On the return march from Alexandria the Union loss was about 165 killed, 650 wounded and 450 captured or missing. Taylor says that the entire Confederate loss in the campaign from Sabine

Cross Roads to Yellow Bayou was 3,976.*

The sending of troops from Vicksburg to join the Red River expedition enabled the Confederates under General N. B. Forrest and others in northern Mississippi and southwestern Tennessee to make an attack on the Union posts in west Tennessee and Kentucky. On March 23, 1864, Forrest at the head of 1,500 troops left Jackson, Tennessee, and advanced northward some 60 miles to Union City which place he reached the next day. This was garrisoned by a force of about 500 men under Colonel Hawkins, who, contrary to the advice of his officers, surrendered at Forrest's demand. The Confederates then advanced rapidly upon Paducah, Kentucky, situated on the Ohio at the mouth of the Tennessee. The town was held by Colonel S. G. Hicks with about 700 Kentucky and Illinois troops including 250 negro soldiers in the artillery service. With the aid of two gunboats in the river Hicks resolved to defend the works. On March 25 Forrest demanded the surrender of the town† but Hicks refused. On the 26th an attack was made but Forrest was unable to capture the town and, content with the injury he had inflicted, withdrew in

* *Official Records*, vol. xxxiv.; Taylor, *Destruction and Reconstruction*; Mahan, *The Gulf and Inland Waters*; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. iv., pp. 367-368; *Confederate Military History*, vol. x., chaps. xiii.-xiv.

† Moore, *Rebellion Records*, vol. viii., Docs., p. 73.

the direction of Columbus. On April 12 Forrest reached Fort Pillow on the Mississippi River, about 70 miles above Memphis, which at that time was garrisoned by 19 officers and 538 enlisted men, of whom 262 were negroes under the command of Major L. F. Booth. Just before sunrise of the 12th the pickets of the garrison were driven in and fighting soon became general. About 9 o'clock Major A. F. Bradford who had succeeded to the command withdrew all the forces within the fort. For some time the Confederates attacked with no appreciable advantage. About 1 o'clock the fire slackened and a flag of truce was sent to the fort with a demand for its surrender. Bradford refused and a second flag of truce was sent with a communication allowing Bradford only 20 minutes to move his troops out of the fort, after which time, if the evacuation had not taken place, an attack would be made. Bradford again refused, whereupon the Confederates attacked and after a contest of 30 minutes captured the entire garrison. Forrest says in a message to Polk that he killed 500 and took 100 prisoners at a loss to himself of only 20 killed and 60 wounded.* This is somewhat exaggerated. About 160 white and 40 colored prisoners were taken, the killed numbering 221 and the wounded 130 out of a garrison of 557. According to Forrest "The river was dyed

with the blood of the slaughtered for 200 yards. The approximate loss was upwards of 500 killed; but few of the officers escaped. There was in the fort a large number of citizens who had fled there to escape the Conscript Law. Most of them ran into the river and were drowned."† There is dispute as to the massacre at Fort Pillow, many claiming that there was an indiscriminate slaughter after the troops had surrendered. Pollard says: "There is no doubt that for some moments the Confederate officers lost control of their men who were madened by the sight of the negro troops opposing them."‡ Stephen D. Lee in a letter dated June 28 affirms that the flag was not hauled down in token of surrender and refers "to history for numerous cases of indiscriminate slaughter after successful assault even under less aggravating circumstances. The case under consideration is an almost extreme one. You had a servile race armed against their masters and in a country which had been desolated by almost unprecedented outrages." Probably the Confederates were more desperate in their fighting because in the fort were numbers of Tennessee Tories (as Forrest calls them),‡ and between these and Forrest's Tennessee regiment there was great bitterness resulting from old neighborhood feuds.*

* *Official Records*, vol. xxxii., pt. i., p. 610.

† Pollard, *Third Year of the War*, p. 254.

‡ *Official Records*, vol. xxxii., pt. i., p. 610.

|| Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. vi., p. 480 *et seq.*; Rhodes, *United States*, vol. v., pp.

* Jones, *A Rebel War Clerk's Diary*, vol. ii., p. 189.

After this exploit, General Sturgis was ordered to march from Memphis to intercept Forrest, but before the expedition got fairly under way it was ascertained that Forrest had fallen back to northern Mississippi. On June 1 Sturgis started from White's Station near Memphis, with about 5,500 infantry and artillery, under Colonel McMillen, and 3,400 cavalry, under General Grierson. Moving southward, Sturgis reached Ripley, 80 miles from Memphis, on the 8th, and on the 10th struck the Mobile & Ohio Railroad near Guntown, Miss., where Grierson, in advance with the cavalry, met Forrest's cavalry near Brice's Cross Roads, and became immediately engaged. Sturgis, who was six miles in the rear with the infantry, moved on the double-quick, followed by a train of 250 wagons and, coming to where Grierson was engaged, led his troops into battle. In three hours' time Forrest routed him, drove him from the field in confusion, captured prisoners, guns, and wagons, and closely pursued him to near Ripley. There, early in the morning of the 11th, his rear-guard, taking advantage of the small stream, after a sharp fight checked Forrest, and Sturgis continued his retreat to Memphis, having lost 23 officers and 594 men killed and wounded, 1,623 prisoners, 14 guns, and his en-

tire train of 250 wagons, with 10 days' rations and a large supply of ammunition. Forrest's engaging force did not exceed 4,000 men; his loss was 492 killed and wounded.*

On July 5 General A. J. Smith, with Grierson's cavalry division, two infantry divisions of J. A. Mower and Colonel D. Moore, of the 16th corps, and a brigade of colored troops, under Colonel E. Bouton, in all about 14,000 men and 24 guns, left La Grange, Tennessee, to march southward against Forrest, then reported in the vicinity of Tupelo, Mississippi. On the evening of the 7th one of Grierson's cavalry brigades, when near Ripley, attacked a Confederate cavalry force of 500 men, driving it back and inflicting a loss of 35 killed and wounded, with a loss to itself of four wounded. Smith moved on through Ripley, crossed the Tallahatchie River at New Albany on the 9th, and on the 10th encamped about five miles north of Pontotoc. Next morning the march was resumed and Pontotoc was found occupied by McCulloch's cavalry brigade, supported by a brigade on a hill immediately south. The 7th Kansas cavalry was deployed as skirmishers and, assisted by a brigade

510-513; John A. Wyeth, *Life of N. B. Forrest*, p. 335 et seq.; Williams, *The Negro Race in America*, vol. ii., pp. 359-376, 568-569; *Confederate Military History*, vol. vii., pt. ii., pp. 193-194; vol. viii., pp. 233-234.

* *Official Records*, vol. xxxix.; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. iv., pp. 419-421; John H. Wyeth, *Major-General Forrest at Brice's Cross-Roads, June 10, 1864*, in *Monthly Magazine*, pp. 530-545 (1899); Stephen D. Lee, *The Battle of Brice's Cross-Roads, or Tishomingo Creek, June 2 to 12, 1864*, in *Publications of the Mississippi Historical Society*, vol. vi., pp. 27-37 (1902); *Confederate Military History*, vol. vii., pt. ii., pp. 196-199; vol. viii., pp. 234-238.

of infantry, advanced and drove in the Confederate skirmishers, while at the same time Grierson's cavalry, gaining the east side of the town, attacked the Confederates in flank and forced them from the place and the hill beyond, leaving several dead and wounded. General S. D. Lee joined Forrest and assumed command of all the Confederate forces. Smith remained at Pontotoc on the 12th, but early in the morning of the 13th marched out of the town eastward for Tupelo, 18 miles distant, on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad. Lee, informed of Smith's movement, ordered it checked before the railroad was reached; Forrest, with a brigade and a regiment, made successive assaults upon the rear, which was covered by Bouton's colored brigade and the 17th Kansas cavalry, but was repulsed and kept back; and Buford's and Chalmers' divisions attacked the train in flank, causing the destruction of a few wagons, but were driven back by Mower's division, which captured some prisoners and a battle-flag. At dark Smith camped at Harrisburg, a mile from Tupelo. Early in the morning of the 14th Lee ordered Forrest to attack Smith's left, and at 7:30 A. M. Forrest, having dismounted his entire command, made an impetuous charge, with four brigades in line, supported by Chalmers' division and Lyons' brigade. The assault fell upon Moore's division and the left of Mower's, but failed to shake either, although four successive attempts

were made. Between the assaults Forrest's artillery was very active, but was effectively replied to by two Union batteries, whose fire was so annoying that a brigade charged them, though resultlessly. After a hard struggle Forrest withdrew from Moore's front, leaving many dead and wounded. He now marched to the left, crossed the Pontotoc road, and advanced in three lines against Mower, whose men reserved their fire until the charging lines were quite near, when they opened a hot fire of musketry and canister, driving them back in disorder; but they rallied and renewed the attack. For over two hours the battle raged on Mower's front; then he ordered his division to advance, which it did, capturing many prisoners, and driving Forrest from the field about noon. The afternoon was spent in caring for the wounded of both armies and burying the dead. About 9 o'clock in the evening Forrest made an attack upon the extreme left of the Union line, including Bouton's colored brigade, but it was easily repulsed. At an early hour of the 15th Forrest's men advanced from the cover of the woods in front of Mower's division; Mower charged them, and they fled to their horses and rode away. Meanwhile another advance was made on the extreme left, held by Bouton's brigade. For two hours there was sharp artillery firing, when Forrest, under cover of his guns, came forward, but was met by a counter-charge, led by Smith, which

broke Forrest's line and sent it in retreat. It was now past noon. Smith's ammunition had run low, and he had a scant supply of rations. Grierson had destroyed some miles of railroad, and after the last repulse of Forrest Smith moved slowly northward about five miles, going into camp for the night at Old Town Creek. The men were settling themselves for a rest when shells from the rear fell and burst among them. Bell's brigade, with a battery, had closely followed the column and attacked; Mower turned upon them; Crossland's brigade came up and joined Bell; but both were repulsed by Mower with

severe loss, and fell back upon McCulloch's brigade which held ground. McCulloch was desperately wounded, Forrest was wounded, and some prominent officers were killed. Smith resumed his march next morning, followed for two days by two brigades of Forrest's cavalry, and reached Memphis on the 23d. Smith had about 14,000 men engaged, and his losses, from the 11th to the 15th, were 77 killed, 559 wounded, and 38 missing. The Confederate troops engaged numbered 6,600; their losses, as reported by Forrest, were 210 killed and 1,116 wounded.*

CHAPTER XXXV.

1863-1864.

GRANT'S CAMPAIGN AGAINST RICHMOND: THE WILDERNESS, SPOTSYLVANIA, AND COLD HARBOR.

Changes in Confederate commanders — Sherman's expedition to Meridian — Thomas' movement to Dalton — Grant's appointment as lieutenant-general — His plan of campaign — Position and strength of the two armies — The battle of the Wilderness — The battle at Todd's Tavern — The march toward Spotsylvania Court House — Sheridan's raid toward Richmond and the battle at Yellow Tavern — Engagements on the Po River — The battle of Spotsylvania Court House — Operations on the North Anna — The engagement at Hawes' Shop — Operations on the Pamunkey and Totopotomoy — Butler's advance on Richmond — The engagement at Swift Creek or Arrowfield Church — Butler's defeat at Drewry's Bluff and his retreat to Bermuda Hundred — The battle of Cold Harbor.

After the movements about Chattanooga and Knoxville there were several changes in commanders of the Confederate armies. Bragg was sent to Richmond to become chief of staff to Davis and Joseph E. Johnston was placed in command of the Confederate armies of the West; General Polk took Johnston's place as com-

mander of the Department of Mississippi and east Louisiana. Johnston proceeded immediately to Dalton,

* *Official Records*, vol. xxxix.; Wyeth, *Life of Gen. N. B. Forrest; Battles and Leaders*, vol. iv., pp. 421-422; Stephen D. Lee, *The Battle of Tupelo, or Harrisburg, July 14, 1863*, in *Publications of the Mississippi Historical Society*, vol. vi., pp. 39-52 (1902); *Confederate Military History*, vol. vii., pt. ii., pp. 200-202; vol. viii., pp. 238-241.

Georgia, where on December 27, 1863, he assumed command of the Army of the Tennessee. His force present for duty numbered about 43,000 men, the effective total of infantry and artillery being not quite 36,000 with 2,500 cavalry. The army occupied a precipitous ridge called Rocky Face crossed by the railroad from Dalton to Chattanooga at Mill Creek Gap, three and a half miles west of Dalton, but terminating only three miles north of that point and therefore easily flanked by the Ringgold Road.

Meanwhile General Sherman, who, commanding the Department of the Tennessee, had in his charge the east bank of the Mississippi from the Ohio to Natchez, was directed by Grant to go down the Mississippi and strike a blow at the Confederate forces in the interior of the State of Mississippi thereby putting a stop to the annoyance and obstruction which raids on the river occasioned to the traffic of that stream. In January of 1864, therefore, Sherman concentrated two divisions of 10,000 men each at Vicksburg under Generals McPherson and Hurlbut, and on February 3 these divisions marched eastward for the purpose of destroying Meridian. General W. Sooy Smith was to start south from Memphis with a cavalry force to ride through the country and join Sherman at Meridian; General Dodge in command at Pulaski, Tennessee, was to hold Logan at Bellefonte, Alabama, for a diversion toward Rome, Georgia; and Gen-

eral Thomas was to make demonstrations toward Dalton to prevent troops being sent by Johnston to Sherman's front. Sherman entered Jackson on the 6th after heavy skirmishing with cavalry, reached Decatur on the 12th, and entered Meridian on the 14th, the Confederate force under Leonidas Polk, being much smaller than Sherman's, withdrawing toward Demopolis. The State arsenal at Meridian was destroyed with its valuable machines for repairing arms and its ordnance stores, as were also extensive storehouses and cantonments. On the 16th the destruction of the railroads centering at Meridian began, the work extending for 60 miles to the north and east and 55 miles toward Mobile. This destruction was of the most systematic and thorough character; 10,000 men worked at it for five days; 61 bridges and culverts and more than a mile of trestles over swamps were burned; and all rails were rendered useless. One practical object of the expedition was thus fully gained, since Meridian did not wholly resume her importance as a railroad centre during the war, but the expedition nevertheless failed of its ultimate result. General W. S. Smith had been ordered to report to Sherman at Meridian and was expected to reach that point by February 14, but he did not leave Memphis until the 11th. Having with him some 7,000 men he advanced south on the Mobile Railroad via Okolona to West Point, but here his further progress was ar-

rested by a Confederate force under Forrest, Chalmers and others. There was some heavy fighting and, as the Confederates were superior in numbers, Smith resolved upon a retreat across the Tallahatchie at New Albany, although it required forced marches; but this enabled him to reach Memphis on February 25, after having inflicted much injury upon the railroad, destroyed a large quantity of Confederate stores and captured many prisoners. Yet the movement rendered impossible the most important object of the expedition—the junction with Sherman. In consequence of this failure Sherman was unable to push on to Selma, Alabama, and accordingly retired slowly from Meridian, bringing his force in excellent condition to Vicksburg, which he reached on February 27.*

The Confederate authorities had been much disturbed by Sherman's move to Meridian, and as Davis thought that Mobile was in danger he directed Johnston to send reinforcements to Polk. Johnston replied that it would be impossible for troops from Dalton to meet the Union army before it reached the Gulf but he was peremptorily ordered to send reinforcements to Polk and accordingly

detached Hardee with his corps. The column moved so deliberately that Sherman was already preparing to return before it had proceeded far on its way and by the time the Tombigbee River was reached the detachment was recalled. Learning of this movement Grant thought it an excellent opportunity for an advance upon Dalton and perhaps for its capture. Accordingly he sent the 14th corps under General Thomas on February 22 and on that night Ringgold, 23 miles from Chattanooga, was occupied. Early the next morning the column moved forward, constant skirmishing going on with the Confederate cavalry. By night Tunnel Hill was reached and the next morning the Confederates were dislodged from their position and the town occupied, 150 prisoners being captured. The movement was continued upon Dalton, 7 miles distant, but on ascertaining that Johnston's entire force was confronting him, Thomas deemed it prudent to fall back to Tunnel Hill. Subsequently, by March 10, he had retreated to Ringgold after having sustained a loss of 350 killed and wounded, while the Confederates lost only about 200.

Meanwhile after the victories of Chattanooga, Washburne, of Illinois, introduced a bill in Congress to revive the grade of lieutenant-general in the army. This bill was passed on February 26, 1864, and was approved by the President on the 29th. Immediately on signing the bill the President

* Sherman, *Memoirs*, vol. i., p. 390 *et seq.*; Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. viii., pp. 330–332; Stephen D. Lee, *Sherman's Meridian Expedition from Vicksburg to Meridian*, in *Mississippi Historical Society Publications*, vol. iv., pp. 37–47 (1901); *Confederate Military History*, vol. vii., pt. ii., pp. 188–193; and the various biographies of Sherman.

nominated Grant for the office created by it. The nomination was promptly confirmed and, on March 3, the Secretary of War directed Grant to report to the War Department as soon as possible.* He forthwith started for Washington but before leaving wrote to Sherman that much of his achievement had been due to the energy and skill of his subordinates and that he wished to thank him and McPherson for their large share in his success.† In reply Sherman deprecated his own and McPherson's services and ascribed all the glory to Grant's own indomitable will and courage, and concluded by urgently exhorting him not to remain in Washington, with its "buffets of intrigue and policy."‡

Grant reached Washington on the evening of March 8 and at a reception at the executive mansion met Lincoln for the first time. The next day, March 9, Lincoln presented Grant his commission as lieutenant-general, promising at the same time to sustain him in every way possible.¶ The following day Grant was formally assigned to the command of the armies of the United States and soon perceived that his place was with the Army of the Potomac instead of in the West. He went to the front, had

a conversation with General Meade at the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac at Brandy Station, and decided to leave Meade in command. He next went to Nashville where he discussed with Sherman, who had succeeded him as chief of the Western army, a general outline of operations in Tennessee and Georgia, and on March 23 returned to Washington.*

Grant established his headquarters at Culpeper Court House toward the latter part of March and there laid out his plan of campaign. This was extremely simple. He intended to employ the full strength of the army in a simultaneous, concerted movement all along the line; the various armies were to move together and toward one common goal. Banks was to finish his operations in Louisiana and to advance with an army of about 25,000 men on Mobile. Simultaneously Sherman was to move from the heart of Georgia and capture Johnston's army. Sigel, who was in command in the Shenandoah, was to march to the front in two columns, one to threaten the enemy in the Valley and the other to cut the railroad communications between Richmond and the Southwest. Gillmore was to be brought North with his corps and, in conjunction with a corps under W. F. Smith, was to form an army under Benjamin F. Butler to operate against Richmond south of the James. Lee's

* Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. viii., pp. 334-336; Rhodes, *United States*, vol. iv., p. 433.

† Sherman, *Memoirs*, vol. i., p. 399.

‡ Sherman to Grant, March 10, 1864, Sherman, *Memoirs*, vol. i., pp. 399-400.

¶ Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. viii., pp. 340-342.

* Grant, *Personal Memoirs*, vol. ii., p. 118; Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. viii., pp. 344-346.

army was to be the objective point of Meade reinforced by Burnside.* Grant intended "to hammer continuously against the armed forces of the enemy and his resources until by mere attrition, if in no other way, there should be nothing left to him but an equal submission with the loyal section of our common country to the Constitution and laws of the land."†

Grant's main reliance, naturally, was the Army of the Potomac which, on April 30, 1864, was composed of the 2d, 5th and 6th corps of infantry and a cavalry corps under command respectively of Generals W. S. Hancock, G. K. Warren, John Sedgwick and P. H. Sheridan. The 9th corps under General Burnside united with the Army of the Potomac on May 6, but acted under the immediate orders of General Grant until the 24th when it became a part of the Army of the Potomac. The strength of the army including the 9th corps on April 30 was in the neighborhood of 120,000 officers and men, with 316 guns, and was under the supreme command of General George G. Meade.‡ The Army of Northern Virginia commanded by General R. E. Lee was composed of the 1st, 2d and 3d infan-

try corps commanded respectively by Generals James Longstreet, R. S. Ewell and A. P. Hill. A cavalry corps of two divisions (those of Wade Hampton and Fitzhugh Lee) was under command of General J. E. B. Stuart. The most reliable estimates gave Lee's strength in officers and men as follows: Infantry 48,700, artillery 4,854, and cavalry 8,399, an aggregate of 61,953 officers and men with 224 guns.*

During the month of April preparations of every kind were actively carried forward. Owing to the weather and bad condition of the roads operations were delayed until the beginning of May. On May 1 the Army of the Potomac was encamped in the vicinity of Culpeper Court House between the Rapidan and the Rappahannock and the 9th corps on the railroad from Manassas Junction to the Rappahannock. Lee's army lay south of the Rapidan, Ewell's corps above Mine Run and A. P. Hill's on Ewell's left higher up the Rapidan; Longstreet's corps was near Gordonsville and Stuart's cavalry lay along the lower Rappahannock; the headquarters of General Lee were near Orange Court House, 70 miles from Richmond. Lee's army being the main objective, Grant's first movement was to cross the Rapidan, turn Lee's right and compel him to fall back toward Richmond or to come out of his intrench-

* Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. viii., pp. 348-349.

† Grant, *Personal Memoirs*, vol. ii., p. 556.

‡ Humphreys (*Virginia Campaign of '64 and '65*, p. 14) gives the total for the Army of the Potomac as 4,496 officers and 94,942 enlisted men present for duty equipped, these including the officers and men of the provost guard and the engineers. The 9th army corps on May 10 consisted of 968 officers and 21,740 men.

* Humphreys, *The Virginia Campaign of '64 and '65*, pp. 15-51. See also Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. viii., p. 352.

ments and give battle on open ground. The principal objection to this movement was the difficulty presented by the Wilderness, a forest of unusually dense undergrowth, where a year before Hooker had come to grief. Grant thought to avoid this locality by crossing the Rapidan at night and getting through the Wilderness before Lee could discover the movement and intercept it by moving on the Orange turnpike and Orange plank road.


Soon after midnight on May 4 the movement began. Hancock's 2d corps, preceded by Gregg's cavalry division, crossed the Rapidan at Ely's Ford and moved to Chancellorsville where by noon of the 4th the entire corps with its trains had arrived. Warren's corps, preceded by Wilson's cavalry division, crossed the river at Germanna Ford and marched out to Wilderness Tavern at the junction of the Germanna road and the Orange turnpike. These troops reached their position by 2 o'clock on the afternoon of the 4th. Wilson's cavalry was thrown forward to Parker's Store on the Orange plank road; Sedgwick's 6th corps followed Warren's across the Germanna Ford and halted a short distance beyond it. At noon of the 4th Grant knew that Lee was aware of his movement, upon which he directed Burnside to make a forced march from beyond the Rapahannock to Germanna Ford; and by the morning of the 5th Burnside's advance was crossing the Rapidan. The orders for the 5th were for Sher-

idan with two divisions of cavalry to move against the Confederate cavalry near Hamilton's Crossing, and at 5 A. M. Wilson's cavalry was to move to Craig's Meeting House and reconnoiter on the Orange pike and plank roads and other roads on his right and left. Hancock's 2d corps was to march from Chancellorsville to Shady Grove Church and extend its right toward Parker's Store on the Orange plank road, to which point Warren's corps was ordered to advance from Wilderness Tavern. In turn Warren was to extend his right toward Sedgwick's 6th corps which had been ordered to Wilderness Tavern.

Grant had no desire to fight a battle in this tangled jungle, but Lee, who had been watching him, intentionally permitted him to cross the river unopposed, thinking that when the Union army halted in the dense thicket, every inch of which was known to the Confederate generals and soldiers, he would have Grant at his mercy. Lee had been expecting Grant to move on his right and when on the morning of May 4 he saw that the movement was being made he determined to attack Grant before he could get out of the Wilderness. Accordingly he ordered Ewell to march by the Orange pike and A. P. Hill down the plank road, and that night Ewell bivouaced within five miles of Wilderness Tavern, while Hill's advance division halted at Mine Run, seven miles from Parker's Store on the plank road and about ten miles from the intersection

of the Brock road. Longstreet moved from near Gordonsville at 4 P. M. and Stuart's cavalry was drawn in and ordered to cover the Confederate right. On the morning of the 5th Ewell continued his march on the Orange pike with instructions to synchronize his march with that of Hill on the plank road, but neither

Hill. Warren had discovered that the Confederates under Ewell were in force two miles beyond Wilderness Tavern and was directed by Meade to attack with his whole command. At the same time Sedgwick was ordered to move up by a cross road, attack the enemy and connect with Warren on the turnpike. A dispatch was then



officer was to bring on a general engagement until Longstreet came up, the latter having been ordered to follow Hill on the plank road.* About two miles away from Wilderness Tavern Ewell halted, as he was three or four miles farther advanced than

sent to Hancock informing him of these movements and instructing him to wait at Todd's Tavern until further developments. Early in the morning Warren started for Parker's Store on the Orange plank road, and when near it Crawford's division was commanded to halt in a good position on high ground; then, finding that



* Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. vii., pp. 358-360.

Wilson's cavalry at Parker's Store needed assistance, Crawford threw out his skirmishers who encountered the flankers of A. P. Hill's corps.

Soon after 8 o'clock in the morning Crawford learned from Warren that Ewell would be assailed on the turnpike by the divisions of Griffin and Wadsworth, and he was directed to join in the attack with one of his brigades. Between 9 and 10 o'clock Hancock was ordered to advance by the Brock road to the Orange plank road and be ready to move toward Parker's Store; and at about the same time three brigades of Getty's division of Sedgwick's corps were transferred from Wilderness Tavern to the intersection of the Brock road with the Orange plank road, directed to move along the latter and, attacking the enemy, drive him, if they could, back beyond Parker's Store. About noon Warren attacked Ewell who had formed for battle across the Orange pike. Advancing along both sides of the pike Griffin's division struck Johnson's and drove it back. Rodes' division was thrown in on Johnson's right south of the pike, and, supported by Early, who had formed across the pike, the line was reestablished. In a severe and bloody fight Griffin was driven back, losing many prisoners and two guns. On Griffin's left Wadsworth's division had advanced, but became confused and was repulsed in a demoralized condition. McCandless' brigade of Crawford's division, while

attempting to unite with Wadsworth's left, was nearly surrounded by Ewell's right and fell back with such heavy losses that Crawford's entire division had to be drawn in.

Thus all the ground gained by Warren was lost and he assumed a new line somewhat to the rear of his first but still in front of Wilderness Tavern, with his right on the Orange Pike. Early in the afternoon General Wright's division of Sedgwick's corps came up on Warren's right and with Neill's brigade of Getty's division formed within 300 yards of Ewell's front, thereby repelling one of Ewell's attacks. Soon after this Seymour's brigade of Rickett's division advanced to Neill's right and at about 5 o'clock two brigades of Sedgwick assailed Ewell's left, but were driven back. Meanwhile Getty had arrived at the crossing of the Brock road and the plank road and had been instructed to attack the Confederate division in his front under Heth which was supported by a division under Wilcox. Getty was to be aided by Hancock who had been told to move forward from Todd's Tavern by the Brock road to drive A. P. Hill beyond Parker's Store and connect with Warren's left. At 4:15 Getty began the movement and about 400 yards beyond the Brock road became hotly engaged with Heth's division. Hancock then went forward to Getty's aid and the fight became fierce and deadly at very close quarters, continuing until 8 p. m.



3



2



4

No. 1 from the original Brady negative. Nos. 2, 3, and 4 taken from the *Photographic History of the Civil War*. Copyright by the Patriot Publishing Company.

1. PART OF THE TANGLED BATTLEFIELD ON THE EDGE OF THE WILDERNESS. 2. PONTON BRIDGES AT GERMANNA FORD ON THE RAPIDAN, WHERE SEDGWICK'S SIXTH CORPS AND WARREN'S FIFTH CORPS CROSSED ON THE MORNING OF MAY 4, 1864. 3. GENERALS MEADE AND SEDGWICK AND THEIR STAFF OFFICERS JUST BEFORE THE BATTLE OF SPOTSYLVANIA. 4. UNION ARTILLERY MASSING PREPARATORY TO AN ADVANCE ON MAY 18, 1864. EWELL'S ATTACK THE SAME AFTERNOON DELAYED THE DEPARTURE. THE VIEW IS FROM GENERAL WARREN'S HEADQUARTERS AT BEVERLY HOUSE, LOOKING TOWARD THE SPOTSYLVANIA BATTLEFIELD JUST BEYOND THE WOODS.

when darkness put an end to the contest. Hancock had not gained much ground but Hill's line had been broken and his right driven back by two brigades of Barlow's division. While Hancock and Getty were thus engaged Wadsworth's division had been sent in a southeasterly direction to strike the Confederates in flank. He forced his way as far as he could through the forest, but not far enough to connect with Hancock, who halted about half a mile from the Brock road. The Union army had fought in detachments with no connection between its corps or divisions.

Meanwhile the cavalry divisions of Generals Gregg and J. H. Wilson had been active. Wilson, after crossing the Rapidan at Germanna Ford, had marched rapidly by Wilderness Tavern to Parker's Store from which he sent a reconnoissance toward Mine Run, the rest of his division going into bivouac. During the night he was ordered by General Meade to advance in the direction of Craig's Meeting House on the Catharpin road, leaving one regiment to hold Parker's Store. Just beyond Craig's Meeting House Wilson was struck by Rosser's Confederate cavalry but drove it back two miles and at noon, having heard nothing of the approach of Meade's infantry and his own position being threatened, he began to fall back on Parker's Store. He then learned that the regiment left there had been attacked by Confederate infantry and that he was cut off from communica-

tion with Meade. Accordingly he determined to withdraw on the Catharpin road by way of Shady Grove Church to Todd's Tavern on the Brock road. Before he was fairly on the road the Confederates harried him, but he succeeded in reaching Todd's Tavern by crossing the Po River at Corbin's Bridge. A part of his command was cut off but rejoined him later in the day. As he approached Todd's Tavern he was relieved by Gregg's division which, under Meade's orders, Sheridan had sent to assist him. Stuart's cavalry, which had closely followed Wilson, was then driven back by Gregg to Shady Grove Church.

Immediately after the close of the first day's fighting Grant prepared to renew the battle the next day, and Hancock, Warren and Sedgwick were to begin the attack at 5 A. M., Burnside being instructed to have two divisions in position between Warren and Hancock and to advance them simultaneously.* During the night of the 5th the corps of Ewell and Hill strengthened their intrenchments and placed artillery in position. A few minutes before 5 o'clock in the morning of the 6th the second day's fight opened by an attack upon the Union right; this was promptly met by the advance of Wright's division of the 6th corps which in turn made two assaults against the Confederate left but was repulsed with severe losses. Warren, too, had been thwarted in

* Grant, *Personal Memoirs*, vol. ii., p. 195.

his attacks on Ewell's right, but they continued until after 10 o'clock when Sedgwick and Warren were directed to suspend them, to strengthen their position, and to throw up new works, so that a part of their troops could be used in an attack from the vicinity of Hancock's right which had been engaged in desperate conflict. Hancock had disposed the divisions of Gibbon and Barlow, both under command of Gibbon, to defend his left flank against an apprehended attack by Longstreet, and at 5 A. M. launched the divisions of Birney, Mott and Getty, all under Birney, along the Orange plank road, while at the same time Wadsworth's division of Warren's corps advanced on Birney's right. The Confederate divisions of Heth and Wilcox were attacked with such prodigious energy and skill that they were driven a mile and a half through dense woods and back on the trains and artillery near Lee's headquarters. Just before Hill's troops gave way the head of Longstreet's corps, which had marched nearly all night, came upon the field at Parker's Store and was sent along the plank road to support Heth and Wilcox. Kershaw's division was in the lead and began to form on the right of the road. At this time Hancock's corps had become somewhat disorganized by the rush through the undergrowth, and Birney's left, when attacked by Kershaw, was not only brought to a standstill but was forced back on the centre. Wadsworth's ad-

vance had crowded many of Birney's troops to the south side of the plank road so that a greater part of Birney's command was on the left of that road. Field's division of Longstreet's corps had followed close after Kershaw's division, was formed on the Confederate left of the plank road, and, advancing, became hotly engaged with Birney's right and Wadsworth's troops, Gregg's Texans and Benning's Georgians in the lead bearing the brunt of the fight. Following Field's division came R. H. Anderson's division of Hill's corps. This formed on the same part of the line, one portion uniting with Field's troops in the attack, while the other portion supported.

At 9 o'clock Hancock again attacked with the divisions of Birney, Mott, Wadsworth, Stevenson of Burnside's corps, and three brigades of Gibbon's division, but he made no headway and the fire on the front died away. Meanwhile discovering that Hancock's left extended only a short distance from the plank road, Longstreet sent a part of his command to the right to attack Hancock's left and rear, planning then to follow the flank movement by a general advance of the entire corps. The onset first fell on the left of the advanced line held by Frank's brigade partly across the Brock road, and the line was easily swept aside. Mott's division was then driven back in confusion, and the demoralization spread to the troops on the right so that Hancock was com-

pelled to withdraw his entire corps to the Brock road where the troops were re-formed in two lines beyond their intrenchments. On Hancock's right Wadsworth's troops broke and, in striving to rally them, Wadsworth was mortally wounded. Longstreet then ordered a general advance in the course of which, while moving at the head of his column by the flank down the plank road and when opposite the force that had made the flank movement, a volley was fired that killed General Jenkins who was in command of the leading brigade of Field's division and so severely wounded General Longstreet that he was not able to resume active duty until October.* General Lee soon came up, postponed the attack to a later hour, and so extended his line that the right rested on the unfinished Orange road. Meanwhile a brigade of the 9th corps, which had been sent to the left under Gibbon, swept down in front of Hancock's lines from left to right and completely cleared the vicinity of every vestige of the enemy.

It had been expected that Burnside would advance through the space between Warren on the turnpike and Hancock on the plank road and attack Hill and Longstreet in flank, but in making his way through the undergrowth he came upon a body of Confederates on a wooded crest near the plank road and therefore moved farther to the left. It was not until

afternoon, therefore, and after Hancock's repulse, that they became engaged; they then accomplished little and toward evening fell back and intrenched. By this time Hancock had re-formed his lines, had been reinforced by troops sent from Meade and planned to renew the battle at 6 P. M.; but at 4:15, having Longstreet's and Hill's troops well in hand, Lee anticipated Hancock's action and advanced in force against his intrenched lines. When Lee came within 100 yards of the front line he opened a severe fire and at the end of half an hour a portion of Mott's division and a part of Birney's brigade gave way. Through this break the Confederates pushed forward, Anderson's brigade of Field's division taking possession of that part of the first line of intrenchments and planting its colors on them. At this point the woods had taken fire during the afternoon and, when Lee's force attacked, the log breastworks at that part of the line became a mass of flames which extended for many hundreds of yards to the right and left. The heat and smoke driven into the faces of the Union troops prevented them from firing over the parapets and at some points obliged them to abandon their position. Anderson's brigade, taking advantage of this, seized a part of the breastworks but were driven out by Carroll's brigade. By 5 o'clock Lee's troops had been completely repulsed in Hancock's front and the Confederates suffered severe losses in killed and wounded.

* Longstreet, *From Manassas to Appomattox*, p. 574.

Just before dark Ewell sent two brigades of Early's division around the right of Sedgwick's corps held by Ricketts' command, and in coöperation with the rest of Early's division forced Ricketts back in some disorder and captured Generals Shaler and Seymour and a large number of troops. Wright's division, too, was thrown back in confusion but he soon restored order, and Early, withdrawing, formed a new line in front of his old one. During the night an entirely new alignment was drawn up by the 6th corps, its front and right moving back—a change which was conformed to by the right of the 5th corps.*

Meanwhile on the left there had been some severe fighting at and near Todd's Tavern where Sheridan was holding the left flank of the army and covering its trains. On the 6th Sheridan had two divisions at Todd's Tavern commanding the road centering at this point, and had been attacked here earlier in the day by Stuart who was eager to get at Grant's flank and his wagon trains; but these attacks were repulsed. Meade, anxious about his left, directed Sheridan to draw back from Todd's Tavern closer to the trains, which movement Sheridan executed in the afternoon and the Confederate cavalry occupied Todd's Tavern. On the morning of the 7th neither side appeared in the humor to renew the struggle. Reconnois-

sance showed that the Confederates were well intrenched and Grant decided to continue the movement by the left flank; so when darkness came on, the Union troops began their march for Spotsylvania Court House, with the purpose of placing themselves between Lee and Richmond. The Union troops engaged in the battle of the Wilderness numbered about 101,000 and their losses, as officially reported, were 2,246 killed, 12,037 wounded and 3,383 missing—an aggregate of 17,666. The Confederate army had numbered about 60,000 and its losses were about 7,750, though no accurate reports are obtainable.*

Grant's next objective being Spotsylvania Court House, only 15 miles southeast of the Wilderness, it was considered possible to reach it by a night march early on the morning of May 8th. As a preliminary to the movement Sheridan's cavalry was to seize Todd's Tavern on the Brock road midway between the two places. On the morning of the 7th two brigades of Gregg's division and two of Merritt's, dis-

* Sawyer, *Grant's Campaign in Virginia* (1908); Humphreys, *Virginia Campaign of '64 and '65*, pp. 18-56; *Official Records*, vol. xxxvi.; Grant's *Personal Memoirs*, vol. ii.; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. iv., pp. 97-128; 145-169; Swinton, *Army of the Potomac*; Walker, *History of the Second Army Corps*; Gordon, *Reminiscences of the Civil War*; Morris Schaff, *The Battle of the Wilderness* (1910); *Confederate Military History*, vol. iii., pp. 431-444; vol. iv., pp. 229-235; vol. v., pp. 314-318; vol. vi., pp. 289-291; and the biographies of Lee, Stuart, Grant, Meade, Sheridan, Thomas and other generals engaged.

* Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. viii., pp. 366-367.

mounted and fighting on foot, attacked Stuart, driving him from Todd's Tavern with severe loss. Fitzhugh Lee's division retreated in the direction of Spotsylvania Court House and Wade Hampton's force retired southward to Corbin's Bridge across the Po River. Sheridan withdrew and encamped with Gregg's and Merritt's divisions in the open fields to the east of Todd's Tavern. Early on the morning of the 8th Gregg took position to guard the roads from the south while Merritt's division renewed the engagement with Fitzhugh Lee on the Spotsylvania Court House road in order to open it for an advance of Warren's 5th corps from Todd's Tavern. A severe engagement took place between Lee and Merritt, but Merritt gradually gained ground until about 6 o'clock when he was relieved and Robinson's division of Warren's corps assumed the task. At 9:30 A. M., Hancock's 2d corps, following Warren's, arrived at Todd's Tavern and took position covering the Brock, Catharpin and Spotsylvania roads and began to intrench, holding the extreme right of the army. At 11:30 A. M. General Nelson A. Miles' brigade with Gregg's cavalry brigade and a battery moved out on the Catharpin road toward Corbin's Bridge; but when within half a mile of it artillery on the heights south of the Po River opened fire, whereupon Miles immediately formed line, his artillery replying to that of the enemy. This gave rise to a skirmish with Wade Hampton's cavalry

which was kept at bay, and at 5:30 P. M., when Miles began to withdraw, he was attacked by Mahone's division of infantry and fell back, fighting all the way to Todd's Tavern.

At 3 P. M. the trains began their movement toward Chancellorsville and Piney Grove Church. After dark Warren's 5th corps marched by the Brock road in the rear of Hancock's 2d corps and arrived at Todd's Tavern at 3 A. M. of the 8th. Sedgwick's 6th corps followed, moving eastward to Chancellorsville, then southward to connect with Warren, while Burnside's 9th corps followed Sedgwick. When Hancock reached Todd's Tavern at 9 A. M. of the 8th he intrenched. Upon Warren's arrival at Todd's Tavern he found Merritt's cavalry division engaged with Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry and, as we have seen, immediately sent Robinson's division to take Merritt's place. In the encounter which ensued Robinson was wounded and his division driven back to the woods in its rear. Robinson had encountered two brigades of R. H. Anderson's corps, the advance of Lee's army which had beaten Grant in the race for Spotsylvania Court House. At one time Lee held the opinion that Grant was retiring from Fredericksburg, but being too sagacious to base his entire action on one supposition and surmising that Grant might be moving toward Spotsylvania, Lee on the 7th had cut a military road through the forest from the Orange plank road to the

highway by Sandy Grove Church and thence eastward to the court house. Late in the day Lee was informed by Stuart that Grant's trains were in motion southward and accordingly he directed his army to move to the court house on roads nearly parallel to the Union line of march. General R. H. Anderson, who commanded Longstreet's corps, had been ordered to march on the morning of the 8th, but being much troubled by the fire and suffocating smoke in the Wilderness woods concluded to avoid it and, setting out at 11 o'clock on the night of the 7th, by dint of marching all the rest of the night arrived near the court house at 8 o'clock on the morning of the 8th. There he found that Lee's cavalry was engaged with Warren's infantry and therefore sent part of his corps to Lee's support, while two brigades marched on to the court house and occupied it, Wilson's cavalry division, that had been sent by Sheridan to seize it, withdrawing. Lee's cavalry retreated as Anderson came up, and the latter took up the fight with Warren. Griffin's division of Warren's corps, which had advanced on Robinson's right, was repulsed, and both commands fell back upon Crawford's and Cutler's divisions which had then reached the front. Cutler moved forward and drove the Confederates from Griffin's right, and towards noon Warren intrenched at about 200 yards from the enemy. Shortly before 1 o'clock Sedgwick came up, and late in the day be-

gan an assault upon the Confederate position. Penrose's New Jersey brigade of the 6th corps charged Anderson's right, but was repelled. Crawford's division of Warren's corps then pushed forward, passed Anderson's right and struck Rodes' division of Ewell's corps then forming on Anderson's right, and forced it back some distance; whereupon Rodes rallied his troops and drove Crawford within his intrenchments. During the evening Ewell's corps came up and posted on Anderson's right.

On the morning of the 9th A. P. Hill's corps, under command of Early, appeared, and Lee established his lines covering Spotsylvania Court House with Anderson's corps on the left on the Po River, Ewell's corps in the centre and Hill's on the right covering the Fredericksburg road. During the night Lee strengthened his lines while Grant readjusted his own. Skirmishing was kept up by both sides, in the course of which General Sedgwick commanding the 6th corps was killed, the command then devolving upon General Horatio G. Wright. Early in the day Burnside moved across from the plank road to the Fredericksburg road at the crossing of Ny River, east of the court house, and threw one of his divisions across the river encountering infantry and some dismounted cavalry. Hancock moved east from Todd's Tavern and intrenched on Warren's right overlooking the Po River.

At this time Grant sent Sheridan

with 10,000 cavalry and six batteries to cut the railroads entering Richmond from the north and northwest. Sheridan moved along the telegraph road; Merritt's division crossed the North Anna at Anderson's Ford at dark and encamped; the rest of the cavalry, harassed by a brigade of Stuart's cavalry, halted for the night on the north side of the river. Early on the morning of the 10th the march was resumed. Several miles of the Virginia Central Railroad were destroyed and at night Sheridan crossed the South Anna, halting at daylight of the 11th on the south bank. Early on the 11th Davies' brigade encountered Munford's cavalry at Ashland on the Fredericksburg Railroad, drove it out of the place, destroyed the depot and several miles of railroad and rejoined Sheridan's main body at Allen's Station. Meanwhile General Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry of about 4,500 men had made a circuitous march to interpose between Sheridan and Richmond and had reached Yellow Tavern on the Brock road, six miles from Richmond. Sheridan's whole force then advanced, with Merritt's division in the lead followed by the divisions under Wilson and Gregg. Merritt attacked and gained the Brock road at Yellow Tavern, but Stuart seized a position on his flank and enfiladed his line with artillery. Custer's brigade, supported by Wilson's division, then charged the flanking force, broke it, captured two guns and mortally wounded General Stu-

art.* Stuart's detached brigade under General James B. Gordon attacked Sheridan's rear but was driven back toward Ashland by Gregg. Fitzhugh Lee's division then retreated toward Richmond, hard followed by Sheridan who entered the most advanced lines of the works encircling Richmond. At daylight of the 12th Sheridan massed his force at Meadow Bridge, but finding the Confederate works too strong to be attacked decided to recross the Chickahominy at Meadow Bridge then held by Gordon's cavalry and a battery on the north side. After a sharp engagement in which General Gordon was killed, Merritt's division succeeded in crossing. Meanwhile Wilson had been enabled to pass the second line of the Richmond advances on the Mechanicsville road and both he and Gregg were attacked by the infantry brigades of Barton and Gracie and by some dismounted cavalry. At first Wilson was driven back in some disorder but, after a severe contest, the Confederates were in turn compelled to retreat, and between 3 and 4 p. m. Wilson and Gregg crossed the Chickahominy above the Mechanicsville bridge and Sheridan with his corps encamped near Gaines' Mill. The next day he crossed to the south of the Chickahominy by Bottom's Bridge, marched through White Oak Swamp, and on the 14th encamped in the vicinity of Haxall's Landing on

* *Battles and Leaders*, vol. iv., p. 194.

the James River. He made several demonstrations on the New Market road in the direction of Richmond and having drawn supplies from General Butler's army then in that vicinity, started on the 17th to rejoin Grant, marching by way of White House on the Pamunkey. Detachments were sent to destroy the railroad bridges over the South Anna and to make demonstrations on Richmond, and on May 24 Sheridan rejoined Grant's army near Chesterfield Bridge on the North Anna. In this raid Sheridan's losses were 64 killed, 337 wounded and 224 missing.*

Meanwhile Burnside had reported to Grant that, in his movement on the 9th, he had met the enemy east of the court house and judged from indications in his front that Lee was meditating an advance northward toward Fredericksburg. Accordingly Grant ordered Hancock to move on the 10th on Lee's left across the east and west bends of the Po River and late in the afternoon the stream, some 50 yards wide, was crossed by the divisions of Barlow, Gibbon, and Birney, the last meeting a stubborn resistance from cavalry and a battery. After crossing, three pontoon bridges were laid and the troops were pushed toward the Block House bridge with Barlow in

advance; but night compelled a halt. At daybreak Hancock made a close examination of the Block House bridge with the design of carrying it by assault, but during the night Mahone's Confederate division had been sent to that point and had intrenched itself in a position commanding the bridge and its approaches. Therefore Brooke's brigade of Barlow's division was sent down the river to find a crossing and two regiments were dispatched by Birney along the Andrews Tavern road to cover Brooke's movement; whereupon about half a mile below the bridge Brooke threw across a regiment which soon discovered a Confederate line of earthworks held by artillery and infantry. About 1 o'clock Hancock was ordered by Meade to send two divisions to aid Warren in an assault on the Confederate lines at 5 p. m., and accordingly Gibbon and Birney were recalled to the other side of the Po, leaving Barlow to hold the ground south of the river. When Birney began to withdraw, the regiments he had sent toward Andrews Tavern, having driven back Wade Hampton's cavalry, were attacked by infantry and, as Meade did not wish to bring on an engagement south of the Po River, he ordered Barlow to fall back, Hancock being directed to give the matter personal attention. At 2 o'clock in the afternoon Barlow began the retrograde movement. At this time Brooke's and Brown's brigades were south of the Shady Grove road and

* Sheridan, *Personal Memoirs*, vol. ii.; *Official Records*, vol. xxxvi.; Humphreys, *The Virginia Campaign of '64 and '65*, pp. 133-136; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. iv., pp. 188-193; McClellan, *Life and Campaigns of General Stuart*; Theodore S. Garnett, *J. E. B. Stuart* (1908); Davies, *Life of Sheridan*; Wilson, *Under the Old Flag* (1912).

Miles' and Smyth's brigades were along the road, the left resting on a crest a few hundred yards from the Block House bridge. As Barlow began to retreat he was attacked. Heth's Confederate division of three brigades and a battalion of artillery, which had crossed the river below the Block House bridge, gave battle to Brooke and Brown as they were withdrawing, but was driven off with severe loss, and Brooke and Brown then took position on a wooded crest on the right of Miles. Heth followed closely, whereupon Miles and Smyth retired to a crest in front of the bridges, and all the artillery, except Arnold's battery, was transferred to a new position on the north bank of the river. Heth again attacked Brooke and Brown, but was again repulsed with heavy loss. During this contest the woods on the right and rear of the Union troops took fire and the flames approached so close that, upon the second repulse of Heth, the brigades were ordered to abandon their position. Falling back, however, through the burning forest in good order and immediately recrossing the river under heavy artillery fire, Smyth's brigade was then sent across and deployed to protect Miles' crossing, but before Miles could move the Confederates opened a furious artillery fire from the front and left. Under cover of this the Confederate infantry attempted to cross the open ground in front of Miles, but the latter held it in check and the Confederate guns

were silenced by the Union batteries on the north side of the river. Taking advantage of this respite Miles withdrew by the two pontoon bridges, one of which was immediately taken up and the other destroyed.*

While this engagement on the Po River was in progress Warren was preparing for an assault. Gibbon's division was recalled, however, Hancock was placed on Warren's right, and at 11 o'clock two brigades advanced, met an obstinate resistance from Field's division and were compelled to retire with considerable loss. Warren, too, made an attack but was repulsed by Field, though he gained information of Field's position which enabled him to report to Meade that a general assault would be successful. This onset was to be made at 5 P. M. by Hancock with the 5th and 6th corps and part of his own, but Hancock was engaged on the Po River and, at 3:45 P. M., Warren was directed to execute it. This was done with Crawford's and Cutler's divisions of the 5th corps and Webb's and Carroll's brigades of the 2d corps, but Warren was repulsed with a heavy loss. At 5:30, however, Hancock returned from the Po River, and at 7 o'clock made another assault with the divisions of Birney and Gibbon, this being against the brigades of George T. Anderson and Gregg, of Field's division. Some of the Union troops gained the works

* *Official Records*, vol. xxxvi.; Humphreys, *The Virginia Campaign of '64 and '65*; Walker, *History of the Second Army Corps*.

held by Gregg's Texas brigade, but a flank fire of Anderson's brigade drove them out and the attacking column fell back in a demoralized condition. At about the same time General Wright, on Warren's left, found a vulnerable place on the west face of the noted salient held by Rodes' division of Ewell's corps and made a demonstration against it. Upton's brigade of the 6th corps, reinforced by four regiments of Neill's corps and supported on the left by Mott's division of the 2d corps, prepared to attack at 5 P. M. After some artillery fire Upton charged from the woods, went over the Confederate works, broke Doles' brigade and part of Daniels', planted his colors on a second line of works and captured a four-gun battery. Mott, however, failed to support Upton and, recovering from their surprise, the Confederates threw two brigades in Upton's front. The brigades of Daniels, R. D. Johnston, J. A. Walker and Steuart fell upon both flanks and Upton was then ordered to withdraw. He lost about 1,000 men and was obliged to abandon the captured battery, but carried back with him 1,200 prisoners and several stands of colors. Farther to the left Burnside made a reconnoissance toward Spotsylvania Court House and had a spirited engagement, driving the enemy close to the Fredericksburg road and intrenching within a quarter of a mile of the court house. During the 10th the Union forces engaged numbered about 38,000 and the


losses were about 4,200, while the Confederates lost about 2,000 killed and wounded. It was at this juncture that Grant sent a report to Halleck containing the grim, indomitable words: "I propose to fight it out on this line if it takes all summer."

On the 11th Grant prepared for an attack to be made the next day. Finding that the Confederate left was well defended he made arrangements to attack the centre at a salient of the line. General Wright was directed to extend his left, concentrate on that wing, and be prepared to coöperate with Hancock in an assault. Hancock with the 2d corps was to pass to the left of Wright during the night and attack the salient at daylight. Warren's 5th corps was to operate against the works in his front in order to keep the Confederates in that quarter busy, and on the extreme left Burnside was to make a demonstration with the 9th corps. During the afternoon of the 11th Wright extended his lines. The two divisions of Barlow and Birney, of Hancock's corps, started at 10 P. M. and at midnight reached the Brown House where they found Mott's division. Passing over the intrenchments they began the formation of an assaulting column. Barlow's division was massed across a clearing in two lines, each regiment being doubled at the centre. The first line consisted of the brigades of Brooke and Miles and the second of those of Smyth and Brown. Birney's division was formed on Barlow's

right in two deployed lines; Mott succeeded to Birney's rear and Gibbon's division was placed in reserve.

The point to be assailed was where Lee's intrenchments had been carried

apex or east angle of the works being held by Edward Johnson's division and the west angle and face by Rodes' division. To provide against contingencies a second line had been laid



northward to inclose a space about a mile in length and half a mile in width, the faces of the salient taken together covering about two and a quarter miles in length and being defended mainly by Ewell's corps, the

off and partly constructed some distance in the rear and in such a way as to cut off the salient at its base. In the rear of this line lay Gordon's division as a reserve. On Ewell's right was A. P. Hill's corps and on

his left that of Longstreet under command of R. H. Anderson. Lee evidently thought that troops were being withdrawn from in front of Anderson's corps, and believing that Grant was making a flanking movement ordered the artillery on the left and centre to be withdrawn. Accordingly Ewell's chief of artillery removed all but two batteries from the line of Edward Johnson's division, but during the night Johnson discovered that the Union troops were massing in his front and, believing that an attack was imminent, requested Ewell to return the artillery immediately. At dawn on the morning of the 12th Barlow's division, led by the brigades of Brooke and Miles, began the assault. On the right Birney passed, though with difficulty, over the rough ground, but kept nearly abreast of Barlow's line. Brooke and Miles tore down the abatis in front of the Confederate works, sprang over the intrenchments and a desperate hand-to-hand fight ensued. Birney came up on the right and in a very short time nearly a mile of the works had been carried, General Johnson himself and General Steuart with 20 guns, 30 colors and nearly 3,000 men being captured. With scarcely a halt Barlow and Birney swept on for nearly half a mile until they struck a strong line of works running east and west across the base of the salient, the existence of which had been hitherto unknown. This line of works was held by General J. B. Gordon's division and

Lane's brigade of Hill's corps. As Gordon was about to start, Lee rode to the head of the column evidently intending to lead the charge. Gordon remonstrated, the soldiers refused to advance unless Lee betook himself out of danger, and finally one of them seized the general's bridle and led his horse to the rear.* Gordon's men then attacked the Union lines behind the captured works, and after a fierce struggle in the pine woods, the Union troops, piled in upon one another six or eight lines deep, were forced to back out of the works in spite of the fact that they held the outer side. At this time the 6th corps came up and took post on the right of the 2d, occupying the line from the west angle southward; Mott's division joined the 6th corps at that angle; and then, farther on to the left, came the divisions of Birney, Gibbon and Barlow. There was great confusion among the Union troops and the Confederates made most determined efforts to recover their intrenchments. Anderson sent troops from the left, the three brigades of Hill's corps came from the right, and for nearly a mile the combatants engaged in a desperate struggle around the bloody angle. They fired directly into each other's faces; bayonet thrusts were given over the intrenchments; prisoners were pulled over the piles of logs to be killed or carried to the rear, and some even leaped the barrier and sur-

* Fitzhugh Lee, *Life of Lee*, p. 336; Long, *Life of Lee*, pp. 338, 341.

rendered to get out of the deadly hail of bullets. Walker says:

"General Hancock had, as soon as the first success was achieved, brought up some of his guns to within 300 yards of the captured works, and these were now pouring solid shot and shell over the heads of our troops into a space crowded with the Confederate brigades; he even ran a section of Brown's Rhode Island and a section of Gibb's Fifth United States up to the breastworks; and though the muzzles protruded into the very faces of the charging Confederates the begrimed cannoneers for a time continued to pour canister into the woods and over the open ground on the west of the McCod House. The contest had settled down to a struggle for the recovery of the apex of the salient between the east and the west angle. * * * Never before since the discovery of gunpowder had such a mass of lead been hurled into a space so narrow as that which now embraced the scene of combat. Large standing trees were literally cut off and brought to the ground by infantry fire alone. If any comparison can be made between the sections in that desperate contest, the fiercest and deadliest fighting took place at the west angle, ever afterward known as 'the bloody angle.' Here Wright's Sixth corps had taken post on coming up at 6 o'clock. * * * All day long the bloody work went on, and still the men of the North and of the South were not gorged with slaughter. The trenches had more than once to be cleared of the dead, to give the living place to stand. All day long, and even into the night the battle lasted, for it was not until 12 o'clock, nearly twenty hours after the command 'Forward' had been given to the column at the Brown House, that the firing died down and the Confederates, relinquishing their purpose to retake the captured works, began in the darkness to construct a new line to cut off the salient."

Both lines made diversions during the day to relieve the tremendous pressure on the centre. Warren with a part of the 5th corps attacked Anderson's command and was repulsed with a loss of over 1,000 men. On Hancock's left Burnside's 9th corps made an assault and after the head of Potter's division had secured a lodgment within Hill's works it was at-

tacked in flank and driven back with heavy loss. Later in the day General Early, commanding Hill's corps, attempted to strike Burnside in flank, met the latter in motion and drove him back to his works and then retired to his own lines. On the 12th the Union forces engaged numbered about 66,000, of whom 6,020 were killed and wounded and 800 missing. There are no accurate reports of the Confederate losses but they were estimated at between 9,000 and 10,000, of whom about 4,000 were captured.*

On the 13th Colonel Carroll with a brigade of the 2d corps found the Confederates strongly intrenched on a new line at the base of the salient. Dispositions were then made to turn Lee's right flank, and during the night of the 13th the 5th and 6th corps were moved over to the Fredericksburg road, spending the next day in getting into position. As the Confederates were found to be strongly intrenched in front of Spotsylvania Court House, it was deemed inexpedient to attack. During the day Up-ton's brigade of the 6th corps was assailed by the Confederates and driven back some distance, but the ground was immediately retaken by a brigade from the 5th and one from the 6th corps. When Lee saw that the 5th corps had moved away from Anderson's front, the latter's corps was sent to the extreme right beyond

* Humphreys, *The Virginia Campaign of '64 and '65*, pp. 105-106. See also Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. viii., pp. 379-382.

the Fredericksburg road and the line was extended to the Po River, Ewell still holding the works in the rear of the bloody salient. Stormy weather then came on preventing active operations for more than a week, during which time Grant endeavored to find a vulnerable spot in Lee's line. The interval gave time for Union reinforcements to come up, and on the morning of the 18th Grant attacked again. The 2d corps, with the 6th on the right and the 9th on the left and Warren assisting with his heavy artillery, attempted to force Ewell's lines, but in vain. Under the fire of 29 guns of Carter's battalion which swept all the approaches to Ewell's line, the attacking force was driven back with a loss of over 2,000 killed and wounded, even before it came well within the range of musketry. Therefore, finding Lee's lines too strong to be broken, Grant issued orders on the 18th for a movement to the North Anna to begin at 12 o'clock on the night of the 19th. On that night the 2d and 9th corps were moved to the left with the 2d in reserve. Late in the afternoon Ewell attempted to flank Grant and get possession of the Fredericksburg road, but he was met by Tyler's division reinforced by Crawford's division of the 5th and Birney's division of the 2d corps, and, after an engagement lasting until dark, was driven back. Some of Ewell's troops pushing to the rear on the Fredericksburg road met Ferrero's division of colored troops and


were repulsed. Grant's loss was 196 killed, 1,090 wounded and 249 missing, while Ewell's loss was only 900. On the night of May 20 Hancock's 2d corps, preceded by Torbert's cavalry, marched for the Mattapony and North Anna Rivers. Torbert attacked and drove Kemper's brigade from an intrenched position at Milford Station and across the Mattapony, Hancock following and intrenching beyond the river on the 21st. Other corps followed Hancock and Grant's advance reached the North Anna in the forenoon of the 23d at Ireland and Jerichofords and Chesterfield bridge, the latter a mile above where the Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroad crosses the river. Lee followed and thus the lines around Spotsylvania Court House were deserted. The entire losses of the Union army around Spotsylvania Court House from May 8 to 19 inclusive are estimated by General Humphreys as 15,722 killed and wounded and 2,001 missing, an aggregate of 17,723. The Confederate losses are not known but were very severe.*

When Grant's advance reached the North Anna on May 23 Lee was found

* Humphreys, *The Virginia Campaign of '64 and '65*, pp. 57-118; *Official Records*, vol. xxxvi.; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. iv., pp. 129-135, 170-184; Powell, *History of the 5th Army Corps*; Walker, *History of the Second Army Corps*; Grant, *Personal Memoirs*, vol. ii.; Gordon, *Reminiscences of the Civil War*; Early, *Last Year of the War for Independence*; *Confederate Military History*, vol. iii., pp. 445-455; vol. iv., pp. 235-243; vol. v., pp. 318-320; vol. viii., pp. 205-206; and biographies of generals engaged.

in his front. He had detected Grant's designs, put his army in motion for Hanover Court House and on the morning of the 23d was south of the North Anna in position covering the roads and railroads leading to Richmond. Here he was joined by General Breckinridge from the Shenandoah Valley and by Pickett's division from near Richmond. Ewell was on the right, Anderson in the centre and A. P. Hill on the left, with Breck-

Bartlett's brigade and, with a loss of about 350 men, drove Wilcox back with heavy loss in killed and wounded and nearly 1,000 prisoners. About the same time Hancock prepared to force a passage at Chesterfield bridge. A part of Kershaw's division held a bridge-head north of the stream and at about 6 o'clock the brigades of Colonels Pierce and Egan carried this point with a loss of about 100 men, the Confederates retreating across the



inridge and Pickett in reserve. The Union 5th corps under Warren crossed the river at Jericho Ford and at 4:30 p. m. on the 23d was in line of battle about a half mile from the river, Cutler's division on the right, Griffin's in the centre and Crawford's on the left, its flank resting on the North Anna. At 6 o'clock Wilcox's division of A. P. Hill's corps attacked Cutler's division and part of Griffin's, drove back Cutler in some disorder, and uncovered Griffin's right, but Griffin drew back his right, was supported by

river. During the night of the 23d Lee shortened his line so that it formed a right angled triangle with the right angle opposite Ox Ford and extending down the river three-quarters of a mile and then southeast to near Hanover Junction. The left under A. P. Hill ran from Ox Ford* southwest across the Virginia Central

* In the atlas to the *Official Records* Ox Ford is called Oxford Ford, but in *Battles and Leaders* and other works it is called Ox Ford. In the map we have followed the *Official Records* but in the text have followed the others.

Railroad to Little River. On the morning of the 24th Hancock crossed the river unopposed and began to intrench within 700 yards of Lee's line. About 6 P. M. Smyth's brigade was assailed and became sharply engaged. Barlow's division prepared to attack but Lee's position was found to be so strong that this project was abandoned. At the same time Wright's 6th corps crossed the river at Jericho Ford and joined Warren. Burnside's 9th corps arrived at Ox Ford but could not cross in the front of the blunt angle of Lee's line holding the south side; whereupon Potter's division was sent to the left and, crossing lower down, formed on Hancock's right while Crittenden's division moved up stream to near Quarles' Mill and, crossing, joined Crawford's division of Warren's corps. Supported by Crawford Crittenden moved forward to open the way for Wilcox's division to cross, but was attacked by Mahone's division and driven back with severe loss. Everywhere Lee was well intrenched. Grant found himself with two wings on one side of a stream difficult at all times to cross and liable to sudden freshets, while his centre was on the other side. Lee's centre like a blunt wedge stood ready to receive him and interpose between his wings, neither of which could support the other. Thus Grant was completely checkmated. Lee's position was too strong to assail, so Grant coolly ordered the trains to recross the river on the 25th, crossed himself

on the night of the 26th and, 32 miles marching to the left, crossed the Pamunkey at and near Hanover town by the afternoon of the 28th.*

General Sheridan with Torbert's and Gregg's cavalry divisions led the advance. Torbert crossed the Pamunkey at Hanover Ferry on the 27th after considerable skirmishing in which he took about 60 prisoners, and the two cavalry divisions supported by Russell's division of infantry pushed on to Hanover town and bivouaced for the night. On the morning of the 28th Sheridan was permitted to make a demonstration and discovered the enemy's position. Advancing along the Mechanicsville road Gregg's division encountered the two cavalry divisions of Wade Hampton and Fitzhugh Lee and Butler's South Carolina brigade about a mile beyond Hawes' Shop. Gregg attacked and then ensued a severe cavalry engagement which continued several hours, neither side yielding ground. Finally late in the day Custer's brigade of Torbert's division came up, dismounted, formed in close column of attack in the centre of Gregg's line and then the whole line charged, driving the Confederates back upon their infantry at Totopotomoy. Gregg's loss was 256 killed and wounded; the

* *Official Records*, vol. xxxvi.; Grant, *Personal Memoirs*, vol. ii.; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. iv., pp. 135-137, 146-147; Pennypacker, *Life of Meade*; Humphreys, *Virginia Campaign of '64 and '65*, p. 119 et seq.; Walker, *History of the Second Army Corps, Confederate Military History*, vol. iii., pp. 458-462.

entire Union loss was 44 killed and 306 wounded. The Confederates loss is not known.*

Meanwhile, as we have seen, Lee had learned of Grant's movements and on the 27th put his army in motion to interpose between him and Richmond. Early's corps crossed the South Anna and by noon of the 28th was in position with its right near Beaver Dam Creek, its left on the Totopotomoy near Pole Green Church, four miles from Hawes' Shop. Anderson's corps formed on Early's right and covered the road from White House on the Pamunkey by Old Church, Bethesda Church and Mechanicsville to Richmond. Hill's corps and Breckinridge's command extended on Early's left to near Atlee's Station crossing the Virginia Central Railroad, a mile north. In the afternoon of the 28th the 6th and 2d Union corps crossed the Pamunkey at Huntley's, four miles above Hanover town, and took position across the Hanover Court House road at Crump's Creek, and the 5th corps crossed at Hanover town, the left near the Totopotomoy, while the 9th corps crossed at midnight. The 2d, 5th and 6th corps formed line near Hanover town, 17 miles from Richmond, the 6th being on the right, the 2d in the centre and the 5th on the left. At noon of the 29th Barlow's division of the 2d corps advanced from Hawes' Shop to At-

lee's Station, driving before it small bodies of Confederate cavalry to the other side of the Totopotomoy where the infantry was found strongly intrenched. Warren's 5th corps took position on the Shady Grove Church road; Wright's 6th corps moved on the right of the 2d, occupying for a time Hanover Court House, and then closing in to the left; and the 9th corps moved between the 2d and 5th, pushing out on the right to Pole Green Church. During the 30th there was incessant skirmishing, and late in the day Early's corps attacked Warren near Bethesda Church in an attempt to turn his left, but was repulsed. To relieve Warren Hancock was ordered to attack at 7 o'clock and Brooke's brigade carried the first line of rifle-pits occupied by the Confederates. On the 31st Birney's division crossed the Totopotomoy and carried the enemy's advanced line on the right of the Richmond road. General Wilson's cavalry division moved to Hanover Junction and destroyed the railroad bridge over the North Anna, at the same time defeating the Confederate cavalry and driving it from Mechump's Creek.*

On May 31 Grant's army extended along the road from near Hanover Court House to Cold Harbor, the 6th corps being about six miles northeast

* *Official Records*, vol. xxxvi.; Humphreys, *The Virginia Campaign of '64 and '65*, p. 160 *et seq.*; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. iv., pp. 138, 147, 198.

* *Official Records*, vol. xxxvi.; Walker, *History of the Second Army Corps; Battles and Leaders*, vol. iv., pp. 137, 138, 147, 214, 233, 244; Humphreys, *Virginia Campaign of '64 and '65*, p. 165 *et seq.*

of the court house and to its left respectively the 2d, 9th and 5th corps. The 18th corps was at White House on the Pamunkey where it had just arrived from the Army of the James. On the right of Grant's line was General J. H. Wilson's cavalry division, and on the left Sheridan with the two cavalry divisions of Torbert and Gregg. The 18th corps had been with General Butler in his campaign along the James. Butler had been informed that Richmond was his objective and was directed to be well up James River toward Richmond by daylight of May 5 and to push ahead with all energy. If Lee should fall back before Richmond, Butler was to coöperate with Grant. If he were able to invest Richmond from the South so that his left could rest on the James, the junction with Grant was to take place there. In case the Army of the Potomac should approach from that quarter, Butler was to attack vigorously and either carry the city or assist Grant by detaining a large force of the enemy there.* Butler's force consisted of the 10th corps under Gillmore, the 18th corps under W. F. Smith, in all about 32,000 men, and 3,000 cavalry under A. V. Kautz. By May 6 Butler had reached and intrenched at Bermuda Hundred Neck. Kautz's cavalry division moving from Suffolk destroyed several bridges on the Norfolk and Petersburg and the

Weldon Railroads and joined Butler on the 10th.

The day before, Butler had advanced with the greater part of his force to strike the railroad connecting Richmond and Petersburg. With a large part of the 10th and 18th corps Gillmore and W. F. Smith moved out on the morning of May 9 and destroyed the road from Chester Station on the north to Swift Creek on the south, a distance of six miles. Arriving at the creek and driving the Confederate skirmishers across it, the Union troops found that the stream was not fordable and that the bridges were held by Hagoods' and a part of B. R. Johnson's brigade, with artillery posted on the south bank. There was a sharp engagement across the stream, with artillery and infantry, in which each side lost about 150 men, and on the morning of the 10th the expedition returned to Bermuda Hundred.*

Butler found his advance barred by strong works at Drewry's Bluff on the right bank of the river, eight miles below Richmond. The works could not be reached by the navy and on the land side the bluff was defended by 22,000 infantry and over 2,000 cavalry, besides field artillery and heavy guns. On May 12 Butler advanced several divisions of Gillmore's and Smith's corps between the railroad and the river, and after some fighting the Confederates fell back toward Drewry's

* See the criticism of Grant's plan in Swinton, *Army of the Potomac*, pp. 462-464.

* *Official Records*, vol. xxxvi.



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1. BROADWAY LANDING ON THE APPOMATTOX, WHERE BUTLER LANDED IN HIS CAMPAIGN AGAINST DREWRY'S BLUFF. 2. ONE OF THE GUNS IN THE CONFEDERATE BATTERY BROOKE ON THE JAMES RIVER ABOVE DUTCH GAP CANAL. 3. A HEAVY CONFEDERATE GUN IN ONE OF THE BATTERIES ABOVE DUTCH GAP. 4. LOOKING SOUTH ALONG THE MAIN RAMPARTS OF BATTERY BROOKE, FRONTING EAST ON THE RIVER. THIS BATTERY WAS MIDWAY BETWEEN FORT DARLING AT DREWRY'S BLUFF AND THE DUTCH GAP CANAL, BEING DUG BY BUTLER.

Bluff. On the 15th there were skirmishes and artillery firing, and Beauregard issued orders for an attack the next morning to cut Butler off from Bermuda Hundred and capture or destroy his army. Early on the morning of the 16th, under cover of a thick fog, an assault was made upon

in front of Butler's lines. On the 20th Beauregard carried some of Butler's advanced lines and a sharp fight ensued to regain them, which was only partially successful, a portion of them being retaken by Howell's brigade of the 10th corps, which lost 702 men, while the Confederate loss was about



Smith's line which was forced back in some confusion and with considerable loss. At the same time an attack was conducted against Gillmore who not only repulsed it but also sent help to Smith. Toward evening, however, Butler ordered his troops to fall back, and at night they were in their intrenchments at Bermuda Hundred, Beauregard following and intrenching

800. On the 29th Smith, with three divisions of the 10th and 18th corps, 16,000 men and 16 guns, left the Army of the James and joined the Army of the Potomac in time to take part in the battle of Cold Harbor. Meanwhile on May 12 Kautz had conducted a cavalry expedition to cut the Danville Railroad near Appomattox Station and was successful in blowing up

a bridge at that place, and breaking up the road and destroying stores at several stations. He then inflicted considerable damage on the Petersburg and Lynchburg Railroad and on the Weldon Railroad at Jerrett's Station. The Union loss from May 14 to 16 was 390 killed, 2,380 wounded and 1,390 missing, and, including all of Butler's engagements and Kautz's cavalry operations from May 5 to 31, the Union loss was 609 killed, 3,769 wounded and 1,580 missing. The Confederate loss cannot be definitely ascertained, but it was less than that of the Union army.*

As Grant could not depend upon Butler for any aid he decided to rely solely on his own troops. Accordingly an advance was ordered along the whole line, and on the 31st, after a severe fight, Sheridan occupied Cold Harbor. Lee's position was so strongly intrenched and so difficult of access that Grant determined to extend by his left on Lee's right. In view of this extension Cold Harbor became an important point, since there the roads concentrated from Bethesda Church, Old Church, White House,


New Bridge and all the bridges across the Chickahominy above and below New Bridge.* At midnight of May 31 General H. G. Wright's 6th corps was sent along the rear of the army to Cold Harbor and was directed to be there by daylight on June 1 to support Sheridan, who, it was believed, would be attacked in force at daybreak. Wright did not arrive until 9 o'clock, however, and by this time Sheridan had repulsed two determined attacks of Kershaw's division. At 3 p. m. on May 31 the 18th corps under W. F. Smith was ordered to march upon White House and form on the right of the 6th corps, but owing to a mistake in the order Wright did not reach his position until the afternoon of June 1. Opposing the two corps were the Confederate divisions of Hoke, Kershaw, Pickett and Field. In front of the main line was a row of rifle-pits which it was necessary to take before Lee concentrated on that flank and thus covered the road to Richmond. Between 5 and 6 o'clock Wright and Smith assaulted, the latter carrying the advance Confederate works and holding them, the Confederates falling back to a new line. The loss in the two assaulting corps was about 2,200. On the morning of June 2 Sheridan advanced Gregg's division to Sumner's bridge on the Chickahominy, attacked a force of infantry, cavalry and artillery posted near the bridge,

* *Official Records*, vol. xxxvi.; Humphreys, *The Virginia Campaign of '64 and '65*, pp. 137-159; Grant, *Personal Memoirs*; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. iv., pp. 195-212; Roman, *Military Operations of General Beauregard*; George A. Bruce, *General Butler's Bermuda Campaign* (1912); Johnson Hagood, *General P. G. T. Beauregard, His Comprehensive and Aggressive Strategy*. Drewry's Bluff and Petersburg, in *Southern Historical Society Papers*, vol. xxviii., pp. 318-334 (1900); *Confederate Military History*, vol. iv., pp. 243-248; vol. v., pp. 321-322; vol. viii., pp. 207-211.

* With regard to the importance of Cold Harbor see Coppée, *Grant and His Campaigns*, pp. 336-339.

carried their advance position and held it until Hancock's corps arrived. Late on the 1st Hancock's 2d corps moved from the extreme right to take position on Wright's left, but the corps took the wrong road and did not arrive until 7 o'clock, when, under heavy skirmishing, Hancock formed line across the road from Cold Harbor to Dispatch Station.

18th corps was to the left of the 5th; and the 6th and 2d corps were to the left of the 18th. Lee had observed these movements and, preferring to take the initiative himself, ordered Early on June 2 with three divisions to attack Grant's right flank and drive it down in front of the Confederate line. Early found Burnside in the act of withdrawing from near Sydnor's



The attack was to be deferred until the morning of June 3, at which time Grant's line was held on the right by General J. H. Wilson's cavalry from the Pamunkey to Bethesda Church; Warren's 5th corps stretched from Bethesda Church about three miles to Beulah Church; Burnside's 9th corps had been ordered to withdraw from the extreme right and formed in Warren's rear to support his right; the

Mill to take position in Warren's rear. He attacked and captured the skirmish line and fell upon Burnside's rear division, but the latter with the assistance of the other divisions checked Early, though not before he had reached the rear of a part of Warren's skirmish line. Rodes' division had attacked Warren's front, but Warren repulsed the attack and at night both sides intrenched. The

Union losses on June 1 and 2 were 5,000 killed and wounded.

Meanwhile Lee closed in to the right and formed his lines in front of Grant's left, his right on the Chickahominy near Alexander's Bridge, his left extending in the direction of the Totopotomoy. A. P. Hill's corps was on the right, Longstreet's, commanded by R. H. Anderson, in the centre and Early's on the left, with cavalry on both flanks. The line included the ground on which was fought the battle of Gaines' Mill in June of 1862 and covered all the main roads to Richmond. Grant's whole line, except the cavalry on the left, was ordered to assault Lee's lines at 4:30 on the morning of June 3. Reinforced by 2,000 cavalry and 3,000 infantry Wilson was ordered from Hanover Court House to Hawes' Shop to attack Early's left and rear. The main work was to be done by the 2d, 6th and 18th corps supported by the 5th and 9th. At the signal of assault the soldiers sprang promptly to their work. On the left Barlow's and Gibbon's divisions of the 2d corps leaped their works and under a severe fire of artillery and musketry drove in the Confederate advanced line and in many cases gained the main line, but the latter was soon retaken and in 20 minutes from the time the signal was given the 2d corps was repulsed with a loss of 3,000 men, including many of its best officers.* The men did not

retreat far but lay down within a few yards of the Confederate works and began to intrench. The 6th corps fared no better. Its three divisions rushed to the assault, carried some advanced rifle-pits and attacked the main line, but being attacked in turn by a severe musketry fire and an enfilading artillery fire were repulsed with a loss of 800 killed and wounded, though they had gained positions at some points not over 40 yards from the enemy's works where they lay intrenched. On the right of the 6th corps the 18th corps was obliged to form one division to the right to protect its flank. The divisions of Martindale and Brooke assaulted, but were quickly driven back with a loss of about 1,000 men, and desisted from further effort. Thus in less than an hour the three corps had lost nearly 5,000 men in killed and wounded. Meade, however, ordered another assault, but Smith, Wright and Hancock refused to obey as it meant a wanton waste of life. Accordingly, having received the opinion of his corps commanders that further assault was inadvisable, Grant at 1:30 p. m. issued orders to intrench with a view to advancing against the enemy's works by regular approaches. Meanwhile, early in the morning, Burnside with the 9th corps and Warren with the 5th had attacked Early farther on the right, occupied some of the positions taken from the Confederates on the 2d, intrenched close up to Early's line and were about to make an assault when orders were re-

* *Official Records*, vol. xxxvi., pt. i., p. 367.



Upper photo taken from the *Photographic History of the Civil War*. Copyright by the Patriot Publishing Company. Lower photo from the original Brady negative.

1. THE FIELD AT COLD HARBOR WHERE GRANT'S ARMY ASSAULTED LEE'S INTRENCHMENTS AND LOST 10,000 VALUABLE LIVES.
2. THE HORRORS OF WAR. COLLECTING THE REMAINS OF THE DEAD AT COLD HARBOR, LONG AFTER THE BATTLE.

ceived to suspend attack. The loss of the Army of the Potomac for the entire day of June 3 was 7,000 killed and wounded. All night of the 3d both armies were intrenching. The lines were so close that no pickets could be thrown out, but as there were many wounded between the lines a truce was arranged on the 7th for the removal of the wounded, though by this time exposure and starvation had transferred the greater part of them to the death roll. Regular approaches

were made by the Union lines, but as an assault gave no promise of success, Grant on the night of the 12th withdrew to cross the James River. At Cold Harbor, Grant had 103,000 men present for duty. His losses from June 1 to 12 were 1,845 killed, 9,077 wounded and 1,816 missing, an aggregate of 12,738. Lee's army did not exceed 65,000 men and his losses probably did not exceed 2,600 killed and wounded.*

CHAPTER XXXVI.

1863-1865.

THE FREE STATES AND RECONSTRUCTION.

The battle of Helena and the capture of Little Rock, Arkansas — The reconstruction of Arkansas — The formation of "Union Associations" in Louisiana — The reconstruction plans of Banks and Lincoln — The adoption of a constitution abolishing slavery — Johnson's course in Tennessee — The amendment of the State constitution — The election and inauguration of Governor Brownlow — The rival factions in Maryland — The methods employed to secure the ratification of the constitution — Radical and conservative disputes in Missouri — Price's invasion — The adoption of the "Drake Constitution" — The test oath and its effect — Blair's course.

The year 1863 had been one of disaster for the Confederate arms in Arkansas. In January Arkansas Post was captured after a gallant defence of three days. On July 4 Lee was defeated at Gettysburg, Vicksburg was surrendered to Grant, and in Arkansas the Confederates sustained a crushing defeat at Helena. After July 13, 1862, when General Curtis arrived there from western Arkansas, Helena had been occupied by Union troops and on July 4, 1863, was held by a division of the 13th corps under General Salomon and a brigade of cavalry—in all 4,129 effective men

under command of General B. M. Prentiss. Helena was surrounded by hills and those nearest the city were

* *Official Records*, vol. xxxvi.; Sawyer, *Grant's Campaigns in Virginia* (1908); Grant, *Personal Memoirs*, vol. ii.; Walker, *History of the Second Army Corps*; Humphreys, *Virginia Campaign of '64 and '65*, pp. 169-193; Swinton, *Army of the Potomac*; W. F. Smith, *From Chattanooga to Petersburg*; Horace Porter, *Campaigning with Grant*; Wilkeson, *Recollections of a Private Soldier*; Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. viii., chap. xv.; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. iv., pp. 137-144, 213-232; biographies of Meade by Bache, Pennypacker and B. R. Meade; of Hancock by F. E. Goodrich and F. A. Walker; of Grant by J. S. C. Abbott, A. W. Alexander, Adam Badeau, Coppée, W. A. Crafts, Dana and Wilson, P. C. Headley, Edward Howland, Phelps, J. H. Larke; and of Lee by W. H. Taylor, J. R. Deering, J. W.

strongly fortified — Graveyard Hill in the centre, Fort Righter on the north (or right), and Fort Hindman on the south (or left) — all these being connected by a line of bastions and rifle-pits, both ends of which rested on the river. Toward the middle of June the Confederates decided to attack the place, and it was hoped, if successful, to raise the siege of Vicksburg, or if Vicksburg fell, still to keep the river closed. General Holmes was ordered to move from Little Rock with about 7,600 men, consisting of Price's and Marmaduke's divisions, Fagan's brigade of infantry and Walker's brigade of cavalry. On the evening of July 3 Holmes bivouaced about four miles from Helena, and at midnight advanced to within a mile of the outer works. The assault was ordered to begin at daylight. On the Confederate right Fagan with 1,770 men advanced on Fort Hindman, carried all the outer intrenchments, and made a desperate attempt to take the fort, but was repulsed with a loss of over 400 men. Meanwhile, on the left, Marmaduke's infantry and Walker's cavalry, aggregating 2,780 men, were repulsed in their assault on Fort Righter. In the centre Price, with 3,100 men, carried all the intrenchments in his front, seized Graveyard

Hill, and ordered one brigade to take the town and another to assault Fort Hindman in the rear; but the Union troops checked the advance of the two brigades and drove them back, and, as the attacks of the right and left assaulting columns had been repulsed, the Union fire was concentrated on Price. Accordingly, seeing the utter futility of further fighting, Holmes at 10:30 gave the order to withdraw and led his troops back to Little Rock. The Union loss was 57 killed, 146 wounded and 36 missing. The Confederate loss was 173 killed, 687 wounded and 776 missing.*

An attempt was then made to occupy the capital of the State. After the fall of Vicksburg and Port Hudson in July of 1863, General F. Steele was ordered from Vicksburg to Helena and directed to form a junction with General Davidson then moving south from Pilot Knob, Missouri, to break up General Price's army and to occupy Little Rock. On July 31 General Steele arrived at Helena, and found at that place two divisions of infantry and a brigade of cavalry, in all 7,000 men with 39 guns. On August 5 he marched for Devall's Bluff on White River, and was there joined by Davidson with 6,000 cavalry and three batteries, making his force about 13,000 men and 57 guns. A few days later he was joined by a brigade which raised his aggregate to over

Jones, J. E. Cooke, Fitzhugh Lee, Long, W. P. Trent, P. A. Bruce, H. A. White, G. Bradford, T. N. Page; Robert Stiles, *Four Years Under Marse Robert* (1904); F. T. Hill, *On the Trail of Grant and Lee* (1911); Woodbury, *Burnside and the Ninth Army Corps*; *Confederate Military History*, vol. iii., pp. 463-471; vol. iv., pp. 251-254; vol. v., pp. 320-321; vol. vi., pp. 291-292.

* *Official Records*, vol. xxii.; Greene, *The Mississippi*, pp. 234-236; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. iii., p. 456 *et seq.*; *Confederate Military History*, vol. x., pt. ii., pp. 175-193.

14,000, of whom 10,500 were effective. On August 24 Davidson's cavalry advanced, skirmishing with Marmaduke's cavalry, up to and through Brownsville and as far as his intrenchments and Bayou Meto. Davidson fell back to Brownsville, where on September 2 he was joined by Steele. The position on the Bayou Meto, 12 miles from Little Rock, was flanked, and on the 7th Steele reached the Arkansas River near Ashley's Mills, where Davidson's cavalry had a sharp skirmish and drove the Confederates across the river. Steele repaired the main road back to Bayou Meto, and on the 10th Davidson crossed to the south side of the river by the pontoon bridge and marched on Little Rock. The city was defended by Price with about 7,000 men, of whom 6,500 were intrenched on the north side of the Arkansas, and about 1,200 on the south side on the line of the Bayou Fourche, about five miles from the city. Davidson moved directly on the city without much opposition, until he reached the Bayou, where he found Marmaduke's cavalry dismounted, a brigade of infantry, and two batteries, all drawn up to receive him. Davidson attacked on two roads, driving the Confederates back. As the advance of Davidson to the south bank had necessitated the withdrawal of the Confederates from their works on the north, Steele advanced along the north bank, passed over the undefended breastworks, and, planting batteries opposite the town, began a

bombardment of it. Marmaduke gradually fell back through the city, closely followed by Davidson's cavalry, and when Price learned that Davidson had turned the position, he decided to retreat, at 5 o'clock evacuating the city and retreating to Arkadelphia. Steele's cavalry followed Marmaduke's cavalry for a day but returned to Little Rock on the 12th. At 7 o'clock in the evening the city was formally surrendered to Davidson by the city authorities and remained in Federal control until the end of the war. Steele's loss was 137 killed, wounded and missing; while Price's loss was only 64.*

With the fall of Little Rock the Confederate control entirely disappeared from the northern half of the State, and under the conditions and promises of the President's amnesty and reconstruction proclamation of December 8, 1863, a notable Union reaction took place and political rehabilitation began to assert itself. Lincoln at once set about the reconstruction of the State, following the plan laid down for Banks in Louisiana. Writing to Steele on January 20, 1864, Lincoln directed him to order an election to be held on March 24, 1864, provided the State constitution was so modified as to declare that there should be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude except in the punishment of crime whereof the

* *Official Records*, vol. xxii.; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. iii., p. 457 *et seq.*; *The South in the Building of the Nation*, vol. iii., pp. 313-314.

party should have been duly convicted.* Lincoln's plans, however, seemed likely to conflict with the popular movement which had already started in the State. On January 8, 1864, representatives of 23 of the 55 counties of the State which were in Federal occupancy met in convention at Little Rock, and on January 22 adopted an amended constitution, declaring the act of secession null and void, abolishing slavery immediately and unconditionally, and wholly repudiating the Confederate debt. The convention established a provisional State government, appointed Isaac Murphy provisional governor, and adopted a schedule providing for an election on March 14, 1864, for the purpose of adopting or rejecting the constitution and of electing State and county officers, a legislature and members of Congress. When Lincoln learned of this movement he directed that the convention plan be followed, though he issued orders that General Steele was to decide the matter definitely.† Steele acquiesced in the action of the convention and when the election was held on March 14 and the two days following, less than 12,500 votes were cast, of which 12,177 were in favor of the constitution and 266 against it. Isaac Murphy, who had been the only delegate in the secession

convention to cast his vote against withdrawing from the Union, was chosen governor. On April 11 the new State government was inaugurated at Little Rock, and four days later both houses of the newly elected legislature met and organized, members being present from more than 40 out of the 55 counties. Among the laws enacted was one requiring that at succeeding elections each voter should swear allegiance and declare that he had not voluntarily borne arms in the Confederate cause after the day the new State government was inaugurated. At the March election three members of Congress had been chosen and the legislature appointed two United States Senators, but when these representatives of the State presented their credentials to Congress that body was disputing the question of reconstruction, and for the time refused to admit them.

The political history of that part of Louisiana held by the Union forces at this time is important, because it illustrates the beginnings of reconstruction. Though martial law was in force under Butler's administration, yet there were signs of coming rejuvenation. In June of 1862 provost courts were established, and in August George F. Shepley was appointed military governor. He revived three of the civil district courts in the State, and confined the work of the

* Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. viii., pp. 412-413.

† Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. vii., pp. 415-416.

‡ *The South in the Building of the Nation*, vol. iii., p. 316. See also Fay Hempstead, *History*

of Arkansas. For text of the constitution, see Thorpe, *Federal and State Constitutions*, vol. i., pp. 288-306.

provost court to criminal cases. In December of 1862 Shepley ordered an election for members of Congress, at which B. F. Flanders was chosen to represent the first district and Michael Hahn the second. These men were allowed seats in Congress, but their terms expired on March 4, 1863. In April of 1863 the supreme court of the State was organized with Charles A. Peabody as chief justice, and then followed the establishment of a criminal court, a probate court, recorders' courts, and a few parish courts near New Orleans.*

The political reconstruction of Louisiana was not quite so successful. During the Butler régime the elements of a radical Republican party began the organization of "Union Associations" in New Orleans and the adjoining territory within the Union military lines. Each of these associations selected five delegates who were to constitute a "Free State General Committee," of which Thomas J. Durant was elected president. This committee announced as its cardinal principle that the State constitution was destroyed by the war and that a general convention should be held to make a new one. The radicals, led by Durant, favored negro suffrage and this plan was approved by General Shepley who, on June 12, 1863, appointed Durant attorney-general of the State with power to act as commissioner of registration. At

the same time he ordered a registration to be made of all free white male citizens of the United States who had resided six months in the State and one month in the parish, for the purpose of taking an oath of allegiance and registering as voters to organize a new State government, loyal to the United States.

The conservative citizens, however, were not favorable to this plan. They maintained that the State government was simply suspended and that it should be revived, not reorganized, by a new constitution. They wished to hold an election the following November for all State and Federal officers. Banks favored the conservative party and wanted the mulattoes only to be given the right to vote at first. They wrote to Lincoln, and on August 5 the President outlined his wishes regarding the matter somewhat in detail. He said that he would be glad if Louisiana made a new constitution recognizing the Emancipation Proclamation and adopting emancipation in those parts of the State to which the Emancipation Proclamation did not apply. He indorsed Durant's action with regard to taking a registry of the voters with a view to the election of a constitutional convention, and trusted that the work would be pushed forward as rapidly as possible so that it might be completed by the time Congress met. He stated, however, that if Louisiana should send representatives to Congress their admission would depend upon the respec-

* *The South in the Building of the Nation*, vol. iii., p. 141.

tive Houses and not upon the President.*

There was great difficulty in enlisting the active coöperation of the voters. More than one-fourth of the slaves in the State lived in the territory held by the Union armies, and it could not be expected that their owners, whose property rights were yet undisturbed by military decree, would join enthusiastically in the free State government. Besides, there was much party indifference, Governor Shepley was absent during the summer in Washington, and Banks was busy with his military schemes, all of which contributed to the general inaction. On October 9, 1863, however, Governor Shepley renewed his order of registration, and general interest was further quickened by the announcement that the conservative faction intended to hold an election for Congressmen, members of the legislature and State officers, in conformity with the old constitution and laws of Louisiana. The free State committee denounced this plan as illegal and dangerous, and the movement was easily suppressed by military orders from Governor Shepley.

The President's annual message of December 8, 1863, and the amnesty and reconstruction proclamation which accompanied it, announced that he would recognize State government reconstructed under its provisions by one-tenth of the voters of the seceded

States who had taken the prescribed oath. This plan appealed favorably to General Banks, who had now, under Lincoln's orders, assumed supreme command in the task of reorganizing the State government. Accordingly, on January 11, 1864, Banks issued a proclamation announcing that an election for State officers would be held on February 22, these officers to constitute "the civil government of the State, under the constitution and laws of Louisiana, except so much of the said constitution and laws as recognize, regulate, or relate to slavery, which, being inconsistent with the present condition of public affairs and plainly inapplicable to any class of persons now existing within its limits must be suspended, and they are hereby declared to be inoperative and void." He further announced that an election of delegates to a convention for the revision of the constitution would be held on the first Monday in April of 1864, and called upon the citizens to join heartily in the measures suggested for the reconstruction of civil government. The general's plan, however, did not conform entirely with the claim of the conservatives that the constitution and the laws of Louisiana had not been destroyed by secession but merely suspended, or with the claim of the free State committee that they had been completely destroyed. Accordingly the parties were badly split. In January of 1864 the free State committee held a nomination meeting which split

* Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. viii., pp. 421-422.

up into two factions. The majority went with the so-called moderates and nominated Michael Hahn for governor and J. Madison Wells for lieutenant-governor. The radicals (the "Free State" party) nominated B. F. Flanders, and the independent conservatives, J. Q. Fellows, who stood for the "rights of all, the Constitution and the Union." The election, which was held on February 22, resulted in an overwhelming victory for Hahn. Accordingly, on March 4, 1864, Hahn was inaugurated with imposing civil and military ceremonies and was invested by President Lincoln with the powers hitherto exercised by the military governor.*

On March 11, 1864, Banks ordered an election of delegates to a convention for revising and amending the constitution, and on March 16 Governor Hahn gave notice to the qualified voters of the election. This was held on March 28 and resulted in the choice of 98 delegates. The convention met at Liberty Hall, New Orleans, on April 6 and completed its labors on July 23, 1864. Lincoln favored conferring suffrage on the "very intelligent" blacks and those who had "fought gallantly in our ranks." He made this suggestion in a private letter to Governor Hahn on March 13, but stated that the idea was "only a suggestion, not to the public

but to you alone."* The members of the convention, however, were not in favor of negro suffrage, and were unwilling to grant even the limited suffrage suggested by Lincoln, but the legislature was authorized to extend the suffrage if it saw fit.† On May 11 Governor Hahn notified Lincoln that the ordinance of emancipation without compensation had been adopted by a vote of 70 to 16.‡ The perfected constitution was adopted in convention on July 22 by a vote of 66 to 16.¶ When the elections for the adoption or rejection of the constitution were held on September 5, 1864, 6,836 votes were cast in favor of its adoption and 1,566 for its rejection, which was an immense falling off from the vote cast at the election of State officers. Nevertheless, in a letter to Major-General Hurlbut on November 14, 1864, Lincoln wrote:

"A very fair proportion of the people of Louisiana have inaugurated a new state government, making an excellent new constitution — better for the black man than we have in Illinois. This was done under military protection, directed by me, in the belief, still sincerely entertained, that

* Lincoln's *Complete Works*, vol. iv., p. 196; Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. viii., p. 434; Curtis, *Constitutional History of the United States*, vol. ii., pp. 353-354; Pierce, *Life of Sumner*, vol. iv., p. 221 *et seq.*; Raymond, *Life of Lincoln*, p. 489.

† Albert Phelps, *Louisiana, A Record of Expansion*, p. 331; *The South in the Building of the Nation*, vol. iii., pp. 143-144.

‡ Burgess, *Reconstruction and the Constitution*, pp. 14-15; Blaine, *Twenty Years of Congress*, vol. ii., p. 40; Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. viii., p. 435.

¶ For text see Thorpe, *Federal and State Constitutions*, vol. iii., pp. 1429-1448.

* Lincoln to Hahn, March 15, 1864, in Lincoln's *Complete Works*, vol. ii., p. 498. See also Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. viii., pp. 431-434; *The South in the Building of the Nation*, vol. iii., p. 143.

with such a nucleus around which to build we could get the State into position sooner than otherwise." *

The authority of the reorganized State government of Louisiana was very limited, however, and President Lincoln was censured by political opponents for unjustifiable interference with the affairs of the people of Louisiana. Details of this will be taken up later.†

As we have seen, Andrew Johnson was appointed military governor of Tennessee on March 3, 1862, and entered upon his duties at Nashville on the 10th. He assumed an attitude of severity against all opposition to reconciliation with the National Government, exacting of all public officers, the Nashville city council, teachers, preachers, and prominent citizens, an oath of allegiance, and filling all vacancies with Union men. But he could do very little in the execution of his plans during the next few months, for the operations of the two armies around Murfreesboro indicated that the Federal military control in Tennessee was not yet permanently established, and this uncertainty blighted such Federal efforts at reconstruction as were set on foot. The Confederates of the State held a convention at Winchester in middle Tennessee on June 17, 1863, and nominated Robert L. Caruthers for governor, at the same time naming candidates for the Con-

federate Congress. The entire ticket was elected and the Congressmen took their seats at Richmond, but Caruthers was never inaugurated as governor.* On July 1, 1863, a Union convention met at Nashville at the call of a committee consisting of W. G. Brownlow, Horace Maynard and others. They took an oath of allegiance to the United States and adopted resolutions declaring void the various secession laws and ordinances. But the time was not yet ripe for the election of a legislature. Moreover, the Union and Confederate armies were beginning their campaigns around Chattanooga, and not until September 9 was that place occupied by Rosecrans. A few days later Burnside had marched into Knoxville; but November had come before Bragg's army was disastrously defeated. On September 11 Lincoln wrote to Governor Johnson that, as Tennessee was cleared of armed insurrectionists, it was "the nick of time for reinaugurating a loyal state government." On September 19 he authorized Johnson to exercise such powers as might be necessary to enable the loyal people of Tennessee to present such a republican form of government as would entitle the State to the guarantee and protection of the United States.† During the next three months the military operations created anxious sus-

* Lincoln's *Complete Works*, vol. ii., p. 597; Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. ix., p. 446.

† Raymond (*Life of Lincoln*, p. 490) repels this charge as unfounded.

* *The South in the Building of the Nation*, vol. ii., p. 518.

† Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. viii., pp. 441-442.

pense, and before this suspense was entirely relieved by the news of the battle of Lookout Mountain, the President had issued his amnesty and reconstruction proclamation of December 8, 1863. The great pressure of business at Washington still further tended to delay matters, but, after Federal supremacy was assured, Governor Johnson wasted no time in beginning reconstruction proceedings. On January 21, at a public meeting held at Nashville, Johnson uttered the famous phrase that "treason must be made odious and traitors must be punished and impoverished." This meeting passed resolutions requesting the governor to issue a proclamation ordering an election for delegates to a constitutional convention. The governor, however, decided not to go so fast, but to build the new political structure with the greatest caution. Accordingly, on January 26, 1864, he issued a proclamation ordering an election of local officers only, on March 5, in those parts of the State under the control of the Federal authorities, at the same time prescribing an oath for voters which was more exacting than that of the President. When appealed to, Lincoln said that Johnson knew best what the exigencies of the case required, and he did not apprehend that Johnson "would think it necessary to deviate from my [Lincoln's] views to any ruinous extent." He advised the Tennesseans to accept Johnson's plan, as, otherwise, they would have conflict and confu-

sion. The election was held, but the returns were so meagre as to decide nothing more than that the elective method was a failure.*

The question of reconstruction sank into abeyance for some time. There were two factions among the Unionists of the State, and the dissensions which divided them increased with the efforts to restore the State to the Union. A meeting of prominent Union leaders was held at Nashville on August 12, 1864, which resulted in the calling of a convention to meet in that city in September for considering the rehabilitation of civil government and arranging for participation in the approaching Presidential election. When the convention met only a small number of delegates were present, but enough were there to adopt a resolution by which all Union men favoring any measure for crushing the rebellion were admitted, and, although dissension prevailed, the Radicals held control and nominated electors on the Lincoln and Johnson ticket. Resolutions were also passed requesting the governor to require a strong oath like that prescribed in the preceding March election, and favoring an amendment to the State constitution abolishing slavery. In compliance with the demands of the convention, Governor Johnson issued a proclamation for holding the Presidential election in November and authorized all

* Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. viii., pp. 443-445; *The South in the Building of the Nation*, vol. ii., pp. 518-519.

white citizens who had resided in the State for six months previous to the election and had been loyal to the Union to vote; he demanded also the oath prescribed by the convention. Lincoln was requested to relinquish the rigid franchise qualifications, but he declined to do so, stating that he would not interfere with any Presidential election "except it be to give protection against violence." The Lincoln and Johnson ticket was elected, but the vote of Tennessee was rejected by Congress.*

It does not appear that at this election any attempt was made to choose a governor or legislature or constitutional convention. The Union meeting which had assembled at Nashville in August of 1864 had appointed an executive committee, composed of five citizens from each grand division of the State. In November of 1864, after the Presidential election, this committee issued a call for a State convention to meet at Nashville on December 19, to consider methods by which Tennessee could be restored to the Union.† This meeting could not be held at the designated time, however, owing to General Hood's invasion of the State and the close proximity of his army to Nashville, but was postponed until January 9, 1865. When the convention did finally meet there was considerable discussion as to

whether any changes in the organic law of the State should be proposed instead of providing for a regular constitutional convention. Following the advice of the governor, the delegates proceeded to propose amendments to the State constitution, abolishing slavery and involuntary servitude except as a punishment for crime, and forbidding the legislature to make any law recognizing the right of property in man. The schedule contained also a number of proposed alterations and changes, providing for the repeal of the section of the constitution forbidding laws for the emancipation of slaves and of the military league made with the Confederacy on May 7, 1861; for the suspension of the statute of limitations and the annulment of all legislative enactments after May 6, 1861, and of all State bonds issued after the same date. The ordinance of secession and the military league acts were declared to be acts of "treason and usurpation, unconstitutional, null and void." These proposed amendments were to be submitted to the vote of the people on February 22, 1865, and, if adopted, an election for governor and members of the legislature was to be held on March 4 following. At the election of February 22, 1865, the proposed changes were ratified by a vote of 25,293 to 48.* Accordingly, on February 25, Johnson issued a proc-

* *The South in the Building of the Nation*, vol. ii., pp. 519-520.

† Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. viii., p. 447.

* Text of the amendments are in Thorpe, *Federal and State Constitutions*, vol. vi., pp. 3445-3448. Thorpe gives the vote as 21,104 to 40.

lamation declaring the amendments to the constitution and the announced schedule ratified, and confirmed and ordered an election for governor and legislators on March 4. The election was held on that date and William G. Brownlow received 23,352 votes out of a total of 23,387, the vote for the legislators being the same as that for governor. On April 2 the legislature met, and on the 5th of the same month Governor Brownlow was inaugurated. The legislature soon ratified the 13th amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and in due time United States Senators were elected and provision made for choosing members of Congress, who were regularly elected by the people in the following August.*

Maryland, outside of the first few months of the war and the battles of South Mountain and Antietam, had not been subjected to the horrors of warfare. In the election of November 6, 1861, the majority of the members chosen to the legislature were Union men, and at the same time Augustus W. Bradford was overwhelmingly elected to succeed Governor Hicks. One of the most important questions in Maryland was that of emancipation. The free colored persons and slaves in the State were about equal numerically, the former numbering about 84,000 and the latter 87,000. President Lincoln hoped to

induce voluntary action on the subject of emancipation by his plan of compensated abolishment. But the Maryland Unionists who belonged to the conservative or slaveholding class were opposed to this plan, not alone by their life-long hatred of abolition but also by the constant irritation arising from the escape of their slaves. Few of the Marylanders had become imbued with the spirit of the new anti-slavery drift in politics and therefore refused to entertain the President's policies, though they were strongly in favor of the prosecution of the war for the maintenance of the Union. The bolder politicians of the State thereupon seized the opportunity to form a more radical party and used the President's recommendation of compensated abolishment and the passage of the bill for the emancipation of slaves in the District of Columbia, as the means of bringing their plans before the citizens of the State. The first declarations came from the conservative opponents of both propositions. On January 2, 1862, the legislature expressed confidence in Lincoln but protested against the interference with the domestic institutions of the States, and on February 22 passed a resolution appealing to the Northern States to rebuke their representatives for wasting their time in advising schemes for the abolition of slavery in the rebellious States.* On April 1 a large meeting was held in Montgom-

* *The South in the Building of the Nation*, vol. ii., pp. 521-522; 524-526; Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. viii., pp. 446-449.

* J. T. Scharf, *History of Maryland*, vol. iii., p. 463.

ery County, at which resolutions were adopted denouncing the act emancipating slaves in the District of Columbia as unwise, ill-timed and unconstitutional.

On the other hand, at a convention in Baltimore on May 28, 1862, President Lincoln's policy of compensated abolishment was declared to be beneficial to the people of the State, and reapportionment of the representation in the State legislature was urged, since the counties which contained the slave population virtually controlled the whole State. The victory at Antietam and the President's preliminary proclamation aided the party reorganization. On January 12 Francis Thomas, of Maryland, introduced a resolution in the National House of Representatives instructing the Committee on Emancipation and Colonization to inquire into the expediency of making an appropriation to aid the State of Maryland in a system of emancipation and colonization. On the 19th Bingham, of Ohio, introduced a bill for the same purpose and on February 25 the committee reported a bill appropriating \$10,000,000. Much objection was made to it and, as Maryland had not asked for the aid, the bill was recommitted and not again reported.

On May 23, 1861, the Union State convention had appointed a State central committee and in 1863 the party machinery was still in the hands of this committee, which thoroughly represented the conservative unionism;

but the radicals of the State formed Union leagues and called a convention of "all persons who support the whole policy of the Government in suppressing the rebellion" to meet at Baltimore on June 16, 1863. At the same time the State central committee called a convention to meet on June 23, the two bodies being designated the "Union League Convention" and the "State Central Convention." The Union League Convention met at the time designated, but adjourned until the 23d. As the two conventions were in session on the same day, the Union League Convention proposed that harmony of action be brought about by a joint call for a third convention to be held at some future time, but there was too much difference of opinion to permit such a fusion. The Union League Convention declared for emancipation, but the State Central Convention refused to consider any other issues save those of war "until treason shall succumb before an offended people." Thus there were two rival factions, one seeking delay and the other urging haste in the settlement of the slavery question. At the elections on November 4, 1863, the unconditional Union or emancipation candidates were overwhelmingly elected over the candidates of the conservative Unionists. They had a large majority in the lower branch of the legislature and a practical working majority in the senate. Accordingly, on January 6, 1864, when the legisla-

ture met at Annapolis, the unconditional Unionists perfected and passed a bill providing for an election on April 6, 1864, submitting to the voters of Maryland the question of "convention" or "no convention," and providing also for the election of delegates to a State convention to amend the constitution. When the popular vote was taken, there was a majority of more than 12,000 in favor of holding the convention. This convention met at Annapolis on April 27, 1864, and completed its labors on September 6, 1864. In the constitution drawn up by this convention were two remarkable articles, one intelligible and one unintelligible. Article XXIV. declared that there should be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, and that all persons held to service or labor as slaves were to be free. Article V. declared that "every citizen of this State owes paramount allegiance to the Constitution and Government of the United States."* This was certainly unintelligible, for "paramount" belongs to a sovereign and "allegiance" to a subject; "allegiance" is due to a person and there was no "sovereign" in the United States; evidently the authors of the phrase had no idea of what they meant by it.† The constitution would have to be forced through, its framers knew, so they provided a new set of

qualifications for those who were to vote on it, thus anticipating its operative power. The constitution was adopted by the convention on September 6, 1864, by a vote of 53 to 25, though afterward 35 of the delegates joined in the protest against it. The new instrument was then sent to the people at large and during the ensuing month was vigorously discussed. On October 12 and 13 it was submitted to popular vote, the election proving to be one of the closest ever held in the State. Despite all manœuvres of the majority of the convention for suppressing the will of the people there was a preponderance of nearly 2,000 against the constitution, the vote standing 27,541 in favor and 29,536 against. Then the majority tried their last resort. They took the vote of Maryland soldiers outside of the State, and thus won by a majority of 375, since the soldier vote stood 2,633 in favor and 263 against ratification. When this constitution became operative slavery ceased to exist in Maryland.*

After the November election of 1863 there was a lull in the disputes between the radicals of Missouri and General Schofield. On November 10 the legislature met at Jefferson City, the two principal questions before it being the election of United States Senators and the passage of an act to

* For the full text of the constitution, see Thorpe, *Federal and State Constitutions*, vol. iii., pp. 1741-1779.

† *The South in the Building of the Nation*, vol. i., pp. 207-208.

* Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. viii., p. 19; Rhodes, *United States*, vol. v., pp. 47-48. See also W. S. Myers, *The Self-Reconstruction of Maryland, 1864-1867*, in *Johns Hopkins University Studies*, series xxvii., nos. i.-ii. (1909).

call a State convention for the purpose of dealing with the subject of emancipation. The conservatives had lost their most conspicuous leader in the death of Governor Gamble, who died on January 31, 1864, and from that time the party rapidly declined in prestige and numerical strength. Accordingly the radicals elected B. Gratz Brown and John B. Henderson to the United States Senate. On February 13, 1864, the legislature decreed that the question of holding a convention should be submitted to the people in November of the same year, at which time also delegates were to be elected.

Meanwhile Schofield was superseded in the military administration of Missouri (January, 1864) by General Rosecrans. When the senatorial election had been decided and the new State convention arranged for, the violent controversies somewhat abated; but Rosecrans stirred up new trouble by issuing an order that the members of the larger representative organizations of the various churches (synods and councils) should, before transacting their business, take an oath of allegiance to the United States, and this was resented by some as imposing a qualification, not of a political, but of a religious character. The radicals appeared to be satisfied with Rosecrans, however, while the conservatives merely accused him of inefficiency and not of political bias. The summer of 1864 passed away without any marked political disturb-

ances, but the tranquility of the State was much upset by the annual invasion of General Price, who moved northward from Arkansas, drove the Union garrison out of Pilot Knob and advanced a part of his forces to within a few miles of St. Louis. Turning north and west, he next threatened Jefferson City, but finding this guarded went along the Missouri River, captured Boonville, Glasgow, Lexington and Independence. Finally, however, the Union detachments in the State were concentrated and drove Price southward along the Kansas border in precipitate flight.

Upon one point General Rosecrans gave the radical party in Missouri unfeigned satisfaction. In issuing orders for the election of 1864, the general stated that all those who since December 17, 1861, "had been in the rebel army or navy anywhere, and all who, since that date, have been anywhere engaged in guerilla marauding or bushwhacking" should be excluded from the right of voting. After asserting that the civil power was too weak to execute the laws and punish offenders, he declared that violations of the election laws would be treated as military offences. By this time the conservative party, as such, had practically disappeared, the members of the Democratic faith returning to the Democratic party, while those of Whig and Republican allegiance fused with the radicals, a re-alignment which had a most favorable effect upon the Republican cause. Previous to this

time the conservatives and radicals had been nearly equal numerically, but in the election of 1864 Lincoln received 72,750 votes, against 31,678 for McClellan, while the radical candidate for governor was elected by about the same majority. Eight out of the nine Congressmen elected were radicals, as were the majority of the members of the legislature. At the same election there was a majority of about 38,000 in favor of holding a convention, and three-fourths of the delegates elected to the convention were radicals.*

On January 6, 1865, the new constitutional convention met at St. Louis and created an instrument known as the "Drake Constitution." On January 11 an ordinance was adopted by a vote of 60 to 4, forbidding slavery within the State, and it was at once put in force by a proclamation of the governor.† The constitution contained a test oath which ran counter to every principle of liberty and which threatened to disfranchise all the best men of the State, section 3 of article II. providing that:

"No person shall be deemed a qualified voter who has ever been in armed hostility to the United States, or to the lawful authorities thereof, or to the government of this State; or has ever given aid, comfort, countenance, or support to persons engaged in any such hostility; or has ever, in any manner, adhered to the enemies, foreign or domestic, of the United States, either by contrib-

uting to them, or by unlawfully sending within their lines money, goods, letters, or information; or has ever disloyally held communication with such enemies; or has ever advised or aided any person to enter the service of such enemies; or has ever by act or word manifested his adherence to the cause of such enemies, or his desire for their triumph over the arms of the United States, or his sympathy with those engaged in exciting or carrying on rebellion against the United States; or has ever, except under overpowering compulsion, submitted to the authority, or been in the service, of the so-called 'Confederate States of America'; or has ever left this State, and gone within the lines of the armies of the so-called 'Confederate States of America,' with the purpose of adhering to said States or armies; or has ever been a member of, or connected with, any order, society, or organization, inimical to the Government of the United States, or to the government of this State; or has ever been engaged in guerilla warfare against loyal inhabitants of the United States, or in that description of marauding commonly known as 'bush-whacking'; or has ever knowingly and willingly harbored, aided, or countenanced any person so engaged; or has ever come into or left this State, for the purpose of avoiding enrolment for, or draft into, the military service of the United States; or has ever, with a view to avoiding enrolment in the militia of this State, or to escape the performance of duty therein, or for any other purpose, enrolled himself, or authorized himself to be enrolled by or before any officer, as disloyal, or as a Southern sympathizer, or in any other terms indicating his disaffection to the Government of the United States in its contest with rebellion, or his sympathy with those engaged in such rebellion."*

Section 6 provided that all voters should take an oath that they had never directly or indirectly done any of the acts mentioned in section 3, that they had always been truly and loyally "on the side of the United States against all enemies, either foreign or domestic." Few in Missouri could honestly take such an oath. To

* Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. viii., pp. 483-484.

† Carr, *Missouri*, p. 364 *et seq.*; F. N. Thorpe, *Short Constitutional History of the United States*, pp. 214-218; Rhodes, *United States*, vol. v., p. 49, note.

* Thorpe, *Federal and State Constitutions*, vol. iv., pp. 2194-2195.

do any of the things prohibited without taking the test oath was made an offence punishable by fine or imprisonment. Frank Blair, the creator of the Republican party in Missouri and a corps commander in the Union army, attempted to vote. When the election judges demanded that he take the test oath he refused, saying, "if I take that oath I commit perjury. I fought four years to destroy the Confederacy and would fight four years more if necessary. I never sympathized with the Confederacy, but I did sympathize with my kin, friends, and neighbors who were in the Con-

federacy." Therefore the judges would not let him vote, and he sued the judges to verify the constitutionality of the test oath. The radical circuit and supreme courts of Missouri held the law to be unconstitutional and contrary to the genius of our institutions. Thousands of preachers and others were indicted and punished under this test oath. Finally Blair, disgusted with such performances, left the Republican party and put the Democratic party on its feet again, and it has been dominant in the State ever since, with the exception perhaps of one or two elections.*

CHAPTER XXXVII.

1864.

SHERMAN'S CAMPAIGN AGAINST ATLANTA.

Atlanta's importance — Grant's orders to Sherman — Johnston's position — The attack on Dalton — The battle of Resaca — The capture of Rome — The movement toward Dallas — The battle of New Hope Church — Engagements at Marietta, Pine Mountain, and Kolb's (or Culp's) Farm — Sherman's repulse at Kenesaw Mountain — The battles at Smyrna Camp Ground, Peach Tree Creek, Leggett's or Bald Hill and Ezra Church — McPherson's death — The cavalry raids of McCook and Stoneman — The battle of Jonesboro and the evacuation of Atlanta by Hood.

As we have seen, Grant had taken supreme command of the armies of the United States, and as he had concluded to give his personal attention to the Army of the Potomac he left the southern and western part of the field of operations in the hands of General W. T. Sherman, who on March 12 was placed in command of the military division of the Mississippi comprising the Departments of the Ohio, the Cumberland, the Ten-

nessee, and the Arkansas. General J. B. McPherson was assigned to the command of the Army of the Tennessee; General Thomas was in command of the Army of the Cumberland at Chattanooga; and General Schofield of the Army of the Ohio at Knoxville. By a subsequent order in April Hooker was placed in command of the 11th and 12th consolidated corps;

* *The South in the Building of the Nation*, vol. iii., pp. 237-238; Carr, *Missouri*, p. 368.

General Howard was assigned to the command of the 4th corps; and General Schofield to the 23d corps.

Next to Richmond, Atlanta, Sherman's objective point, was the most important centre of Confederate military operations. Owing to its admirably protected situation the city had been chosen at the outset as a great military depot of supplies and materials and a vast workshop for the purposes of war, an important reason being that Atlanta was one of the chief railroad centres in the Confederate States. Northerly ran the Western and Atlantic Railroad to Chattanooga; southwesterly the Atlanta, West Point and Montgomery Railroad connecting the former point with the capital of Alabama, thence with Mobile on the south and with the whole Mississippi Valley on the west; southeasterly ran the important road to Macon and thence to Savannah; easterly the road to Augusta and again to Savannah and Charleston. Atlanta was essentially the door of Georgia, as was Chattanooga of Tennessee. Unless Atlanta were occupied by the Union forces only cavalry could be utilized further south and their operations must necessarily be hurried, brief and always dangerous; but with Atlanta once in the possession of the North, the city would become a new advanced base from which the Union forces could operate with the assurance that their rear was entirely secure. On April 4, 1864, Grant had communicated to Sherman his entire

plan of campaign and stated that he purposed to send the latter against Johnston's army "to break it up and get into the interior of the enemy's country as far as you can, inflicting all the damage you can against their war resources."* Sherman accepted this task with "infinite satisfaction" and planned that Schofield should advance on the left, Thomas in the centre and McPherson on the right against Johnston's position at Dalton.

In preparing his army for the forward movement Sherman did away with everything that would impede the march. Tents were forbidden to all except the sick and wounded and only one tent was allowed to each headquarters for use as an office.† Sherman's army consisted of the Army of the Cumberland under George H. Thomas, numbering 60,773 men, the Army of the Tennessee under J. B. McPherson, numbering 24,465 men, and the Army of the Ohio under J. M. Schofield, numbering 13,559 men, a total of 98,797 men and 254 guns;‡ and Sherman was joined early the next month by some cavalry and two divisions of infantry, raising his total force to 112,819. Opposing Sherman at Dalton, the first objective point of Sherman's Atlanta campaign, was Joseph E. Johnston with his force of 52,992.||

* Sherman, *Memoirs*, vol. ii., p. 26.

† Sherman, *Memoirs*, vol. ii., p. 22.

‡ *Battles and Leaders*, vol. iv., pp. 284-289. See also Cox, *Atlanta*, p. 25.

|| Regarding the strength of Johnston's army see the article by E. C. Dawes in *Battles and*

On April 28 Sherman received his final orders from Grant to start May 5 and on May 2 the army began to move forward in three columns, Thomas in front, Schofield on the left and McPherson on the right. The position occupied by Johnston in front of Dalton was practically impregnable. On the left and south the place was guarded by a wall of quartz rock called Rocky Face Ridge. It is traversed by a gorge named Buzzard's Roost through which runs a small stream called Mill Creek. When Sherman arrived in front of this formidable barrier he found the summit and sides of Rocky Face strongly fortified. Mill Creek also had been dammed, thus affording an additional protection to the gap at Buzzard's Roost. Accordingly Sherman decided to change his tactics. On May 6 the Army of the Cumberland was at and near Ringgold, the Army of the Tennessee at Gordon's Mill on the Chickamauga, and the Army of the Ohio near Red Clay on the Georgia line north of Dalton. Sherman ordered the four corps of Thomas and Schofield to move on Dalton in front, while McPherson with two corps passed through Snake Creek Gap. On the 7th McPherson was ordered to march

from Gordon's Mill through the gap to Resaca, 18 miles south of Dalton, and while he was making this movement Thomas and Schofield pressed forward against Johnston. Thomas drove the Confederates in his front through Buzzard's Roost Gap and Schofield closed down on Thomas's left. On the 8th there was heavy skirmishing between Thomas and the Confederate divisions of Stewart and Bate at Buzzard's Roost and about six miles farther south a determined assault.


The road from Lafayette to Dalton passes through a cleft in the palisade which had been deepened and widened and had thus gained its name, Dug Gap. Geary's division attacked this gap. The enemy's skirmishers were driven from the foot of the ridge and up the road nearly to the summit, when two brigades were formed in double lines on either side of the road. The position of the gap could not be carried and an assault was ordered on the perpendicular palisades south of it. The men charged only to be killed or captured and the assault failed, two other charges resulting similarly. Finally the Union troops withdrew with a loss of 306 killed and wounded, and 51 captured or missing. At Varnell's Station the cavalry divisions of Stoneman and Wheeler had an engagement in which each side lost about 150. Thomas pressed so vigorously in front of Buzzard's Roost that the heavy skirmishing attained the dimensions of a battle. By the

Leaders, vol. iv., pp. 281-283. Pollard (*Last Year of the War*, p. 48) reports Johnston's army at 40,900 infantry and artillery and about 4,000 cavalry. Davis (*Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government*, vol. ii., p. 551) estimates the force at 68,620 men which is substantiated by Johnston in his *Narrative of Military Operations*, p. 574. Hood in his *Advance and Retreat* places the number still higher.

11th Sherman moved his army to pass through Snake Creek Gap, having decided to join McPherson. Having been informed of this, Johnston, on the night of the 12th, abandoned his

while the Confederate loss was not more than half that number.*

McPherson meanwhile had moved from Gordon's Springs toward Resaca. On the night of May 8 his advance bivouaced in the gap and the next morning defeated a brigade of Confederate cavalry posted at the eastern end of it. McPherson advanced to within a mile of Resaca on the Oostanaula but found the Confederate position too strong to be forced and, fearing an attack upon his own left flank, withdrew, taking up a strong position near the east end of Snake Creek Gap. By this time Sherman had resolved to transfer the major portion of his army from Dalton to Resaca. Howard's 4th corps and a small force of cavalry were to demonstrate on Buzzard's Roost Gap and occupy Confederate attention north of Dalton. On the 10th Hooker's 20th corps moved through Snake Creek Gap and joined McPherson. Palmer's 14th corps and Schofield's 23d corps soon followed and on the 12th the whole army, save Howard's corps and the cavalry attached to it, had passed through the gap. On the morning of the 13th McPherson began the forward movement. Thomas with the corps of Palmer and Hooker was to move on McPherson's left and




position to face Sherman at Resaca and the following morning General Howard occupied Dalton. The Union loss around Dalton from May 7 to 12 was about 830 killed and wounded,

* *Official Records*, vol. xxxviii.; Cox, *Atlanta*, pp. 29-41; Sherman, *Memoirs*, vol. ii.; Johnston's *Narrative*; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. iv., p. 252; Van Horne, *History of the Army of the Cumberland*; *Confederate Military History*, vol. vi., pp. 297-298, 302-304.

Schofield on Thomas' left, the whole preceded by Kilpatrick's cavalry. Kilpatrick drove the Confederate cavalry to within two miles of Resaca and then wheeled out of the road to allow McPherson to pass, who, encountering the Confederate pickets near Resaca, drove them in and occupied a range of bald hills, his right on the Oostanaula, about two miles below the railroad bridge, and his left


covering the railroad bridge and a trestle bridge. Polk's left rested on the Oostanaula, and Hood's corps, on Hardee's right, extended across the railroad to the Connesauga facing to the northeast. On the right was Wheeler's cavalry, and on the left Jackson's cavalry guarded the Oostanaula from Resaca to Rome. During the afternoon of the 14th McPherson carried a bridge at Camp



abreast of the town. Thomas came up on McPherson's left and faced Camp Creek. Schofield worked his way through dense woods and joined Thomas' left, but it was noon of the 14th before these movements were completed at which time Howard's 4th corps, following Johnston from Dalton, had reached a position about a mile north of Schofield's left.

Meanwhile, as we have seen, Johnston had abandoned Dalton and, during the 13th, formed his army covering Resaca, the corps of Polk and Hardee west of the place facing west and

Creek, and, crossing it, secured a commanding position very close to Polk's main line and there intrenched. The Confederates attempted to retake the position but their assaults were repulsed. Farther to the left, Palmer's 14th and Schofield's 23d corps became severely engaged with Hardee at Camp Creek. One part of Schofield's corps was defeated with severe loss but another part succeeded in making a lodgment beyond the creek. Two divisions of Howard's corps were then dispatched to Schofield's support, leaving Stanley's division in



From the original Brady negatives.

1. VIEW OF THE RESACA BATTLEFIELD FROM THE DALTON ROAD.
2. ANOTHER VIEW OF THE RESACA BATTLEFIELD.
3. BATTLEFIELD OF NEW HOPE CHURCH.
4. UNION INTRENCHMENTS AT THE FOOT OF KENESAW MOUNTAIN.

echelon to the left, and Hooker's corps was sent there also. Nothing the exposed position of the Union left Johnston ordered Hood, with the divisions of Stewart and Stevenson, to attack and turn it. Late in the afternoon Hood assailed Stanley and was gradually driving him back when the advance of Hooker's corps, Williams' division, came up, repulsed Hood and drove him back to his intrenchments. Shortly after noon of the 15th Hooker came up with the corps of Butterfield and Geary on the right and centre and Williams on the left. Almost simultaneously Hood with the divisions of Stevenson and Stewart, supported by three brigades from the corps of Polk and Hardee, advanced against the Union troops. Before Stevenson had gone far from his works his left was struck by Butterfield and Geary and, after a severe fight, he was driven back to his works leaving a 4-gun battery behind. On Hood's right Stewart's division swung to the left, drove Williams' skirmishers from the railroad, and, crossing, assaulted Williams' main line, but was bloodily repulsed. Hooker's loss was over 1,600. On the 14th Sherman had ordered a pontoon bridge to be thrown across the Oostanaula at Lay's Ferry toward Calhoun, and Sweeny's division with the 16th corps was sent to threaten Calhoun. Sweeny crossed with one brigade and drove some Confederate cavalry from the opposite bank, but learning that the Confederates were crossing above him he retired his

entire division half a mile to a less exposed position. On the morning of the 15th he moved back to the river and crossed it, laid a pontoon bridge and constructed works, where he was ineffectually attacked by Walker's Confederate division. On learning that part of Sherman's army was east of the Oostanaula, Johnston felt that further delay would be fatal and therefore, on the night of the 15th, abandoned Resaca, and, burning his bridges behind him, marched for Calhoun. On the morning of the 16th Sherman occupied Resaca and immediately started in pursuit. The Union loss at Resaca was about 600 killed and 2,146 wounded, while the Confederate loss was about 300 killed, 1,500 wounded and 1,000 missing.*

On May 16, 1864, after the fall of Resaca, General J. C. Davis' infantry division was ordered down the west bank of the Oostanaula to support Garrard, and the latter was further directed to leave his artillery at Farmer's bridge, eight miles above Rome, in charge of Davis, who was to rejoin his corps at Kingston, while Garrard made a rapid movement on Johnston's flank. Davis made a march of 15 miles on the 16th, and bivouaced a few miles from Farmer's Bridge. Meanwhile Garrard had, on the 15th,

* *Official Records*, vol. xxxviii.; Johnston, *Narrative of Military Operations*; Sherman, *Memoirs*, vol. ii.; Cox, *Atlanta*, pp. 42-48; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. iv., p. 262 *et seq.*; Van Horne, *History of the Army of the Cumberland*; *Confederate Military History*, vol. vi., pp. 304-306; vol. viii., pp. 126-128.

driven the Confederate cavalry from Farmer's Bridge, and pursued to within sight of Rome, but the force concentrated there proving too large to engage, he returned to Farmer's Bridge on his way to Lay's Ferry, where he met Davis on the evening of the 16th. Davis determined to go on to Rome, but when he arrived there on the 17th found it held by two Confederate brigades. At 5 P. M. the Confederates advanced and drove in his skirmishers. Davis then brought up his entire division, deploying two brigades and holding one in reserve. A severe contest ensued, which lasted until dark, when the Confederates withdrew to their works and Davis threw up intrenchments. On the morning of the 18th he ordered an advance, and found the works in his front abandoned. He then occupied Rome, capturing ten guns, valuable iron works and machine-shops, and a large amount of public stores. His loss was about 150 killed, wounded, and missing; the Confederate loss, about 100 killed and wounded.*

Johnston retreated by way of Calhoun and Adairsville to Cassville where he prepared to make a stand. Sherman closed in on him to force a battle, but Johnston abandoned Cassville during the night of the 19th and the next day crossed to the south side of the Etowah. Sherman occupied Cassville and Kingston and prepared for another advance against Johnston,


who held the line of the railroad at Alatoona Pass and other points this side of Marietta.* Sherman concluded to turn these positions by moving from Kingston to Marietta by way of Dallas, a small town about 25 miles south of Kingston and 20 miles west of Marietta. The advance began on the 23d but the Confederate cavalry discovered it, whereupon Johnston prepared to check the movement by marching to Dallas and covering points leading to it. On the 25th when Hooker's 20th corps approached Dallas, it discovered that Hood's Confederate corps held the crossroads at New Hope Church, 4 miles northeast of Dallas. Hooker attacked Hood late in the afternoon but was repulsed with a loss of 1,346 killed and wounded and 60 missing, while Hood lost less than 400. During the night and early the next day the rest of the army moved up on Hooker's right and left and intrenched, McPherson's two corps on the right holding Dallas. Sherman gradually extended to the left, skirmishing heavily all along the line, and, on the evening of the 27th, T. J. Wood's division of the 4th corps attacked the Confederate right near Pickett's Mill but was driven back with a loss of 1,224 killed and 318 missing, while the Confederates reported a loss of only 85 killed and 363 wounded. This engagement took place a little over two miles northeast of New Hope Church.

* *Official Records*, vol. xxxviii.; Van Horne, *History of the Army of the Cumberland*, vol. i.

* On these movements see Cox, *Atlanta*, p. 49 *et seq.*

There was no cessation of the heavy skirmishing, and Sherman, still deploying to the left, ordered McPherson, who was intrenched at Dallas, to close in on Hooker at New Hope Church so as to enable Hooker to extend to the left. Hooker deferred the movement until the next day, the 28th, and then, on turning from his intrenchments, was attacked by Hardee. The Confederates made a desperate

Confederate commander had abandoned all his works and fallen back to Kenesaw Mountain. Thereupon Sherman moved to the railroad at Ackworth and Big Shanty, and the first stage of the Atlanta campaign was ended. During this time, May 6 to 31, the Union loss had been 9,299 killed, wounded and missing, while the Confederate loss was 5,807 killed and wounded.*



effort to seize his works but were defeated with a loss of about 390 killed and wounded, while McPherson lost 325 killed and wounded and 54 missing. Sherman continued his movement to the left; McPherson withdrew from Dallas on June 1 and pushed up on Hooker at New Hope Church toward which point Hooker moved. Allatoona was seized, as was also the railroad back to the Etowah, and on June 4 Sherman was preparing to attack Johnston at New Hope Church; but he found that the

After his withdrawal from Dallas on June 4 Johnston took up position covering Marietta, his left on Lost Mountain, his right beyond the railroad and behind Noonday Creek with a strong advanced position on Pine Mountain. This latter mountain was an isolated hill rising 300 feet above the surrounding country and forming a salient near the centre of the Confederate line. On Johnston's retreat Sherman repaired the railroads destroyed by the Confederates, brought up supplies, established a secondary fortified base at Allatoona Pass, and, on the 10th, on being joined by Blair with two divisions of the 17th corps, moved his whole line forward, thus confronting Johnston in his new position. By the 14th General Thomas, with a part of his line, had worked his way close to Pine Mountain. During the day General Johnston with

**Official Records*, vol. xxxviii.; Johnston, *Narrative*; Sherman, *Memoirs*; Van Horne, *History of the Army of the Cumberland*, vol. ii.; Cox, *Atlanta*, chaps. vii.-viii.; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. iv., p. 268 *et seq.*; Rhodes, *United States*, vol. iv., p. 450 *et seq.*; *Confederate Military History*, vol. vi. pp. 309-311, vol. viii., pp. 129-130.

Generals Hardee and Polk were on the mountain observing the Union movements when some of 'Thomas' cavalry opened on the group, killing General Polk. On the night of the 14th Johnston abandoned Pine Mountain, placing Bate's division, which had occupied it, in reserve, and on the morning of the 15th it was occupied by Howard's 4th corps. Johnston still held the intrenchments connecting his principal line with Pine Mountain and other detached works and at noon the corps of Howard and Hooker attacked these intrenchments, Howard on the left of the mountain and Hooker on the right. After a short engagement the Confederates were driven to their main works, whereupon Hooker (Geary's division, supported by Williams', on the left, and Butterfield's on the right) pushed against the main line. The Union assault was repulsed, however, with a loss of 639 killed and wounded, while the Confederates suffered but slightly. The skirmishing continued until the 18th when Johnston fell back to a new line, Hood's corps with its right on the Marietta and Canton road, Loring's (formerly Polk's) on Kenesaw Mountain, and Hardee's corps on the left, extending across the Lost Mountain and Marietta road.*

Sherman pressed in closely on the Confederate centre and left, north of

Marietta, still continuing the extension of his line to the right, south of it. The Confederates made a corresponding move to the left and, on the night of the 21st, Hood's corps of two divisions (Hindman's and Stevenson's) moved from the right near the railroad north of Marietta to the Marietta and Powder Springs road near Zion Church, about four miles southwest of Marietta and a mile east of Kolb's (or Culp's) Farm. On the morning of the 22d Hascall's division of Schofield's corps had advanced on the road from Powder Springs Church to Marietta with orders to take position on Hooker's right near Kolb's house. Hooker, in going to the right and forward, reached to the Marietta road at Kolb's and made connection with Hascall's division. Hooker's right was held by Williams' division; at Williams' left was Geary's division; and further to the left, on the line of Howard's 4th corps, was Butterfield's division. Williams and Hascall experienced much sharp skirmishing when getting into position, and from some of the prisoners taken from Hood's corps it was learned that Hood, supported by Hardee, was about to attack; whereupon Williams and Hascall were ordered to deploy their divisions and throw up breastworks, Hascall in heavy woods and Williams on open commanding ground that offered excellent opportunity for artillery action. This movement had not been completed when, at 5 o'clock in the afternoon, Hood made the


* *Official Records*, vol. xxxviii.; Sherman, *Memoirs*, vol. ii.; Cox, *Atlanta*, p. 89 et seq.; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. iv. *passim*; W. M. Polk, *Leonidas Polk, Bishop and General* (1893); *Confederate Military History*, vol. vi., pp. 315-316.

attack. The Confederate right advanced amid a terrific fire of shell, case-shot and canister that tore great gaps in the line and partially broke up its formation, but the Confederates pressed on and, coming under still closer canister fire and deadly volleys of musketry, were repulsed after a desperate struggle of less than an hour. Hood's loss was 1,012 killed and wounded and about 100 missing, while the Union loss was about 200.*

On June 13 Sherman wrote that he would study Johnston's position on Kenesaw and Lost Mountains and adopt some plan of dislodging him or drawing him out of his position, but he afterwards seems to have changed his mind and to have come to the conclusion that he had no alternative but to make an assault. Accordingly he resolved to attack the left centre of Johnson's position and orders were given on the 24th that, on the 27th, McPherson should assault near Little Kenesaw and Thomas about a mile farther south.†

Kenesaw Mountain was strongly entrenched and was held by Loring's corps on the right opposite McPherson, and Hardee's corps on the left opposite Thomas. The assault was made at about 9 o'clock on the morning of the 27th, and all along the lines for ten miles a furious fire of artillery and musketry was kept up. A part

of Logan's 15th corps fought its way up the slope of Little Kenesaw, carried the Confederate outposts and tried to go farther but was checked by the rough nature of the ground and the fire of artillery and musketry delivered at short range



from behind breastworks. After sustaining a loss of 600 men Logan withdrew his troops to the captured outposts. About a mile to the right Newton's and Davis' divisions of Thomas' corps charged up the face of the mountain, drove in the Confederate skirmish line, and reached the main works, but were unable to carry them; therefore, after heroic effort

* *Official Records*, vol. xxxviii.; Johnston's *Narrative*; Cox, *Atlanta*, pp. 108-115; *Confederate Military History*, vol. vi., pp. 316-317.

† *Official Records*, vol. xxxviii., pt. iv., pp. 582, 588.

and the loss of 1,580 killed, wounded and missing, including Generals C. G. Harker and Daniel McCook, he fell back and intrenched 75 yards from the enemy's works. The assault was over in two hours and a half and was a complete failure, being one of the most serious reverses sustained by Sherman in the campaign. His loss was nearly 2,500 while the Confederates lost only 808 killed and wounded.*

After the battle of Kenesaw Mountain flanking operations were renewed to the right to reach the railroad, and Johnston, finding it in danger and his communications with Atlanta threatened, abandoned Marietta on the night of July 2, after having been under an uninterrupted cannonade and infantry fire for 26 days, and intrenched a few miles south of Marietta with an advanced position at Smyrna Camp Ground. Sherman occupied Marietta on the morning of July 3 and immediately pushed forward, hoping to catch Johnston before he could get his army across the river, and was much surprised when the head of Thomas' column struck the strong Confederate earthworks at Smyrna Camp Ground. The army was then deployed and there was much heavy skirmishing. On July 4 General Dodge moved with the 16th corps out on the Ruff Station road, and devel-

oped a Confederate position of two intrenched lines strongly held, and in turn immediately intrenched. At 4 p. m. three regiments of Veatch's division under Colonel E. F. Noyes and three regiments of Sweeny's division made a charge and captured Johnston's first line of works and more than 100 prisoners, the loss to themselves being 140 killed and wounded. During the night Johnston abandoned his advanced position and withdrew to the intrenched line covering the railroad bridge. Sherman, closing up against him, was met by a heavy and severe fire, but then threw forward both flanks and by the morning of July 6 held possession of the river above for 18 miles as far as Roswell, and 10 miles below as far as the mouth of the Sweet River. On the 9th Sherman secured three good crossings on the Chattahoochee River and sent over a part of his army, whereupon Johnston, on the night of the 9th, crossed to the south side, burned the railroad bridge and the pontoon and trestle bridges, and took position in the outer defences of Atlanta.*


Sherman spent the next few days in strengthening his positions, increasing the number and capacity of his bridges, rearranging the garrisons in his rear and bringing forward supplies. On the night of the 17th he ordered a general advance on Atlanta and by night the entire army formed

* *Official Records*, vol. xxxviii.; Sherman, *Memoirs*, vol. ii.; Cox, *Atlanta*, chap. x.; Van Horne, *History of the Army of the Cumberland*, vol. ii.; Johnston, *Narrative; Battles and Leaders*, vol. iv., p. 270 et seq.; *Confederate Military History*, vol. vi., pp. 317-321; vol. viii., pp. 131-133.

* *Official Records*, vol. xxxviii.; Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. ix., pp. 26-27; Cox, *Atlanta*, pp. 130-143.

a general line along the old Peach Tree road. Being apprised of Sherman's advance, Johnston took up his position for defence on Peach Tree Creek, a little rivulet north and east of Atlanta which flows into the Chattahoochee near the railroad bridge. While planning his defensive campaign he was removed from command by Davis because "you have failed to arrest the advance of the enemy to the vicinity of Atlanta, far in the interior of Georgia, and express no confidence that you can defeat or repel him."* Johnston was succeeded by John B. Hood and the change seemed to indicate that the Confederates meant to fight.† In truth Johnston's removal implied that the Confederates must assume the offensive and Hood lost no time in carrying out Davis' design.‡ The Confederate army was strongly posted about four miles in front of Atlanta on the south bank of Peach Tree Creek, holding the line of that stream and the Chattahoochee for some distance below the mouth of the creek. On the 18th and 19th Sherman's army, with the Army of the Cumberland under Thomas on the right as a pivot, swung

to the right and, all advancing, closed in on Atlanta. General Schofield's Army of the Ohio occupied Decatur and then moved toward Atlanta, while the Army of the Tennessee under McPherson, after destroying several miles of the Augusta Railroad east of Decatur, invested that place. After some sharp skirmishing Thomas threw his heads of column across Peach Tree Creek but left a gap of two miles between him and Schofield,



this being partially closed on the 20th by two divisions of the 4th corps, while Newton's division of the same corps was left on the Buckhead road to the left of Hooker's 20th corps. On the 19th, learning that Thomas was crossing Peach Tree Creek, Hood resolved to crush him before he could intrench and then to attack Schofield and McPherson. With this end in view Hood formed his line in three corps, Cheatham's on the right, Hardee's in the centre, and Stewart's

* Johnston, *Narrative*, p. 249. See also B. T. Johnson, *Memoir of Joseph E. Johnston* (1891); R. M. Hughes, *General Johnston* (1893).

† Sherman, *Memoirs*, vol. ii., p. 72.

‡ Pollard (*Last Year of the War*, p. 86) says: "Johnston was removed and Lieutenant-General Hood put in command of the army, President Davis declaring that if the people wanted 'a fighting general' they should have such in this man who was brave, headstrong, incompetent; who had the heart of a lion but, unfortunately, with it a head of wood."


on the left. Cheatham was to hold his left on the creek to separate Thomas from Schofield and face Schofield and McPherson, while Hardee and Stewart, moving by division in *echelon* from the right went against the flank and front of Thomas to drive him back to the creek and then down it toward the Chattahoochee into the narrow space formed by the river and the creek into a sort of pocket.

At 4 o'clock in the afternoon of the 20th the order was given to advance. Bate's division on Hardee's right, passing by Newton's left, found no enemy in its immediate front and failed in an effort to reach Newton's flank. Walker's division in Hardee's centre struck Newton's command and bent back both flanks, but after a severe struggle was driven back with great loss. Hardee was about to renew the attack on Newton with the divisions of Maney and Cleburne, when Cleburne was withdrawn to go to the extreme right and Hardee abandoned any further aggressive attempt. On Hardee's left Stewart furiously assailed Hooker's troops who had not yet taken position. Geary's division had crossed the creek more than half a mile above Howell's Mill and was on high timbered ground with its right thrown forward, and the 33d New Jersey lay on a bare hill some distance in advance. Williams' division was moving up to connect with Geary on the left and Palmer's division of the 14th corps on the right. Ward's division

was near Collier's Mill on Geary's left and rear near the banks of the creek, to the right and rear of Newton's division, from which position its brigade commanders led their men against the flank of Walker's division engaging Newton. Stewart moving by division in *echelon* first struck the 33d New Jersey, drove it back, and, after taking many prisoners, hit Geary, Ward and Williams in quick succession, making a series of determined assaults. These continued until night, but finally Stewart was repulsed and compelled to withdraw to his works with a loss of about 2,000 men. In this battle the Union troops engaged numbered about 20,000 and the Confederates about 19,000. The Union loss was about 1,600 killed and wounded and the Confederate loss about 2,500 killed and wounded.*

On the 21st Sherman advanced strong skirmish lines to within about two miles of the works surrounding Atlanta. In the morning Leggett's division was ordered to carry a high bare hill about half a mile south of the Decatur Railroad. Supported on the right by the division of Giles A. Smith, Leggett advanced under cover of the hill itself, drove the Confederates under Cleburne from it and began to intrench. At daybreak of the

* *Official Records*, vol. xxxviii.; *Sherman, Memoirs*, vol. ii.; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. iv., p. 312 *et seq.*; Van Horne, *History of the Army of the Cumberland*, vol. ii.; Johnston, *Narrative of Military Operations*; Cox, *Atlanta*, p. 144 *et seq.*; *Confederate Military History*, vol. vi., p. 321 *et seq.*



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1. THE CHEVAUX-DE-FRISE ON MARIETTA STREET, ATLANTA. 2. PART OF THE CONFEDERATE FORTIFICATIONS ON THE WEST SIDE OF ATLANTA, LOOKING SOUTH. 3. VIEW FROM THE CONFEDERATE FORTIFICATIONS AT ATLANTA. BEYOND THE TREES IS THE SCENE OF THE BATTLE OF JULY 22, 1864, KNOWN AS THE BATTLE OF ATLANTA, IN WHICH GENERAL J. B. McPHERSON LOST HIS LIFE. 4. CONFEDERATE FORTIFICATIONS AT THE END OF PEACH TREE STREET, ATLANTA, TO THE NORTH OF THE CITY, JUST AFTER SHERMAN HAD TAKEN POSSESSION. THE CANNON BELONGED TO THE UNION ARMY AND THE MUD ON THE WHEELS SHOWS THE KIND OF ROADS OVER WHICH SHERMAN HAD TO DRAG THEM.


22d it was discovered that the foremost Confederate works had been abandoned. Sherman first thought that the Confederate general meant to give up Atlanta without a further contest but he was soon undeceived. He ordered a general advance along his line to occupy the city, and the movement began accordingly. During the night, however, Hood had resolved to withdraw his army to the inner fortifications about Atlanta and to detach Hardee's corps of four divisions to march by the right flank, pass Sherman's left, and attack his left and rear. Giles A. Smith's division of Blair's 17th corps held Sherman's left and Dodge's 16th corps was some distance on the rear of the centre of Blair's corps and at right angles to it, Blair fronting west and Dodge south. At midnight Hardee moved out of Atlanta by the McDonough road and about daybreak, having passed Sherman's left, halted, formed line, and gave his men needed rest. In half an hour the order was given to advance and the corps went forward until the divisions of Bate and Walther struck the two Union divisions of Dodge by which they were held in check, but all efforts to progress were repulsed with great loss; among the killed being General Walther. At the moment the attack was made Sherman and McPherson were engaged in conversation. Sherman gave the necessary orders to meet the emergency, and McPherson, after sending troops to fill an interval between Dodge and

Blair, rode to Dodge and then toward Blair's line. He rode through a woodland path and came upon a squad of Confederate skirmishers, and, refusing to surrender, attempted to gallop away but was shot dead. He was succeeded by John A. Logan. Meanwhile the left of Hardee's line had attacked Smith's division in front, flank and rear. Smith gradually yielded ground but refused to connect his left with



Dodge's right and the Confederates were thereby able to advance to the foot of Leggett's Hill. While Hardee's assault on Sherman's left was in progress, Cheatham's corps assailed in front, the onslaught falling upon Leggett's Hill and the 15th corps on the right of it just as Leggett had repulsed an attack in his rear. Leggett held his ground in spite of repeated Confederate onsets until nightfall, when Hardee withdrew his right wing, leaving his left connected

with the intrenched line in front of Atlanta. On the right of Logan's corps of the Army of the Ohio was assailed by Smith's Georgia militia, but they were easily driven back. On Hardee's right Joseph Wheeler's cavalry attacked J. W. Sprague's brigade at Decatur and for a time pressed it vigorously, but when Reilly's brigade of the Army of the Ohio arrived on the field Wheeler fell back. In the battle of Leggett's or Bald Hill the Union loss was about



4,000 and the Confederate loss between 5,000 and 6,000.*

After this battle the Army of the Tennessee was transferred from the extreme left of the investing line to the right near Ezra Church, and Hood prepared to check its further extension. On the night of July 27 he marched with the greater part of his

command out of Atlanta and on the 28th ordered the division of General J. C. Brown to attack Logan's corps then advancing on the right and force it back beyond Ezra Church. Brown drove in Logan's skirmishers and carried some points of Logan's line, but his two attempts to dislodge Logan were frustrated with great slaughter, his loss numbering 694 killed and wounded and 113 missing. During Brown's attack four regiments from the corps of Dodge and Blair extended Logan's right and took part in the action. Clayton's division assaulted on Brown's right but not until after Brown's first repulse, and by a misunderstanding his three brigades made isolated attacks on Harrow's division, all of which were repelled with great loss. Walthall had led out his division while Brown and Clayton were engaged and at 2 P. M., after they had been withdrawn, he was ordered to move over the ground of Brown's fight, where he made several attempts to drive back the Union troops, but failed. Accordingly, after more than an hour's severe fighting, he retreated with a loss of about 1,100 men, and at night Hood withdrew his troops to the works around Atlanta. In this battle the Union forces numbered about 13,000 men and the Confederates about 18,000. The Union loss was 559 killed and wounded and 73 missing, and the Confederate loss about 2,800 killed, wounded and missing, the estimates of Sherman, Howard and Logan

* *Official Records*, vol. xxxviii.; Sherman, *Memoirs*; Cox, *Atlanta*, pp. 163-176; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. iv.; Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. ix., pp. 270-274; Grenville M. Dodge, *The Battle of Atlanta*; *Confederate Military History*, vol. vi., pp. 323-334; vol. viii., pp. 137-138.

that the Confederate loss was from 5,000 to 7,000 being excessive.*

While Sherman was operating against Atlanta he decided to strike a blow at the Macon Railroad. General George Stoneman with 5,000 cavalry was to move by the left around Atlanta to McDonough and General E. M. McCook with 3,500 men by the right of Fayetteville, the two to join on July 28 at Lovejoy's Station on the Macon Railroad. On the morning of the 27th both columns started. McCook with 3,200 men and 8 guns marched down the Chattahoochee, moved on Palmetto Station on the West Point Railroad, tore up two miles of track, and went on to Fayetteville where he captured about 250 prisoners, 500 wagons, which he burned, and 800 mules (the greater part of which he killed) and then pushed on to Lovejoy's Station. He was to meet Stoneman there but heard nothing from him and continued his raid. He had several hard encounters and was forced to release his prisoners, abandon his artillery and trains and cut his way out, but succeeded in reaching the Chattahoochee with parts of his command, and then marched to Marietta with a total loss of about 600 men.

Before starting out Stoneman had received Sherman's permission, after completing his work at Lovejoy's, to


proceed to Macon and Andersonville and release the thousands of prisoners at these places. He began his march on the morning of the 27th, left Garrard's division at Flat Rock, and, with the brigades of Adams, Biddle and Capron, in all about 2,200 men, crossed the Ocmulgee River near Covington, destroyed a large amount of rolling stock at Gordon and Griswoldville, reunited his detachments near Macon, shelled the place, and then moved back toward Clinton. Meanwhile General Iverson's Confederate cavalry division had been ordered by Wheeler to follow Stoneman and now came upon him. Allen's Confederate cavalry brigade had passed around his flank and had taken a strong position directly across his line of retreat, while Armstrong's brigade was closely menacing his left flank. Believing himself opposed by an immensely superior force Stoneman authorized his brigade commanders to cut their way out while he, with a regiment and a section of artillery, held the enemy in check; but when the others had escaped Stoneman surrendered with about 500 men. The greater part of Adams' brigade escaped and joined the army near Atlanta. Capron's brigade escaped but was subsequently surprised and scattered and very few reached the Union lines.*

* *Official Records*, vol. xxxviii.; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. iv., pp. 254, 319, 335, 341; Cox, *Atlanta*, chap. xiv.; Sherman, *Memoirs*, vol. ii.; *Confederate Military History*, vol. vi., pp. 336-339; vol. vii., pp. 215-216.

* *Official Records*, vol. xxxviii.; Sherman, *Memoirs*, vol. ii.; Van Horne, *History of the Army of the Cumberland*, vol. ii.; Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*, vol. ix., pp. 278-283.

After the battle of Ezra Church General Sherman, unable fully to invest Atlanta, drew the 14th corps and Schofield's Army of the Ohio from the left and extended his lines on the right nearly to East Point, about six miles below Atlanta. To create a diversion Hood on August 10 sent Wheeler with 5,000 cavalry to operate upon Sherman's line of communication with

on the night of the 18th against the West Point and Macon roads and completely destroy them. Kilpatrick crossed the West Point road at Fairburn and struck the Macon road a short distance north of Jonesboro where he encountered Ross' brigade of cavalry and drove it through Jonesboro. Kilpatrick then began the destruction of the railroad but had made




Nashville. Wheeler destroyed the railroad near Marietta, Calhoun, Adairsville and Dalton, captured over 1,000 head of beef, and, after demonstrating on Dalton and Resaca, was driven into east Tennessee. On August 16 Sherman had issued an order for a general advance upon the West Point and Macon Railroads but Wheeler's raid caused him to suspend this order and, instead, he directed Kilpatrick with 5,000 cavalry to move

little progress in his task when Jackson's brigades of cavalry and infantry came up from the south and compelled him to retreat. Thereupon Kilpatrick made a circuit, struck the railroad at Lovejoy's, and there encountered another Confederate force through which he cut his way and reached Decatur, near Atlanta, on the 22d. Kilpatrick's work of destruction did not satisfy Sherman, however, and he renewed his order for the

movement of the whole army. On the night of August 25 the siege of Atlanta was raised. Stanley's 4th corps drew up from the left and moved to the right, closing up with the 14th near Utoy, while the 20th corps fell back to an intrenched position covering the Chattahoochee bridge and the army hospitals. On the night of the 26th Howard's Army of the Tennessee made a wide circuit and took position on the right of Thomas' Army of the Cumberland along Utoy Creek, facing south, the Army of the Ohio remaining in position on the extreme left. On August 28, making a general left wheel pivoting on Schofield's army, both Thomas and Howard reached the West Point road extending from that location to Red Oak and Fairburn, Schofield closing on upon Thomas' left only a short distance from the Confederate works covering the junction of the road at that point. The next day nearly 13 miles of the railroad was destroyed, and on the 30th the entire army moved forward for the Macon road. Schofield approached it near Rough and Ready on the left and presented a bold front toward East Point; Thomas in the centre reached Couch's on the Fayetteville and Decatur road after experiencing but little opposition; and Howard on the right, after a sharp engagement with the Confederate cavalry, saved the bridge over Flint River and sending over part of his command halted at night within half a mile of Jonesboro.*

Finding himself in front of a large force, Schofield, on the morning of August 31, disposed the Army of the Tennessee for battle; with Logan's 15th corps on the left, Ransom's 16th corps on the right and Blair's 17th corps in the rear of Logan's left.

When Sherman began his movement on the night of the 25th Stephen D. Lee's corps of Hood's army covered the railroad from near Atlanta to a place nearly a mile south of East



Point. Hardee's corps was on Lee's left, while Hood held Atlanta with Stewart's corps and the Georgia militia. On the 30th Hood ordered Hardee, with his own corps and Lee's, to move rapidly to Jonesboro and crush Howard on the morning of the 31st. At noon of that day both Hardee and Lee were in Howard's front, and at 3 o'clock in the afternoon the assault was made. For two hours the fighting was severe, but finally Hardee was repulsed with a loss of about 1,700 men

* Cox, *Atlanta*, p. 188 et seq.

while the Union loss was only 179 killed and wounded. That evening Hood ordered Lee's corps to march back and take position at Rough and Ready.* Sherman immediately sent Thomas and Schofield to Howard's assistance and dispatched Kilpatrick down the western bank of the Flint to strike the road south of Jonesboro. At noon of September 1 Davis' 14th corps joined Howard's left, relieving Blair who was deputed to support Kilpatrick. By this time Lee's corps had gone but Hardee was still in position and intrenched, covering Jonesboro on the north. At 4 P. M. Davis charged the Confederate works and carried parts of them, capturing General Govan with the greater part of his brigade and two 4-gun batteries. Stanley and Schofield reached the field too late to take part in the engagement. During the night Hardee retreated to Lovejoy's Station, whereupon Sherman started after him in hot pursuit. The Union loss on September 1 was 223 killed, 946 wounded and 105 missing. The Confederate loss is not fully known but it must have been nearly the same. The result of this battle was the fall of Atlanta. Before Hood learned how Hardee's attack on August 31 had turned out

he ordered Lee to return in the direction of Atlanta to make a movement on Sherman's flank or to cover the evacuation of the city. Lee received the order at midnight and was halted next morning about six miles from Atlanta. Meanwhile Hood had learned of Hardee's failure and ordered Lee to join Hardee, which he did on September 2. At 5 o'clock on the afternoon of the 1st Hood marched out of Atlanta with Stewart's corps on the McDonough road; the Georgia militia was sent to Covington and at night the rear guard blew up some abandoned ammunition trains. On the morning of the 2d Slocum's 20th corps entered the city, and on the 4th Sherman, turning his back on the Confederates at Lovejoy's, marched his army to East Point and Atlanta. During the entire campaign from May to September the Union losses were 4,423 killed, 22,822 wounded and 4,442 missing, an aggregate of 31,687. The Confederate losses were 3,044 killed, 18,952 wounded and 12,983 prisoners, a total of 34,979.*

* Hood, *Advance and Retreat*, p. 205.

* *Official Records*, vol. xxxviii.; *Battles and Leaders*, vol. iv., pp. 247-344; Bowman, *Sherman and his Campaigns*; Sherman, *Memoirs*, vol. ii.; Van Horne, *History of the Army of the Cumberland*, vol. ii.; Cox, *Atlanta*, p. 207 et seq.; *Confederate Military History*, vol. v., pp. 333-340; vol. vi., pp. 345-349; vol. viii., pp. 140-142. See also the biographies of the generals engaged.

